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13 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Jensen & Meckling (1976) |
Agency costs. 'Separation & control', private benefits, costs of debt/outside equity |
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Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) |
Shareholder Rights, based on governance index G. Stronger rights, higher firm value, higher sales, growth, lower capex, fewer acquisitions |
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Ahern & Dittmar (2012) |
Norwegian women on boards. Negative impact of mandated board change on firm value |
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Hwang&Kim (2009) |
Social ties. 87% conventionally independent, only 62% conventionally & socially independent |
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Peyer & Vermaelen (2009) |
Buy back anomalies. Open market repurchases are a response to a market overreaction to bad news |
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Yermack (1996) |
Board size. Small boards more effective, better financial ratios & CEO performance. Inverse relation board size firm value. Convex: largest fraction lost value occurs as boards grow from small to medium |
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Betrand & Mullainathan (2001) |
CEO luck. Lucky dollar vs general |
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Kulich et al. (2011) |
Men higher & more sensitive to bonuses. Performance sensitivity. |
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Goergen & Renneboog (2008) |
Contractual corporate governance. Cross border m&a, (re)incorporation, cross listing. Enable investor to choose preferred level of investor protection & regulation |
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Morck, Schleifer & Vishny (1986) |
Board ownership & market valuation. Convergence of interest hypothesis & entrenchment hypothesis |
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Gaspar, Matta, Matos (2005) |
Investment horizons. Short term target shareholders more likely to receive bid but lower premium. Short term bidder shareholders more likely to suffer bigger loss |
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Kempf, Manconi & Spalt (2015) |
Shareholder distraction. Firms with distracted shareholders more likely to announce diversifying acquisitions, generate negative short run long run returns. |
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Renneboog & Simons (2009) |
Public to private. Reemerged market for LBOs since second half 1990s. |