Asian Studies Exam 2

Front 1

revisionist states

Back 1

revisionist states or challengers want a new place for themselves in int’l society commensurate with their power; reversal of power relations

Front 2

status quo states--

Back 2

¨status quo states: states that have participated in designing the rules of the game and stand to benefit from these rules; maintenance of the distribution of bop.

Front 3

Mercantilism

Back 3

Mercantilism: export manufactured products in order to import needed resources; promote private-sector exports (tax policy, preferential access to foreign currency); privileging producers over consumers and associating national security with trade surplus; protection shifted over time from advancing sectors to declining ones

Front 4

ASEAN (Association of SE Asian Nations)

Back 4

Is a geo-political and economic organization of 10 countries located in South Asia, which was formed on 8 August 1967, by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Since then, membership was expanded to include Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. It aims at the acceleartion of economic growth, social progress, cultural development among its members, the protection of the peace and stability of the region, and to provide opportunities for member countries to discuss differences peacefully.

Front 5

APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)

Back 5

Is a forum of 21 Pacific Rim Countries (refers to the countries and cities located around the edge of the Pacific Ocean- ex. Auckland, Hong Kong, Lima, Los Angeles, Seattle, Shaghai) to cooperate on regional trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation. It's objective is to enhance economic growth and prosperity in the region and to strengthen the Asia-Pacific community.

Front 6

Yoshida Doctrine

Back 6

The Yoshida Doctrine, named after Japan's post-World War II Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, involved placing highest national priority on economic development, while simultaneously keeping a low diplomatic profile.[1]
Yoshida's aim was to focus all available means on an economic recovery after World War II while leaving Japan's military defense to the United States

Front 7

1972- SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

Back 7

The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), was an important diplomatic document issued by the United States of America and the People's Republic of China on February 27, 1972 during President Richard Nixon's visit to China. The document pledged that it was in the interest of all nations for the United States and China to work towards the normalization of their relations, although this would not occur until the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations seven years later.
The US and China also agreed that neither they nor any other power should "seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region". This was of particular importance to China, who shared a militarized border with the Soviet Union.

Front 8

Why did the U.S. normalize its relations with China?

Back 8

Carter: active interest in détente with the Soviet Union; mutually beneficial arms control agreement to constrain Soviet power; maintain an official presence in TW; normalization with China= a low priority.
}China: interested in rapid normalization;
}1977-1978 US’s greater concern about Soviet power→ greater importance of China as a strategic partner; p. 92. → Jan. 1,1979 China and US established diplomatic relations; →greater Sino-Japanese cooperation; 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship; Sino-Japanese military ties.

Front 9

2. Why did the triangular relations among US, PRC, and USSR begin to unravel after 1972?

Back 9

China is taking regional initiatives in trade liberalization;
4. }ACFTA , the world's biggest free trade area (covering a market of 1.7 billion consumers), came into effect on Jan 1, 2010. But local businessmen and trade experts fear obstacles such as corruption and red tape could well stop them from using it to its full potential.
5. }China has just overtaken the United States to become ASEAN's third largest trading partner, and will leap Japan and the EU to become “number one” within the first few years of the FTA.
6. }Under ACFTA, China and the six founding ASEAN countries — Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand — are to eliminate barriers to investment and tariffs on 90 percent of products.
7. }Later ASEAN members, including Vietnam and Cambodia, have until 2015 to follow suit.
8. }The average tariff rate China charged on ASEAN goods would be cut to 0.1% from 9.8%. Average tariffs imposed on Chinese goods by ASEAN states will fall to 0.6% from 12.8%.

Front 10

One of the pronounced shifts in Chinese foreign policy over the past decade has been Beijing’s active participation in regional economic cooperation in East Asia, such as APEC, APT, and the proposed China-ASEAN FTA. What explain China’s shift to support for Asian economic regionalism in the 1990s?

Back 10

¢China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: driven more by politics (regional influence) and China’s relations with Japan, SK and US; it would increase ASEAN’s GDP by 1% but raise China’s GDP by only 0.3%.
¢ACFTA , the world's biggest free trade area (covering a market of 1.7 billion consumers), came into effect on Jan 1, 2010.

