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90 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Hanoi Government estimates for civilian casualties in the 21 years of fighting.
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four million civilians were killed across North and South Vietnam,
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Amount of communist fighters deaths
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1.1 million communist fighters died
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Ho Chi Minh
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leader of N. Vietnamese
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US figures covering the American phase record
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200-250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers killed and 58,200 US soldiers dead or missing in action.
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Vietcong
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In the late 1950s, a communist guerrilla force – the Vietcong – emerged in the south
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Troops in Vietnam by end of 1964 compared with the 1950s.
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23,000 US military advisers in Vietnam – up from 800 in the 1950s -
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South Vietnamese Army
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ARVN
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End of 1967 figures for soldiers in Vietnam
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485,000
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Feb 1972
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Nixon visits China
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MACV
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US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
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1962-troops
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9,000:-a tenfold increases over Eisenhower
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22nd November 1963
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Kennedy Assassinated
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Johnsons escalation-Anderson quote
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The commitment to sustain S.Vietnam was undertaken by Truman and renewed by Eisenhower, continued in full force by Kennedy
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Why Escalate the War?
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Assisting was not enough
Deterioration Fear of losing Communist |
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June 1965-since Diem's gov
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There had been 5 governments since Diem's death
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Feb 1965
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Operation Rolling Thunder
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October 1967
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large anti-war demonstrations-initiate public relations campaign.
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End 1967 troops
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485,000 troops in Vietnam
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Kennedy-escalation
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He believed importance of the 'Third World' in the Cold War era.
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Gulf of Tonkin
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Johnson won from Congress on August 7, 1964, passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which allowed the president to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."
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27th January 1973
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After a bloody military stalemate and long negotiations, the US and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam signed the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam
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Kennedy quote on staying in vietnam - 1962
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We are going to win in Vietnam. We will remain here until we do win.
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Where became the locus of anti-war movements?
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uni and colleged campuses
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21st May 1965
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Gathering more than 10,000 students and faculty members on Uni of Califronia at Berkely for Vietnam.
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Sept 20th 1967
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LBJ discontent exploded
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How many Americans relied on TV as their principle source of news in 1965?
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more than half a million
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Early 1967 polls..
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for the first time critics outweighed the supporters
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Robert McNamara
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Sec of defense
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Dean Rusk
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Sec of State
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John McCone
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Director of CI
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McGeorge Bundy
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Presidents special assisstant for National Security
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Maxwell Taylor
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remained chairman of Joint CDheif of Staff (left to beome ambassador to the republic of Vietnam)
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Moise on LBJ and escalation
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less enthusiastic than any of his top advisors
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Moise on evidence for Johnson and not wanting to escalate
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The way Johnson postponed escalation and the strengthening of the military...reflects lack of enthusiasm
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Moise on Kennedy
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committed and wanted escalation
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Buzzanco on revisionism
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revisionists are correct. revisionism is that the war was lost in washington (press and politicians) rather than vietnam.
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Positives of Vietcong
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-dedicated and impressive
-tactical integrity -maneuvered in the Jungle |
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Quagmire theory
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successive administrations had inadvertently led America deeper and deeper into a bog.
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''tradgedy without villains''
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no president had ever imagined the mess that might eventually reults from the incremental decisions
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when were the pentagon papers leaked
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1971
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What did the pentagon papers show?
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far from being unaware of their decisions, the author sof the PP argued the successive presidents knew full well their efforts might fail to bring victory in vietnam
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Why did revisionist seem appealing/come about?
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By 1975-conditions in Vietnam worsened-economic problems, etc...tarnished image of the Vietnamese communists
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Traditionalist view
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war was wrong and unwinnable
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Sharp-revisionist on losing the war
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It was lost in Washington...fighting with one hand behind its back.
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Summers-revisionist.why lost war
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US fought the wrong kind of campaign-counterinsurgency campaign. US should of waged a more conventional war against N Vietnam.
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Kaiser - on war
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neither necessary nor winnable:miscalculation.
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why have their been changes in scholarship
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the people who fought are still around but those who did not, or did not live through it are starting to approach the subject.
records released such as PP |
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Johnson and Nixon...media
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obssessed...polls were taken, cared about what was reported.
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Small on media and opinion
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the media creates opnion by reporting opinion. When they say the country are in a conservative mood, those who do not know what mood they are in suppose they are in a conservative mood.
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Logevall on kennedy
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would escalate, knew of the commitments. 'deep and unquestiningly commitment'
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Logevall on Johnson...
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-saw the failures of his allies to stop Hitler...
he would be finished politically if Vietnam was to fall to communism |
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Logevall on Johnson and withdrawal
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might have had the opporutnity but realistically was never going to take that step
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Longevall on Media
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newspapers declared opposition to expanded military action.
