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61 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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LAND IMMEDIATELY |
Execute a landing without delay. |
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LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE |
land at the first site at which a safe landing can be made. |
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Land as soon as practicable |
"Extended flight is not recommended. The landing site and duration of flight are at the discretion of the PIC." |
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What is a "WARNING" |
Explanatory information about An operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that may result in injury, death, or loss of aircraft if not carefully observed or followed. |
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What is a "CAUTION" |
Explanatory information about An operating procedure, practice , or condition, etc., that may result in damage to equipment, if not carefully observed or followed. |
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What is a "NOTE" |
Explanatory information about an operating procedure, practice, or condition, etc., that must be emphasized. |
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Define "Shall"
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"Shall" is used only when application of a procedure is mandatory.
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Define "Should"
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"Should" is used only when application of a procedure is recommended.
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Define "May" and "need not"
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"May" and "need not" are used only when application of a procedure is optional.
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Define "Will" |
"Will" is used only to indicate futurity, and never indicates any degree of requirement for applicability of a procedure. |
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The following should be performed for all emergencies |
1. Maintain control of the aircraft. 2. Alert crew. 3. Determine the precise nature of the problem. 4. Complete the applicable emergency procedure or take action appropriate for the problem. 5. Determine landing criteria and land as required. |
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Engine Malfunction in Flight |
*1. Control Nr. * 2. CONTGCY PWR switch - ON. * 3. Single-engine conditions - Establish. * 4. ENG ANTI-ICE switches - As required. * 5. External cargo/stores/fuel - Jettison/dump, as required. * 6. Identify malfunction.
WARNING
Flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inoperative may result in unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event of a dual-engine failure.
WARNING
With engine anti-ice on, up to 18% torque available is lost. Torque may be reduced as much as 49% with improperly operating engine inlet anti-ice valves. |
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Engine High-Side Failure in Flight |
* 1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure - Perform. * 2. PCL (malfunctioning engine) - Retard to set: a. Torque 10% below good engine, or b. Matched Ng, or c. Matched TGT.
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Engine High-Side Failure on Deck
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* 1. PCLs - IDLE.
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Engine Low-Side Failure |
* 1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure - perform |
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Engine Torque or TGT Spiking/Fluctuations
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If an engine instrument is spiking/fluctuating and inducing secondary indications in Ng, Np, and/or Nr:
* 1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure - Perform. If fuel contamination is suspected: * 2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WARNING PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate an engine failure. Consider performing APU Emergency Start procedure prior to manipulating the PCL. Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize the Nr decay rate if the malfunctioning engine fails. |
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Compressor Stall
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* 1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure - Perform.
* 2. PCL (malfunctioning engine) - IDLE. NOT IN PCL : CAUTION If the Ng decay relight feature attempts to relight the engine, subsequent compressor stalls may occur and damage the engine. A yaw kick may be experienced each time the engine relights. The engine must be manually shut down. |
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Engine High-Speed Shaft Failure
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* 1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure - Perform.
* 2. PCL (malfunctioning engine) - OFF . CAUTION Following a high-speed shaft failure, the engine will overspeed, the Np overspeed system will flame out the engine, and the auto-ignition system will activate the relight feature. The engine Np governor will eventually bring Np down toward 100%. The engine must be manually shut down to prevent further damage. NOT IN PCL : Indications: Np is greater than Nr by more than 3% Engine torque is below 10%. |
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Abort Start |
To abort start: * 1. PCL - OFF. * 2. ENGINE IGNITION switch - OFF. If engine oil pressure is indicated: * 3. Starter - ENGAGE. |
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5 Reasons to Abort Start |
Abort engine start if any of the following limits are exceeded:
1. Ng does not reach 14% within 6 seconds after starter initiation. 2. No oil pressure within 30 seconds after starter initiation (do not motor engine). 3. No light-off within 30 seconds after moving PCL to IDLE. 4. ENG STARTER advisory disappears before reaching 52% Ng. 5. TGT reaches 851* C before idle is attained. |
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Engine Malfunction During Hover/Takeoff |
* 1. Control Nr. * 2. CONTGCY PWR switch ON. If a suitable landing site exists or unable to transition to forward flight: * 3. Set level attitude, eliminate drift, cushion landing. If able to transition to forward flight: * 4. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure - Perform. |
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Dual-Engine Failure in Flight/Hover |
* 1. Autorotation - Establish * 2. Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure - Perform. If time and altitude permit: * 3. Engine Air Restart emergency procedures - Perform.
