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107 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Palko
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is the 14th A due process clause essential to a fair system of justice?
a. Restrictive test of due process defined by Cardozo. b. If D had been tried in fed system and double jeopardy applied, he would not have been allowed to be retried under double jeopardy. c. Court says not a violation of any fundamental right embodied in the due process clause, although it’s a fundamental right guaranteed in fed court due to the 5th A. d. Double jeopardy is not so fundamental that the states have to follow. |
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Adamson
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prosecutor was allowed to get up and argue that they should convict the D bc he didn’t testify – so they should infer he was guilty. If done in fed ct, instant reversal.
a. Issue is whether 5th A right against self-incrimination should apply to the states. Court says no – it’s up to the states to decide if they want to permit this or not. B. The modern approach – the shift to “selective incorporation” 1. Selective incorporation – SC has consistently held that the 14th A only incorporates the Bill of Rights on a selective basis. Early cases incorporated procedural safeguards that were “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” |
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Duncan
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– question of whether a jury trial is so fundamental to our system that states must provide it as well.
a. Question about right to jury trial in relatively minor criminal case. Is the right so fundamental even in a misdemeanor case? b. Ct says right to jury trial means the same thing whether applied under 5th A or applied to the states through dp clause. |
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Betts v. Brady
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Right to Counsel. D charged with burglary, and asked for atty but was told they are only appointed for rape and murder cases. When his petition for habeas corpus reached SC, only 3 justices ready to say that there’s a right to counsel in all cases.
1. Focus on “totality of the circumstances” test to determine if counsel should be appointed. |
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Gideon
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Gideon charged with burglary in FL. Asked for counsel but it was not appointed, so he represented himself and was convicted. Abe Fortas designated to represent him at SC. Jury returned not guilty verdict.
1. This was a case like Betts where the court said a lawyer wouldn’t have made a difference, but it obviously did. 2. Equality standard. Bottom line – every D has to be treated the same regardless of the circumstances of his case. |
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Shelton
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1. Discussion of Argersinger v. Hamlin – Gideon applies to any D who faces the risk of imprisonment. No D can be in prison without having been represented. The possibility of jail requires the appointment of counsel.
a. Reach of Gideon only applies if you face jail time. b. Right to counsel on appeal – fundamental difference btw trial and appeal is that constitution does not guarantee a right to appeal, so up to each state whether to even allow an appeal. i. Appeals in states that allow it – court said if the court allows appeal, they have to make it equally available for indigent Ds. ii. State must provide free transcript and appellate atty if they allow an appeal. 2. Betts v. Brady not dead and gone – we still use totality of circs to assess the fairness of things – we’re not saying indigents can’t have a jury consultant or investigator, we’re saying they’ll have to show us that this resource is essential to fairness in your case. |
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Douglas
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Griffin-Douglas “Equality”
indigent D sought appointed counsel to represent him in his appeal after conviction. The appellate court determined that appointed counsel would not assist D or the appeal, and denied D’s request for appellate counsel. 1. Held – a state must provide counsel for indigent defendants to pursue an initial appeal, so D’s judgment was reversed. |
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Moffitt
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NC provided appointed counsel only for an initial appeal to the state court of appeals. Moffitt sought appointment of counsel for review in state supreme court and USSC. State courts denied his request, but fed court of appeals held that under Douglas, counsel should have been appointed. SC granted cert.
1. Held – an indigent is not entitled to appointed counsel to assist in discretionary appellate review. |
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Wilkes Entick v. Carrington
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Exclusionary Rule.
guy rallied against the govt, they argued the officers should be immune bc they acted in good faith on the warrant. |
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Boyd
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looked at British Wilkes case. Conclusion that breaking into a man’s house and using that evidence to convict him is within the condemnation of the constitution. 4th and 5th A work in tandem. You can’t use evidence from an unlawful subpoena.
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Weeks
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Fed ER.
Here no subpoena was issued; they conducted search in a lottery investigation and found evidence of a fed crime. Feds went in and seized evidence and made a fed case. SC reverse and said you can’t use the evidence if illegally acquired. a. Ct held that in fed prosecution the 4th A bars the use of evidence from an unlawful search and seizure. b. This was the first explicit statement of this rule. |
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Wolf
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court said protection against unlawful searches and seizures is fundamental and it applies to the states, but it does not carry with it the exclusionary rule that was set out in Weeks.
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Mapp
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overrules Wolf and hold that the exclusionary rule does apply to the states. Evidence obtained in violation of those protections will be excluded.
1. The constitution itself requires the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 2. The only way we can apply this rule to the states is to find that the constitution demands it – they found this to be the case. 3. 4 legs that justify the exclusionary rule: a. Privacy b. Government (judicial) integrity c. Self-incrimination (5Amend leg) d. Deterrence 4. Court later sawed of 3 of these legs – all that is left as rationale is deterrence. Prime example of deterrence rationale in Leon. |
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Leon
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as long as the officer has a good faith belief that he is executing a valid search warrant, the evidence is ok.
1. Good-faith exception to exclusionary rule – makes sense when you accept the idea that the only reason we use the rule is for deterrence. 2. By getting a warrant, you’re covering your ass, even if it is invalid. But there are exceptions: a. If you can show that the info presented to the magistrate was false or misleading, you can avoid Leon and get the evidence excluded based on no probable cause. b. If the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role – if we can show that the mag was functioning as a police officer rather than a judge, we can avoid Leon and evidence will be suppressed. (Ex. – case of mag who gave search warrant but went with police to see if there was really porn in the shop.) c. If the warrant is so facially deficient that the officer can’t reasonably presume it to be valid. (Airhead exce ption – any airhead would know this is not a valid warrant!) |
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Scott
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Respondent was found to have violated his parole based on evidence seized during an improperly conducted search.
1. Court determined that the exclusionary rule 4th A did not apply to parole revocation proceedings. The exclusionary rule did not extend to proceedings other than criminal trials. 2. A parolee was not entitled to all due process rights to which a criminal defendant was entitled as the parole revocation proceedings adopted by the states were informal, administrative proceedings. |
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Olmstead
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Protected Area.
they thought this guy was a bootlegger, so they tapped his telephone. Question was whether this was a violation of the 4th A. 1. Opinion said this is not your “papers, home, personal effects, etc.” – so this was not considered a search. No problem under 4th A. State of law at the time Katz was decided. |
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Katz
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Guy was a bookmaker and was sure they’d tapped his phones so did all his business from pay phone. FBI set up a listening device on the booth to hear his side of the conversation from the booth. It was concealed on top of the booth with not penetration into the booth, just picking up the sound.
