Taylor states that under the causal approach, “actions are events which are peculiar in that they are brought about by desires, or intentions, or combinations of desires and beliefs. As events, actions may be described among other ways as physical movements…In this, they resemble a host of other events which are not actions. What distinguishes them is a peculiar type of psychological cause: that they are brought on by desires or intentions” (Taylor, pg. 78). To understand an action is to understand the contents of the mental state that precedes the movement since they are separate and prior to our actions. As agents, we may have privileged access to our beliefs, desires, or intentions, which give us knowledge of our own actions. Our actions can serve to specify these mental states but an action may also fail to express an agent if it doesn’t reflect the internal mental states of the agent. Davidson is of the belief that non-causal understandings ultimately fail where causal explanation does not in making clear why an agent performs an action. In explaining his dissatisfaction with non-causal understandings, Davidson focuses on a particular scenario. In this example a man is driving a car and he is approaching a turn. The man knows he should signal, he knows how to signal, and in this context he raises his arm. Some may be of the opinion that the man’s raising of his arm is ‘signaling’, and under the context placing aspects of the qualitative approach that may seem appropriate. Yet, Davidson asserts there are complications that result from accepting this view without further contemplation. Davidson writes that, “he had a reason to raise his arm, but this has not been shown to be the reason why he did it” (Davidson, pg. 692). The man could have simply been moving his arm for a plethora of other reasons such as to block the sun or wave. As such, it feels that there is a necessity in the causal
Taylor states that under the causal approach, “actions are events which are peculiar in that they are brought about by desires, or intentions, or combinations of desires and beliefs. As events, actions may be described among other ways as physical movements…In this, they resemble a host of other events which are not actions. What distinguishes them is a peculiar type of psychological cause: that they are brought on by desires or intentions” (Taylor, pg. 78). To understand an action is to understand the contents of the mental state that precedes the movement since they are separate and prior to our actions. As agents, we may have privileged access to our beliefs, desires, or intentions, which give us knowledge of our own actions. Our actions can serve to specify these mental states but an action may also fail to express an agent if it doesn’t reflect the internal mental states of the agent. Davidson is of the belief that non-causal understandings ultimately fail where causal explanation does not in making clear why an agent performs an action. In explaining his dissatisfaction with non-causal understandings, Davidson focuses on a particular scenario. In this example a man is driving a car and he is approaching a turn. The man knows he should signal, he knows how to signal, and in this context he raises his arm. Some may be of the opinion that the man’s raising of his arm is ‘signaling’, and under the context placing aspects of the qualitative approach that may seem appropriate. Yet, Davidson asserts there are complications that result from accepting this view without further contemplation. Davidson writes that, “he had a reason to raise his arm, but this has not been shown to be the reason why he did it” (Davidson, pg. 692). The man could have simply been moving his arm for a plethora of other reasons such as to block the sun or wave. As such, it feels that there is a necessity in the causal