Ir: Liberalism

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Liberalism – Sorensen What is the liberal traidtion?

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• The liberal tradition, and how this applies to IR. A basic belief in the goodness of human nature. Acknowledgement that states pursue their own interest, but also, that states share interest and can thus engage in collaborative and cooperative social action. Modernisation increases the need for and scope of cooperation.

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(Sorenson) utopian liberalism after WWII

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• Utopian Liberalism after WWII. Wilson’s attempts to change the jungle of international relations, into a well ordered zoo. The creation of the league of nations; its failure spurred liberalist critique (eg Carr and the Twenty Years Crisis)

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(Sorenson) 4 creeds of liberalism

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• Sorenson divides liberalist thought into 4 creeds: sociological, institutional, interdependence, and republican liberalism. All four are interrelated.

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(Sorenson) Sociological liberalism

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• Sociological Liberalism. Transationalism against Statism: the processes whereby international relations are conducted now increasingly take place between groups, people and organisations. The creation of ties that goes beyond the state – to – state relations. How does this help liberal ideas? ‘Rosenau argues that individual transactions have important implications and consequences for global affairs. The state – centric anarchic world has not disappeared, but a new multi centric world has emerged that is composed of sovereignty free collectivities which exist apart and in competition with sovereign based actors. Rosenau supports the idea that an increasingly pluralist world will be more peaceful. Keohane moved from this model to one below.

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(Sorenson) Interdependence Liberalism

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• Interdependence Liberalism. The high division of labour in the international economy increases interdependence between states, and that discourages and reduces violent conflict. Remember how Waltz’s argument contrasted the functional differentiation of hierarchy, with the same undifferentiated actions for anarchical systems. Globalisation brings, economic at least, differentiation.

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(Sorenson) Complex Interdependence

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• Complex Interdependence. (Power and Interdependence, Nye and Keohane, 1991). More than state actors get involved in international relations. Interests become complex and interdependent: for example, the high politics on the agenda, that concern issues of security and deploy military power as the main power resource, are increasingly complemented by other ‘low profile’ issues: economic interest (esp vis a vis financial crisis), environmental and humanitarian interests etc. In this context, power is no longer viewed on as military power alone, but also as lying in a variety of resources: eg. negotiating skills, or control over important economic resources or functions.

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(Sorenson) What are the consequences of complex interdependence?

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• What are the consequences of complex interdependence? The pursuit of different goals by different agents in the system ; the differentiation of power resources as well as national interests, means that we have moved beyond a stage where national interest is defined between a ‘minimum of survival and a maxim of universal domination’ (Waltz). The conception of what informs interest is plural; dependent on international as well as domestic structure, and complex interdependence means that the power resources that states have in hand to pursuit these diverse interests are not reducible to military power.

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(Sorenson) What does complex interdependence mean for the neo – neo debate?

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• What does this mean for the neo – neo debate? The conscious abstraction of the realist research programme from state disposition as well as state interaction aimed to create a general, simple and elegant theory, that would say ‘a number of few things about important issues in IR’. But the parsimony of neorealism, which consisted the scientific pride of the programme, ended up being its major drawback: it abstracts too much from questions of interaction between states, the effect of norms, laws, institutions and other constants of IR, and completely ignores the effect of domestic structure on international outcome. At the same time, it defines interest, and the power resources sought and employed by states in its pursuit, very narrowly. Neorealism failed to explain the collapse of USSR, which had little to do with structural considerations, the success of international institutions like the EU, and the UN of the early 90s, and the shift in international norms towards more concern for humanitarian intervention, at what seemed to be in the expense of the absolute norm of international sovereignty. In view of all this, neoliberalism came in to address the faults of neorealism: the explanation of change, the potential for increasing cooperation which seemed viable after 1990, the effects of globalisation and the increasing prominence of non state actors, the effect of liberal democratic structure in international relations.

