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32 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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“Cities of walls”
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Gated communities/complexes
Segregation Violent policing The poor are more likely to be: Victims of crime (including domestic violence) Victims of police violence Victims of natural disasters |
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good governance/ cities of walls
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Fear, crime and policing in cities
The importance of city planning and geography (ex brazilia) “Cities of walls” – residential segregation and security exposes poor to crime (africa biggest homocide rate) The role of the media Film |
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rise of good governance as a concept
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(1) The increasing complexity of public administration and management and the rise in influence of non-state actors
(2) The debt crisis, the increase in the power of IFIs via structural adjustment, and the decline of state capacity in developing countries (3) The rise of neoliberalism (4) The “third wave” of democratization (5) The collapse of communism (6) Changes in social scientific perceptions of the relationship between economics and politics |
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good governance
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political will and state capacity (strength versus scope)
"the activity of making collective decisions" "involves the coordination of both public and private sector bodies…Governance positions government as one actor in a network" "opens up a variety of possibilities for new forms of joint government-citizen initiatives.” |
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good governance distinct
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No universally accepted definition (a contested concept)distinct from government (the temporary, top political level within state institutions) and governability (the capacity of governments to make authoritative decisions)
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Good governance and econ development
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Seen by many as crucial to economic development. It is also a contested concept.
ex: world bank's def emphasizes the rule of law, stability, and effectiveness rather than Effective public sector institutions, high priority in investing in people, etc |
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Quantitative indicators of state capacity
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% of children in primary school
tax ration (3) human development index (UNDP) (4) the response of the state bureaucracy to routine requests – i.e. driver’s license, visa, permit, etc. Leaders seen as legitimate Judiciary seen as fair? |
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good governance and conditionally (benn vs wolfowitz)
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2006: Hillary Benn, then-UK Secretary of State for International Development versus Paul Wolfowitz, then-World Bank Group president.
Benn: “We must not penalise the poor because of corruption among politicians and officials. And where governments aren’t willing to tackle the problem, we mustn’t turn our backs on poor people either.” |
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Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
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The modern concept of state sovereignty (supreme authority within a territory) is often dated to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
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“Good governance” and sovereignty
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has been said to involve a new intrusiveness and conditionality in development, and reduced developing countries’ sovereignty.
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cold war
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political loyalty was more important than “good governance” for most donors, and the IFIs formally.
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post cold war
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Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of sovereignty has undergone some changes and come to be seen as more conditional than it was in the past – conditional, in part, on governments’ duty to protect citizens.
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neoliberal reform
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The “crisis of the state” in the 1980s
The first wave of neoliberal reform The second wave of state reform Different prescriptions for the second wave reforms Contrasting explanations for the adoption of reform Distinctive regional challenges What should be done? |
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State crisis in the 1980s
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The second oil shock and the rise in US interest rates (1979)
Debtor countries’ problems with debt repayment Net flows of capital are reversed – from developing to developed countries World Bank’s first SAP (1979) IMF and World Bank promote economic liberalization (not contemplated in Bretton Woods accords) by attaching conditions to new lending (“conditionality”) |
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first wave of neoliberal reform
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The peak of the first wave (the “Washington Consensus”) was the mid-1980s
The regions most directly affected = Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa |
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structural adjustment programs
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SAPs
Reduce fiscal deficit (cut spending, increase revenues, or both – in practice, often meant cuts in spending and investment, reductions in state salaries and personnel, and elimination of state functions) De-regulate Reduce tariffs and other impediments to trade Privatize state-owned enterprises Increase exports and facilitate debt repayment Decentralize government |
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success of first wave?
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Neoliberalism as theory, policy prescriptions, and policy practice
As a policy prescription, it did address the immediate crisis Its diagnosis of the failures of import-substitution industrialisation policies (ISI) and statist controls over the economy had some validity |
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Problems with public sector under ISI
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Little state leverage over stagnant firms
Dualistic labor market economies (privileged formal/state sector, deprived informal/private sector) SOEs often used for patronage High state debt – this often fuelled inflation DUPs, “rent-seeking”, and predation |
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positive results of first wave
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Some resumption of growth
Relative price stability Fiscal imbalances often corrected Mitigation of debt crisis Increase in exports |
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negative results of first wave
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Low growth
Widening inequality – emergence of new super-rich elite Little poverty reduction Financial and economic volatility Environmental deterioration and social regression Decline in state capacity – state disintegration |
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The second wave of state reforms
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Creating new regulatory agencies (re-regulation)
Strengthening legislative capacity and the electoral system (democracy promotion) Improving health and education services Reforming judiciaries and public security agencies (“rule of law” reforms) Improving tax collection New accountability agencies |
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Do different models of second wave reform have to be implemented in different combinations in different regions?
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i.e. accountability reforms in E. Asia, and civil service and managerial reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America?
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Factors that do not directly explain the propensity for coups:
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the size of the military, the sophistication and professionalism of the military, the size of the military budget
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reasons for coups
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Internal (to military)
Violations of military hierarchy Expansion of military capacity and sense of mission Expanded sense of threat Domestic Weak political parties Weak state institutions other than the military High degrees of conflict International Defeat in war Foreign military and political assistance An enabling international environment – for example, military coups in neighboring countries, recognition by great powers |
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Reasons for a rise in military governments in the 1960s and 1970s
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Continued poverty
Prior military interventions Rising military capacity Conflicts Superpower support |
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Reasons for the decline of military rule
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the third wave of democracy
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difficulties in analyzing democracy
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Generalisations across regions and countries are difficult
Democracy is a moving target Democracy is a normative project Media bias – foreign policy priorities of big powers distorts perceptions No single model of democracy |
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The “third wave”
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The first wave – late 19th/early 20th century
The reverse wave of the inter-war years The second wave after World War II The reverse wave of the Cold War The third wave after the 1974 Portuguese revolution |
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portuguese revolution/ carnation revolution of 1974
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Inspired by the pro-independence guerrillas they had been fighting in the Portuguese empire's territories in Africa,[3] a group of Portuguese officers organised in the Armed Forces Movement rose to overthrow the fascist and authoritarian Estado Novo regime that had ruled Portugal since the 1920s. Portugal's new regime pledged itself to ending the colonial wars and began negotiations with the African independence movements.
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resasons for third wave
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A lack of legitimating ideology on the part of some authoritarian regimes
The end of the Cold War and changes in big power foreign policy Economic growth and complexity Globalisation and global supply chains Regional economic agreements Changes in the Catholic Church The rise of human rights NGOs The “CNN” effect and the diffusion of ideas |
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The debate about democratic quality
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“Illiberal democracy” (Zakaria) – strengthen “rule of law” institutions, then democratize.
Neoliberal democracy – the public sphere is weakened by liberal economic policies – popular mobilisation and economic nationalism as a solution. Delegative democracy – the executive is too strong, strengthening of other branches and “horizontal accountability” is necessary. Democracy without citizenship – political rights without civil and social rights. Social democracy as a solution. Elitist democracy – political society is parasitic on civil society; new mechanisms of “vertical accountability” must be constructed. |
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development
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Adjusting local practices so as to better take advantage of global market opportunities?
Resisting exploitation imposed by multinational corporations, powerful states, and international financial institutions? Selectively protecting national economic interests and entering the most beneficial transnational economic networks? |