Front 11

Why does Brzezinski think China is a status quo power? Why does Mearsheimer predict that China will inevitably challenge the US power?
¨Defining characteristics of the int’l system: states operate in anarchy; all great powers have some offensive military capability; no state can know the future intentions of other states with certainty; →the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals.

Back 11

¨China will strive to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors, esp. Japan and Russia, to ensure that no state in Asia can threaten it. Try to push the US out of Asia.
¨Brzezinski: Nukes change everything! Avoidance of direct conflict for fear of the total elimination of societies.
¨Mearsheimer: Other factors may override economic considerations, eg. Germany & Japan.
¨Brzezinski: doubts that China could push the US out of Asia. Even if it could, China would not want to live with the consequence: a powerful, nationalistic, and nuclear-armed Japan. The most worrisome danger is tensions over TW, as the US would enter the conflict.
Mearsheimer: “No amount of good will can ameliorate the intense security competition that will set in as an aspiring hegemon appears in Asia.

Front 12

9. 5- What are the three major factors that shaped Japan’s strategic outlook/ national security after WWII?

Back 12

10. Geography: small, resource-poor island nation→ highly dependent on world markets for raw materials, esp. oil and natural gas→ important to maintain access to world markets.
11. Burden of history: Japanese imperial expansion b/t 1890 and 1945 left behind bitter memories in much of Asia, esp. Korea and China→ fear of a remilitarized Japan, threat to its neighbors, possible arms race.
12. Geostrategic environment: “Yoshida doctrine” p. 140; highly dependent on the US for security; the fear of abandonment and entanglement→ keep Am allies at arms length; the Mutual Security Treaty 1952, cooperation was restricted to the defense of Japan.

Front 13

What are the major causes of trade frictions between Japan and its trading partners? (Note: focus on Japan’s trade surpluses, Japan’s mercantilism, 2 characteristics of Japan’s trade, and market access).

Back 13

—Mercantilism: export manufactured products in order to import needed resources; promote private-sector exports (tax policy, preferential access to foreign currency); privileging producers over consumers and associating national security with trade surplus; protection shifted over time from advancing sectors to declining ones.
—2 characteristics of Japanese trade:
1)sheer size of the trade and current account surpluses (avrg. >$100 bn per year in 1990s);
2)low levels of intraindustry trade:(gov policies + industrial structure + persistence of cartels pervasive in declining industries); nontariff barriers; keiretsu (long-term supplier or vendor relations)→ difficult for foreign firms to break into the supply chain. 7
—Japan’s trade surpluses: protection from Japanese competitors through tariffs, quotas, “voluntary export restraints”
—Market access: Japanese agricultural import barriers; protecting declining industries.
—Managed trade: negotiating market shares of each country’s products; export restraints and market access.
—Japan & China: fear of the imports of inexpensive Chinese products; impose “safeguard” provisions, antidumping in steel and textiles.

Front 14

Why was the level of net capital outflow from Japan high in the 1980s?

Back 14

—1980s large current account surpluses + appreciation of yen (1985-87 The Plaza-Lourve Accords→almost double the value of the yen)→ investment abroad inexpensive; changed comparative advantage; trade & FDI, “export platforms” to circumvent trade barriers; eg. all the major Japanese auto makers have sought to establish subsidiaries or joint ventures within China

Front 15

Why did Alastair Johnston argue that describing China as a revisionist or non-status quo state is not accurate? (Note: focus on China’s performance on the five indicators). ¨

Back 15

He explores the degree to which China’s leaders are pursuing status quo or revisionist foreign policies. His conclusion: Describing China as a revisionist or non-status quo state is not accurate.
¨China has become more integrated into and more cooperative within int’l institutions than ever before.
¨5 indicators
1.Participation rates in int’l institutions; during the 1990s China became overinvolved in int’l org for its level of development.
2.Degree of compliance with int’l norms ;
3.Behavior toward the “rules of the game”;
4.Revisionist preferences and the distribution of power; revise the status quo of TW, US hegemony preferable to Japanese hegemony.
Revisionist behavior and the distribution of power