1. Govt argued no intrusion into any constitutionally protected area. Court used to base stuff on this concept of intrusion into the home/private area. 2. Court says this is not the question anymore – 4th A doesn’t protect areas, it protects persons – protects their reasonable expectations of privacy. So this overruled Katz. 3. No reason for Katz to believe that anyone could hear his conversation – he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. |
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Greenwood
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D was suspected of drug trafficking and police asked D’s neighbor’s regular trash collector to pick up D’s trash bags and turn them over to police. He did and investigator found evidence of drug use, which she used to obtain a search warrant. In executing warrant, police found drugs in house.
1. Held – a person does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of trash put out on the street for pickup. |
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Riley
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Court upheld helicopter surveillance of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from a height of 400 ft to be ok, on the ground that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy when any member of the public could legally fly at that altitude.
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Karo
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case dealt with the use of electronic beepers place inside containers to assist police in tracking an item.
1. Court has held that such use of a beeper, when installed with the consent of the original owner, is not by itself a search or seizure bc the transfer of a container with unmonitored beepers does not infringe any privacy interest. 2. But in Karo – Court said monitoring the beeper does constitute unreasonable search when it reveals info that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance, such as info about a container’s location within a house and the duration of its time in the house. |
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Kyllo
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issue of thermal imaging. This was police’s answer to finding out about people’s indoor pot gardens (because helicopter fly-overs were held to be ok.)
1. Unreasonable search. Use of thermal imager is an unreasonable search because it lets you know what’s going on inside the house, and what goes on there is sacrosanct under the 4th A – this is where we have the highest and most honored protections of privacy. 2. Attaches and elevated level of privacy to the home. |
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Stanford Daily
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argument was that they were not suspects of any criminal activity, yet the govt believed they had info in their possession that would be evidence.
1. Search warrants v. subpoena duces tecum – principle difference is that subpoenas can be issued without probable cause but search warrants cannot. But subpoenas can still be an unreasonable search and seizure. a. Search warrant – will expose more than what the police are looking for in executing the warrant. Search warrant for documents – it will not be immediately apparent which doc is the doc described in the warrant. i. Argument made by Stanford Daily was give us a subpoena instead! This will be minimal intrusion. ii. What about the 5th A with respect to what can be seized pursuant to a search warrant? When we bring this evidence into court it’s requiring him to incriminate himself against the 5th A. b. Subpoena – command that you take and bring with you specific documents requested. |
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Spinelli
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Probable Cause.
none of their surveillance included evidende of D engaging in criminal activity. They see him going into an apt at the same time every day, they find out he has 2 telephone lines in an apt in someone else’s name. An undercover informant tells them he is taking bets at a specific phone number, and the number was registered to the apt they saw him going to. a. Supreme Ct says this is not sufficient evidence to prove that he is a bookmaker. b. 2-prong test: i. The magistrate must have been given evidence showing that this person is a reliable witness, and ii. A basis to believe that what he is relaying is based on his personal knowledge. c. Agents didn’t put the guy’s name in the affidavit here bc didn’t want to blow his cover. Court says this situation doesn’t meet the test. |
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Gates
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Spinelli/Agular test (veracity and basis of knowledge) only used as a component of the test now. an anonymous letter stated that a couple was involved in drug-dealing.
a. Based on totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause. b. Court gets rid of Spinelli test here. c. Dissent says we should still use the Spinelli 2-part test. |
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Testing probable cause under warrant
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1. We test ONLY based on what is actually in the affidavit. If the officer forgot and left something out, there is no probable cause.
2. Determination by magistrate is based on what is in the affidavit, period. No looking beyond the 4 corners of the affidavit. 3. When testing prob cause in context of warrantless arrest or search – how do we determine what officer knew at time of arrest/search? He comes into court and testifies about this. |
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Search warrants
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1. Need:
a. Probable cause b. Particular description of place to be searched c. Particular description of things to be seized |
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Garrison
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police searched Garrison’s apt when they had a warrant for his neighbor’s apt bc they were on the same floor and they didn’t realize they were in another apt.
a. Court said once they realized they were wrong they had to stop the search. b. But they found drugs before they realized, so they were ok, and Garrison gets screwed. c. “Plain view” – when police see evidence in plain view, even if no warrant, they can seize it. |
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Richards
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Police executed a search warrant for petitioner's hotel room seeking evidence of the felonious crime of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. They did not knock and announce prior to their entry and drugs were seized. At trial, petitioner sought to exclude evidence on the ground that the officers had failed to knock-and-announce.
a. The court affirmed the judgment against petitioner because it found the officers' decision not to knock-and-announce was reasonable under the circumstances of this case, but found that the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations was unconstitutional. |
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Arrests and Searches of Persons
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A. Spectrum
1. Stop – reasonable suspicion 2. Arrest – probable cause 3. Arrest in house – probable cause + warrant |
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Stop vs. arrest
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a. Arrest occurs at the point you reasonably perceive that you are no longer free to go.
b. Miranda protection only required when you are in custody and subjected to interrogation. c. A stop does not allow an officer to physically restrain you. d. Once an arrest is made and there is probable cause, you can make a search incident to the arrest. e. Distinction between arrest in public place and arrest in the home. In the home, you need probable cause and a warrant. In public, not warrant needed |
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Frisk
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a. Frisk does not allow an officer to reach inside the pockets unless he encounters something that could be a weapon.
b. Purpose of frisk is NOT to search for evidence – it’s to protect the officer from possibly being attacked. It’s not a full-blown search. |
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Watson
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police had plenty of time to get a warrant before the arrest but they didn’t get one.
1. Probable cause to arrest Watson as soon as he walked into the restaurant? There was an informant who gave them the info – he claims he has personal knowledge that Watson committed the crime bc he gave him this stolen credit card. At that point, the postal inspector could have gone to a judge and gotten a warrant. But when he went into the restaurant, they didn’t immediately arrest him. They waited because they wanted to get more info. 2. Court concludes that 4th A doesn’t require a warrant as long as you have probable cause. |
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Robinson
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Robinson was arrested for driving without a license because the officer knew his license had been revoked. Robinson was convicted of possession of heroin that the officer found in a cigarette packet in his pocket.
1. Arrest was unlawful because the officer didn’t have probable cause – it was not based on any evidence. 2. No probable cause to believe there was anything in his pocket. 3. If not justified as a frisk to protect the officer, how can we justify something like this? a. Search incident to a lawful arrest – so the only thing needed to make this search ok is a lawful arrest. 4. Robinson court is willing to accept full-scale custodial arrest – the officer can make a full-scale search of everything in the person’s possession. |
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Whren
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officers stopped the vehicle for a minor traffic violation. They used this minor violation as a pretext for why they really wanted to stop the car. This was a successful pretext stop – they found drugs in the car. Ds assert there was no prob cause or reasonable suspicion of any drug activity to justify this stop.
