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52 Cards in this Set
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Munn v. Illinois (1876) United States Supreme Court |
Guidelines and license requirements for the inspection of grain and storage in public warehouses. Operation without a license or bond payment, and higher storage and handling rates that were higher than those fixed by law. While the property was owned privately, the use was public. Unconstitutional challenge failed. |
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Attorney General v. Williams (1903) United States Supreme Court |
Building height regs for buildings on certain Boston streets. Massachusetts Attny. General sought to enjoin maintenance of a building above the 90' height limit. Found to be a condemnation and a taking for public use. Adequate provision for payment of damages sustained and not in conflict with consitution.
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Cochran v. Preston (1908) Maryland Court of Appeals |
Height restriction of 70' on certain Baltimore Streets surrounding Washington Monument. Permit to build additional story to apartment house denied (78' height). Court found reason for statute was to protect buildings and contents from ravages of fire. Such purpose was entirely legitimate and a valid exercise of police power. |
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Welch v. Swasey (1909) United States Supreme Court |
Building permit in Boston denied due to being taller than the 80-100' feet allowed. Valid exercise of police power if not unreasonable or inappropriate and were made for the safety, comfort, or convenience of the people. |
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Eubank v City of Richmond (1912) United States Supreme Court |
City of Richmond municipal ordinance provided that upon request of 2/3 of abutting property owners, a committee on streets would establish front setbacks for specific proposals. Ordinance found to violate the Constitution as it deprived owner due process and equal protection. One person having 2/3 ownership of a block inappropriately had power against less collective ownership. Unreasonable exercise of police power and ordinance deemed invalid. |
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Hadacheck v. Sebastian (1915) United States Supreme Court |
Operation/prohibition of a brickyard within city limits. Neighbors found to be seriously incommoded by brickyard operations, prohibition found not arbitrary. Found to be a valid exercise of police powers. |
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Thomas Cusack v. Chicago (1917) United States Supreme Court |
Majority consent of owners with frontage on street for billboard or signboard placement on a block with 1/2 residential use. Billboards shown to foster offensive and unsanitary conditions, and immoral practices, loiterers and criminal activity. Found to be valid exercise in police power to protect health, safety and welfare. |
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Town of Windsor v. Whitney et al. (1920) Connecticut Supreme Court |
Developer opened streets in a subdivision and sold lots without review and layout of streets and public infrastructure by Town Plan Commission. Court found reasonable regulation of property rights is appropriate, is not a takings and is not in breach of due process. |
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Romar Realty v. Board of Commissioners (1921) New Jersey Supreme Court |
Developer planned 1-story stores in violation of front setback regulations. Court found beautification of street was not necessity and was not a proper exercise of police power. Ordinance was invalid. |
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Inspector of Building of Lowell v. Stoklosa (1924) Massachusetts Supreme Court |
City of Lowell aimed to prevent builder from constructing building for business purposes in prohibited zone. Found to not be unreasonable, and consent of landowners during public hearing with City council was not a delegation of legislative power. Ordinance upheld. |
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Zahn v. Public Works of Los Angeles (1925) California Supreme Court |
Challenged setbacks enacted pursuant to a general comprehensive zoning plan. If plan is based on public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and applied fairly and impartially, it's a valid exercise of police power. |
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty (1926) United States Supreme Court |
68 acre tract of land in Euclid where an comp zoning plan and ordinance regulated and restricted location of uses, and dimensional requirements. The restriction and control of private land was a valid exercise in police power. |
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Washington Ex Re. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge (1928) United States Supreme Court |
Philanthropic home for aged and poor in a former prior residence. Proposal to replace building required consent of 2/3 of property owners within 400'...no municipal review, neighborhood consent was final approval. Found to be unwarranted delegation of power and repugnant of the 14th amendment.
