Reading...
Play button
Play button
Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
61 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
|
Lubitz v. Wells
|
Golf Club Case
Rule A parent is not liable for the actions of a child who causes injury by way of an unattended object belonging to the parent if the object is not of the type that he “knew or should have known” its potential to harm. |
|
|
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.
|
“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”
|
|
|
Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams
|
Rule: There is no liability when the occurrence is unusual, extraordinary, or improbable. When deciding whether or not an occurrence is foreseeable, courts are not basing their reasoning on probability; they are basing it on possibility.
Reasoning: If the drum was in reasonably good repair, there would be no liability. Given the condition of disrepair of the drum, it is foreseeable to a reasonably prudent person to see that harm would arise. The fact that an explosion or fire is possible is proof of liability. |
|
|
Chicago, B. & Q.R. v. Krayenbuhl
|
Rule: Using the standard of ordinary care of a reasonable man, businesses have a duty to protect against foreseeable dangers to the public that do not pose an excessive cost or burden to the business. Considerations include the character and location of the premises, the purpose for which they are used, the probability of injury, the precautions necessary to prevent injury, and a cost-benefit analysis of the machinery/business.
|
|
|
Davison v. Snohomish County
|
Sued County for bridge rail not withholding impact of car.
Rule: The costs of preventing an injury should be weighed against the cost of the injury itself, if the cost of preventing an injury is too great the defendant should not be said to have a duty to prevent that injury. |
|
|
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
|
Holding: The cost of having a bargee on board was negligible compared to the cost of losing the flour, given the high probability of an accident given the busy and overcrowded harbor, therefore Connors Co. is liable for not having a bargee on board at the time of the accident.
Rule: The burden (B) of taking adequate precautions must be weighed against the amount of damages (L) taking into account the probability of the injury (P). - B< PL entails negligence - B> PL entails no negligence |
|
|
Vaughan v. Menlove
|
Built a Hay Rick, Caught Fire- thought in good faith it wouldn't
Rule: Courts should adhere to holding people to the standard of a man of ordinary prudence because the good faith standard is too subjective. Reasoning: This is the way it’s always been done. If liability for negligence is dependent on a person it is as variable as a person’s foot whereas the standard of the ordinary man is well known. |
|
|
Delair v. McAdoo
|
Issue: Was the defendant negligent for driving with a worn out tire that blew out and caused damage to the plaintiff’s car?
Holding: The defendant is negligent because it was his duty to know that visibly worn out tires were dangerous and he breached that duty, causing damage to the plaintiff’s car. Rule: The reasonable, prudent person must be aware of dangerous tires because it is his duty to know. Reasoning: The dangers of car accidents are too great for the ordinary man not to be held accountable for damaged tires. Policy reasons for this are that there are more cars on the road and the public safety must be kept. |
|
|
Trimarco v. Klein
|
Shower Glass -LandLord
Issue: Should D be held to what is common practice as part of the reasonable person standard? Holding: D should be held to the standard established by what is common practice. Rule: Common practice is evidence of what the reasonable person would do and thus one can be held liable for not meeting common practice standards. |
|
|
Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.
|
Rule: People who are reacting to an emergency, not of their own creation, are not held to the reasonable person standard.
Reasoning: We cannot expect people to sacrifice their own lives in order to avoid the risk of endangering another. In emergencies, people have very little time to react and do not have time to necessarily take the exact right action. |
|
|
Robinson v. Lindsay
|
Snowmobiling Case
Rule If a child is engaged in a traditional childhood activity, the child standard of care applies. However, the performance of an inherently dangerous activity normally reserved for adults requires the adult standard of care to be applied, even if the tortfeasor is a minor. |
|
|
Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co.
|
Rule: If an individual had forewarning of the onset of a sudden mental disability then that individual can be held liable for his/her actions.
- NOTE: THIS RULE IS THE EXCEPTION, GENERALLY AN INDIVIDUAL WITH A MENTAL DISORDER IS HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM HIS/HER ACTIONS, EVEN IN THE CASE OFSUDDEN ONSET. |
|
|
Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc.
|
Holding: The jury instruction that the defendant should be subjected to the standard of care of an ordinary pilot “having the same training and experience as Fred Heath” is subjective and improper. The defendant is subjected to the objective standard of care of an ordinary prudent pilot.
