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20 Cards in this Set
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Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] (HL) |
Application of s.4 of Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 can be seen in Reeves, where harm in question was inflicted by Reeves himself who committed suicide while in police custody. police were liable because they breached their duty to prevent very act which had occurred. They raised defences of volenti, novus actus interveniens and contributory negligence. Neither defence of volenti nor novus actus claim was accepted but HL found that negligence of police and deceased’s act of intentional self-harm contributed equally to damage. Since purpose of Act is to apportion damages to reflect C’s own responsibility for harm suffered, m award of damages in this case was reduced by 50%. question being asked in contributory negligence is not: what was cause of accident? The emphasis is on what was cause of the damage. |
Reeves committed suicide while in police custody |
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Jones v Boyce (1816) 1 Stark 493 |
Where a defendant’s negligence creates an emergency, courts are reluctant to find contributory negligence on part of a claimant who makes a wrong decision in a stressful moment. conduct of a claimant in these situations is judged with emergency in mind. C was a passenger on D’s coach and, fearing that it was about to overturn, he jumped off and suffered injury. coach did not overturn and had he stayed where he was C would have been safe. However, confronted with two alternatives in an emergency situation C was not guilty of contributory negligence because he had acted reasonably in circumstances. |
C was a passenger on D’s coach and, fearing that it was about to overturn, he jumped off and suffered injury |
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Froom v Butcher [1975] (CA) |
C was driving his car when he collided with a car driven by D and as a result he suffered head and chest injuries. D admitted liability for accident but claimed that C’s injuries were largely result of his own failure to take care of his safety by not wearing a seatbelt. D argued that damages awarded to C ought to be reduced accordingly. At first instance judge held that C was not negligent and full damages were awarded for injuries. However, D appealed on ground that judge had erred in not holding that C’s failure to wear a seatbelt amounted to contributory negligence. Although C’s negligence did not contribute to accident happening, his failure to take precautions increased risk of harm. CA held that standard of care is objective and said that in failing to wear a seatbelt C failed to take reasonable precautions for his own safety and award of damages was reduced by 20%. question being asked in contributory negligence is not: what was cause of accident? The emphasis is on what was cause of damage. |
C was in a car accident but failed to wear a seatbelt |
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Smith v Finch [2009] EWHC (QB) -> applied Froom v Butcher [1975] |
Contributory negligence was rejected in Smith v Finch where a cyclist sustained serious head injuries in a road accident caused by D. Although there is no legal requirement to wear a cycling helmet, Court made an analysis of Froom and came to conclusion that judgment and observations of Lord Denning MR should apply to wearing of helmets by cyclists. Given the guidance to cyclists in the Highway Code that they should wear cycle helmets, the logic of Froom v Butcher as to motorists not wearing seatbelts should be applied also to cyclists not wearing helmets. However it remained for the defendant to show that the particular injuries suffered would not have occurred if the claimant had been wearing a helmet. In this case D was unable to show that an approved safety helmet would have prevented C’s serious head injuries or made them less severe. |
cyclist sustained serious head injuries in a road accident caused by D |
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Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB |
In Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] C was going from his workplace to canteen for lunch and, disregarding his employer’s safety instructions and unknown to driver, he was riding on towbar of one of D’ traxcavators. A dumper travelling close behind ran into traxcavator and caused C injuries. Although driver of dumper was found to be negligent in failing to keep an adequate lookout, judge found contributory negligence on part of C because he had placed himself in a position of danger on traxcavator. He was therefore found to be one-fifth responsible for damage he suffered. On appeal against reduction of damages C argued that his contributory negligence should not count against him because obvious danger arising from riding on towbar was being thrown off, not being run into from behind and crushed by another vehicle. His appeal was dismissed on ground that he had unreasonably exposed himself to danger. He could not then say that particular risk to which he had exposed himself was not cause of his damage. |
C was riding on towbar of one of D’ traxcavators |
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Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co Ltd [1949] (HL) |
=> Contributory negligence involving children D had sold a pint of petrol to a nine-year-old boy. child had falsely told D that his mother wanted petrol for her car. When he used fuel to make a burning torch for purposes of a game he suffered severe injury for which D were held liable in negligence. In supplying petrol to such a young boy, who neither knew nor could be expected to know of dangers associated with handling it, D was negligent. There was no contributory negligence on boy’s part. |
D had sold a pint of petrol to a nine-year-old boy. child had falsely told D that his mother wanted petrol for her car |
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Gough v Thorne [1966] (CA) |
