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13 Cards in this Set

  • Front
  • Back

Jensen & Meckling (1976)

Agency costs. 'Separation & control', private benefits, costs of debt/outside equity

Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003)

Shareholder Rights, based on governance index G. Stronger rights, higher firm value, higher sales, growth, lower capex, fewer acquisitions

Ahern & Dittmar (2012)

Norwegian women on boards. Negative impact of mandated board change on firm value

Hwang&Kim (2009)

Social ties. 87% conventionally independent, only 62% conventionally & socially independent

Peyer & Vermaelen (2009)

Buy back anomalies. Open market repurchases are a response to a market overreaction to bad news

Yermack (1996)

Board size. Small boards more effective, better financial ratios & CEO performance. Inverse relation board size firm value. Convex: largest fraction lost value occurs as boards grow from small to medium

Betrand & Mullainathan (2001)

CEO luck. Lucky dollar vs general

Kulich et al. (2011)

Men higher & more sensitive to bonuses. Performance sensitivity.

Goergen & Renneboog (2008)

Contractual corporate governance. Cross border m&a, (re)incorporation, cross listing. Enable investor to choose preferred level of investor protection & regulation

Morck, Schleifer & Vishny (1986)

Board ownership & market valuation. Convergence of interest hypothesis & entrenchment hypothesis

Gaspar, Matta, Matos (2005)

Investment horizons. Short term target shareholders more likely to receive bid but lower premium. Short term bidder shareholders more likely to suffer bigger loss

Kempf, Manconi & Spalt (2015)

Shareholder distraction. Firms with distracted shareholders more likely to announce diversifying acquisitions, generate negative short run long run returns.

Renneboog & Simons (2009)

Public to private. Reemerged market for LBOs since second half 1990s.