Rule: A professional is subjected to the requisite knowledge and skill level of an ordinary prudent practitioner in the profession. |
|
|
Hodges v. Carter
|
Sued Lawyer-
Holding: Attorneys who fail to recover damages in an insurance suit, due to a ruling of improper service that was unknown and untested in the legal community, do not breach a duty of care to their client. Rule: Attorneys are required to exercise the skill and diligence of an ordinary prudent attorney, and are not answerable for an error of judgment in an unsettled point of law. |
|
|
Boyce v. Brown
|
Holding: The plaintiffs did not show that Dr. Brown breached his professional duty because the defendant’s failure to take an X-ray of Mrs. Boyce’s ankle was not an obvious departure from the professional standard of the medical community and Dr. Kent’s testimony that he would have taken the X-ray was not sufficient to establish such a departure.
Rule: A physician’s testimony that he would have followed a different course of treatment does not establish a professional standard of care unless it also appears that the course of the treatment deviated from the standards established in the medical community. |
|
|
Morrison v. MacNamara
|
Rule: The standard of care to be used by medical laboratories is the national standard of care instead of a local standard of care.
Outdated to protect rural doctors. Man Fainted during simple procedure |
|
|
Scott v. Bradford
|
Woman not properly informed of all complications of a surgery. Not informed patient standard but MD need to go over every standard of care. oddly P lost though.
|
|
|
Moore v. The Regents of the University of California
|
Rule: To satisfy her fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, a physician must disclose all personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health that may affect the physician’s professional judgment.
Tricked pt. to keep coming back b/c they wanted to study him. |
|
|
Osborne v. McMasters
|
Minn. drug clerk sold poison which killed a guy.
Rule: A negligence cause of action can ensue from a violation of a duty specified in a statute, in the same way as from a breach of duty established by the common law. |
|
|
Perry v. S.N. and S.N.
|
A duty to obey the criminal law is not equivalent to a duty in tort. Conditions for a ct to determine whether imposing tort liability for violations of the statute is fair, workable, and wise.
|
|
|
Martin v. Herzog
|
Buggy Crash, one wrong side, the other without lights. Without lights is P,
Rule: An unexcused violation of a statute that is intended for the protection of others constitutes negligence per se, and it should be decided upon as a matter of law by the court and not left to the jury. Analysis: Under Highway Law, §329a, the plaintiff had a duty to travel with lights for the protection of others on the highway. Failing to do so is a negligent wrong. The jury does not have power to relax the duty established by the statute. A plaintiff does not forfeit the right to damages when he travels without the lights unless the absence of lights is at least a contributing cause of the disaster. In this case, a causal connection between traveling without lights and the collision may be inferred. |
|
|
Goddard v. Boston & Main R.R. Co.
|
Rule: When an object is lying on the ground, the owner of the premises is not liable for injuries resulting from that object unless plaintiff can show enough evidence for breach of duty.
Banana Peel Law Suit SJC |
|
|
Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Co.
|
Banana Peel II
Rule: When it can be easily inferred that a hazard has been in an area frequented by the public for some time so that the defendant should have known it was there, the defendant has breached his duty of care. Analysis: Witnesses described the banana peel in ways that lead to the inference that the banana peel had been on the platform for a considerable amount of time and that it was located in a place which was easily seen by a railway employee. If the employee had been reasonably careful to perform his duty, he would have removed the banana peel. |
|
|
Joye v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.
|
Banana Peel III
Rule: Constructive notice requires the plaintiff to produce evidence as to whether the defendant put the item on the floor or knew of its presence, which requires a determination of the length of time it was on the floor. Holding: The plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to establish the length of time the banana was on the floor, and thus did not prove constructive notice to the defendant Analysis: The longest the floor had gone without being swept would have been 35 minutes, as presented by defendant’s testimony (circumstantial evidence), which is not held to be an unreasonable amount of time. |
|
|
Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co.
|
Slipped on Pizza
Rule: Actual or constructive notice of a condition need not be proved where the dangerous condition is continuous or easily foreseeable from operating methods. |
|
|
Byrne v. Boadle
|
No Witnesses Bakery Flour Hit on Head
Rule: Where the item causing the accident is shown to be under the management of the defendant and the accident is such that in the ordinary course of events it would not have happened if those in management had used proper care, then there is a presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. |
|
|
Larson v. St. Francis Hotel
|
Holding: The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff cannot prove the defendant’s exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the accident
Rule: In order to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff needs to prove that there was an accident, that the defendant had exclusive control over the instrumentality which caused the accident, and that the accident was of the kind that would not have happened without negligence. |
|
|
Sullivan v. Crabtree
|
Car accident Driver Sued
Rule: Res ipsa loquitur creates an inference of negligence, and whether there is reasonable evidence to support this inference is a question of fact for the jury. However, as in ordinary negligence cases, the burden is still on the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent. |
|
|
Perry v. MacDougal
|
Tire came out from under trailer
Rules: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied in rare-instances to common-sense inferences when the facts of the accident by themselves establish that, but for the breach of reasonable care by the person in control of the injury-producing object, the accident would not have occurred. The requirements for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are that the incident/occurrence is one that does not normally occur without negligence by the defendant and that the defendant was in exclusive possession of the instrumentality that caused the injury. |
|
|
Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans Ry. Co.
