Utah Criminal Case Law

Front 1

Print evidence Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62 : the State argued that Dr. Cole’s testimony should be excluded because
allowing contradictory evidence at trial impinged on the trial court’s role to make a
legal determination about the reliability of the evidence. ¶27 

Back 1

Although a trial court makes a
legal determination about the reliability of the expert’s testimony under rule 702, such a
determination is a threshold decision about admissibility.  See Utah R. Evid. 702.  Once
the court determines that evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial, the
court may not then violate a defendant’s constitutional rights to present an effective
defense by excluding conflicting evidence or testimony that challenges that expert’s
opinion or credibility.  See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690‐91 (1986)

Hint 1

¶28 Quite simply, there are two separate reliability determinations:  admissibility,
which is a legal determination the court makes, and the weight assigned to the evidence
admitted at trial, which is a factual determination made by the fact finder.  The court
cannot impinge on the factual determinations correctly left to the finder of fact by
excluding evidence or testimony because the court has made an incorrect legal
determination that competing evidence is not reliable for admissibility purposes

Front 2

4 factors to consider when determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda

Back 2

The Utah Supreme Court has identified four factors that aid in determining
whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes:  “(1) the site of interrogation; (2)
whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of
arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.”  Salt Lake City v.
Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983).  

Hint 2

No one factor is dispositive, and we look to the
totality of the circumstances in making our determination.  See State v. Worthington, 970
P.2d 714, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

Front 3

Does restraint by medical staff constitute custody for purposes of Miranda?

Back 3

It has been noted that “the restrictions on [a
person’s] freedom arising from police interrogation and those incident to his
background circumstances” must be carefully separated.  United States v. Jamison, 50910.  Defendant also argues that the fact the questioning took place “in the middle of the
night” points to his being the subject of custodial interrogation.  In support of this
position he cites to State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, 220 P.3d 136, in which the Court
observed that a public clubhouse took “on an isolated character” when questioning took
place “at four o’clock in the morning.”  Id. ¶ 27.  We note, however, that hospitals are
places of constant activity regardless of the time of day.  Thus, unlike a public
clubhouse, which likely has few, if any, patrons at four o’clock in the morning, a
hospital’s emergency room during the same period of time would not take on the same
kind of isolated character, as was the case here given that medical personnel were freely
entering and exiting Defendant’s room during the interview.
20090473‐CA 18
F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we do not assume an individual is in custody
for Miranda purposes when his confinement and isolation are the result of medical
treatment and not police interrogation.  See, e.g., id. (concluding that restraint because of
injury and medical exigencies at a hospital did not factor into the court’s custody
analysis).

Front 4

McDonough Test for honesty in answering Voir Dire - subjective or objective?

Back 4

 Under Rasmussen, the fact that Juror
Smith may have forgotten about seeing Millett’s name or a similar name on the sex
offender registry is not relevant to the analysis under the first prong of the McDonough
test.  Rather, if Juror Smith possessed this information but did not disclose it in response
to a voir dire question that sought to elicit that information, his answer would be
objectively inaccurate.  By reasoning that Juror Smith had simply forgotten about seeing20090400‐CA 14
Millett’s name or a similar name on the sex offender registry during voir dire, the
district court based its conclusion that Juror Smith had not failed to answer honestly a
question on voir dire based on his subjective intent in failing to disclose the information
rather than considering whether his response was objectively accurate under the
circumstances.  In so doing, the trial court erred by misapplying the first prong of the
McDonough test.  See supra ¶ 15; see also Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245 (concluding that a trial
court’s finding that a juror did not fail to answer honestly a question on voir dire based
upon the court’s belief that the juror did not subjectively intend to deceive the court is
clearly erroneous because it misapplies the objective standard that must be applied
under the first prong of the McDonough test).