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Jones v. City of Los Angeles (1930) California Supreme Court |
Ordinance enacted independently of general zoning plan targeting toward hospitals/mentally ill. Found valid to prohibit future establishment of these types of businesses, but invalid in its application to take away an existing facilities right to do business. |
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Dowsey v. Kensington (1931) N.Y. Court of Appeals |
Kensington Village zoning ordinance restricted a certain area to detached single family dwellings only. Court found that devaluation of property via use limitations without good reason to beautify the remaining area was not a valid exercise of police power. |
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Welton v. Hamilton (1931) Illinois Supreme Court |
Apartment building, non-compliant to regulations initially not approved by commissioner of buildings but approved on appeal to City Board of Appeals. Upon argument court found that the Board of Appeals held no authority to approve a variance, however with the only hardship being monetary (smaller building) it was not sufficient reason to grant in exercising police power for the good of the public. |
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US v. Certain Lands, City of Louisville Kentucky (1935) United States Federal District Court |
Condemnation of property by US Government to build low-cost housing and slum clearance project. Government had no authority to exercise eminent domain for private use (must be public) and also did not possess such police power. Condemnation was unlawful. |
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NYC Housing Authority v. Muller (1936) New York Court of Appeals |
NYC Housing Authority condemnation of property for clearing of slums and redevelopment. Public acquisition for private use/redevelopment normally invalid, however since carried out in the public interest it constituted a public benefit and therefore public use. |
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Austin v. Older (1938) Michigan Supreme Court |
Eve of Zoning Ordinance adoption, gas station in soon-to-be residential district constructed. Later upon request to remodel, this non-conforming use was not permitted to do so. Court found that the proposed structure was not in conformance with ordinance and refusal was proper and not abuse of discretion. Refusing permit was not arbitrary or unreasonable. |
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People Tuohy v. Chicago (1946) Illinois Supreme Court |
Slum Clearance Bonds to acquire property for rehab of blighted areas. Court maintained that public use, as related to eminent domain, and that in acquisition according to Plan is public and not private, and eminent domain justified. Clearing of slums, public nuisances, also authorized by Constitution. |
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Ayres v. City of Los Angeles (1949) California Supreme Court |
Subdivision which City required dedication of land for street use in form of conditions. Court found the conditions were valid and reasonably related to public health, safety & general welfare, and there was a legal nexus. |
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Lordship Park Assoc. v Board of Zoning Appeals (1950) Connecticut Supreme Court |
Subdivision refusal based on Town 'preliminary development plan' which required a specific road constructed; however, it was adopted without being heard by public and no regulations adopted based on it. Adoption must vet the furtherance of public welfare with public notification. Denial not justified. |
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Miller v. City of Beaver Falls (1951) Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
City plan stating parks/playgrounds 'have been or may be laid out but not opened'. Court found plotting areas for parks/playgrounds and 3-year freeze was a taking by "possibility, contingency, blockade and subterfuge' in violation of the Constitution, and required just compensation. |
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Fischer v. Bedminister Township (1952) New Jersey Supreme Court |
Zoning Ordinance adopted creating zoning use districts. Court found the requirements and ordinance was reasonable and also that the petitioner could have requested a variance. |
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Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne (1952) New Jersey Supreme Court |
Developer challenged minimum dwelling size and residential district designation. Court found municipality has power to impose size requirements within a zoning ordinance to protect community character. Ordinance upheld. |
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Akron v. Chapman (1953) Ohio Supreme Court |
Junkyard in residential zone, ordinance made it non-conforming with stipulation that it shall be discontinued after period of reasonable time. When discontinuance was pursued in Court it was found that the ordinance deprived continued lawful use and was in violation of State and US Constitutions. |
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Berman v. Parker (1954) United States Supreme Court |
Washington DC blighted property clearance, large area, an existing nonconforming commercial use that didn't mean the litteral interpretation of ordinance. Court found public welfare is broad and inclusive, and includes spiritual and aesthetic values. If acquisition in fulfillment of a plan is required, it may do so. |
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Harbison v. City of Buffalo (1958) New York Court of Appeals |
Legally existing non-conforming junkyard required to cease use in 3-years. Found to be OK if relatively slight and insubstantial loss to property or where public benefit deemed greater than detriment to owner. If impact/loss to owner were great enough, ordinance would be unconstitutional. |
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Jenad v. Village of Scarsdale (1966) New York Court of Appeals |
Planning Board required dedication of land for park purposes or fee-in-lieu payment to Village; Court found required dedication valid if reasonably connected to need for park, school or playgrounds as part of subdivision approval. Also found fee-in-lieu not a tax but reasonable form of planning. |
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Jones v. Mayer (1968) United States Supreme Court |
Home sale refused to buyers who were African-American. Court held that the 13th Amendment barred all racial discrimination, private and public, and was valid exercise of power for Congress to enforce. Sale to African-Americans could not be refused. |