NOT IN PCL :
WARNING
- Rotor rpm decays rapidly following a dual-engine failure or the loss of the second engine after a single-engine failure. Delay in lowering the collective will result in loss of rotor rpm and may cause catastrophic failure of the rotor system due to dynamic instability at low rpm.
- Entering an autorotation at low airspeeds(below 50 KIAS),where the vertical sink rate is high in proportion to the horizontal speed, will result in an airspeed indication that is considerably higher than actual. A positive nose down attitude should be held until 80 to 85 KIAS is indicated, after which pitch attitude may be adjusted to maintain the desired airspeed.
- Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective TRIM RLSE switch is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude. AFCS commanded collective movement could result in a catastrophic loss of Nr.
- Flying at greater than 110% torque, with one engine inoperative, may result in unrecoverable decay of Nr in the event ofadual-enginefailure. (If both engines fail, generators will drop off line at approximately 80 percent Nr, resulting in loss of both pilot and copilot mission and flight displays.)
- If the engine fails in a hover in ground effect, do not decrease the collective. This will cause the helicopter to settle more rapidly. The helicopter should be held in a landing attitude. The landing can be cushioned by increasing collective as the helicopter approaches the ground. |
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Single-Engine Failure in Flight
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* 1. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure - Perform.
NOT IN PCL : Warning light is activated by the vertical instrument when Ng decreases below 55%. In the event of an isolated Ng signal failure, the ENG OUT light will be illuminated with the engine operating normally. |
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Engine Air Restart |
* 1. APU Emergency Start procedure - As required. * 2. ENGINE IGNITION switch - NORM. * 3. Fuel selector lever(s) - DIR or XFD. * 4. PCL(s) - OFF. * 5. Starter(s) - ENGAGE, motor engine. * 6. PCL(s) - IDLE (TGT 80*C or less, if time permits). * 7. PCL(s) - Advance to FLY after starter dropout.
WARNING
If APU is unavailable, and a crossbleed start is necessary, maximum torque available will be reduced during the start sequence. Depending on operating conditions, level flight may not be possible. Ensure AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch is placed to ENG for crossbleed starts.
NOT IN PCL :
CAUTION
For a crossbleed start, use the maximum Ng safely obtainable on the donor engine. Ng less than 94% may result in hot starts.
Note
Either a single or dual-engine restart may be attempted following dual-engine failure. Decision should be based on applicability of respective start envelopes and considerations of longer time to idle when executing a dual-engine restart. |
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APU Emergency Start
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* 1. ECS - OFF.
* 2. AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch - APU. * 3. FUEL PUMP switch - APU BOOST . * 4. APU CONTR switch - ON. * 5. APU GENERATOR switch - Check ON. |
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Unusual Vibrations on Deck
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* 1. Collective - Lower.
* 2. PCLs - OFF . * 3. Rotor brake - Apply as required. CAUTION Application of the rotor brake may aggravate lead/lag tendencies and cause a mechanical failure. |
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Hung Droop Stop(s)
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* 1. Reengage rotor to greater than 75% Nr.
NOT IN PCL : Note While operating in cold weather, consideration should be given to turning the BLADE DE-ICE control panel POWER switch to the POWER ON position. This will activate the droop-stop heaters and aid the droop stops in seating. |
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LOW ROTOR RPM
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* 1. Control Nr.
