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18 Cards in this Set

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  • Back
What's the point of the reproductive skew theory?
it attempts to explain the reproductive partitioning within animal societies according to the ECOLOGICAL SOCIAL and GENETIC attributes
What is a high skew society? low skew?
High- one or a few breeders strongly dominate the reproduction

Low- reproduction is shared more equitably
What are transactional models of skew? Give an organismal example.
the dominant breeders of the society "pay" subordinates (by yielding reproduction) to stay in the group and cooperate peacefully. ex. Paper wasps
What are the 2 kinds of reproductive incentives that dominants can provide to subordinates?
1) staying incentive--a fraction of the reproduction just sufficient to guarantee that the subordinate stays and helps the dominant vs. leaves to breed solitarily

2) peace incentive--a fraction of the reproduction just sufficient to guarantee that the subordinate cooperates peacefully instead of fighting to the death for complete control of the group's resources.
Define all 4 variables in the staying incentive model where the dominant is alpha and subordinate is beta:
sol, lone, group, r, p
sol = subordinate's expected reproductive success if it breeds solitarily
lone = the dominant's reproductive success if the subordinate does not join it
group = the dyad's total reproductive output if the subordinate joins
r = relatedness b/w the 2
p = minimum fraction of group's total reproduction
Under what condition will the subordinate require no staying incentive (it will stay even if it gets 0 offspring)?
if sol < or = r(group-lone) b/c then the numerator of Ps will be less than or equal to 0
As the relatedness between subordinate and dominant increases, the staying incentive ____________.
Declines (thus, skew increases)
Staying incentive will _______ as the group output (group) increases, the lone dominant's output (lone) decreases, and as a solitary subordinate's output (sol) decreases
decrease (skew increases)
This is all in the subordinate's point of view but when will the dominant yield the required staying incentive?
if sol + lone < group
What will happen if this inequality is satisfied?
the dominant will yield the minimal staying incentive to the subordinate. NOT GROUP SELECTION...acted on individual genetic interests
What's an organism that practices staying incentive?
paper wasps
the subordinate gets a bigger staying incentive as:
S increases, G decreases, L increases, r decreases
How would you get complete skew (in dominant's point of view)?
if s < r (s-l)
the group dissolves if
s > g-l
In pure tug of war outcomes, what part does relatedness play on skew?
hardly at all (dominant just doesnt push as hard but neither does subordinate)
skew increases as...
G increases and r increases
In the tug of war model (aka allopine bees), what's the relationship b/w group output and r
group output significantly increases as r increases and decreases with increasing subordinate abilities
which model is more prevelant among humans (tug of war or transactional?)