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57 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Company
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Nature and Circumstances of the harm were not forseeable, Criminal Acts were not forseeable by tire company, Murderer was Intervening cause (tire compnay did not have a right r control over area or criminal)
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Herrera v. Quality Pontiac
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D realized/should have realized that a 3rd party may commit criminal acts, D created the increased risk, and criminal acts were forseeable. (unlocked car, theft, police chase).
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Marshall v. Nugent
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(oil truck case, p struck by third party) The situation created by D was not yet stablized when P was struck by a third car. The harm caused to the p by 3rd party was reasonably forseeable, D was liable for full consequenses steming from his negligent act.
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Cahoon v. Cummings
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(Esophageal cancer case)
Minority rule case, Dr pays for the perentage of chance the p would have had to survive. Majority rule is full recover if you had a 51% chance |
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Ford v. Trident Fisheries
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(Fishing boat case) Proximate cause failed, D was negligent, but their negligence (not having the lifeboat ready to launch) was not the casue of P's harm, he would have drowned anyway. (Sudden emergency, exceriseize reasonable care when placed in a situation at no fault of their own)
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Responsibility of Common Carriers
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Higher standard of care just above reasonable care
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Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
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D Occupier is liable for physical harm to TPChild, casued by artificial condition, if.. D knows or has reason to know children likely to TP, D knows or has reason to know of condition that could casue risk of death or SBI, Burden to fix < risk to kids, D fails to take reasonable care or protect
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Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Cardozo v. Andrews |
Cardozo Test for Proximate Cause: Duty, Only owe a duty to those you could reasonable see an injury to
Andrews Test: Proximate cause, Substantial factor, natural and continuous sequence, not too many interveining casues, remote in time space and forseeable. |
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Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transport Services
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(P pulled out in front of D) But for wrongful quality of D act (Speeding/changing to the other lane) would p have suffered the same harm? Yes, D act of moving to other lane was a reasonable reaction to avoid P, accident would have still occured if D was not speeding.
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Proximate Cause
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1) but for wrongful quality of D's act
2) Was P forseeable 3) nature & Circumstances of P's injury forseeable? |
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Rowland v. Christian
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Where the occupier of the land is aware of a concealed condition involving in the absence of precautions an unreasonable risk of harm, a failure to warn constitutes negligence. (Minority view that does not distinguish between invitee and licensee)
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Invitee
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Induced & Encouraged
Duty Owed: Reasonable Care |
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Lincensee
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Privileged to enter or remain on land by consent
Duty Owed: Duty to warn regarding conditions known or should know of |
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Trespasser
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No Consent to be on land
Duty owed: Refrain from Wanton & Willfull Conduct |
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Artificial conditions highly dangerous to trespasser on limited area
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condition is one which possesor maintains, is to knowledge that likley will cause death or serious bodily injury, is of nature trespasser will not discover, and posessor ailed to use reasonable care to warn of condition and risk,
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Res Ipsa Loquitur
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"The thing speaks for itself" Allows for inference of negligence when p can't prove exactly what happend. 1) the D had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury and 2) type of incident/injury would not have happend without D being negligent
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Boyer v. Iowa HIgh School Athletics
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(Bleachers Collapsed at end of basketball game) Even if the P also has access to the instrumentality that casued the injury Res Ipsa can still apply, D had control over the bleachers, P was not responsible for figuring out what went wrong after being injured.
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City of Louisville v. Humphrey
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(Guy dies in drunk tank) City was not in exclusive control of inmate (could have been other inmates) res ipsa could not apply
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Escola v. Coca-Cola
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Res Ipsa can still apply when the injury causing instrumentality leaves D's control if P can prove the conditions were not changed or altered when they took possession (Coke bottle broke in P's hand).
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Negligence Per Se
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1) Safety Statute (protects life or limb)
2) D violated Statute 3) violation caused harm to a person the statute was designed to protect 4) violation caused the type of harm the legislature was trying to prevent - did violation cause the harm 5) Excuse? Impossibility or safer purpose |
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Martin v. Herzog
Neg per se |
Collision, p without lights, d wrong side of road. P's negligence was contributory becasue it caused the type of harm the safety statute was made to prevent
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Tedla v. Ellman
Neg per se |
Siblings walking on wrong side of road. Statute was made to prevent the same harm they were trying to revent by walking on the opposite side of the road. excuse, safer purpose
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Brown v. Shyne
Neg per se |
Violation of statute to get a license was not the casue of P's harm, p must prove D lack of care caused the injury
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Custom
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Community or general business standard. It is helpful to the jury but not controlling, only used as evidence
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Trimarco v. Klein
Custom |
(shower glass door) P used custom as evidence to show d was negligent
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The T.J. Hoper
Custom |
Custom may be unreasonable. Just becasue everyone is not doing it does not mean you used reasonable care. (lack of radio on boat, whole industry fell below standard)
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Helling v. Carey
Custom |
It was not custom to perform a glaucoma test under 40, court held B<PL. Simple test was easy to administer and should have been erformed given the great risk of the disease.
