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86 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Churchgoers attend what kinds of churches? |
Ethnically/racially homogeneous churches |
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People who say religion is important to identity |
Likely to say ethnicity is important to identity |
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God gap (American Grace) |
The gap in questioning political differences between people at varying religious levels |
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Religion and partisanship |
There's unquestioned generalization of political life |
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Abortion and same sex marriage... |
Tightly connected to religiosity |
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Highly religious |
More likely to be Republican |
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Religious divide |
Republicans had advantage among churchgoers in early '70s, fallout from McGovern campaign of 1972 |
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Religiosity advantage of Republicans over Democrats |
Disappeared with Carter |
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In the 1980s, Republicans gained advantage among religious voters, continued to grow |
Current period is unusual. Church attending evangelicals and Catholics have found a common political cause |
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2 shifts from American Grace: 1) change in voter |
The churchgoer switches from Democratic to Republican |
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2) Generational replacement |
The older generation with partisan allegiances is replaced by political newcomers who came of age in period of political alliances. The new alliances supplant this |
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God gap is widest |
Among those under 35. It grows weaker among generational cohorts |
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Older voters formed political loyalties when there was no relationship |
because of religiosity and partisanship |
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Connection between frequency of worship attendance and voters' party ID |
1982: baby boomers had more relative attendance and Republican party ID 1997: There was a correlation between religious ID and Rep Party ID |
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Comparison between boomers and their children |
Post-boomers have two times the correlation between attendance and party affiliation. People calibrate religious involvement to align with politics |
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Current religious divide has increased |
because of change. Like gradual change over time |
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Sunday morning country clubbers = |
churchgoers |
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High percent of republicans |
people who attend church frequently and have a high education |
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American with high SES are more likely to attend church than those with low SES |
Working class is less likely to attend church than upper class |
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Cultural issues like abortion, same sex marriage |
have had greatest impact on votes cast by upper class voters |
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Coalition of religious is around |
a small bundle of issues (abortion/same sex marriage) |
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Less category |
Civil liberties vs. safety, govt policy, interventionist vs. foreign policy, spending on foreign aid |
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Alignment occurred b/c of |
change in political choices offered to voters |
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Most people's abortion views are between 2 poles of the issue |
There are seemingly small shifts in abortion attitudes which can have significant political implications |
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There's increasing acceptance of homosexuality |
1988: overall same sex marriage support was very low 2008: 1/2 of US expressed support |
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Working mothers and gay marriage: |
won increasing acceptance among religiously secular Americans |
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There's generational replacement that's making homosexuality increasingly acceptable |
Young people support it, and same sex marriage will be less likely to be an issue |
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Young people's attitudes resemble those of their grandparents |
Goes against the grain on other trends. Young people are the most sexually permissive. |
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While the majority of Americans think abortion should be legal in all circumstances, the majority doesn't think it should be legal in some circumstances |
Including safety, legality, rarity. One can be pro choice without defending abortion always |
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Juno generation |
Not ripe for political action |
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80% of Americans disagree with political persuasion by religious leaders |
Some forms of political activity are more common in some forms than others |
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Politics from the pulpit is rare, no matter where you worship |
Drop off in frequency of political sermons. |
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Nearly 3 in 5 churchgoers have heard a sermon on abortion |
but it's not too frequent |
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Religious social networks are echo chambers |
social interaction among like minded coreligionists reinforces/hardens beliefs, even if it's subtle |
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Democracy - public controls behavior of elected officials by exercising influence at the ballot box |
anchor of party ID limits voters from changing party they vote for from one election to the next and wavering in their choice of candidates during campaigns |
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elections |
choice of who will represent country. Religion and politics is all about how we evaluate people |
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Knowledgable voters sort as Democrats and Republicans based on beliefs and stick to them |
Less informed enter campaigns as relatively blank slates, available to persuasion by short-term forces of campaigns (can be persuaded) |
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Jeremiah Wright incident |
Obama could have lost election |
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Some types of voting behavior |
group based voting: voters orient themselves to parties and candidates on the basis of which groups they are for or against. Religion REALLY matters here |
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another type of voting behavior |
Nature of the times voting: voters evaluate whether times are good or bad and reward or punish the incumbent party accordingly |
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another voting behavior |
candidate evaluations: voters' evaluations of the personal characteristics and leadership abilities of candidates (support whom they like and trust) |
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2008 election temperature |
unpopular incumbent, economic depression, American frustration: Obama just happened to be biracial |
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Kaiser Family: economy/jobs are a top issue for voters, followed by other issues including health care |
Economy: 21%, health care: 13%, f.p.: 13%, religion and politics is important, but not only criteria, candidate's personal characteristics: 6% |
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from lecture God gap |
political differences between people at varying levels of religiosity |
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Theories are generally applicable to white voters |
Highly religious, likely to be Republicans. Least religious, likely to be Democrats. African Americans don't fit the trend! |
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Connections between religiosity and politics |
glue that holds religiosity and partisanship together: political salience of abortion and same sex marriage. Issues are salient because parties have taken opposing positions on both issues Republicans have formed a coalition of the religious (highly religious evangelical and mainline Protestants, and Mormons) |