|
Train Xing - Guy Crossed - Train was speeding
Rule: A breach of duty is the cause in fact of the injury if that injury would not have happened butfor that breach of duty. Train was speeding by 12 mph. No proof that stopping wouldve occurred if at 25 or 37 so no but for proof. |
|
|
Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.
|
Fat Woman Fell down unlit stairwell--
Rule: A defendants breach does not need to be the exclusive cause of an injury, it only needs to be a substantial factor. If a breach of duty greatly increase the likely hood and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence it is a substantial factor. |
|
|
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound
|
The court held that medical testimony of a reduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury. Causing reduction of the opportunity to recover (loss of chance) by one's negligence, however, does not necessitate a total recovery against the negligent party for all damages caused by the victim's death. Damages should be awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages caused directly by premature death, such as lost earnings and additional medical expenses, etc.
|
|
|
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M.R.R. Co.
|
Holding: If a fire set by the engine of one railroad company unites with a fire set by the engine of another company(OR unites with a fire of unknown origin), there is joint and several liability, even though either fire would have destroyed Plaintiffs property.
Analysis: When there are two concurrent causes, do not use the butfor test, use a the “substantial factor test”. If you can show the act was a substantial factor, this satisfies cause in fact. Using a butfor test would allow two concurrent causes to blame each other and potentially allow both to escape liability. |
|
|
Summers v. Tice
|
Holding:
The plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate which defendant’s bullet struck him will not bar him from recovery; the burden shifts to the defendants to prove their bullet did not inflict the harm. If neither can prove this, both are jointly and severally liable. Rule: If two defendants are negligent towards the plaintiff, but only one defendant’s negligence did in fact cause the injury, the plaintiff may recover from both defendants if the plaintiff is unable to establish which defendant actually caused the injury and neither defendant can prove that his negligence did not cause the harm. |
|
|
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
|
DES - Medicine Pregnant Case
Rule: If the plaintiff cannot prove which of multiple defendants was the cause in fact of her injury but can demonstrate she has joined a substantial share of the manufacturers and that each of these defendants were negligent in producing the injury causing product, the court will shift the burden of proof to each defendant to prove they did not cause the injury; if they cannot exonerate themselves they are liable proportionally to their market share. |
|
|
Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co.
|
A defendant is only liable for the ordinary and natural results of his conduct and not remote damages that are caused by his negligence.
|
|
|
In re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd.
|
Holding/Rule: Yes. If a person can foresee some injury from his breach of duty, he is liable for all injury that is a direct result of the breach.
|
|
|
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (Wagon Mound No.1)
|
No. The defendant is liable only for damages that are reasonably foreseeable or probable consequences of his breach.
Rationale: The court rejected the direct/indirect distinction made in Polemis. It said that it is unjust to hold a defendant liable for damages that are not reasonably foreseeable merely because they are a direct result of the breach |
|
|
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (Wagon Mound No.2)
|
Holding/Rule: Yes. Damages are reasonably foreseeable even if they are unlikely to occur if the costs of preventing the damage are slight and the loss if the injury occurs is great.
Rationale: To measure reasonable foreseeability, the court applied the B<PL formula developed in United States v. Carroll Towing. The court said that a reasonable person under the same circumstances as the officers of the Wagon Mound would have known that there was some risk of the oil igniting (P), and that if it did, serious damage would ensue (L). The burden of eliminating that risk (B) was very small, so it was reasonably foreseeable that the oil would ignite and damage the docked ships. |
|
|
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.
|
Issue: Did the defendant railroad company have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the injury sustained by the falling scales?
Holding/Rule: No. The scope of reasonably foreseeable risks to people within the zone of danger defines the defendant’s duty. Rationale: Justice Cardozo held that the defendant did not owe a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf because she was not within the zone of danger. It was not reasonably foreseeable that dropping an ordinary looking package would injure a person standing many feet away. Because this risk was not reasonably foreseeable, the railroad company did not have a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf to protect her from the kind of injury that occurred. |
|
|
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.
|
Rule: An intervening act may be a superseding cause only if it is extraordinary under the circumstances or not reasonably foreseeable. D need not reasonably foresee the manner of injury/particular injuring event, so long as she should have foreseen that some injuring event of the same general nature might have occurred.
|
|
|
Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co.
|
Holding/Rule: No, a negligent and foreseeable intervening act is not a superseding cause which allows a D to avoid liability. However, an intervenig intentional/malicious/criminal act (even one identical to a negligent act deemed to be foreseeable) is generally not foreseeable and may form a superseding cause.