=> Contributory negligence involving children In this case C, a 13-year-old girl, was waiting to cross a busy road. A lorry driver stopped and beckoned her to proceed across road and as she did so she was struck by D who was driving too fast. trial judge found that driver was negligent but he also held that girl had been contributorily negligent in failing to check if there was any traffic before she crossed road. On appeal against finding of contributory negligence CA held that fact that she had relied entirely on driver’s signal to cross road did not constitute contributory negligence. Lord Denning said that a very young child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence but, depending on circumstances, an older child may be. |
A girl followed the signal of a lorry driver and crossed the street, was then struck by a driver speeding |
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JACKSON V MURRAY (2015) (SC) |
=> Contributory negligence involving children Lesley Jackson, a 13 year old school girl, alighted from a clearly marked school bus and proceeded to cross a rural two way road from behind the bus. Lesley began to cross road and was struck by a car when crossing westbound carriageway. driver estimated that he had been travelling at 50 mph and stated that on seeing minibus he had not slowed down at any time, that he had not thought that there would be children crossing road at the time, and that he had not seen Lesley until moment of impact. Judge, at first instance, ruled principal cause of accident had been teenager's recklessness in attempting to cross road without taking proper care to check that road was clear to allow her to do so. He found her 90% contributory negligent for collision. This case was first appealed to Inner House of Court of Session with three Judges presiding. apportionment of Lesley’s blame was reduced to 70%. They held that Judge at first instance placed insufficient regard on age of young girl at time of accident and that greater stress should have been placed on driver's actings. case was appealed again to SC and heard in front of five Judges. They believed appeal Judges had also been wrong to assess contributory negligence so high. They believed driver of car had been culpable to a substantial degree, and girl's contributory negligence should be re-assessed at 50%. In their findings, they looked to following points; Lesley was only 13 and a 13-year-old would not necessarily have same level of judgement and self-control as an adult. young girl had to take account of Mr Murray’s car approaching at speed, in very poor light conditions, with its headlights on. court recognised assessment of speed in those circumstances was far from easy, even for an adult. It was also necessary to bear in mind that situation of a pedestrian attempting to cross a relatively major road with a 60mph speed limit, after dusk and without street lighting, was not straightforward, even for an adult. |
Scotland case where Lesley Jackson crossed the road and got hit by a car |
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Morris v Murray [1991] (QB) |
defence of volenti succeeded in case of Morris v Murray [1991] (QB) => Volenti non fit injuria (consent) After a bout of heavy drinking, Murray suggested to Morris that they go for a spin in his light aircraft. Soon after take-off, aircraft crashed, killing Murray and severely injuring Morris who brought an action against the deceased’s estate. => CA found that pilot’s drunkenness was so extreme and obvious that C was volens to risk. |
After drinking heavily they went for a spin in his aircraft, which crashed |
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Dann v Hamilton [1939] (KB) |
=> Volenti non fit injuria (consent) Where C accepts a lift from an obviously inebriated driver plea of volenti depends on degree of intoxication. In Dann v Hamilton, D had driven C and her mother to see Coronation decorations. They visited several public houses and it became obvious that D’s ability to drive was impaired. However, plea of volenti was rejected and C was found not to have consented to or absolved D from subsequent negligence on his part. Asquith J held that volenti did not apply to this situation, unless drunkenness was so extreme and so glaring that accepting a lift was equivalent to ‘walking on edge of an unfenced cliff’ |
had driven C and her mother to see Coronation decorations. D got drunk. |
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Smith v Charles Baker & Sons [1891] (HL) |
=> Volenti non fit injuria (consent): Knowledge of risk does not necessarily imply consent. In this case, HL ruled that knowledge of danger does not necessarily signify consent. In this case C was employed drilling holes in a rock cutting and while he was working a crane often swung heavy stones overhead. employee was aware that there was a risk of stones falling and he had complained to his employer about dangerous practice. When he was injured by a falling stone he brought an action against his employers, who pleaded volenti non fit injuria. Even though C had knowledge of danger and he continued to work, volenti was rejected because court refused to accept that by continuing to work C had voluntarily undertaken risk of stones falling. |
C was employed drilling holes in a rock cutting and while he was working a crane often swung heavy stones overhead |
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Condon v Basi [1985] 2 All ER 453 |
=> Volenti non fit injuria (consent) in sporting activity In case of sporting activities, there is implied consent to contact which occurs within rules of the game. However, C might not be agreeing to accept all risks associated with sport but will only impliedly consent to accept a lower standard of care for injuries sustained in a sport played within ordinary rules of game. In this case defence of volenti failed where C suffered a broken leg as result of a foul tackle in course of a game of football. It was held that consent to reasonable contact is consent only to non-negligent behaviour. |
C suffered a broken leg as result of a foul tackle in course of a game of football |
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Watson v British Boxing Board of Control [2001] (QB) |
=> Volenti non fit injuria (consent) in sporting activity In case of sporting activities, there is implied consent to contact which occurs within rules of game. However, C might not be agreeing to accept all risks associated with sport but will only impliedly consent to accept a lower standard of care for injuries sustained in a sport played within ordinary rules of game. In this case, it was also held that although a boxer consents to injury caused by his opponent in boxing ring, he does not consent to injury resulting from inadequate safety arrangements by sport’s governing body after being hit. |
