Statutory Interpretation

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Who interprets federal statutes?

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Federal statutes are interpreted by federal courts

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What is the purpose of statutory interpretation?

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to determine the intent of congress

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How do you determine the intent of congress?

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1. Begin with the text. Words are chosen to express intended meaning.
2. When are plain and unambiguous, the court does not ordinarily look to outside sources such as legislative history to determine meaning. When the words of statute are ambiguous, the court will do so.

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Describe the legislative process

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1.intro of bill to committees
2.committee consideration: hearing are held, amendments are considered, and reports are made. (committee reports are legislative history and are the means of communicating a committee’s decision to entire chamber)
3. Floor debate and amendment in each house
4. Reconciliation and presentment to the president.
2 chambers may appoint a conference committee that changes bill. When conferees agree on revised bill, a report is written explaining the compromise.
The conference committee report contains record of changes made. If the chambers agree, a final bill (“enrolled legislation”) is presented to president.
5. The President sign or vetoes.If president vetoes, 2/3 of congress may override.

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Resolutions

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Congress uses these to regulate admin/internal business, or to express facts or opinions on non-legislative matters. They do not have to be signed by the president and do not have the force of law

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Theories of Statutory Interpretation

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3 approaches: Textualism, Purposivism, and Intentionalism. Each rely on same tools of construction, (but emphasize different ones) and are grounded in principle of legislative supremacy. All are concerned with legislative intent to some degree.

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Intentionalism

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Asks what would the legislature have specifically intended if confronted with an interpretive question

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Purposivism

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Asks what is the general purpose or aim of congress (specific intent is too difficult to reconstruct). Purposivists read a statute’s provisions to advance congress' general aims, as derived from a variety of sources. They pay attention to the semantic meaning of the text, following it as long as it doesn’t contradict the statute's overall purpose. Note: Holy Trinity was a purposivist decision, and discerned the purpose by looking at the title of the statute, the mischief it was supposed to cure, and the legislative history.

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Textualism

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Asks how would a reasonable people understand the precise language? What is an objective reading of the text? Strict textualists feel that going beyond the text (to LH) is illegitimate. Canons of construction are used to determine the plain meaning. Example: the rule of lenity is used to find reasonable interpretation of text.

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The Court’s Tools of Construction

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The text, legislative history, the purpose of the statute as a whole, avoiding absurdity, and the canons of construction

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What are the sources of legislative history?

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1.Committee reports-statements may be put I here with intent for others to read.
2. Appropriations- did congress continue funding
3. Amendments or changes in drafts- was language added, changed or deleted?
4. Member statements- things said at hearings
5. Reports or testimony- becomes evidence pointed to in interpreting the law

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What are canons of construction?

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Rules that presume an issue will be decided a certain way unless a party proves otherwise. All approaches agree that statutory interpretation entails some reliance on canons.

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Plain meaning

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The plain meaning (a reasonable interpretation) controls unless the words are ambiguous. Courts look beyond the text (to LH) if words are ambiguous.

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Absurd results

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Congress is presumed to avoid absurd results, so statutes should not be interpreted to provide absurd results.

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All words...

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All words are given effect if possible. It is implied that Congress intended for all words to have effect on the rule. (2 words next to each other should mean something different from one another).

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Implicit repeals

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Implicit repeals are disfavored. Subsequent bills do not appeal earlier legislation unless the intent to do so is unmistakably clear; or when 2 statutes cannot be reconciled.Congress intends to leave things unchanged all things it doesn’t change.

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Appropriations bills

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Language in appropriations bills does not have substantive effect.

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Retroactive application of statutes

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There is a presumption against retroactivity of statutes in statutory interpretation.

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Statutes in derogation of common law...

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...should be narrowly construed

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Well established common law principles...

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...are presumed to be retained

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expressio unius est exclusio alterius

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To include one is to exclude all others

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A guide to the meaning of a statute...

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...is the evil it was meant to address

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Rule of Constitutional Avoidance

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Where 2 reasonable interpretations are possible, but one would require resolution of a constitutional issue, courts should choose the other. We assume Congress doesn’t intent to impose Constitutional issues.

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Conflicting language between specific and general provisions of a statute

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In cases of conflict, specific statutory language controls over general. Ex-If introductory language conflicts with other parts, specific controls

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The use of the ordinary meaning of language and exceptions

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Ordinary meaning of words is preferred unless: a) there is evidence that a word has special meaning within the communities for whom a statute was intended; or b) the statute uses a legal term of art relevant to the matter at hand (it would be presumed that the term is given that meaning).

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Ambiguous tax statutes

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are construed against the government i

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Rule of Lenity

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An ambiguous criminal statute should be construed in favor of the defendant. (Exception- the rule of lenity cannot dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term)

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Context

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Statutory language must be read in context -words gather meaning from the words around them. The presumption of uniform usage of words can relent when context is clear. The meaning of a word can actually alternate in a statute. (See General Dynamics case).