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B<PL
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Burden less than probability times the liabilty
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U.S. v. Carroll Towing
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Judge hand's BPL formula, burdern of a precaution, having someone on the boat during daylight house was less than the probability of the barge breaking losse and the liability of the resulting damage,
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Washington v. Louisiana. Power and Light
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Cost to insulate all the wire in the community was too high conisdering the very small porbability of an injuring occuring althogh the libaility of a resulting injury was very high
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Weirum v RKO General
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(Radio Station contest) the contest made a forseeable risk of harm to fellow drivers on the road, the burden of not having the contest was ) and the probability and liability of harm was high
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Negligence
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1) Cause in Fact
2) D's negligence Duty and Breach 3) Proximate Causation, But For wrongful quality, P forseeable, Nature and circumstances 4) Harm to P |
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Brown v. Kendall
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The violation of the licensing statute did not cause P's harm.
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Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Railway
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2 separate forrest fires merged and burned down p's house. D's fire would have burned P's house regardless of the other fire, D was liable for the entire harm. If other fire was started by a human that other person would have been jointly and severably liable.
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Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric
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Kid fell from bridge, but grabbed a wire and was electrocuted before he fell. If kid would have died anyway, d is only liable for pain and suffering, If he would of lived but disabled D would be liable for diffferened between disabled state and death
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Ybarra v. Spanguard
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P was unconscious during treatment and injured. All the Dr's and nurses would be liable for injury becasue P would be unable to determine who in fact casued his injury.
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Summers v. Tice
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2 or more D's who are both negligent and at least one definitely casued P's harm, both are jointly and severably liable. Burden is on D to shoe the other casued the harm
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Smith v. Rapid Transit
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(woman ran off road by bus) mathematical probability alone is not enough to show causation.
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Hoyt v. Jeffers
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Circumstantial evidence is admissable to show causation (Sparks emitted from chimney mill)
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Cause in Fact
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General Causation: is this D's conduct capable of producing P's harm
Specific Causation: Did this D actually cause P's harm |
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Actual Causation
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But for D having acted act all would P nonetheless have suffered the same harm?
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Consent
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willingness in fact for conduct to occur...it does not need to be communicated to D
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O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship
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If P's outward behavior indicaed consent, D was justified in his acr, despite what P's unexpressed feelings might have been
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Barton v. Bee Line
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Minority decision, if P knows the nature and quality of the act, then P can consent even though a minor, no tort action when criminal action is available
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Bang v. Charles T Miller Hospital
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If not immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternative and given the chance to decide before the dr proceeds with the operation. (severed spermatic cords)
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Kennedy v. Parrot
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A surgeon may lawfully extend the operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in the area of the original incision whenever he in the exercise of sound professional judgment determines that correct surgical procedure dictates and requires such an operation originally contemplated. (tumor removed from ovary while operating on her appendix). Implied consent by law
1.The person is not able to consider the matter 2.An immediate decision is necessary 3.No reason to believe the person wouldn’t consent if he were able to do so 4.A reasonable person in the same position would consent. |
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Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals
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Although p consented to the game, there are rules, D iolated those rules, P's consent was not for those action (intentional blow)
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Self Defense, Force NOT threatening death or serious bodily harm
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Reasonable force may be used to match the force bing used by the other, not death or serious bodily harm
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Self defense by force threatening death or serious bodily harm
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to match such force 1) honest belief you are being confronted with deadly force 2) P's belief is reasonable under the circumstances 3) reasonable means used. If you are not in your dwelling you must retreat if possible
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Courvoisier v. Raymond
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(Break in/Rioters/police officer got shot)An action of force is justified by self-defense whenever the circumstances are such as to cause a reasonable man to believe that his life in in danger or that he is in danger of receiving great bodily harm and that t is necessary to use such force for protection.
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Defense of others
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Minority View
Majority View |
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Defense of Property
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No deadly force for defense of property. Only use reasonable force if a) intrusion is not priveleged 2) actor reasonable believes intrusion can only be revented by force and c) actor has requested the other to leave, and other has refused or actor believed that the request is uselss or harm will be made before it can be made
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Katco v. Briney
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Reasonable force may be used to protect property but not such force that will take human life of inflict great bodily harm. (Spring gun trap in abandoned house.)
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Castle doctrine
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You do not have to retreat from your own home, when you are met with deadly force you do not have to retreat first.
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Necesity
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May be used when an emergency occurs that requires the defendant to intrude upon or harm property in order to prevent greater harm to herself or others. P must pay for damage that occurs to others property
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Ploof v. Putnam
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Necessity justifies entry upon the land. (storm gave Ploof’s no choice but to dock at d’s land). D is liable if refuse P
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Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
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Even though D was priveleged to use P's property to portect his own, D was liable for the damge it caused to D's property (D was unloading at P's dock when a storm came in, D remained tied up at the dock through the storm which resulted in damage
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