1. Even if we can show intentional discrimination, if objectionable what the officer did was reasonable, then we don’t care about other motives he might have had to make this stop – at least as far as the 4th A is concerned. 2. With respect to equal protection clause… |
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Soto
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racial profiling case, they counted cars driven by blacks on NJ turnpike and way more blacks were pulled over. Data also shows that 98% of cars go over the speed limit, so anyone could be pulled over. Is this enough to show discrimination?
i. Subjective intent of officer is irrelevant under 4th A. But that doesn’t mean it’s legal. What’s the remedy? ii. Here they got an injunction – requiring the police to record the race of those they pulled over and supervision of the practices and policies by the NJ highway cops. iii. We look to equal protection clause to find the remedy – it affords protection if you can come up with the evidence to show discrimination taking place. |
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Atwater
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officer sees that the mom is driving kids around without safety belts. Ordinarily an officer would just write a ticket, but this guy decides the woman should go to jail – and he actually takes her into custody. She brings suit against the city. Issue is whether this is excessive force to take her into custody.
1. Court says it is up to the officer. 2. Here the officer didn’t find any evidence, so not a suppression case. But what if he had found evidence and the court finds that the statute didn’t give the officer discretion to take the person into custody? a. Patterson case – police watched suspect they believed was involved in robbery/murder, he goes to a friend’s house, they leave in friend’s car, police pull car over. In course of stop based on reasonable suspicion, they find baggie of pot on the friend, not the suspect. Under CA law, less than an ounce is an infraction and doesn’t justify taking that person into custody. But they do take him in and in the course of investigation find out he was involved in the robbery/murder too. He challenges on grounds of fruit of unlawful arrest (taking him into custody for infraction.) Court of appeals says illegal arrest, but so what – not an unreasonable arrest under 4th A to take someone into custody for mere infraction. i. Lago Vista said it’s not a violation of 4th A to take into custody for infraction. We only suppress evidence if there’s a constitutional violation. |
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Garner
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if an officer has probable cause, but he brutalizes the person in arresting him, does that make the arrest unlawful?
1. No – the use of excessive force does not make the arrest retroactively unlawful. 2. Important case in recognizing that the 4th A establishes reasonable standards for how a person is treated, but don’t assume that that invalidates the arrest. -Can be an unreasonable seizure in the 4th amendment sense. |
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Payton
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presented 2 consolidated cases. In Payton, they found a shell casing in his house while they were there to arrest him – this was ok bc it was in plain view. In Rittick, they go into his house to arrest him for robbery and open a drawer next to nightstand and they find drugs. They did not have prob cause to search for drugs. They did have justification to conduct a search incident to the arrest of the area within Rittick’s control.
1. Court says neither of these cases was a lawful arrest. Court says even though we’ve held that you can arrest someone without a warrant in a public place, if you’re going to arrest him at his home, you need to go to the magistrate to get an arrest warrant. Neither of these cases required a search warrant because the stuff was in plain view or discovered in a search incident to an arrest. 2. The arrest warrant simply permits entry to the home to execute and arrest. During this, if evidence is found, it can be seized. This doesn’t mean and arrest warrant now equals a search warrant |
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Chimel
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they go to this house with a warrant to arrest Chimel for a burglary of a coin shop, so they’re looking for stolen coins. They then search the attic, garage, workshop, bedrooms, open drawers, etc and they find coins.
1. Court throws out search even though they had a valid arrest warrant. The only search you can conduct incident to an arrest is the area of immediate control of the arrestee. They can open drawers IF these are in the immediate control of the suspect. 2. Area within immediate control of suspect – brightline rule for police is the area around the suspect at the time he is arrested, even though once he’s arrested, he’s no longer in control. (Handcuffs don’t matter – the area is still considered area within immediate control.) |
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Dale
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they see the suspect drive up, and as he’s going into the house they arrest him on the porch. Then they go in and search the house.
1. SC says not a valid search. They could have easily avoided this by waiting until he was in the house and then arresting him – then they could have searched the house. 2. If making arrest outside the house they then had prob cause to believe there was something inside the house, could they search the house to make sure no one enters while they wait to get a search warrant? Court has said no violation of 4th A if this is done. |
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Carney
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Vehicle Searches.
Officers in this case had time to get a search warrant before conducting the search. They had prob cause that there was evidence in the motorhome bc they saw this guy enticing kids into his home for sex and pot. They also had prob cause to arrest him. It was in a public place. 1. Held – the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement does apply to motor homes. |
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Belton
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search incident to arrest. Officer pulls over speeding car – there is justification for this stop bc of speeding, and he can briefly detain occupants. He sees container of super gold. He arrests all 4 occupants and separates them. He take the jacket out of the back seat and searches it. Court analyzed this as a search incident to arrest.
1. Court determined he had prob cause due to the smell and the super gold label. 2. Court uses this case to clarify the scope of search that can be conducted incident to a lawful arrest. 3. Brightline rule – when a person is arrested in an automobile, anywhere in the automobile will be considered within the immediate control of the person. This includes glove compartments, luggage, boxes, bags, etc. – but does NOT include the trunk. a. What about a hatchback? This would count if the trunk is readily accessible from the passenger compartment. |
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Knowles
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D was stopped by a police officer for speeding and was issued a citation rather than arrested. The officer then conducted a full search of D's car, incident to the citation. The officer found a bag of marijuana and a "pot pipe." D was then arrested and charged. D made a motion to suppress the evidence because the search was not incident to arrest. The trial court denied the suppression motion and convicted him.
1. Court held that the issuance of the citation did not authorize the officer, consistently with the 4th A, to conduct a full search of the car. 2. There was no need to discover and preserve evidence because once defendant was stopped and issued a citation all the evidence necessary to prosecute had been obtained. The threat to safety from issuing a traffic citation was significantly less than in the case of a custodial arrest. |
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Acevedo
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container search. Police observed a guy pick up a package that they know contains pot bc they been keeping surveillance. They follow him to his apt and they see another guy, Acevedo, leave – he has the pot package wrapped with him. He puts it in his trunk and they pull him over and find the pot. CA court says they should have gotten a search warrant bc a closed container asserts an expectation of privacy.