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Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders (1970) Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Purchase of 140-acre tract contingent upon rezone from 2-acre (exterior)/3-acre interior zoning to 1-acre for single-family dwellings. Court held that while density was a general concern, at some point it becomes private preference, sewerage not valid argument associated with lot size. Considered exclusionary zoning lacking justification and unconstitutional. |
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Serrano v. Priest (1971) United States Supreme Court |
California public school financing system with substantial dependence on local property taxes, disparity on revenue available per pupil in districts unconstitutional. Court held that the system invidiously discriminated because it made the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. |
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Golden v. Town of Ramapo (1971) New York Court of Appeals |
Ordinance amendment required subdivision review & Special Use Permit approval by Planning Board. Planning Board denied subdivision approval without first granting Special Use Permit. Court found amendment was invalid as it was not authorized in enabling law. Ramapo usurped its power by regulating population growth in a manner which had not been delegated to it. |
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Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (1972) New Jersey Supreme Court |
Ordinance permitted multi-family dwellings only on farm for farmers and 200' from property lines. Court found the Township exhibited economic discrimination through zoning ordinance. Poor were deprived of adequate housing opportunities and Township used federal, state, county, and local finances and resources solely for the betterment of middle and upper-income persons. Ordinance declared invalid. |
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Fasano v. County Commissioners of Washington Co. (1973) Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal of approval of zone change to allow for mobile home park and what standards should be met. Court found rezone should be in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan in that there is a public need and that need will be served. Court found the County did not demonstrate that the zone change was in accordance with comp plan or relevant statute, affirming the zone change was invalid. |
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Board of Supervisors of Fairfax Co. v. Snell Construction Corp. (1974) Virginia Supreme Court |
Piecemeal reduction of permissible residential density (downzoning) on proposed development. Ordinance was approved and amended shortly thereafter (11 months), Court found no substantial change in circumstances. To justify piecemeal downzoning, changed circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety or welfare has occurred. Newly elected governing body with different political objectives is not such a change. Ordinance void.
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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974) United States Supreme Court |
Village restricted land use to single-family dwelling only, excluding lodging/boarding/multi-family dwellings, and defined single housekeeping unit. Court found ordinance limiting residential occupancy to traditional families a valid exercise of police power. Police power is not confined to elimination of slums, but ample to layout zones family values make sanctuary for people. |
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Baker v. City of Milwaukie (1975) Oregon Supreme Court |
Land area zoned as residential apartment-business office, new Comp plan downzoned it but existing zoning ordinance not updated. Court found City had a duty to enact zoning ordinances in accordance with Comp Plan. Court held that Comp Plan was the controlling land use planning instrument for the City and has a duty to zone in accord with the Plan. Ordinance was invalid. |
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Construction Indust. Assn. of Sonoma Co. v. City of Petaluma (1975) United states District Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit |
5-year Petaluma Plan put in place to to fix housing development growth-rate at 500 dwelling units per year to protect small town character and surrounding open space. Court found the Plan was not arbitrary or unreasonable and didn't exclude or impact any particular group. Court concluded the concept of public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold the desire of growth at an orderly and deliberate pace. |
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Warth v. Seldin (1975) United States Supreme Court |
Penfield, NY (Rochester suburb) claimed to have ordinance that allocated 98% of Town vacant land to single-family detached housing and imposed unreasonable requirements thereby discriminating against low to moderate income families who couldn't afford to build in such manner. Courts found petitioners lacked standing and that they must allege specific concrete facts showing harm and court ruling in favor would benefit them. |
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Carla Hills v. Dorothy Gautreaux (1976) United States Supreme Court |
Challenged by african-american tenants in Chicago, that Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and HUD deliberately selected family public housing Sites to avoid placement of black families in white neighborhoods. Court found practice unconstitutional with the 5th Amendment and ordered to remedy via integration outside of City and within Chicago suburbs. |
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City of Eastlake v. Forest City Ent. (1976) United States Supreme Court |
Any change in land use agreed to by City Council required 55% approval vote in referendum. Proposed high-rise apartment rejected by Planning Commission and referendum. Referendum not delegation of legislative power but is the basis for the Town meeting and a means for direct political participation and is valid exercise. |
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Coleman Young Mayor of Detroit v. American Mini Theatres (1976) United States Supreme Court |
Adult theater may not be within 1,000 feet of any two other regulated (adult) uses. On challenge, Court found a municipality may control the location of all types of motion picture theaters, as well as location of the commercial establishments, either by specific zones or dispersion throughout city. |
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Associated Homes v. Livermore (1976) California Supreme Court |
Residential building permit moratorium until educational, sewage, and water supply facilities complied with specific standards. Court found ordinance neither invalid as it was enacted by initiative, nor unconstitutional by reason of vagueness. However, regional impacts would need to be proven further...