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The same words in the same act...

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...are presumed to have the same meaning.
(This conflicts with the canon that says that statutory language must be read in context and that words gather meaning from the words around them)

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Rule about fixing Congress' mistakes

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The courts don’t generally fix congress’ mistakes

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Scrivener’s error rule

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In cases where there is an obvious mistake, the courts will correct

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Heirarchy of Legislative History

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The order of preference of the use because of the value in determining congress' intent.
Hierarchy: committee reports> sponsor statements (opinion of only one person) > floor statements (individual members discuss bill after it comes out of committee)

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Why use legislative history?

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Because words ina statute may be ambiguous. LH may show the special meaning of words.

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Letter v. Spirit of the Law

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A statute may appear over or under inclusive in relation to its general aims or purposes. Here there is a mismatch between the spirit (general background purpose) and the letter of the law (rules embedded in a statutory text). One view is that when the letter of the law fails to capture its spirit (or reason), enforcing the spirit of the law better approximates what the legislature would have done. Riggs v Palmer and Holy Trinity are examples of that approach.

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Riggs v. Palmer (New York 1989)

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Not Good law. The court decided whether under a certain statute a murderer could inherit from its victim. Despite the clarity of text of the statute, the court held that the legislature could not have intended so. Congress' intent likely ran counter to words of the statute. Today a court would not deviate from a statute just because it believed that congress would not have applied it to a set of facts.

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Church of the Holy Trinity v United States (1892)

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Did statute that prohibited making arrangements to bring over aliens to perform labor apply to a pastor?The court applied the canon that Congress is presumed to avoid absurd results, and that congress did not intend such a prohibition despite the clarity of the statute. Like the Riggs case, this is Not Good law. (Other canons that could apply: the evil the statute was meant to address, and rule of constitutional avoidance).

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What is wrong with Riggs and Holy Trinity?

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They are not the law as it is now. Courts don’t correct legis mistakes frequently

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Decsribe new textualism

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New textualism supports the idea that judges should adhere to the meaning of the statutory text even when that meaning is contrary to its purpose. Modern textualists emphasize the legislative compromise embedded in statutory text, and resort less to legislative history.

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West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (1991)

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This is a new textualist case. The court decided that expert witness fees could not be awarded as a part of "reasonable attorneys fees". Rules applied: Plain meaning controls the interpretation of the statute unless there is ambiguity, and only then should the court look beyond the text. the statute here was not ambiguous. Ordinary meaning of words is preferred unless words have special meaning or a term of art is used. In the legal profession "reasonable attorneys fees" doesnt include expert fees. Congress intends to leave things unchanged all things it doesn’t change. Judicial opinions supported this position and if congress wanted to change something it would have. It is not the courts job to correct legis mistakes.

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What is textually constrained purposivism?

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Textually constrained purposivism says that the text is important but knowing the statutory purpose is necessary to resolving ambiguity. The courts may consult outside sources to aid in interpretation, but should establish that the statutory language is elastic enough to accommodate the interpretation.

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General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 US 581 (2004)

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Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act also prohibited favoring old over young. No. Statutory language must be read in context -words gather meaning from the words around them.The word “age” needed to be read in context. The meaning of the word “age” did not stay the same throughout the statute. Ordinary meaning of words is preferred.Ordinary people speak of age discrimination as being against older people. (Note: the ct looked at LH to determine purpose of the act. The Wirtz report, testimony at house/senate hearings, etc. It also looked at other parts of the statute. The introductory provisions and the statements of purpose. A Contrary result would defeat purpose.

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The absurdity doctrine

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Even where plain meaning of legislation is clear, courts may make exceptions where results are absurd. The intent of congress and the purpose of the statute may be otherwise. (Fits with Intentionalism and purposivism)

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United States v. Kirby, 74 US 482 (1868)

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Was arresting a mail carrier for murder obstructing of the mail within the statute? No. Congress is presumed to avoid absurd results

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Public Citizens v. United States Dept. of Justice 491 US 440 (1989)

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Whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act should be construed to apply to the ABA committee simply bc it was “utilized” by the president? No. Congress is presumed to avoid absurd results. An unconditional reading of the FACA would produce the absurd result extending its requirements to any group of 2 or more ppl from which executive seeks advice. A guide to the meaning of a statute is the evil it was meant to address. The statute was meant to address wastefulness with an extended reach but was no supposed to extend that far.
(Note- to avoid an odd result, the court weighed the language with other evidence of congressional intent- legis history).

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The Scrivener’s error doctrine

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A scrivener’s error is an obvious error in the transcription of legislative policies into words. On RARE occasions, the judiciary will correct this. These cases involve departures from the text in order to avoid obviously unintended results.
Signs of an error: other parts of the statute hint at it, or language makes no sense.