1. Similar Chadwick case – railroad employees reported a trunk smelled like pot. Police saw a guy pick it up and put it in his trunk of his car. They arrested him and opened the trunk without a search warrant. Court said they needed a warrant for that – just because it’s in an auto doesn’t mean it loses that protection. 2. Acevedo court overrules Chadwick. Once you put a container in an automobile, the expectation of privacy that goes with the container is subsumed by the lesser expectation of privacy that goes along with the automobile. |
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Houghton
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D’s car was stopped by an officer, who noticed a syringe in the driver's shirt pocket. The driver admitted the syringe was used to take drugs. The officer then began a search of the passenger compartment of the car for contraband. He found a purse, which D claimed was hers. Inside, the officer found two containers; both contained illegal methamphetamine.
1. Held – the officer was entitled to inspect D’s belongings found in the car that were capable of concealing the object of the search because he had probable cause to search the car. |
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Bertine
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inventory issue.
1. Even if you don’t have prob cause that there is evidence of a crime in the car. Goal is not to find incriminating evidence, but to protect police. This exception permits inspection of the car without prob cause and without a warrant for purposes of inventory. Routine part of the seizure of an automobile. 2. Inventory must be conducted pursuant to a regular police procedure. |
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Terry
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Stop & Frisk.
officer saw D and another person walking back and forth in front of store window early in the morning. Officer stopped D and patted him down, feeling a gun in the process. D was convicted of carrying concealed weapon and appealed. 1. Held – a stop and frisk by a police officer is constitutionally permissible when the officer has neither probable cause nor a warrant. 2. Police must be granted a limited license to stop and frisk – the 4th A allows a frisk or patdown when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience as a police officer, that criminal activity might be going on and that the person might be dangerous, and where in the course of investigating the behavior the officer identifies himself and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of this encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear of his own or others’ safety. 3. In these limited circumstances, police are only entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to assault the police. Anything beyond this is unreasonable and prohibited by 4th A. |
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Wardlow
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Defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two of the officers caught up with him, and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Defendant was arrested when officers discovered a .38-caliber handgun.
1. The Court found that nervous, evasive behavior was a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, and that headlong flight was the consummate act of evasion. The Court found that the determination of reasonable suspicion had to be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior, and that officers were justified in suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal activity based on his presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. |
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Royer
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Narcotic detectives determined that defendant fit the profile of a person transporting illegal drugs because he was carrying heavy American Tourister luggage, was between the ages of 25-35, was casually dressed, appeared pale and nervous, paid for his ticket with cash, and wrote only a name and destination on his luggage tag. When officers stopped defendant and asked to see his identification, the name on the airline ticket did not match defendant's driver's license. Without returning defendant's documents, the officers asked defendant to accompany them to a small room. The officers retrieved defendant's luggage and asked defendant's permission to open the luggage. Defendant handed them a key without giving an affirmative answer.
1. The Court held that defendant's consent was involuntary because defendant was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage. When the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told defendant he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room while retaining his ticket and driver's license, defendant was effectively seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment |
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Drayton
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load of passengers on bus, there is no announcement that the cops can briefly detain the passengers on the bus or that there is any right to refuse. They just say they are looking for drugs, and they go around and ask each person if they can check them. The 2 Ds are on the bus and they say ok, the cops reach down and feel some hard packages around their groin and then they search and find concealed packages of drugs. Is this a consented search?
1. Argument is that bc they didn’t refuse the search and knew they could, this was distinguishable from a prior similar case that held no consent bc the person didn’t know that they couldn’t search them. 2. Applies totality of the circumstances test – there is no reason why anyone on bus would think that they are detained because they are checking their bags or them, therefore it is voluntary consent |
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Place
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When defendant arrived at the airport on a Friday afternoon, he was met by drug enforcement agents. When defendant refused to consent to a search of his bags, an agent told him that they were going to take the bags to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant. The agents transported the bags to another airport to subject them to a sniff test by a narcotics detection dog that reacted positively to one of the bags. Ninety minutes had elapsed since the seizure of the bags. The agents retained the bags until Monday morning when they secured a search warrant for the bag wherein they discovered cocaine.
1. The Court affirmed the reversal of defendant's conviction on the basis that the evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible. 2. The 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. The violation was exacerbated by the agents' failure to accurately inform the defendant where they were transporting his bags, how long he might be dispossessed, and what arrangements would be made for return of the bags if the investigation dispelled the suspicion |
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Bustamonte
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Consent Searches.
D and 5 others were in car with a burned-out headlight. Police stopped car and driver had no license. A passenger, Alcala, had a license and told the police it was his brother’s. Police asked if they could search the car, Alcala said yes and opened the trunk, where police found stolen checks. D was convicted of theft. 1. A D does not have to be warned that he is under no obligation to give his consent in order for a D’s consent to be voluntary. 2. Court held this consent to be voluntary. Voluntariness is determined from all of the surrounding circumstances. While D’s knowledge of his right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, it is not an absolute prerequisite to voluntariness, at least when D is not in custody. |
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Rodriguez
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– Fischer told police she had been assaulted by Rodgriguez in what she referred to as “our” apartment. She showed signs of severe beating. She told police D was asleep in the apt and that she had a key to let them into the apt. She said she had furniture and clothes in the apt. She took them into the apt, and officers saw drugs in plain view and seized it. D was charged with drug possession. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that Fischer had moved out of the apt several weeks earlier and had no authority to consent to the entry.
1. Held – if the police enter a dwelling based on the reasonable but mistaken belief that a 3rd party who consented to the entry had authority to consent, the evidence found inside may be used against the resident of the dwelling. 2. 4th A doesn’t prohibit the warrantless entry of a dwelling when voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the person whose property is searched, or from a 3rd party who possesses common authority over the premises. a. Common authority rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. Here Fischer did not have common authority over D’s apt because she took the key without D’s knowledge. b. Case was remanded to determine whether the officers reasonably believed that Fischer had the authority to consent |
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Interrogation & Voluntariness Test
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A. Due process “voluntariness” test for admitting confessions – cases that illustrate totality of circumstances test for admissibility of confessions
1. Due process – to what extent does due process itself govern police behavior during interrogation? a. Test for due process – totality of the circumstances b. This test was being applied by the SC in examining whether confessions should be suppressed in state proceedings until Miranda came along in 1966. |
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Ashcraft
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focus on the individual background of D in terms of his ability to withstand police interrogation – is he educated, is he streetwise, would he feel threatened, etc.
a. Significance of Ashcraft is the length of interrogation. b. 2 different versions of what was going on but Justice Black says no matter how you look at these facts, the guy never left the interrogation room and the officers came § in in relays over a long period of time. Just that alone is so coercive that we find it violates due process principles. |
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Watts
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court will throw out the confession even if it is reliable.
a. We are not suppressing because we’re concerned that these techniques will make innocent people confess |
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Crooker
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D was a law student and was working as a houseboy for wealthy woman and he killed her. He was arrested and subjected to interrogation. He asked if he could have a lawyer and the request was denied – after 6 hours he confessed. He was sentenced to death.
a. SC said we have a sophisticated young man who knows his constitutional rights, and he was not coerced – so court upheld the conviction. |
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Massiah and Escobedo: the Court grows disenchanted with the voluntariness test and turns to the right to counsel
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1. If dealing with a suspect where criminal prosecution has already begun, this is where Massiah comes in.
