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28 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Having the most first place votes
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Plurality
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Having over half of the first place votes
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Majority
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Voting method that only uses 1st place votes
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Plurality
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Voting method where the candidates with the least first place votes are eliminated until someone has a majority
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Sequential Runoff
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Voting method where all candidates except the two with the most first place votes are eliminated
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Runoff
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Voting method where all candidates are compared one-on-one to every other candidate
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Pairwise
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Voting method where candidates get 1 pt for a last place vote, 2 pts for a next to last vote, etc.
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Borda Count
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If there are 5 candidates, there are _____ possible rankings.
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120
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If there are 5 candidates, there are _____ possible pairwise comparisons.
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10
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If there are 5 candidates, there will be _____ points awarded on each ballot using Borda count.
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15
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If there are 5 candidates, there will be _____ possible ways to vote using approval voting.
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32
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If there are 5 candidates, a candidate must win _____ pairwise comparisons to be the Condorcet candidate.
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4
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A candidate who could defeat any other candidate in a two-way race
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Condorcet candidate
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Voting method where voters can vote yes or no to every choice on the ballot
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Approval voting
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One individual's preferences should not be the sole basis of the group ranking
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Arrow's Condition:
Nondictatorship |
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Each individual should be allowed to order the choices in any way--including ties
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Arrow's Condition:
Individual Sovereignty |
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If everyone prefers A over B, then A should finish higher than B
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Arrow's Condition:
Unanimity |
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Removing a choice should not change the ranking of the other choices
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Arrow's Condition:
Freedom from Irrelevant Alternatives |
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The ranking method should produce the same result if applied again to the same preference schedule (no randomness)
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Arrow's Condition:
Uniqueness of Group Ranking |
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There is no method that is guaranteed to fairly determine the winner of an election with 3 or more choices
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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
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A paradox where the candidate with over half of the first place votes loses
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Majority Paradox
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A paradox where a candidate who would beat any other candidate in a two-way race loses
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Condorcet Paradox
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A paradox where a candidate dropping out of the race changes the winner of the election
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Freedom-from-Irrelevant-Alternatives Paradox
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A paradox where voters ranking a candidate higher on their ballot causes that candidate to place lower in the final ranking
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Monotonicity Paradox
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A series of steps for completing a task
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Algorithm
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A rule for describing a pattern based on the previous term
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Recursive Rule
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A rule that describes a pattern without using the previous term
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Explicit Rule or
Closed Formula |
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A voter ranks choices differently from their true preferences--usually to hurt a certain candidate
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Insincere Voting
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