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Longevall on why America fought
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-said it was defend free people-wrong
wanted to stop communism-self-determinsim |
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MacNamara and Mc G Bunday on idea of world prestige and stopping communism (Longevall)
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worried about the implications of world position of a defeat in vietnam...highly effective exponents of a staunch us commitment to the war
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Longevall on advisers/president
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no president is a prsioner to his advisers
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Johnsons personality according to Longevall
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America and his credibility were synonymous
dominating intimidating Humphrey in early 1965 expressed concern about escalation-Johnson banned him from Vietnam policy discussions |
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Longevall offers three themes for Vietnam...
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1)contingency-1965-fluid-several options
2)rigidity-american decision making 3)failure of opponents of escalation to fully commit to preventing it |
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contingency-theme one-Longevall
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nothing inevitable about the slide into Vietnam.
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Gelb and Betts
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too much commitment in vietnam...
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weakness to the commitment meant cant pull out-no alternatives argument
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Long 1964-could always choose where to go
at home they were not confonted by all powerful anti-communism, |
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problem with south vietnam
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had not kept to their side of the bargain-unwillingness of southern leaders to work to rectify the dismal situation in the south.
anti-Americanism noo hope dfor american intervention on any scale unless the S>V leaders and people become fully committed. |
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three months after the 1965 election...
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Johnson deceived the nation and Congress about the state of the war and plans for it...escalated without telling (McNarama condemns)
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McNamara on Johnson and escalation
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'if LJ had in mind a plan to escalate the war, he never told me... and he had no such plan
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Speech by Johnson
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go to vietnam for moral purpose
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Anti-war Movement
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fifty and 75 thousand been gathering Oct 20 1967. On 21st when the media left, soldiers advanced without warning on the remaining demonstrators. Most media afterwards devoted little attention to the political arguments to the demonstrators.
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Small on newspapers covering the 1967 oct anti-Vietnam protests
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several major newspapers not only denied the authorities had used tear gas but claimed the demonstrators used the weapon
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Small's conclusions on the anti-war movement
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never very cohesive,
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Small
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did not see how media could affect it..chicago riots again reported negatively by the press.
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5th -6th April 1969
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150,000 turned out in more than forty cities. Chicago-30,000 people, their largest anti-war campaign.
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Small on why media did not really report in 1969
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The mass anti-war demonstrations had become too routine to be interesting. Media uniterest
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Small on problem of anti-war movement
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never really took off-mass demonstrations retarded growth of nti-war sentiment of majority of American people.
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How much airtime was dedicated to Vietnam between when and when?
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25% between 1968 and 1973
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Hunt on Kennedy and escalation
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agreed to more advisers, and resources.
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Hunt on Kenneday and withdrawal
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clung to idea in 1963-''APPARANTLY'' privately indiciated wanting to pull out of the war.
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Hunt on MacNamara
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obviosuly in favour of escalation
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Hunt on Johnson
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loss to the president was unacceptable. preceded deliberately.
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Policy dilemmas:- Lexington (11)
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-As stakes grew, the leverage shrunk-defending communism. American goals made bargainning hard
-hard pressure on S.Vietnam but pressing could lead to complete collapse -Saigon gov was so weak-needed America -war unwinnable..nationalism, but could fail without involvement -increase involvement-increase domestic criticism -damned if they do, damned if they dont -not learned of limited success-wanted power, wanted to employ it-corrupted by it -trying to save America from McCarthyism -did not understand cultrual differences-thought they could treat Vietnam like any other western country -slippery slope-piled on commitment after commitment. -international policy of communism. |
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Anderson-dissent
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1966-anti war was at grass roots level-local rallies, small meetings etc
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Hess:- on why Vietnam was impotant
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domino theory-containment was crucial
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Winnable school of thought
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revisionist, won all battles but lost the war, overiding strategy should of been to stop N inflitrating the S.
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unwinnable school of thought
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fundamentally doomed, traditionalists, America supporting losing cause, limited war-domestic/international constraints.
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27th January 1973
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Bloody military stalemate ended-Paris agreement
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US official explanation
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-Vietnam was not vitally important to national interest-prevent communist take over.
domino theory, obligation to an ally-france. |
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Stalemate theory
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promoted by Ellsberg and Gelb- tw former advisers to gov during Vietnam years:escalated not for victory but to avoid defeat.
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McNamara on Kennedy
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would of pulled out had he not been assassinated.
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MacNamara's 11 reasons to why America failed.
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-exaggerated dangers to US
-treated leaders in s.Vietname from own culture -underestmiated nationalism -not expert in Vietnam like Kennan -failed to adapt military technique -failed to discuss the war with people-lost support -failed to maintain unity between s.v and america -no god given right to shape countries -should of worked with international community -not always immediate solutions to problems -organizational problems like cost |
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kaiser on advisers and Johnson
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in light of their experience, Johnson, MCN, R, T seemed to feel they had no other option,
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example of contingency...fighting
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1961-1964 - vast majority of American opertaions like the majority of ARVN operations, never made contact with the enemy.
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July 26th 1965
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Johnson announced officially and for the first time that US was in a war with Vietnam
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