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Massiah
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the statement was obtained by an undercover agent and was a statement made in the backseat of a car.
a. Court said the case was in the mansion at this point – it involves an adversary confrontation with the state at a point where both sides need to be represented at all times. b. You can’t elicit a statement from the accused without having a lawyer with him at this point. c. After criminal prosecution has been initiated, the accused has the right to have his lawyer at every point during confrontations with the state. |
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Escobedo
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looking at the 6th A but also the problems it brings up. This case was vehemently criticized after it came down. Did not resolve the issue that was still before the court in Miranda. In Miranda, the big surprise was that the court veered off in a different direction – not based on 6th A, but 5th A – the 5th A creates a right to counsel as well.
a. D was picked up and questioned about a shooting, released, then arrested again. He requested and was denied a chance to talk to his counsel, and counsel’s requests to see him were denied. He subsequently confessed, not realizing he was guilty under IL law even though he didn’t do the actual shooting. b. Held – D has a right to counsel when he is being held for the purpose of eliciting a confession. c. The accused has been denied the right to counsel when the inquiry has ceased to be generally investigatory, but instead: i. The inquiry has focused on a particular suspect; ii. The suspect has been taken into custody and interrogated; iii. The suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer; and iv. The police have not informed him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent |
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Miranda
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D was arrested, taken to the police station, and questioned without being advised of any right to remain silent or to have an attorney.
a. Held – when a defendant is taken into custody, it is required that his legal rights to remain silent and his right to have an attorney present be explained to him. b. Reach of Miranda only encompasses situations where the person is being interrogated in the custody of police. At this point, they have to obtain a waiver from the person in order to interrogate. Right to remain silent and right to counsel. c. Miranda does not move the interrogation to the mansion – it is still in the gatehouse, but even in the gatehouse, the 5th A protection is so important that it requires assistance of counsel to be able to assert it. d. You can’t just give the warning and then proceed with interrogation. You have to have a clear waiver – either signed written or very clear oral statement that he understands these rights and is willing to give them up. e. Court makes it very clear that for Miranda, we’re talking about someone already in custody – not just a stop and frisk or questioning someone in public, etc. i. In custody – test is whether a reasonable person would believe he is no longer free to get up and walk away. ii. Custody doesn’t require handcuffs or a patrol car. f. Booking exception – purpose of questioning is to get routine book information, so Miranda doesn’t apply here. |
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Harris
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Custody. Court said it’s hard to believe a police officer will be violating the Miranda rule just to get evidence to impeach the suspect with.
i. So we will not extend the exclusionary rule so far as to enable the use of a confession, even in violation of Miranda, to impeach the D. |
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McCarty
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Miranda applicable to traffic arrest for DUI.
i. Test depends on the suspect’s reasonable belief if he is in custody – would a reasonable suspect believe he is in custody? ii. Great example of how the officer can have a plan to arrest the guy but not tell him – so long as the guy doesn’t know this is going to happen, he doesn’t have to be given his rights. (Bc he won’t have a reasonable belief that he’s in custody at this point.) |
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Innis
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Interrogation.
suspect arrested and put in patrol car, invoked his rights and said he wanted to talk to a lawyer. Two officers are in the car and talking about where the weapon could be. One officer says there’s a school around here and a kid could get the gun and hurt himself. D in the back seat pipes up and says I’ll show you where it is. Officers said they didn’t question – they were just carrying on a conversation. Was this interrogation? i. Court says this is not interrogation. ii. Test of interrogation – words or actions other than those normally attendant to arrest/custody that the police should know are likely to elicit and incriminating response from the suspect (functional equivalent and effect on the suspect.) |
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Perkins
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i. How to distinguish from Massiah (undercover cop in car)? Massiah had been indicted and Perkins had not. Here we’re looking at application of Miranda test of whether we have interrogation. (In Massiah, under 6th A, we were looking at if the police elicited info in absence of a lawyer.)
ii. In Massiah, we were in the mansion. Here we’re in the gatehouse. |
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Mosely
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court was first confronted with situation of someone who invokes Miranda rights and then a day later is re-questioned by different officers and waives his rights at that point.
i. Court said the language in Miranda means the interrogation taking place must cease, but there’s nothing to prevent them (or different officers) from re-initiating contact with the suspect and obtaining a waiver at that time. So this waiver was valid. ii. The suspect initially simply invoked his right to silence. |
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Edwards
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here invocation was of right to lawyer.
i. Court distinguished Mosely and said you can’t come back to a suspect who has asked for a lawyer and get a waiver of rights when he has not seen a lawyer in the interim. Questioning must cease until a lawyer is present. ii. Savvy person will ask for a lawyer – bc if you only invoke your right to silence, they can come back and try to start questioning you again. |
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Minnick
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surprising ruling bc the suspect had actually seen a lawyer here. He asked for a lawyer thy stop the interrogation, he meets with the lawyer. When he is subsequently approached, he is given Miranda and waives his rights and says he’ll talk.
i. Court says after request for a lawyer, NO interrogation allowed without the lawyer present. ii. The fact that he’s consulted with a lawyer in the meantime does not dilute his right to have his lawyer present later. iii. This is broader than the 6th A protection bc that is offense-specific. |
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Storm
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D released from custody after invoking right to counsel.
i. A suspect who invokes his right and then is released from custody is no longer protected against re-contact (even though he invoked his right to a lawyer before.) |
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Quarles
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police apprehended D in rear of supermarket after a woman told police that the man who just raped her just entered the supermarket. D matched the description, was frisked and found to be wearing empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing D, officer asked where the gun was and D nodded in direction of empty cartons and said gun is over there. D placed under arrest and given Miranda rights. D waived rights and in response to questions, stated that he owned the revolver. NY courts suppressed the statement “gun is over there,” the gun, and D’s statement that he owned the gun.
i. Held – overriding considerations of public safety justify the officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings to D before D was asked questions regarding locating the weapon. ii. The need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the rule protecting a person’s 5th A privilege against self-incrimination. |
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Elstad
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– suggests that the ordinary concept of fruit of the poison tree does not apply to Miranda violations. Miranda is only concerned with coercive questioning.