|
|
|
McCoy v.American Suzuki Motor Corp.
|
Holding/Rule: Yes, it is not sufficient for a P to merely show that D’s breach of duty was the proximate cause of danger. The rescue doctrine does not vary the ordinary rules of negligence. A Plaintiff must still show that a D proximately caused P’s injury. In order for P to prove as such, it must demonstrate that injury to D was foreseeable.
|
|
|
Kelly v. Gwinnell
|
Holding/Rule: Yes, a social host in such a circumstance can reasonably foresee that his continued provision of alcohol to his guest is likely to cause injury.
|
|
|
Daley v. LaCroix
|
Daleys suffered emotional distress after Δ’s car crashed into their house. Held: Mother and son CAN RECOVER for physical consequences of Δ’s actions. Emotional distress caused physical consequences (i.e. accident →emotional distress →physical consequences). Ct rejects impact rule.
|
|
|
Thing v. La Chusa
|
NIED Mother tried to collect even though didn't see child injury. Can't collect. NIED rule
|
|
|
Hegel v. Langsam
|
Rule: No requirement of law exists which imposes upon a university the duty to regulate the private lives of students or to control their associations.
|
|
|
Gryc v Dayton-Hudson Corp??
|
When a party is found to have acted either maliciously or in a wilful or wanton manner, you may award exemplary or punitive damages.
|
|
|
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip
|
Upheld
punitive damages awarded were not excessive or unconstitutional. |
|
|
Price v. Brown (pg. 172)
|
The court held that allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state a cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an animal when the animal suffers an injury as a result or does not survive the surgery.
|
|
|
Butterfield v. Forrester
|
If the plaintiff could have exercised ordinary care to avoid the accident, the accident appeared to happen entirely from his fault.
|
|
|
Davis v. Mann
|
Holding:
Although the plaintiff may have been negligent, the defendant was bound to exercise reasonable care and go along the road at a pace that would be likely to prevent mischief. Reasoning: - The defendant, through exercising ordinary care, should have been driving at a slow enough pace as to avoid the injury. - Holds that there is a limit to contributory negligence – the doctrine of last clear chance. |
|
|
McIntyre v. Balentine
|
Comparative Negligence
Holding: So long as a plaintiff’s negligence remains less than the defendant’s negligence the plaintiff may recover. In such a case, plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced in proportion tot eh percentage of the total negligence attributable to the plaintiff. |
|
|
Signeur v. National Fitness Institute, Inc.
|
No. A fitness center cannot be held liable if an exculpatory clause clearly and specifically indicates the fitness center’s intent to release themselves of liability for negligence actions.
|
|
|
Rush v. Commercial Realty Co.
|
Holding:
No. An individual does not assume a risk of injury if that individual has no choice but to encounter that risk. |
|
|
Blackburn v. Dorta
|
It lays out the primary versus secondary thing, but then they scrap it. They decided not to worry about it. They decided that assumption of risk is part of the comparative negligence inquiry.
|
|
|
Bussard v. Minimed, Inc.
|
Here, the employee had become such an instrumentality of risk because of the pesticide fumes, the court held. That the employee might be unfit to drive after becoming ill from pesticide fumes was not so startling or unusual that the incident was unforeseeable, the court added.
|
|
|
O'Shea v. Welch
|
"If an employee wholly abandons, even temporarily, the employer's business for personal reasons, the act is not within the scope of employment, and the employer is not liable under respondeat superior for the employee's conduct during that lapse."
|
|
|
Murrell v. Goertz
|
In determining whether a person is an independent contractor or an employee the right to control the physical details of the work are decisive.
|
|
|
Maloney v. Rath
|
A nondelegable duty operates, not as a substitute for liability based on negligence, but to assure that when a negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by the person whose activity caused the harm and who may therefore properly be held liable for the ngeligence of his agent, whether the agent was independent contractor or employee.
|
|
|
Roberts v. State of Louisiana
|
Holding: Yes, the defendant was acting as a reasonable, prudent blind person would act.
Rule: A person with a physical impairment is held to the reasonable standard of care of a person with the same disability. Reasoning: In determining whether the state is to be held liable, they have to begin with an analysis of whether or not Burson, the blind man, is negligent. A blind man must take the precautions that an ordinary reasonable man would take if he were blind. The court found that Burson did not act unreasonably – he relied on his facial sense and his explanation was corroborated by others. His reports indicate he has good mobility skills and he has been working in the same surrounding for 3.5 yrs, so he is very familiar with it. There is also no evidence to show that Burson acted unreasonably (walking too fast, not paying attention, etc.) |