NOT IN PCL : Warning light is activated by the vertical instrument when Nr is less than 96% |
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Main Transmission Malfunction
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If failure is imminent:
* 1. LAND IMMEDIATELY. If secondary indications are present: * 2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WARNING Possible indications of main transmission imminent failure may include: yaw attitude excursions with no control input, an increase in power required for a fixed collective setting, failure of a main generator or hydraulic pump, increased noise, increased vibration levels, or abnormal fumes in the cabin. WARNING Operation of the main gearbox with no oil pressure may result in failure of the tail rotor drive takeoff pinion gear and subsequent loss of tail rotor drive. Note Consideration should be given to performing applicable steps of emergency landing/ditching procedure and transiting at minimum power airspeed and a low altitude flight profile (approximately 80 feet and 80 KIAS) to permit a quick flare followed by an immediate landing/ditching. Note A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temperature gauge and temperature sensor (caution light). |
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Tail/Intermediate Transmission Malfunction
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If failure is imminent:
* 1. LAND IMMEDIATELY. If failure is not imminent: * 2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WARNING High power settings require maximum performance of the tail rotor drive system and may precipitate ultimate drive failure. Consideration should be given to transiting at an altitude sufficient to enter an autorotation and performing the applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure. |
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INPUT CHIP (#1/#2) Caution Lights On
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* 1. Main Transmission Malfunction emergency procedure - Perform.
NOT IN PCL : Note Consideration should be given to returning the engine PCL to FLY for landing. |
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Loss of Tail Rotor Drive Altitude and Airspeed Sufficient to Establish Autorotation
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* 1. PAC call - (AUTO, AUTO, AUTO.)
* 2. Autorotation - Establish. Center tail rotor pedals. * 3. Drive failure - Attempt to verify. * 4. Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure - Perform. * 5. PCLs- OFF when directed (prior to the flare). NOT IN PCL : Loss of tail rotor drive may be the result of a loss of tail rotor rotation or pylon separation with a possible right rotation. Attempt to verify rotation as a result of drive failure rather than flight control jam or yaw boost hard over. WARNING Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective TRIM RLSE button is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude through the collective trim servo. AFCS commanded collective movement can result in an accelerated yaw rate. |
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Loss of Tail Rotor Drive Altitude and Airspeed Not Sufficient to Establish Autorotation
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* 1. PAC call - (HOVER, HOVER, HOVER.)
* 2. Collective - Lower. * 3. PNAC - Hands on PCLs. * 4. PCLs - OFF when directed (approximately 20 to 30 ft) NOT IN PCL : Loss of tail rotor drive may be the result of a loss of tail rotor rotation or tail pylon separation with a possible right rotation. Altitude may have to be adjusted based on rate of yaw and/or turn. |
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Loss of Tail Rotor Control
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* 1. Collective/airspeed - Adjust as required to control yaw.