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Jay-Z |
Bush doesn't care about black people |
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Religious divide between parties has become entrenched |
this division has varied over time (grown considerably since mid 1980s, Putnam Campbell pg 374) |
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Abortion and family issues may be losing political potency |
Who will care about those issues 10 years from now? Same sex marriage = not a big deal |
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Politics and worship blend most easily in Af Am churches but not a frequent occurrence |
For Evangelicals, overt political activity is even less common |
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66% of Americans oppose telling specifically who to endorse |
Also, legal ramifications of endorsing (501c3, etc) |
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Political appeals are more likely to come from family, friends, neighbors than fellow congregants |
Subtle influence of churches are considerable. Politically relevant info is communicated (governed by religious group beliefs and norms) |
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Teachings in religious communities resonate politically, then reverberate through friendship networks formed within religious communities |
Same religious messages. Subtle, powerful reinforcing of congregations |
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2008 religious service attendance rate is ~ 37% |
religious trends are slow moving. None of the categories have changed much in recent decades |
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In 1950s, 99% of Americans believed in God |
In 2008, number was 92% |
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US: more religiously diverse than it was in 1972 |
Catholic immigrants. US shut down immigration in 1924. Restrictions loosened in 1965 |
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5% attend services monthly at least |
% of nones is rising. People raised without religion are more likely than they used to be to be without religion as adults. Backlash to religious right's rising visibility in 1980s |
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After 1990s, more people thought saying you were religious = saying you were a conservative republican |
Now, significant minority of people are without no religion |
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# of people claiming religion other than Christian/Jewish more than doubled from 1% in 1970s to between 2.5-3% today |
Recent immigration driving increase in religious diversity. Immigrants from central/South American are mostly Christian |
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Despite increasing #s of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, non-Christian Jews, % of religious others is small |
declining proportion of protestants in US. 1970: 62%, 2008, just more than half |
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Different groups concentrated in different parts of the U.S. |
More Catholics in SW/NE, more protestants in SE, more Jews/Muslims in major cities, nones in West |
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Americans are more accepting of religious diversity |
Congregations have become more ethnically/racially diverse |
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Belief |
86% of Americans believe in heaven; 73% in Hell, now as did several years ago. After decline in 1950s, almost everyone still says they believe in God as a higher power |
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Generational turnover |
More recently born individuals are less likely to believe in an inerrant Bible than those born longer ago |
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Highly educated people are less likely than less well educated to say that the Bible should be taken literally |
declining confidence in special status of one's own religion. Every indicator of traditional religiosity is either stable or declining |
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belief in life after death |
Increase in % of people who say they are spiritual but not religious (not interested in organized religion, not yearning people ready to be won over by a new type of religion specifically targeted to them |
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More people say that they pray than attend services |
Americans' religious involvement has softened. GSS - 38% attend religious services weekly |
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Religious involvement is softening because one of the most religiously involved demographics is shrinking (married couples with kids |
Aging: younger cohorts are replacing older ones. The elderly population will include more people who didn't spend time religiously involved |
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Some events spark changes in religious involvement, but these are short lived |
More fundamental change is in demographics |
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There are more than 300,000 congregations in the U.S. |
6 trends: looser connections between congregations and denominations, more computer technology, more informal worship, older congregants, more high income college educated congregants, more people in very large churches |
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Median congregation is same size today as in 1998 |
No increase since 1998 in congregations' involvement in social services |
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Organizational ties between congregations and national denominations have loosened |
Clear indication of growing proportion of unaffiliated congregations with a denomination (not Catholicism, though) |
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1 in 5 Protestant churches is independent of a denomination |
1 in 5 Protestants now attends these independent churches. If unaffiliated were a congregation, would be #2, behind the Catholic Church |
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Increased informality in these congregations |
More clapping, shouting. Dress informally |
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2/3 of American say religion is losing influence (Pew) |
younger adults are less inclined to consider increase in nonreligious as bad, whether or not they're religiously affiliated |
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About 1/3 of Americans have always been church attenders |
Remarkable continuity |
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Church attendance is not increasing |
Debate about whether we are experiencing stability or slow decline in church involvement |
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America has significant minority of people with no religion at all |
Though population has increased in US but church attendance isn't increasing, doesn't mean they're related. |
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1972-2010: 2 most important long term trends in religious affiliation highlights? |
In 1972, 7 percent said no affiliation; in 2010, 51%. In 1972, 62% are Protestant, 2010, 51% |
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88% of nothing in particular religiously affiliated aren't actively looking for churches. |
32% of religiously unaffiliated are 18-29 |
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Slight decline in 2009-2011 of weekly religious attendance |
Number of people who seldom/never attend church increases by 4 points |
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Theories about causes of rise of the unaffiliated |
- political backlash: young adults, turned away from organized religion b/c they view it as entangled with conservative politics |
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Theories about causes of rise of unaffiliated |
Delays in marriage - postponement of marriage+parenthood by young adults |
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Theories about causes of rise of unaffiliated |
Broad social disengagement - tendency among Americans to live separate lives and engage in fewer communal activities |
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Secularization |
economic development contributes to rise of unaffiliated. Joel Osteen is not offering preachy type religion |
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We are still religious but growth of nonreligious is growing |
48% say it's a bad thing. 11% say it's a good thing. 39% say it doesn't matter. |
