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35 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Internalism |
*Justification is solely determined by factors that are internal to a person *Evidence is accessible from a first-person perspective *Descartes: best evidence for believing in the existence of physical objects was the testimony of our senses |
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Foundationalism |
*Propositions are justified independent of other beliefs *Based on self-evident beliefs (don't require justification) |
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Validity |
*An argument is valid if it makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false |
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Soundness |
*An argument is sound if all of its premises are true |
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Deductive Standards |
*Premises entail the conclusion *Premises must be true |
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Inductive Standards |
*Premises make probable the conclusion *Premises must be true |
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Moral Justification |
*I have reason to believe x because x is morally right *stealing *Crazy man will set off bomb unless you tell him the lights are off, so you make yourself believe lights are off |
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Pragmatic Justification |
*I have reason to believe x because believing x will be useful to me *A terminally ill patient will believe that they will get better |
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Epistemic Justification |
*I have good reason to believe x because I have good evidence to believe that x is true |
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Classical Analysis of Knowledge |
*A knows B only if A believes B, B is true, and A has epistemic justification for believing B *Counterexample: broken clock scenario |
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Metaphysics |
*Basic nature of reality *What is real? *What makes us human? |
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Moral Philosophy |
*What is it to be a good person? *What constitutes good/right action? |
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Necessary Condition |
P is a necessary condition for Q when it is impossible for Q to be true while P is false |
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Sufficient Condition |
P is a sufficient condition for Q when it is impossible for P to be true while Q is false |
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Simplicity |
Number and conciseness of the theory's basic concepts |
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Explanatory Power |
ability to effectively explain the subject it pertains to |
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Inference to the best explanation |
If one has several hypotheses to explain a certain situation/phenomenon, one can infer that one hypothesis is a "better" explanation than the others, and conclude that it is true |
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Primary Qualities |
*Qualities which are in the objects and we are inclined to say they are in the objects *size, shape |
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Secondary Qualities |
*Qualities which are not in objects, but we are inclined to say they are in objects *color, sound |
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A Priori knowledge |
*Knowledge known independently of experience *Nothing can be uniformly red all over and uniformly blue all over |
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A Posteriori knowledge |
*Knowledge gained from experience *That flower is purple |
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Analytic Proposition |
*True simply in virtue of the meaning of the words/concepts involved *A bachelor is an unmarried man *The whiteboard is white |
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Synthetic Proposition |
*All cases which aren't analytic (Not true simply in virtue the meaning of the words/concepts involved) *I am wearing pants *The dog is black |
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Epistemology |
*Knowledge and rationality *What is it to be a living thing? *How are beliefs justified/rational? |
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Semantic Externalism |
*The meaning of an expression is determined by the causal history of that expression *Has to have been caused in the right sort of way |
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Hume's Skeptical Argument |
1. to believe in the existence of physical objects based on our senses, we must believe that senses are a reliable indicator of reality 2. to believe sensations are reliable indicator of external reality, we would need to observe that whenever we have sensations, certain objects were causing them 3. there is no way of correlating sensations and objects no way to correlate 4. therefore, we can't justify believing in the existence of physical objects
In order to believe our senses, we need to establish a connection between senses and physical objects
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Descartes' Dream Argument |
1. If there are sure signs to distinguish veridical perception from non-veridical perception, then I'm not justified in thinking that I am not dreaming 2.There are no such signs 3. Therefore, I am not justified in believing I'm not dreaming
*there are no certain indications that distinguish wakefulness from sleep |
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Descartes' Dream Argument from Illusion (Trust Argument) |
1. My senses have deceived me in the past 2. It is prudent to never fully trust anything that has deceived you in the past, even once 3.It is prudent to never fully trust the senses
*tries to soften is by believing in a non-deceiving god, which allows him to trust his senses |
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Descartes' Deceiving God/Evolution Argument |
1.If it is possible that God is deceiving me that 2+2=4, I don't know that 2+2=4 2.It is possible that God is deceiving me that 2+2=4 3. I don't know that 2+2=4 (or anything) |
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Descartes' Response to Skeptical Arguments |
There is a non-deceiving god, which would allow him to trust his senses |
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Berkeley's Pain/Pleasure Argument |
*Only perceivers can experience pain *Pain and pleasure aren't in the objects around us *must exist only in the perceiver *mind-dependent property *might say that you can experience pain and heat separately, but that isn't plausible *middle cases: no pleasure or pain |
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Berkeley's Perceptual Relativity Argument |
*a room temperature bowl of water will feel cold to a warm hand and warm to a cold hand *One and the same object cannot be both warm and cool, therefore what is perceived cannot exist in the water, but in the perceiver *the world can't have contradictory properties |
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Vogel's inference to the best explanation against skepticism |
*Objects don't co-locate in our experiences *Counter-argument: necessary truths don't fully explain why we don't have objects co-locating, but necessary truths plus other contingent truths -necessary truth: non-colocation --doesnt require further explanation |
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BonJour's inference to the best explanation against skepticism |
1.Digital explanations are necessarily less simple than analog explanations 2.There are no analog skeptical explanations 3.the real world hypothesis is the best explanation of our experiences (simpler one) BONJOUR DISMISSES ANALOG SCENARIOS Don't have to appeal to bodies out in the world, just in minds *digital:matrix computer simulation *analog: sciencey, facts no analog skeptical experiences because no philosopher has ever tried *Counterexample: analog has quantitative simplicity but digital have qualitative simplicity because we wouldn't have to pause at bodies or objects, just minds |
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Putnam's Response to "Brain in a Vat" |
*Self-refuting *People in a synthetic world can think whatever they want, but thoughts don't refer to anything *No causal history (semantic externalism)
Counter-Argument: your theory of reference cant be right because this causes a big problem for knowing my own mental states it seems like i know what I'm talking about even though sometimes I am wrong |