WARNING Following the appearance of the #1 TAIL RTR SERVO caution without the associated BACKUP PUMP ON and #2 TAIL RTR SERVO ON advisories, the aircraft will demonstrate normal yaw responses in flight regimes that do not require excessive tail rotor performance; however, at slower airspeeds, below approximately 40 KIAS, more pronounced effects of loss of tail rotor control may become more apparent. After touchdown, rapid reduction of collective or PCLs may cause excessive and uncontrollable yaw rates. If the tail rotor control cables are damaged, the hydraulic transients associated with switching the tail rotor servo from NORM to BACK UP may cause catastrophic damage to the tail rotor controls. NOT IN PCL : WARNING Servo hardovers in the yaw channel may result in loss of tail rotor control. Consideration should be given to securing the SAS/BOOST and/or TRIM as necessary. Note An momentary uncommanded right yaw will occur when the tail rotor servo switches from normal to backup in a hover. The rate and magnitude will primarily depend on power required and wind direction and magnitude. |
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#1 Primary Servo or #1 Transfer Module Leak (#1 RSVR LOW and #1 HYD PUMP Caution Lights On and BACK UP PUMP ON Advisory Light On) |
* 1. SERVO switch - 1ST OFF . * 2. Land as soon as practicable. If the BACKUP RSVR LOW caution also appears or the backup pump fails: * 3. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. If the #2 PRI SERVO caution and/or HYD warning appears: * 4. LAND IMMEDIATELY. Note Be prepared for loss of tail rotor control. CAUTION Switching the BACKUP HYD PMP to OFF with weight on wheels and #1 HYD PUMP caution light illuminated will result in loss of tail rotor directional control when the backup pump secures. NOT IN PCL : After the #1 RSVR LOW caution light and #1 HYD PUMP caution light illuminate, the pilot positions the SERVO switch to 1ST OFF . The SERVO switch is positioned to 1ST OFF to prevent any further fluid leakage in the event the leak is in No. 1 primary servos. The LDI system should continue to operate normally, powering the No. 1 hydraulic system with the backup pump. |
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#2 Primary Servo or #2 Transfer Module Leak (#2 RSVR LOW and #2 HYD PUMP Caution Lights and BACK UP PUMP ON Advisory Light On)
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* 1. SERVO switch - 2ND OFF .
* 2. Land as soon as practicable. If the BACKUP RSVR LOW caution also appears or backup pump fails: * 3. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. If the #1 PRI SERVO caution and/or HYD warning appears: * 4. LAND IMMEDIATELY. Note Be prepared for loss of the pilot-assist servos. |
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Hydraulic System Warning
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* 1. LAND IMMEDIATELY.
NOT IN PCL : The HYD warning will occur as a result of several compounded hydraulic malfunctions. The order in which the hydraulic emergency will present itself should allow the pilot early indications of the impending failure. |
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#1 and #2 HYD PUMP Failure
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* 1. Restrict flight control movement
* 2. Land as soon as possible |
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Boost Servo Hardover |
* 1. PAC call "BOOST BOOST BOOST" *2. SAS/BOOST pushbutton - OFF .
NOT IN PCL :
A failure of the collective or yaw boost servo may result in high cockpit control forces. The control loads resulting from a hardover condition can be immediately eliminated by shutting off the boost servos. Resulting cockpit control loads will then be the same as for in-flight boost servos off. The control free play noted will be about 1/2 inch. |
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Utility Pump Caution Lights
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* 1. Stop dome.
NOT IN PCL : CAUTION Utility hydraulic pump with low or no hydraulic fluid shall be secured to prevent damage to the pump. |
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AFCS DEGRADED Caution Light On
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* 1. Safe altitude and airspeed - Establish (waveoff/Instrument Takeoff [ITO], as required).
NOT IN PCL : Note If the AFCS DEGRADED caution appears during a night/IMC coupled hover or automatic approach, consideration may be given to continuing hover/approach if not disoriented or unstable. |
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Stabilator Auto Mode Failure
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* 1. PAC call - "STAB, STAB, STAB."