i. Court says we won’t apply a derivative exclusionary rule to Miranda. While it serves the 5th A, it sweeps more broadly than the 5th A. It is a prophylactic procedure, but not a constitutional requirement. ii. Facts – officers went to D’s home with warrant for arrest for burglary. One officer sat down with D without telling him about the arrest warrant, and said he felt D was involved. D said yes he was there. D was taken to station and read his Miranda rights an hour later for the first time. D made a statement about his involvement. Trial court excluded D’s first statement, but admitted his later statement. Court of appeals reversed, stating that bc of brief period separating the two incidents, the latter statement was inadmissible. iii. Held – the initial failure of the police to administer Miranda warnings does not taint subsequent admissions made after a suspect has been fully advised of and has waived his Miranda rights. (i) While Miranda requires that an unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement turns on whether it’s knowingly and voluntarily made. |
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Burbine
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D waives his rights and begins to give statements even though a lawyer has been retained by his family and is waiting to talk to him.
i. Nothing in 5th A give him the right to be informed that a lawyer is available to give him advice. |
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Dickerson
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2 yrs after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted a code which provided that a confession would be admissible if it is voluntarily given. D had been indicted for robbery and moved to suppress a statement he gave to police before he’d been given Miranda warnings. District court granted the suppression, but ct of appeals reversed, holding that under the code section, Miranda warnings were not required if the confession was voluntary.
a. Held – Congress may not overrule the Miranda holding. |
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Martinez
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not an exclusionary rule case because the guy was not trying to suppress evidence. He got into an altercation with the police and is practically dying in the hospital after being shot 5 times by the police, and the officer questions him about what happened. They were more concerned about getting an admission from him than saving the guy’s life. He recovers and files a civil suit against the cop for violation of his constitutional rights.
a. Part of the Thomas’s opinion that 5 justices concur with is part that says he has to go back to the 9th Circuit with his due process claim, because they are rejecting his 5th A claim. b. His dp claim that the court is remanding is simply application of the traditional voluntariness test based on totality of the circumstances. c. Thomas says simply not giving someone their Miranda rights does not at that point violate their rights under the 5th A. d. Lesson in this case is that the voluntariness test is still alive and well. Miranda has not completely supplanted it. |
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Williams I
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little girl molested and murdered and they get the guy. He’s in the mansion and has and atty, who tells hi he won’t be questioned or say anything until he gets back to where they’re going. Police drive him across the state of Iowa without the lawyer and officer give him the Christian burial speech, and the guy leads them to the body. He’s in the mansion and 6th A has kicked in – right to counsel.
1. Was this an interrogation? The test is whether the reasonable police officer would think this conversation would elicit answers. 2. Court says there was a 6th A violation here. 3. An issue raised by the dissent was that this is a question of waiver – is the standard of waiver the same for the 5th and 6th A? But the lawyers didn’t treat this as a Massiah case, but as a Miranda case. The main issue for them was the interrogation. 4. 2 grounds to suppress the info here: a. Violation of Miranda because they interrogated and b. Violation of Massiah even if it wasn’t interrogation because of the absence of his attorney after formal proceedings began. |
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Kuhlmann v. Wilson
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use of passive informant. Wilson and 2 others shot a garage employee in the course of a robbery. He came forward as a witness and described what happened but denied any involvement. After his arraignment, police put him in a cell with Lee, a police informant. D told Lee his original story, but he later told him the truth and Lee told the police.
1. Held – police may use a passive secret informant to record a suspect’s admission in jail. 2. So long as the informant takes no action, beyond merely listening, that is designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks, the informant may report statements to the police. |
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Wade
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says that if the identification is going to be challenged, it is important for the lawyer to be there so he can see any weaknesses in the identification.
a. Wade has limited applicability now. Guarantees a lawyer at a lineup after formal proceedings have been done. So all police have to do is set up the lineup before any formal charges have been filed. b. 6th A right to counsel c. Wade said 6th A doesn’t apply to photo lineups unless it happens after formal proceedings have begun and right to counsel has attached. Court says we don’t need a lawyer there at that point to see how the photos are presented to the witness bc D isn’t even there at that point. Because the court can go back and look at the photos to see if there was a problem. d. What about other rights? i. 4th A – if a guy is unlawfully arrested and put in a lineup, will an ID in that lineup be considered fruit of an unlawful search? Questionable, because the only thing that will really be considered is the in-court ID and how do you show that that one is a product of the out of court ID? ii. Proper test is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality of the evidence to which instant objection is made had been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Application of this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors: (i) The prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, (ii) The existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, (iii) Any identification prior to lineup of another person, (iv) The identification by picture of the defendant prior to lineup, (v) Failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and (vi) The lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. So 4th A does present some potential in terms of inquiring whether the ID itself was a product of a prior violation of the D’s 4th A rights. iii. 5th A – is a guy asked to repeat “put the money in the bag” being compelled to incriminate himself? Or giving a voice sample? This stuff not a problem bc not considered testimony under the 5th A – so not compelled to incriminate yourself in these situations. iv. 14th A due process – say there’s a lineup before formal charges, D is dressed in jail clothes and 5 others in normal street clothes. D black, others are white. Witness ID’s “guy in the orange suit.” The underlying value here is fairness. This is where Court came out in Stovall and a number of cases in which grounds for suppression of out of court ID was simply suggestiveness of the procedure used. These mostly hung on the 14th A – depends on totality of circumstances utilized to obtain the ID and whether they were unduly suggestive. |
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Gilbert
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made the rule in U.S. v. Wade applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment. Also held that neither the 5th nor the 6th A bars the taking of a defendant’s handwriting sample, obtained from him in the absence of counsel and without advice that it could be used against him.
