Strategies Exam 2

Front 1

Incomplete information

Back 1

Game where all info is not known to the defender

Front 2

crisis/ escalation games

Back 2

game where the payoffs keep exponentially increasing as the rounds continue

Front 3

sequential rationality

Back 3

players strategy is sequentially rational if it is a best response to the opponents strategy given the players's beliefts

Front 4

bayes' rule

Back 4

x= pr(c/cr)pr(cr)/ pr (c/cr)pr(cr)+pr(c/cw)pr (cw)

Front 5

sequential equilibrium

Back 5

a strategy profile is a sequential equation if the strategies for all players are sequentially rational & the beliefs are consistent with these strategies

Front 6

separating equilibrium

Back 6

occurs when the weak & tough challengers separate themselves by always choosing the opposite strategies

Front 7

pooling equilibrium

Back 7

both the weak &strong challenger chose the same strategy

Front 8

semi-separating equilibrium

Back 8

have one type play an action with certainty & the other play an action with some positive prob.

Front 9

repeated games

Back 9

1: finitely repeated game with known end: solve by backwards induction
2: finitely repeated game with unknown end:
3:infinitely repeated:

Hint 9

dicount factor- put into effect b/c people weigh what they will put into the future as less than what they will get. Delta = 1 - future and present are equally important/ Delta =0- lives for the present; instant gratification

Front 10

tit-for-tat

Back 10

begins with cooperation, then do whatever the other player did in the previous round

Front 11

grim trigger

Back 11

pay cooperation initially
-if any players defects, then play defect forever after

Front 12

Brute force vs. strategic coercion:

Back 12

Brute force: direct use of force/ Strategic coercion- threat to use force-less costly-can be implicit or explicit- form of bargainng deterrence or compellence

Front 13

Deterrence (direct, extended, general, immediate

Back 13

-aim: to persuade an opponent not to initiate action
-success is measured by whether something happens- successful if nothing happens
-results are hard to observe
-conservative- seeks to preserve the sq

Hint 13

-Direct: threats to prevent attacks on the defender itself
-Extended: extended protection to a 3rd party -protege- only the great powers can engage in this- problem of entrapment
-General- situations with no clear & present danger yet an underlying antagonism exists
-immediate: situation where there is immediate danger

Front 14

protege

Back 14

the actor that receives protection from a great power when engaged in exteded deterrence

Front 15

compellence

Back 15

aims to persuade an opponent to change his behavior
-make a demand

Hint 15

3 goals:
1: want to see the opponent stop short of its goals
2: want to undo its actions
3: want to change the policies
-success is easy to see
-best achieved with promises
-has a deadline
-makes the sq sufficiently unpleasant

Front 16

threat

Back 16

a statement that has the intention to inflict pain on another state

Front 17

salami tactics

Back 17

strategy that takes small steps in response to a deterrent threat, such that the threat is not activated

Front 18

massive retaliation

Back 18

adopted by the US, but never took place
-could resort to using nuclear weapon
-served to establish the reputation of "toughness"

Front 19

1st strike capability

Back 19

attack intended to destroy almost all or entirely the weapons of an opponent

Front 20

promise

Back 20

a declaration that a state will do what it says it will

Front 21

2nd strike capability

Back 21

ability of a country to withstand 1st strike and strike back: such as US and Russia

Front 22

mutually assured destruction (MAD)

Back 22

-both states destroy each other
-is an am- invention
-soviets argued that this was not useful concept- thought they could win a nuclear war

Front 23

brinkmanship

Back 23

-take an issue to the limit without falling over
-threat that leaves something to chance
-strategy of taking your opponent to the break & compelling him to turn back first
-can create a shared risk of responsibility

Hint 23

threats compelling one to retrieve are effective
-now threats can be credible
-manipulating the shared risks of war
-problems:- if your opponent mispreceives, disaster may occur: once it has started, it cannot be stopped

Front 24

blurring the brink

Back 24

if you cannot see where the brink is, then you can walk dangerously close to it: like cuban missile crisis

Front 25

alliances

Back 25

alliance members must fulfill their commitment
-must be public
-an offensive alliance is normall kept secret
-alliance increase the war-fighting effective

Front 26

symmetric vs asymmetric alliances

Back 26

asymmetric
-between a large and small power
-small power may start to demand too much: entrapment

Hint 26

Symmetric alliance:
-alliance between 2 powers of equal strength

Front 27

balance of power

Back 27

bandwagoning or balancing

Front 28

balancing

Back 28

2 or more states join together to take over the stronger nation

Front 29

bandwagoning

Back 29

join the threat to avoid conquest

Front 30

reputation

Back 30

audience cost
-selection effects
- early analysts only looked at the failed alliances which skewed their results
-selections bias

Front 31

selection effects

Back 31

early analysts only looked at the failed alliances which skewed their results

Front 32

entrapment

Back 32

when the weaker state engages in an asymmetric alliance with a stronger state & the weaker power demands too much

Front 33

strategic ambiquity

Back 33

US adopts a deliberately vague position: china and taiwan aren't certain what the us will do

Front 34

credibility-control trade-off

Back 34

alliance must be credible,& yet the larger state must be able to keep control over the situation

Front 35

appeasement

Back 35

main points for countries to form alliances for deterrance
-ex: hitler was able to take what he wanted leading up to ww2
-increase a challengers payoff from the sq

Hint 35

Problem
-the challenger can see it as a sign of weakness & demand more
-makes the challenger more powerful, altering the face of future crisis

Front 36

cooperation

Back 36

Liberals:
-if you play the prisoner's dilemma again will the same outcome occur?
-cooperation amongst state can occur
neo realist
-states living in a dog-eat dog world and this is what happens