* 2. Cyclic - Arrest pitch rate. * 3. Collective - Do not reduce. * 4. MAN SLEW switch - Adjust to 0. NOT IN PCL: WARNING It is possible for the stabilator to fail without illumination of the stabilator caution light and associated aural warning tone. In this case, the first indication of failure will be an uncommanded pitch change. Reengagement of the automatic mode after a shutdown results in the automatic mode operating for 1 second. If a hardover signal to one actuator was the cause of the initial shutdown, and reengagement is attempted, the actuator will move before another disengagement is commanded. In this case, subsequent reengagement shall not be attempted since it may result in additional stabilator movement. If acceleration is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost. The stabilator shall be slewed to 0 as airspeed increases above 40 KIAS. With large fixed stabilator angles, reduction in collective pitch results in increased aft cyclic requirements. Collective reduction during recovery from a trailing edge down stabilator flight condition should be minimal. If the stabilator becomes fixed at or near 0, nose-high attitudes may occur at slow speeds. A combination of high airspeed/low altitude coupled with a runaway down stabilator (indicated by a significant uncommanded nose-down pitch change) will necessitate immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft. Primary consideration is to disengage the automatic mode by activating manual mode slewing as required. At high airspeeds, immediate recognition and flight control input are essential to avoid an unrecoverable attitude. It is essential for the PNAC to slew the stabilator to 0 degrees immediately to gain control of the aircraft. If acceleration is continued with the stabilator in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost. Without stabilator auto mode, careful aircrew coordination to manually slew the stabilator is required to avoid undesirable and potentially dangerous flight regimes and/or aircraft attitudes. |
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STAB AUTO MODE FAILURE
Note
In Manual Mode, the following are not recommended: |
-Swimmer deployments lower than 15 feet AGL. -Night takeoffs, approaches, and landings (except one-time landing following failure). -Automatic approaches to a hover. -Simulated emergency procedures, including practice autorotations. -Flight in known IMC. |
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STAB ANGLE LIMITS |
STAB ANGLE KIAS LIMIT (150
10 100
20 80
30 60
40 45 |
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Unusual Attitude Recovery
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* 1. Level wings.
* 2. Nose on horizon. * 3. Center ball. * 4. Stop rate of climb/descent. * 5. Control airspeed. Unusual attitudes are considered to be attitudes of over 30 pitch and/or 60 bank. There are three general unusual attitudes: nose-low, nose-high, and high-bank angles. During all unusual attitude recoveries, the nose-low attitude is the desired condition from which to complete all recoveries. |
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Total Ac Power Failure/Dual Generator Failure
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* 1. Safe altitude and airspeed - Establish.
* 2. Stabilator - Check position, slew as required. * 3. APU Emergency Start procedure - Perform. WARNING Ensure airspeed versus stabilator angle limits are not exceeded. Stabilator automatic mode is inoperative. Note The stabilator position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the AC Essential bus. Attempt to check visually. Note The capability of slewing the stabilator is retained via the dc essential bus using battery power. Travel is limited to 35 degrees if full down or 30 degrees if full up when a power failure occurs. Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced by as much as 49%. |
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#1 or #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS or #1 or #2 FUEL PRESS Caution Lights
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* 1. Fuel selector lever (affected engine) - XFD (DIR if currently in XFD).
NOT IN PCL : WARNING Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout. |
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#1 and #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS or #1 and #2 FUEL PRESS Caution Lights
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* 1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
* 2. APU Emergency Start procedure - Perform. WARNING Be prepared for dual-engine failure. Recommended airspeed profile is 80 KIAS to minimize Nr droop should dual-engine failure occur. Note Consideration should be given to performing applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure. NOT IN PCL : WARNING Intermittent appearance of a FUEL PRESS caution may be an indication of air leaking into the fuel supply lines, which could cause momentary fluctuation in engine power or flameout. |
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External Engine Fire |
* 1. Confirm fire. * 2. Engine Malfunction in Flight emergency procedure Perform. * 3. PCL (affected engine) - OFF . * 4. Engine T-handle (affected engine) - Pull. * 5. FIRE EXTGH switch - MAIN (RESERVE if required or ac power is off). -If airborne and fire continues: * 6. LAND IMMEDIATELY. -If fire appears extinguished: * 7. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
NOT IN PCL :
Indicates that a fire detector (#1 ENG/#2 ENG) has actuated a fire warning circuit. (Note light in appropriate T-handle.) The safety of the helicopterís occupants is the primary consideration when a fire occurs. If airborne, the most important single action that can be taken by the pilot is to land the helicopter safely.
Note
HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication. |
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Internal Engine Fire
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* 1. Starter - Engage. Motor engine.