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Development Corp. (1977) United States Supreme Court |
Nonprofit developer contracted to purchase land and build racially integrated low and moderate income housing which needed a rezone that was denied. As challenged the Court found that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show violation of Equal Protection Clause. Developer was unable to demonstrate discriminatory intent and Village decision upheld. |
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Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison (1977) New Jersey Supreme Court |
Existing PUD and cluster development regulations argued to be cost prohibitive for low-mod income residents and exclusionary despite historical boom in Town growth. Court found ordinance to be impermissibly exclusionary and remanded for ordinance correction and revision. |
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Penn Central Transport Co. v. City of New York (1978) United States Supreme Court |
Proposed redevelopment of Grand Central Terminal, a landmark site, where owner proposed multi-story office building over the Terminal. Landmarks Preservation Commission rejected plans and decision was challenged as a 'taking' without just compensation. Court found that denial doesn't automatically result in a taking, that landmark laws based on comp plan are not discriminatory, and preexisting air rights were eligible for TDR. |
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First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (1987) United States Supreme Court |
Ordinance prohibiting reconstruction of church camps due to flooding but permitted church to conduct camping and teaching activities at campgrounds. Church argued it was a regulatory taking seeking monetary damages as remedy for inverse condemnation. Court overruled the court's prior holding that a property owner was not entitled to monetary damages for a land use regulatory restriction found to be a taking. However, reasonableness of ordinance was justified on remand because it substantially advanced a legitimate public safety interest, did not deprive economically viable use of property, and moratorium timeframe reasonable length and approach. |
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) United States Supreme Court |
Proposed replacement of small beach bungalow with larger 3-bedroom dwelling located between two public beaches. Coastal Commission required lateral easement to address visual accessibility, increase private use of the beach. Court found condition invalid as unconstitutional taking as the easement did not directly affect the public's ability to view the ocean. There was no nexus between purpose of beach visibility and condition requiring lateral public access easement across the beach. |
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) United States Supreme Court |
Takings challenge where state law barred construction of beachfront lots. Court found a regulation to prevent public harm is not sufficient to bring with it 'noxious use' exception to a takings claim and where regulation prevents all economically beneficial use government generally required to compensate owner except under narrow exceptions. |
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Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) United States Supreme Court |
Proposal to double size of existing plumbing & electrical store in business district. Planning Commission conditioned approval on dedication of flood zone area for storm drain system improvement and dedicate 15-foot strip of land as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. Court stated there must be essential nexus between legitimate state interest and the permit exaction. Court found no valid relationship with the required exaction, and it could have been addressed by other means. This case established two-part inquiry to determine the nexus: (1) nexus between legitimate state interest and condition imposed, and (2) degree of condition imposed bear reasonable relationship to projected impact of development? |
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San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill (2002) United States District Court Northern District of California |
Hospital purchased for use as college campus, unsuccessful in rezone application as City intended to retain existing hospital zoning district. Court found city decision constitutional in that the regulation was neutral by not discriminating on it's face. Also found that RLUIPA does not grant religious institutions immunity from land use regulations. |