Injury during boxing match due to inadequate safety arrangements |
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Baker v Hopkins [1959] (CA) |
=> Volenti non fit injuria (consent) in case of rescuers approach taken by courts can be illustrated in this case, where D employer had adopted a dangerous system of working by lowering a petrol engine down into inside of a well. Petrol engine discharged poisonous emissions and two of workmen were overcome by fumes. C, a doctor, had volunteered to go down well to rescue workmen but he too was overcome by fumes and died as a result. CA held that volenti was inapplicable because C’s actions as a rescuer were not truly voluntary: if D puts either property or person of a third party in a situation of danger so that C is under legal or moral pressure to attempt a rescue then, if C suffers harm in process, he is not to be barred from a remedy by defence of volenti. This decision can also be explained on policy grounds as it is against public interest to deter rescue. |
Petrol engine discharged poisonous emissions and two of workmen were overcome by fumes |
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Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] 3 All ER 180 |
=> Ex turpi causa non oritur actio (illegality) The ex turpi causa maxim applied in this case, where C, who had a history of mental illness, killed a stranger in a violent attack. Before he killed victim C had been discharged into care of defendant health authority. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility for killing but claimed that health authority was negligent in failing to treat him with reasonable care and skill. It was held that a C who had been convicted of a serious offence could not, on ground of public policy, sue a health authority in negligence in failing to treat him properly, thereby preventing him from committing offence. |
C had a history of mental illness and killed a stranger in a violent attack |
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Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] (HL) |
=> Ex turpi causa non oritur actio (illegality) In this case, as result of a serious rail crash (Paddington rail crash) caused by D’s negligence, C suffered severe psychological depression which led him to kill a man. At criminal trial for this offence his plea of guilty to manslaughter on ground of diminished responsibility was accepted and he was ordered to be detained in a mental hospital under Mental Health Act 1983. His claim in damages for loss of earnings after he committed manslaughter was allowed by CA which held it was not defeated by ex turpi causa because damages were not inextricably bound up with or linked to his criminal conduct. Thames Trains Ltd appealed against this decision arguing that C cannot recover compensation for loss which has been suffered in consequence of his own criminal act. In allowing the appeal, HL ruled that Gray’s conviction for manslaughter precluded a claim for loss of earnings during his detention by reason of public policy expressed in doctrine of ex turpi causa. |
As a result of a serious rail crash (Paddington rail crash) caused by D’s negligence, C suffered severe psychological depression which led him to kill a man |
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Joyce v O’Brien [2013] EWCA Civ |
=> Ex turpi causa non oritur actio (illegality) This case involved a joint criminal enterprise in which C suffered serious head injuries as he and his uncle were making a getaway (in a car) following theft of two ladders. CA held that it was foreseeable that parties engaged in criminal activities might be subject to increased risks of harm. Where such harm materialised principle of ex turpi causa would provide a defence. Elias LJ observed that given that doctrine is one of public policy, there should be some flexibility in its operation. It will not apply to minor traffic offences but in most joint criminal liability cases nature of principal offence will determine which acts of a co-conspirator will attract application of doctrine. => The action failed ‘because as a matter of public policy, English law refuses to recognise a duty of care owed by one participant in a crime to another in respect of an act done in furtherance of the no common purpose’. |
C and his uncle were making a getaway (in a car) following theft of two ladders. |
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Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] (CA) |
M=> Ex turpi causa non oritur actio (illegality) In this case, when police arrived to enforce an arrest warrant on C, he attempted to escape from their custody by jumping from a window of his second floor flat. He suffered brain damage and tetraplegia in fall and claimed negligence on part of arresting officers, alleging that they had stood idly by and let him jump. CA held that maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio made claim untenable because C had to rely on his own criminal conduct in escaping lawful custody to found his claim. |
C attempted to escape from police custody by jumping from a window of his second floor flat |
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Patel v Mirza (2016) |
=> Ex turpi causa non oritur actio (illegality): Recent developments In Patel v Mirza (2016) a SC panel of nine justices attempted to rationalise approach to illegality defence. majority held that public interest is best served by a discretionary approach, which allows court to consider a range of factors. This ‘structured discretion’ approach was favoured by Law Commission (2009 Consultative Report). minority favoured a rule-based analysis because a discretionary approach required courts to make value judgments about respective claims of public interest and this would lead to complexity, uncertainty and a lack of transparency. |
panel of nine justices attempted to rationalise approach to illegality defence |
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Contributory negligence |
Section 1(1) of Law reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 provides that damages shall be reduced to such extent as court thinks just and equitable having regard to C’s share in responsibility for damage. |
Reduction of damages |
