Right To A Speedy Trial

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6A right to speedy trial generally refers to

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delay between D's arrest/indictment and trial

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6A incorporated?

Back 2

Fully incorporated into the states via 14A

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LOVASCO (1977)

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Speedy trial clause does not apply to pre-indictment delays

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DOGGETT 1992

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Speedy trial clause applies post-indictment but pre-arrest

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LOVASCO v DOGGETT

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Pre-indictment delays may be acceptable if for a valid reason (i.e. investigative reasons, decided whether to prosecute at all), even if a bit prejudicial to D

If no valid reason for delay (DOGGETT spectrum from negligent--bad faith delays), there can be a speedy trial violation

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Right to speedy trial is vague and amorphous:

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--impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied
--no fixed point in process where State can offer defendant choice of exercising or waiving right
--deprivation of right may lead to severe remedy--dismissal of indictment

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Policy concerns behind 6A right to speedy trial

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--Societal interests
--Defendant's interests
--Government interests

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Societal interests

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Get dangerous D off the streets quicker
Encourage judicial efficiency

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Defendant's interests

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--Length of pre-trial detention
--Minimize anxiety
--Avoid complications that arise when changes in legislation or case law
--Social stigma
--sitting and watching to see what happens to co-defendant if there are two

Possibility that right works against D, if delay could help D prepare more and make P's witnesses and evidence weaker

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Government interests

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--Jail overcrowding
--integrity of evidence
--bail issues
--avoid complications related to changes in law
--national security interests

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Timing: Time Table Approach

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(rejected in BARKER)
Courts define time period within which D must be offered trial.

Pros--would clarify when right is infringed, be more efficient
Neg--Courts engaging in legislative activity, hard to find the right time period
SCOTUS--right approach has to be less precise than this

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Timing: Demand-waiver Doctrine

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(rejected by BARKER)

Restrict consideration of right deprivation to cases in which D has demanded a speedy trial; presumes waiver; notion is that delay helps D, but in fact may hurt D

Neg--general rule is that courts should avoid waiver whenever possible; D under no obligation to bring himself to trial, this would create a duty; D counsel would have to assert right early and often or risk losing

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Timing: Today's test?

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Barker balancing test

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Timing: Barker balancing test

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Court must look at:
--length of delay
--reasons for delay
--whether defendant assert his right
--prejudice to defendant
--"other circumstances as may be relevant..."

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BARKER: Length of delay

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Fluid standard, triggered once it becomes so long that it is "presumptively prejudicial"

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BARKER: Reasons for delay

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--Administrative delay or deliberate attempt to delay? There can be gov. negligence in either direction, but general standard is whether it is an unacceptable delay
--case-by-case basis, assign "weight" to the reasons given

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VERMONT v BRILLON

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D's constantly firing and getting new attorneys; even though attys were appointed, actions were on the side of the D and not gov't, so no violation of speedy trial

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BARKER: Whether defendant assert his right

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Only matters at the "extremes"

GHAILANI

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BARKER: Prejudice to defendant

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--must relate to speedy trial clause
--Causation requirement--things have to specifically relate to speediness of trial, regardless of how bad they were for defendant

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"Relate to speedy trial clause"

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Prejudice must concern
1) Preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration
2) Minimize anxiety and concern of the accused
3) Limiting possibility that defense will be impaired**seen by Barker case as most important factor

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Retrospective vs. Prospective Waivers

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Only retrospective waivers allowed

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ZEDNER v US

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D waives right "for all time," 91-day delay ensues, then D moves to dismiss indictment; SCOTUS OKs this b/c Speedy Trial Act regulates within which trial must being and doesn't allow for prospective waivers

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3161(b)

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Indictment/information must be filed within 30 days from date of arrest

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3161(c)

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Trial must commence no later than 70 days, no earlier than 30 days (unless D consents in writing to the contrary) after filing of indictment/information

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3161(h)

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Delays that stop the clock:
--Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
--Continuance (can only be granted if ends of justice served outweigh speedy trial interest of public and defendant)

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Types of other proceedings that could stop the clock

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--proceedings to determine competency
--determination of other charges against D
--interlocutory appeals
--Pre-trial motions
--transfer of case
--transportation of D from district to district
--time taken by court to consider plea agreement
--any time D is under advisement by court

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3162

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Sanctions

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3162(a)(1)

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Charges dismissed or otherwise dropped

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3162(a)(2)

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Factors to determine whether charges should be dismissed with or without prejudice

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3162(b)

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Where defendant or government delays for impermissible/bad faith reason

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SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974

3164

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Defendants deemed high priority who are:
--detained
--awaiting trial and deemed at high risk

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BARKER v WINGO: Facts

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2 Ds commit murder and arrested on 7/1958, one not tried until 1963 b/c of gov't continuances. D sues under speedy trial.

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BARKER v WINGO: Holding

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Ct. finds for gov't, says there was minimal deprivation because D was not prejudiced and did not assert his right to a speedy trial; introduces 4-part BARKER test

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US v LOVASCO: Facts

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D committed firearm possession/dealing crime in 1973, not indicted until 1975; D files 5ADPC, claiming prejudice b/c two key witnesses were lost b/c of time lapse (no 6A here b/c that only applies after formal indictment)

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US v LOVASCO: Holding

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Ct. finds for gov't--pre-indictment delays don't deprive D of due process even if D somewhat prejudiced

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Government's interests at stake with pre-indictment delay

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--fully consider desirability of prosecuting case
--consider prosecutor's ability to continue investigating case
--don't want to pressure prosecutor's into resolving doubtful cases in favor of early (and possibly unwarranted) prosecutions

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DOGGETT v US: Facts

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D indicted for cocaine distribution in 1980, not arrested until 8.5 years later. D files 6A claim

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DOGGETT v US: Holding

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Ct. finds for D, saying delays are unacceptable. When delay is between indictment and arrest, court considers spectrum of reasons for government delay:

[diligence] - [negligence] - [bad faith]

Anything right of negligence is unacceptable. Negligence can go either way depending on circumstances. With Doggett, since gov't didn't even try to look for him when he went overseas, negligence is unacceptable.

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US v GHAILANI: Facts

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D indicted in 1998 for complicity in terrorist attacks, arrested in 2004 and held as enemy combatant, brought to trial in 2009. D moves to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.

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US v. GHAILANI: Holdings

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Finds for gov't. Enemy combatants held until end of hostilities and then released b/c of status, not specific crime. BARKER analysis applied to enemy combatants, court finds that national security is legitimate reason for delay, D not too prejudiced, and D's assertion of speedy trial right was disingenuous and too late.