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Stovall
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most suggestive form – you present the witness with only one suspect and ask is this the guy?
a. Court found that bc victim was seriously injured and this confrontation took place in the hospital room, the circumstances outweighed the suggestiveness – so the ID was not suppressed. |
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Kirby
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Shard was robbed, and Kirby and another guy were stopped for interrogation on another matter. Each of them had articles on them with the name of Shard. They were arrested for a different crime and taken to the station, where the officers connected D with the Shard robbery. Shard was sent for, and he identified the two as the robbers. D was not advised of his right to counsel. He was indicted for robbery and convicted at trial, where Shard again identified him.
a. Held – a defendant does not have a right to counsel at a pretrial showup before being charged with a criminal offense. b. Before suspected become formally accused (indictment, information, prelim hearing, or arraignment) they have no absolute right to counsel. |
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Ash
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after D was indicted, prosecution witnesses identified him using photos without D’s counsel being present.
a. Held – the defendant does not have a right to have counsel present at a post-indictment photographic identification. b. Unlike a lineup, a photo display is not an adversarial confrontation. Unlike a post-indictment lineup, it is not a critical stage of the proceedings. The accused is not confronted by prosecution and does not require assistance of counsel to deal with intricacies of the law or the advocacy of the public prosecutor. |
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Brathwaite
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here the guy that gave the ID was an undercover cop. Court discussed factors to be considered for identifications:
a. Opportunity to view b. Degree of attention c. Accuracy of the description d. Level of certainty e. Time between crime and confrontation |
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Hopkins
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Grand Jury.
ruled that D has a right to both a prelim hearing and a grand jury. But CA adopted an initiative that overruled this and said there is no right to both. 7. CA Supreme Court ruling that a grand jury must be informed of exculpatory evidence. There is a danger that the grand jury may return an indictment without even being aware of evidence suggesting that the D is not guilty – and they should be aware of this before proceeding with the indictment. |
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Boyd
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Fourth Amendment Limitations.
case of guy involved with glass fraud. Prosecutor asked D to bring in all of this evidence. D said he didn’t have to bring in all of this evidence against himself. a. Court agreed with his argument. b. BUT now we now that the 5th A only protects you against testimony, not against bringing in documents. |
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Dionisio
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investigators were trying to match voices to gambling recordings. They called people in to give voice samples. D objected and said he was being compelled to incriminate himself under the 5th A.
a. Court says no – this info is not being obtained for testimonial significane, but simply to gain the physical properties of your voice. b. Defense argument relied upon Mississippi v. Davis, case in which suspects in a rape were rounded up and taken into custody and required to give a fingerprint exemplar. Supreme Court threw this out. Court in this case says it was not thrown out because it violated their rights to take their fingerprints, but bc it violated 4th A by taking them into custody and the fingerprints were the fruit of that unlawful procedure. c. Here, the grand jury subpoena isn’t seizure under the 4th A. |
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Mandujano
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prosecutor subpoenaed the target of a grand jury investigation to come in and testify. He gets on the witness stand and is warned by the prosecutor that he has a duty to answer and that there is perjury liability. D allegedly gave false answers and is charged with drug offenses but also for perjury. D claims he was not given sufficient Miranda warnings. He was told he could remain silent and he was told he could have a lawyer.
a. Court holds that this was not custodial interrogation – this is not the custody that we were concerned with in Miranda. It’s not the backroom of a police station – it’s in court with 23 people watching, so no worry about coercive techniques. b. So Miranda doesn’t apply – but even if it did and this was a violation, it would not preclude a perjury investigation – you can’t lie. |
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Kastigar
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immunity.
a. The only thing the 5th A protects you from is evidence that has been obtained against you in violation of your 5th A privilege – it doesn’t prevent you from prosecution altogether, just from use of the evidence. b. Until this case, prosecutors had been giving away too much in terms of transactional immunity. i. Transactional immunity – precludes prosecution for any transaction about which the witness testifies. ii. Testimonial (use) immunity – prohibits only the use, including derivative use (using immunized testimony as an investigative lead), of the witness’s testimony in any subsequent prosecution. It does not prohibit prosecution for the offense about which the witness is compelled to testify. This is all that is required by the 5th A. c. Use immunity (as opposed to transactional immunity) – the only thing the 5th A requires is that this evidence will not be used against you. |
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Fisher
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they are investigating fraudulent tax returns.
a. Court says the documents are not protected against the production simply because they incriminate you – that aspect of the Boyd ruling is gone, we don’t extend 5th A protection that far. b. But this case does recognize that in some circumstances, the act of producing the documents is a violation. In effect, you are testifying. That in itself can be incriminating – to the extent that it admits your knowledge of the nature of these transactions and how they are reflected in the record. But here, Court concluded that this was not a problem with these documents in this case – so no 5th A protection applicable here (but door is open for it to be applicable in other settings.) |
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Hubbell
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Hubbell is the lead partner in Hillary’s law firm, this is a case dealing with Whitewater stuff. They subpoena him to bring in documents. He plead the 5th and says it will incriminate him. Govt’s response is to give him use immunity for the production of those documents. It then turns around and uses those docs to prosecute him.
a. Court says Hubbell gets a pass because the govt didn’t meet their obligation of showing that the docs presented under immunity were not used to develop the prosecution against him in this case. |
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Standing
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A. Standing in context of 4th, 5th, 6th A violation – not talking about whether the D has a substantial enough interest in the case, but actually talking about how far we extend the benefits of the exclusionary rule.
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Rakas
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people in car and cops stop and search car and find a sawed off shotgun. The people charged are the people in the backseat and the court says no expectation of privacy under a seat in the car, so you don’t have standing to challenge the search and seizure.
1. Must have some sort of possessory interest in the items that are seized or being the object of the search. 2. This test of standing was abandoned by SC by saying that it is as simple as if he had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated. |
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Rawlings
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D takes drugs and give them to friend and tells her to put them in her purse. She does, and the cops come in and do a search which is questionably lawful bc there was no probable cause to believe that the drugs were in the purse and has to reason to tell her to empty it. She says these are not my drugs, they’re his, and then he asserts ownership.
1. SC says they will not say if this is an unlawful search or not bc he has no standing and he didn’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse so he can’t challenge it and try to have it suppressed bc of the illegality of the search. |
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Carter
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2 drug dealers asked to use a friend’s apartment to prepare the drugs for delivery and tell her if they let her use the apt, she can have some free drugs. Cops find out and don’t get a warrant, they look through the blinds and see the guys cutting drugs at kitchen table and this provides them with probable cause to make an arrest and seize the drugs. Ds say looking through the window is a search and they didn’t have prob cause or a warrant to poke through the window.
1. If the person they saw when they poked through the window was the woman who lived in the apt, this would be a different situation, but Court says these guys had no expectation of privacy in this house bc not theirs and thus no standing to challenge the search and seizure. |
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Wong Son
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police go into Blackie Toy’s laundry and chase him and handcuff him in his shop, he makes statements implicating Yee and Wong Son. Drugs are found in Yee’s apt so now Toy and Wong Son are seeking to suppress the drugs.