NOT IN PCL : An internal engine fire is indicated by a rise in TGT above 540ºC after engine shutdown. |
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APU Fire |
* 1. APU T-handle - Pull. * 2. Confirm fire. * 3. FIRE EXTGH switch - RESERVE (MAIN if required and available). -If airborne and fire continues: * 4. LAND IMMEDIATELY. -If fire appears extinguished: * 5. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. -If on ground: * 6. Fire extinguisher - As required.
NOT IN PCL :
Indicates that a fire detector (APU) has actuated a fire warning circuit. The safety of the helicopter's occupants is the primary consideration when a fire occurs. If airborne, the most important single action that can be taken by the pilot is to land the helicopter safely as soon as possible.
WARNING
Severity of the fire and conditions present will dictate whether an immediate landing/ditching is required.
Note
HF transmissions, sunlight filtered through smoke, haze, water, or at sunrise or sunset may trigger the fire detectors and cause a false fire indication. |
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Cockpit Fire/Cabin Fire |
-If source is known: * 1. Affected power switches and cbs - Secure. * 2. Portable Fire Extinguisher - As required. -If fire continues or source is unknown: * 3. Cabin/doors/vents/ECS - CLOSE/OFF, as required. * 4. Unnecessary electrical equipment and cbs - Secure. -If fire continues: * 5. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
Note
Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing maximum torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be reduced by as much as 49%.
NOT IN PCL :
WARNING
Severity of the fire and conditions present will dictate whether an immediate landing/ ditching is required.
Vapors from the portable fire extinguisher agent, although not poisonous, can cause asphyxiation by displacement of oxygen in a confined space. The cabin should be ventilated as soon as practical.
It may not be advisable to secure all electrical power, thus losing AFCS, ICS, and flight instruments prior to achieving VMC or landing/ditching.
CAUTION
If source of fire is unknown, consideration should be given to securing Mission Power immediately when securing unnecessary electrical equipment to prevent system damage. |
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Smoke and Fumes Elimination
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* 1. Airspeed - Adjust, as required.
* 2. Doors/windows/vents - Open. * 3. Aircraft - Yaw, as required. |
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Immediate Landing/Ditching (Pilot) |
1. Crew and passengers - Alert. 2. Shoulder harness - Locked. 3. External cargo/stores/fuel - Jettison/dump, as required. 4. Searchlight - As required. 5. MAYDAY/IFF - TRANSMIT/EMER. -In the flare: 6. Windows - Jettison, as required. -After landing: 7. PCLs - OFF. 8. Rotor brake - ON. 9. Copilot collective - Stow. 10. Pilot HCU - Stow. -After all violent motion stops: 11. Egress.
CAUTION
Time permitting, consideration should be given to executing APU Emergency Start procedure to maintain electrical and hydraulic power upon rotor disengagement.
WARNING
After actuation, the position of the emergency jettison window lever may cause snagging of personal survival gear, impeding egress. Time permitting, reset jettison handle to the aft position prior to egress.
WARNING
Failure to remain strapped in aircraft until all violent motion or in-rushing water stops may result in injury or incapacitation.
NOT IN PCL :
Stores jettisoned at descent rates greater than those listed in the NATIP have not been tested. Aircraft/rotor system impact from jettisoned stores may be possible. |
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Underwater Egress |
* 1. Emergency Breathing Device - As required. * 2. Cord(s) - Disconnect. * 3. Door/window - Open/jettison. * 4. Place hand on known reference point. * 5. Harness - Release. * 6. Exit helicopter. After egress: * 7. Swim clear of helicopter and inflate LPU.
NOT IN PCL :
WARNING
The downward stroke of the seat will change the frame of reference needed for egress. Extended handles, windows, and controls will not be located in the same relative position. Keep legs clear from under seat area. Downward travel of seat may cause injury or entrapment.