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(Sorenson) • Keohane’s and Nye’s modified structural liberalism

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• Keohane’s and Nye’s modified structural liberalism, did not challenge the framework of neorealism. Systemic constraints were still paramount on international outcomes. States were still the self regarding main players on the international front. The assumptions of rationality and the pursuit of power were not challenged. The framework was thus not altered but nuanced. Different conclusions were reached from similar but more nuanced and rich premises. The possibility of cooperation based on interest was emphasised. The potential for interdependence and institutionalism as a vehicle for change was highlighted. This new type of liberalism did not have the pretensions of a model as elegant, as simple and as general as the structural realism of Waltz and his followers, but it consciously rejected scientific abstraction for more interpretative power and subtlety– in this sense drawing in part from the classical, not strictly structural methodology of the 40s and 50s.

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(Sorenson) whats the main difference between neorealist and neoliberal accounts?

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• Neoliberals where not the only ones that more away from the simplicity and abstraction of the neorealist model. Self defined realists saw the restrictions of what Waltz proposed, and attenuated the model with modifiers: eg Walt with the ‘balance of threat model’, Snyder with ‘process variables’ etc. This simultaneous move on the part of the liberals towards a more systemic interpretation (eg Keohane and Nye) together with the acknowledgment of the need of enrichment of the realist model with other systemic and domestic variables meant that by the late 80s and early 90s there was not so much a stark contrast between liberalism and realism, but more of a spectrum with realists and liberals converging in the middle. The main point of differentiation within this spectrum lies in how much questions of cooperation through institutions and law, the presence of liberal domestic structure and interdependence can mitigate the effects of international anarchy and the search for survival and relative gain.

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(Sorenson) • Institutional Liberalism

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• Institutional Liberalism The power of institutions to form and develop cooperation, mechanisms for keeping peace and order, and diluting conflict. How is this done: a. Provision of information, helps formation of perception, avoidance of jerk reaction in conditions of uncertainty. b. Stage of negotiation, where non violent means can be employed instead. c. Formation of expectation of cooperation among member states d. Creation of norms of cooperation versus conflict e. Integration of identity, increase of interdependence through institutionalism, f. alliance between members at institutional level means collaboration is likely to continue

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(Doyle & Fukuyama) Republican Liberalism

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• Republican Liberalism . Democratic peace theory. Doyle (Fukuyama). This offshoot of neoliberalism stresses the importance of the domestic structure in international relations (inside – out) explanation. Potential problems: false correlation. History, economic interdependence bipolarity in Cold War, and the circumstantial institutionalisation are the causes, not liberal democracy per se. Methodological concerns: interpretative theory, not explanatory: it is the empirical observation that makes Doyle reach his conclusions, not any assumptions that can reach testable hypotheses (as in structural models) It is circumstantial result that he points to, not general truth. Does not really tells us what happens in relation to non – democracies.

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• Summary and History of different liberal trends

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• Summary and History of different liberal trends: the normative liberalism of the Enlightenment was put to practical test after the end of the second war (League of Nations). The failure of the League to deal with the crises in the 30s and the second world war indicated that his was a rather utopian liberalism – some went as far as to explain the whole enterprise as an ideological construction that was aimed to served the interests of the status quo powers (Carr). Realism dominated after the war, where America was strong enough to pursue its own agenda for 30 years or so, but the danger of the Cold War was very much felt. Realism was very much a child of the cold war, the interpretative lense of realism, very much an effect of balance of power (under bipolarity) and military competition – which were easily elevated from circumstantial into ‘natural facts’ of the international system.

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• Realism was criticised both as a ? and ? before the end of Cold War

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• Realism was criticised both as a research project and a explanatory tool before the end of Cold War. Structural liberalism emerges as the dominant response – more nuanced, more interpretative, more able to deal with increasing complexity. As the Cold War comes to an end, realism becomes more criticised, as unable to explain the change that is so obv. happening. The highlight of liberalism comes in the beginning of the 90s, where Fukuyama speaks of the end of history, and ‘democratic peace theory’ receives pre-eminence. By the end of the 90s, the failures of the UN, the increased multilateralism of the US, the failure of the Israel – Palestinian conflict to come to solution, and the aggravation of the relations with now nuclear North Korea somewhat cool the excitement of liberals. After 9/11, the realists take over once more, but since the Obama election things once more look in for a change.