1. Can they claim the 5th A? Yes, because officers failed to get a warrant for the 5thA – so they can suppress their statements. 2. But no 6th A because not indicted yet. 3. But the claim they’re making is that arrested with no probable cause and the things they found were the fruit of the poisonous tree, they didn’t have a warrant either. Statements that Toy made and this is the only way it would have led them to Wong Son. 4. Court suppresses the stuff they found in Yee’s apt – it was a violation of 4th A right to arrest him without prob cause and this is what led to the next guy. 5. Wong Son is a different situation bc he didn’t make any statements in custody, he was taken, booked, and released and then the cops asked him to come voluntarily and he did. Court said bc he was released and then voluntarily submitted to questioning, there wasn’t any continuing operating effect of the arrest to say the statements were fruit of unlawful arrest. 6. Held – the confession and other witnesses must be excluded. The confession did not result from an intervening “independent act of free will.” |
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Brown
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suspect was unlawfully arrested for murder and taken to police station. Given Miranda warnings and waives his rights, and makes incriminating statements. Then argues that his statements should be suppressed even if waived because fruit of unlawful arrest. Argument made by prosecution in this case is based on Wong Son – interruption of chain of events by giving Miranda rights and waiver cuts off the effect of the illegal arrest.
1. But this is not the rule because if Miranda rights and waiver are treated as an automatic break in chain of events, then cops will not be deterred from violating the 4th A in previous actions. 2. Instead we look at totality of the circumstances: a. Temporal proximity – how much time elapsed between arrest and interrogation. (If it takes place a week later and Miranda waiver, strong indication of no fruit.) b. Immediate circumstances c. Flagrancy of the misconduct by the police. |
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Harris
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for valid arrest in suspect’s home, you need arrest warrant and probable cause. Here the police had probable cause, but didn’t get the arrest warrant – they go to his home and arrest him with prob cause but no warrant, remove him from his house and take him to the station and question him.
1. If just applying Brown v. Illinois, we’d say short time elapsed so shouldn’t make any difference. 2. But here, the Court says wait a minute – the illegality here was not the taking of the suspect into custody, but the entrance into his home. We won’t say this interrogation was the fruit of the entrance into his home – once they remove him from his home, he was lawfully arrested. |
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Williams II
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Williams retried without the statement given during the Christian burial speech. He is convicted again, but this time they use evidence found at the place they found the body.
1. If you can show that the body would have been found anyway independent of the confession – then the evidence can be used as if the poison tree never existed. 2. The prosecution made a good showing here with grids and stuff that they would have found the body within a few hours anyway – so fruit of poison tree didn’t apply here. |
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Murray
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1. Court said there was not enough information to determine if the motivation for the search was an independent factor aside from the illegal search.
2. If you can show that the warrant was due to a sneak preview by the cops, then even a valid warrant will be fruit of the poisonous tree. |
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Elstad
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court ruled we won’t apply fruit notion to Miranda violations. We just look at voluntariness of waiver.
2. Even if no violation, confession may still be suppressed because it’s fruit. It can also be fruit of an unlawful search – but the search has to be directed against him in order for him to have standing. Extent to which prior unlawful confession is a violation of Miranda – subsequent confession will not be fruit of this unlawful confession. But Fellers held that with respect to the 6th A, Elstad may not apply bc the confession may be the fruit of a 6th A violation. |
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Impeachment – exception that ate the rule.
Questioning outside Miranda |
if a guy invokes his rights, keep questioning him. Because if he tells a lie it can be used to impeach him in a different trial. Miranda only applies to this proceeding, not others. (Unlikely that officers will actually b motivated to violate amendments to get impeachment evidence.)
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Walter
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illegal search uncovered narcotics in D’s possession on a prior occasion, but didn’t deal with that on the current case. He got on stand and denied possessing and said he didn’t even know what narcotics are. Prosecution impeached him by showing that on a prior occasion he had drugs in his pocket, even though they were drugs found by an illegal search.
1. Court said we won’t allow the exclusionary rule to reach to perjury – he opened the door to this. 2. In Agnello (No longer good law, can now use to impeach even if prosecutor opens the door) case, court said Walter only applies when the D opens the door to the impeachment himself. Almost like waiver. If def makes a definitive statement “I don’t even know what narcotics are,” prior surpressed statements can be used at this point. DA cannot try to slip it in, “Do you know what narcotics are?” |
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Mincy
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C. Impeachment has even been extended to violations of Miranda that appear to have been intentional. Unless the statement was involuntary:
1. Mincy v. Arizona – court drew the line on statements being used for ANY purpose if the statement was involuntary. 2. This suggests the importance of when seeking to suppress, not only arguing 6th A violation and Miranda, but also arguing that it was involuntary. Involuntariness test that court put to one side in Miranda is still alive and well. |
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Harvey
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Court applied full impeachment exception to 6th A violations as well.
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James
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illegally acquired evidence was not being used to impeach D, but to impeach supporting witnesses called by the D to testify on his behalf. Testimony they offered was inconsistent with stuff the D had admitted subsequent to the commission of the offense.
1. How would the fact that D had admitted changing his hair color impeach the testimony of a witness who claimed he changed his haircolor before it took place? This is not prior inconsistency – not offered because it’s different, offered this impeachment evidence as contradictory evidence. If you bring in witnesses who say something different, then what you said at time of crime is let in as an admission. 2. Impeachment that is contridictory to the evidence at trial and not the defendant. Would not go that far to say that the evidence that had be surpressed can be used to impeach the witness. F. “Impeachment exception” actually a misnomer – because often we are letting it in not to impeach, but to contradict. When allowed in to contradict, the evidence bolsters the prosecution’s case |
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Doyle
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after a Miranda warning, silence is ambiguous. We don’t know if the silence is because he is guilty or because he wants his constitutional protection – therefore, to use silence against him will not be permitted.
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Weir
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Court presented with post-arrest silence without a Miranda warning. Officer arrests and doesn’t give warning, D says nothing. Then comes up with great explanation at trial.
a. Prosecution is allowed to ask why he didn’t tell the police in this case. Silence is not rendered ambiguous by this situation when no warning was given. b. What if D just knew about his right anyway and therefore didn’t speak? Court said you can explain this to the jury; up to them to decide. c. Doesn’t violate Miranda if the officer doesn’t question the defendant and the def gives statement without Miranda. |
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Review of Rights
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• 4th A – protects our privacy. You shall not intrude on someone’s privacy in an unreasonable way. Sliding scale.
• 5th A – you can’t interrogate a suspect in custody without getting a valid waiver of the right – must warn him of the right. Protection of autonomy – right to give the finger to the government. No person shall be compelled to incriminate himself. No sliding scale here. • 6th A – a bar to contacting and eliciting evidence from the suspect in the absence of his lawyer once formal proceedings have begun. Promotes fairness of the proceedings. • 14th A – due process. Even when all of these other rights have been waived, under due process you still can’t extract a confession that will be involuntary. Free will. |
