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59 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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argument
p 33 |
a set of logically connected statements, typically in the form of a set of premises and a conclusion.
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categorical syllogism
p 33 |
a specific type of argument that consists of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion
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comparative method
p 19 |
a/k/a Mill's methods, involves the systematic search for the necessary and sufficient causes of political phenomena
*Method of Agreement *Method of Difference |
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conclusion
p 33 (in an argument) |
a claim that is thought to be supported by the premises
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critical test
p 45 |
one that allows the analyst to use observation to distinguish between two or more competing explanations of the same phenomenon
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deterministic cause
p 28 |
one that always produces a specific outcome.
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falsifiable
p 41 |
A scientific statement that is potentially testable - there must be some imaginable observation that could falsify or refute it.
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falsificationism
p 40 |
An approach to science which scientists generate testable hypotheses from theories designed to explain phenomena of interest. (Emphasizes that scientific theories are constantly called into Qs and that their merit lies only in how well they stand up to rigorous testing).
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interaction effect
p 29 |
occurs when the effect of one variable on an outcome depends on the value of another variable
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invalid argument
p 33 |
one in which, if you accept the premises, then you are free to accept or reject the conclusion.
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Method of Agreement
p 25 |
compares cases that "agree" in regard to the outcome to be explained.
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Method of Difference
p 25 |
compares cases that "differ" in regard to the outcome to be explained.
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necessary and sufficient condition
p 21 |
a circumstance in whose absence the event in Qs will not occur and in whose presence the event in Qs must occur.
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necessary condition
p 21 |
a circumstance in whose absence the event in Qs cannot occur.
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sufficient condition
p 21 |
a circumstance in whose presence the event in Qs must occur.
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premise
p 33 |
a statement that is presumed to be true within the context of an argument leading to a conclusion.
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probabilistic cause
p 28 |
one that influences the probability of a specific outcome.
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scientific method
p 42 |
describes the process by which scientists learn about the world.
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tautology
p 42 |
a statement that is true by definition.
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theory
p 43 |
A set of logically consistent statements that tell us why the things that we observe occur. A theory is sometimes referred to as a model or an explanation.
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uniformity of nature
p 43 |
This principle asserts that nature's operating mechanisms are unchanging in the sense that if X causes Y today, then it will also cause Y tomorrow and the next day, and so on.
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valid argument
p 33 |
one in which, ifyou accept the premises, then you are complelled to accept the conclusion.
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bakcward induction
p 65 |
the process of reasoning backward, from the end of a game or situation to the beginning, in order to determine an optimal cause of action.
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branches
p. 59 |
represent the actions that can be taken at choice nodes.
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choice node
p 59 |
a point in an extensive form game at which a player must choose an action.
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exit
p 57 |
You accept that there has been a deleterious change in your environment and you alter your behavior to achive the best outcome possible given your new environment.
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extensive form game
p 59 |
players make their choices sequentially. In a normal, or strategic form game, players make their choices simultaneously.
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game
p 58 |
a situation in which an individual's ability to achieve her goals depends on the choices made by other actors.
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game theory
p 58 |
a fundamental tool for analyzing strategic situations.
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game tree
p 59 |
the entire specification of choice nodes and branches that comprise an entesive form game.
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loyalty
p 57 |
you accept the fact that your environment has changed and make no change to your behavior.
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Nash equlibrium
p 59 |
a set of strategies in a game (one for each player) such taht no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her mind given what the other players are doing.
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payoffs
p 59 |
in a game indicate how the players value each of the possible outcomes.
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Normal or Strategic form game
p 59 |
players make their choices simultaneously
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politics
p 56 |
the subset of human behavior that involves the use of power or influence.
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strategic situation
p 58 |
one in which the choices of one actor depend on the choices made by other actors.
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strategy
p 59 |
for playing a game is a complete plan of action that specifies what a player would do under every possible circumstance.
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subgame
p 65 |
the part of an extensive form game beginning at one choice node and including all succeeding nodes.
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subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
p 65 |
a set of strategies such taht each player is playing a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
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terminal node
p 59 |
a place where the game ends.
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voice
p 57 |
You use your "voice" (complain, protest, lobby, or take direct action) to try to change the environment back to its original condition.
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best reply
p 109 |
the action that yields the highest payoff given what the other player is doing.
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cardinal payoffs
p 115 |
allow us to know how much more the players prefer one outcome to another.
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civil right
p 114 |
does not arise naturally but is instead created by the state through laws; as such, a civil right cannot exist in the state of nature.
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contractarian view of the state
p 105 |
sees the creation of the state as resulting from a social contract between individuals in the state of nature in which the state provides security in exchange for obedience from the citizen.
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discount factor
p 142 |
tells us the rate at which future benefits are discounted compared with today's benefits; in effect, it tells us how much people value the future.
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dominant strategy
p 112 |
the strategy is a best reply to all of the other player's strategies
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dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium
p 112 |
occurs when both players have a dominant strategy.
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failed state
p 94 |
a statelike entity that cannot coerce and is unable to successfully control the inhabitants of a given territory.
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nation
p 92 |
a group of people who share some sort of common identity like a language, religion, ethnicity, or shared history.
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nation-state
p 92 |
a state in which a single nation predominates and the legal, social, demographic, and geographic boundaries of the state are connected in important ways to that nation.
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natural right
p 114 |
a universal right that is inherent in the nature of living beings; as such, can exist even in the state of nature.
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ordinal payoffs
p 108 |
allow us to know how a player ranks the possible outcomes; they do not tell us how much more a player prefers one outcome to another.
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payoff matrix
p 107 |
a table that represents the strategies and payoffs available to players in strategic or normal form games.
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predatory view of the state
p 119 |
holds that states that exercise an effective control over the use of violence are in a position to threaten the security of citizens; makes it possible for them to exploit citizens they have a duty to protect.
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preference ordering
p 108 |
indicates how a player ranks the possible outcomes of a game.
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present value
p 143 |
a stream of benefits tells us how much this stream of future benefits is worth to us today.
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social contract
p 114 |
an implicit agreement among individuals in the state of nature to create and empower the state; outlines the rights and responsibilities of the state and the citizens in regard to each other.
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state of nature
p 105 |
term used to describe situations in which there is no state.
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