Do not inflate LPU until outside helicopter.
Water pressure may prevent opening the emergency egress windows until the cabin fills with water. The windows should be jettisoned prior to water entry to optimize the ability of the crew to safely egress.
Failure to disconnect ICS cord can impede egress. Personal gear may snag during egress, notably on collectives, FLIR HCUs, Parking Brake and RAST release handles, PCLs/Fuel Selectors/Fire T--Handles, or extended Emergency Jettison Window handles.
If entanglement or disorientation delays egress, hold onto a reference point with one hand. Using the other hand, place the Emergency Breathing Device second stage regulator in your mouth, clear water from your mouthpiece, and continue with egress.
To prevent injury while ascending to the surface and breathing from the Emergency Breathing Device, continually exhale to vent the expanding air from your lungs. |
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FLIR Uncommanded Lasing
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* 1. MASTER ARM - SAFE.
* 2. LASER SELECT - SAFE. If lasing continues: * 3. FLIR - OFF. NOT IN PCL : Use this procedure if the FLIR continues to lase after the laser trigger is released on the HCU or if the LASING alert is visible on the FLIR display without operator command. |
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Hellfire Missile Hangfire
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If rocket motor ignites and aircraft yaws:
* 1. Adjust controls as required to maintain straight-and-level flight. WARNING The Hellfire missile thermal battery produces voltage for up to 30 minutes after the Hellfire missile squib is automatically fired during the launch sequence. If continued flight is possible, the aircraft should remain airborne with Hellfire missile pointed in a safe direction for a minimum of 30 minutes to allow the thermal battery to become inert. NOT IN PCL : This condition exists if the pilot/copilot presses the RELEASE CONSENT button but the Hellfire missile remains on the rail after the squib firing pulses have been sent to both the Hellfire missile and rocket motor squibs. The rocket motor may or may not ignite. A Hellfire missile hangfire condition is noted on the MD by displaying the text beneath the Hellfire missile fail symbol. CAUTION Personnel should not handle hung ordnance for at least 30 minutes after attempted launch. Note Normal rocket motor burn time is less than 3 seconds. A rocket motor failure may cause the motor to slow burn or smolder and smoke for more than 3 seconds. The missile thermal battery does not provide the voltage for the rocket motor fire train. Aircraft power via the Signal Data Converter (AH SDC) is required to fire the rocket motor squibs. If motor squibs have not fired within 1.5 seconds after launch attempt, the missile Safe and Arm Device (SAD) will mechanically return to the safe condition. This will disconnect the firing circuit from the rocket motor squibs. |
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All Stores Jettison
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* 1. ALL STORE JETT - Press.
NOT IN PCL : Note In the event of a total electrical failure, all stores jettison is inoperative. All stores jettison is not available with Weight on Wheels. All stores jettison operates regardless of the status (ARM or SAFE) of the MASTER ARM pushbutton. All pylon-loaded weapons will be disarmed before jettison. Emergency jettison of auxiliary fuel tanks via the ALL STORE JETT pushbutton is inhibited when less than 40 gallons (approximately 272 pounds) remain in tank. Minimum pressure to jettison a full sonobuoy launcher is 1,100 psi. If sonobuoy launcher pressure is less than 1,100 psi, the last sonobuoys in sequence may not jettison, with system securing at 250 psi to ensure safe separation of launched sonobuoys. ALL STORE JETT does not jettison CMDS stores. Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS) stores can only be jettisoned by selective jettison. All Emergency Jettison Panel functions operate normally when running any SIM mode. |
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Cargo Hook Emergency Release
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* 1. Cyclic EMERGENCY RELEASE/CABLE SHEAR - Press.
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RAST Messenger Jettison
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* 1. Cyclic EMERGENCY RELEASE/CABLE SHEAR - Press.
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Rocket Misfire |
Point weapon in a safe direction Safe weapon A) +1760 off - select B) ACI master Arm - safe |