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• The shades of liberalism

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• The shades of liberalism. Those very close to neorealists: just place more faith in potential for cooperation based on self interest (Keohane of late 70s, Axelrod). They have been criticised by realists as being no different that realists (Mearsheimer). Although these weak liberals might be only one shade lighter on the spectrum than their realist neighbours, they compensate with explanatory power more than they lack in methodological distinctness. For example, Mearsheimer’s fears for instability in Europe after the removal of the stabilising power of bipolarity have not come to fruition, which resembled much closer the liberal intuitionalist model of the potential of integration. But perhaps it is far better to conceive of neorealism and neoliberalism as occupying overlapping spheres that are characterised by a different scope and emphasis, rather than a difference in fundamental interpretation. This is supplemented by an different understanding of relative variables: At one end the spectrum we have a puritanical emphasis on structure as opposed to other systemic and domestic elements, a the other end we have the belief that domestic and systemic concerns can tell the full story.

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• Fukuyama’s end of history

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• Fukuyama’s end of history is motivated by a belief in the linear progression of Universal History, towards the adoption of liberal democracy. This is where political and economic development terminates. This view makes sense if seen as following the demise of eastern communism. (comes out in 1992). Fukuyama does not see national or cultural barriers as impeding severely the spread of democracy and liberalism. Human progress is measured by the elimination of global conflict, and the adoption of principles of legitimacy that have evolved over time in domestic political orders.
o We can see already the distinction from structural arguments, especially of Waltzarian variety. The global arrangement is determined by endogenous considerations (regime types), rather than structural constraints.
o What challenges are posed to this approach post 9/11?

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• Doyle’s liberalism

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• Doyle’s follows from Fukuyama who is claiming that a world made up from democracies should have much less incentive for war, since all nations should recognise each others legitimacy.
o This inside-out interpretative approach of international relations contrasts with structuralist, especially, but not exclusively the neo-realists. Systemic liberals, do not directly oppose the conclusions of such inside out theories, but have a different focal point of analysis, are more likely to stress systemic factors in explaining liberal tendencies. (for example, think of Keohane’s systemic interdependence).

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what is utopian liberalism and when was it prominent?

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Arose out of first world war (1914-1918) sought to explain why war began in first place, answer is that First WW caused by short-sided leaders, egoism

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early IR was influenced by what and why

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Utopian liberalism. reason: Woodrow Wilson was president in 1917 when US joined WWI and he had a background as political science prof. His orientation was liberal, and so political liberalism had strong backing from the most powerful state in the world.

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President Wison's 14 point program

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1918 in speech delivered to Congress.
Wilson wanted to make the world 'safe for democracy'; his 14 point program includes:
-end to secret negotiations
-freedom of navigation of seas
-arguments should be reduced to lowest point consistent with domestic safety
-colonial and territorial claims shall be settled with regard to the principle of self-determination of people
-A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenant for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity of great and small nations alike

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Wilsonian idealism

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conviction that through a rationally and intelligently designed internation aorganization it should be possible to put an end to war and to achieve more or less permanent peace.
--not intended to do away with states, foreign ministries, armed forces and other agents and instruments of international conflict
-claim is that it is possible to tame states and statespeople by subjecting them to appropriate international organizations
-influenced greatly by Kant's perpetual peace

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'The Great Illusion'

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Published in 1909 by Norman Angell--illusion is that many statespeople still believe that war serves profitable purposes. Angell argues opposite is case. general argument is forerunner of later liberal thinking about modernization and economic interdependence

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modernization and interdependence

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Stressed by Angell in 1909 as two processes of change that renders war and use of force obsolete. why?
-modernization demands states have growing need of things from outside--credit, inventions, markets, materials
Interdependence effects a change in relations between states.
-war and use of force of decreasing importance, international law develops in response to the need for a framework to regulate high levels of international interdependence

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Brian Kellogg Pact

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1928, practically all countries in League of nations signed, international agreement to abolish war