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United States v. Locke 471 US 84 (1985)

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Statutory language req’d filing of a mining claim prior to Dec 31, and a party filed one day late, on Dec 31.
Should the Federal Land Policy Management Act be read as “on or before Dec 31”? Plain meaning controls unless words are ambiguous. The words were not ambiguous, plain meaning of on or before Dec 31 controlled. Congress is presumed to avoid absurd results.The strict interpretation produced a harsh result, but not an absurd result. Nothing in the LH suggested congressional intent to the contrary. The court also looked at the regulations which supported reading the statute the same way

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Scientific or Ordinary Meaning?

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A word in a statute may have a different meaning than what it appears. Consider that statute’s target audience to determine its intended meaning. Is there evidence of special meaning for that audience? The court takes note of a word's ordinary meaning and dictionaries are admitted as aids in understanding.

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Nix v. Hedden, 149 US 304 (1893)

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The court considered whether tomatoes are classified as a vegetable or fruit under the Tariff Act? Ordinary meaning of words is preferred unless there is evidence that a word has special meaning within the communities for whom a statute was intended (or a term of art is used). While botanists may define tomato as a fruit, this isn’t the ordinary meaning. The statute wasnt directed at botanists. In common language of people, tomato is a vegetable.

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Moscal v. United States, 498 US 103 (1990)

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The issue was whether under the statute, the term “falsely made” encompassed genuine documents that were false in content. Yes. All words are given effect if possible. It is implied that Congress intended for all words to have effect on the rule. (2 words next to each other should mean something different from one another). “Forged” and “counterfeited” also appeared in the statute and gave meaning to “falsely made." There was no generally accepted common law meaning for falsely made. The court adopted common law meaning in accord with the overall purpose.

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Smith v. United States, 508 US 223 (1993)

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Whether trading gun for narcotics was “use” of a firearm during and "in relation to" a drug trafficking crime within the meaning of the statute. Yes. The ordinary meaning of words is preferred. Here, the ordinary meaning of "use" could have been broad and wasn’t explicitly narrowed by the statute. Also, Statutory language must be read in context -words gather meaning from the words around them. "Use" could reasonably be read other ways. The phrase “In relation to” read in context with the courts definition of “use” made sense ( to Scalia). The exception to rule of lenity applied here: the rule cannot dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term.

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The use of Legislative History

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Its use to discern statutory meaning is controversial. Legislative history may take the form of changes and amendments to bills, committee reports (explaining why a bill was framed a certain way, goals, and what certain words were meant to mean). LH was initially disfavored, but reliance increased after 1940 as a response to new-deal legislation. Beginning in the 1980s, the “new textualists” challenged the legitimacy and reliability of legislative history. There has been a noticeable reduction of its use

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Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 US 1

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The FWPCA addressed water pollution, and gave the EPA authority to regulate pollutants. the statute's definition of “pollutant” included radioactive materials, some of which were already regulated by the AEC under the AEA. Did “pollutants” include the materials reg by AEC, and should the AEC defer to the EPA? Since implicit repeals are disfavored, and subsequent bills do not repeal earlier legislation unless the intent to do so is unmistakably clear, congress did not intend to repeal AEA. Also, in cases of conflict specific statutory language controls over general.The AEA was a specific statute that gave the AEC authority to regulate those material, and was controlling. LH was important in showing congress didn’t intend to alter current reg scheme- The house committee report defined “pollutant” and didn’t include the materials in question. This was unchallenged by conference committee.

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The New Synthesis

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Today a court would first ask whether the statutory text speaks clearly, and would not typically or uncritically treat legis history as primary indicum of legislative intent. A court would consult LH only if text is ambiguous. (compromised view). Ct is less likely today to use legislative history (has reduced use in last quarter century) and when it does, the citations seem less important to the outcome. Ct is likely to use a dictionary to find textual meaning. New textualism has had a pronounced influence on statutory interpretation

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Exxon Mobile Corp. v Allapattah Services, Inc. 545 US 546 (2005)

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The court decided whether a statute gave courts supplemental jd when some but not all Plaintiffs satisfied the amount in controversy. (Did the statute overrule the Zahn case?) The plain meaning controls unless words are ambiguous and courts look beyond the text only if words are ambiguous. The statute here was unambiguous, so the court shouldn’t consider LH/extrinsic materials. The language of stat didn’t contain an exception that would preserve Zahn. The court said that LH is murky and ambiguous. The majority gave committee reports the same value to docs produced outside of congress (subcommittee working paper and law review article).

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Corning Glass Works v Brennan, 417 US 188 (1974)

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The Equal Pay Act reqd equal pay for equal work on jobs, the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar "working conditions." Corning paid day and night shift different wages becasue of a difference in working conditions. Did Corning violate the act? Did the day shift and night shift perform equal work under similar “working conditions” under the act? Congress intended to use technical meaning of "working conditions" and time of day was not relevant to the accepted defn of “working conditions” in the field.