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42 Cards in this Set
- Front
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Russia's security dilemma (Friedman/Stratfor) |
Russia needs security along its borders; specifically the Northern European Plain. Russia lacks access to 'warm water' oceans and suffers border insecurity in the West (Ukr, Caucasus); Russia's goal is to anchor itself as firmly as possible on geographic barriers without overextension. |
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Three possible roles of a weakened post-Soviet Russia in post-Soviet world (Tsygankov) |
Three strategies if Russia is weak in domestic development, human capital, institutional capacity: 1) Bandwagon with powerful state, balance against other states 2) Focus on internal development, disengage from international arena (retrench) 3) Recueillement – Russia should focus on development while forming flexible cross-cutting coalitions If Russia is strong in three roles it can become a pole and a cultural model |
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Recruiellement (Tsygankov) |
Because Russia is weak it should concentrate on improving domestic conditions, develop soft balancing coalitions (divide and rule). Conditions: Russia must act on realistic opportunities and assess its capabilities, can only work under conditions of multipolarity, must explain interests and goals to rest of world, low likelihood of major wars in regions adjacent to Russia |
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Yeltsin's policy in Georgia |
Yeltsin supportive of Georgia keeping Abkhazia and South Ossetia because he was fearful that supporting secession would create a precedent for North Ossetia and other parts of Caucasus. He wasn't successful in gaining support in Duma. Russia decided not to openly support Georgia militarily in fighting separatism, chose instead to impose arms embargo on Abkhazia and reject Abk and SO's independence. |
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Peacekeeping forces in Georgia after 1991 & mid-June 2008 |
After 1991 Russia, Georgia and SO created mutual peacekeeping force. Agreement prohibited Russian non-peacekeeping forces. Mission expanded in 1994. Georgia could have withdrew from agreement but USA asked Georgia not to to not antagonize Russia – Georgia complied. |
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Rose Revolution in Georgia/Effect on Russian FP |
Bloodless revolution => Saakashvili became president. To keep sphere of influence Russia offered more help in keeping separatists in line. Saakash moved westward and wanted to join NATO and EU and removed pro-Russian officials. Putin placed economic embargo on Georgia, poured huge money into separatist areas, installed loyal leaders in these groups. Russia extended citizenship to people in Abkh and SO, allowing them to use 'protecting their citizens' argument in future |
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June/July 2008 Russia's Kavkaz military exercises purpose/significance |
Exercises aimed at 'anti-terrorism'. Many Russian peacekeeping forces stayed in place in conclusion of Kavkaz exercises, putting them in striking distance of Georgia [Mike: evidence suggested that Georgia was used as a terrorist sanctuary – used as justification by Russia] |
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2008 NATO Bucharest Summit |
NATO settled for 'eventual membership' for Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia thought it had security, whereas Russia saw NATO's inaction as weakness and non-commitment. |
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Russia defense of actions in Georgia in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war |
Ended genocide of SO's, defended Russian citizens in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, defended peacekeepers that had been attacked by Georgian military. Russia justified its actions in self-defense/human rights. |
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The EU's Tagliavini Report |
Concluded that Georgia started the war, but Russian action was uncalled for. Genocide was false, 'passportization' challenged Georgia's sovereignty, but Georgia indeed attacked Russian peacekeepers. |
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Putin's policy in Abkh/SO 2002-present |
Russia and Abkh sign 'Alliance and Strategic Partnership Treaty' in 2014. Similar agreement signed with SO. Created joint efforts such as a military unit and a 'Coordination Center of Internal Affairs". Russian answer to EU's Association Agreement with Georgia to protest expansion. |
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Dawisha's argument about Russian elites |
Russian elites purpose to represent and promote state interests abroad and to enrich themselves through corporatist-kleptocratic regime. ("privatize the profit, nationalize the risk") |
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'The Corporation' (Dawisha) |
Power vertical that Putin has created in which state involves itself in every sector of the economy. Russian corporatism not like other world because it is kleptocratic meaning people steal sh!t. |
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Силовики (Siloviki) |
Group of officials who began their career un power ministries (sila means power). This group wants military rebuilding, counter NATO op's while at the same time stealing sh!t (kleptocracy). |
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Civiliki |
Modernizers, have opposite ideas of Russian FP than siloviki and thus Russian foreign policy often seems chaotic and varied |
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CSTO |
Collective Security Treaty Organization. Militarized security alliance formed to promote peace, strengthen regional security and stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Created by Russia to reign FSU states. Russia militarizes CSTO to potentially counter NATO. |
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SCO |
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Addresses a series of regional concerns - terrorism, extremism, separatism (Aris). SCO views multilateralism for state building and sovereignty. Elite driven model (Aris). |
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CSTO members |
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan. NOT AZERBAIDJAN, UZBEKISTAN AND TURMENISTAN!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! |
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SCO members |
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. NOT ARMENIA, BELARUS, TURKMENISTAN |
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Russia's military bases in Central Asia |
Russia's largest foreign deployment spread out between 3 bases in Tajikistan: Dushanbe, Kulyab, Kurgan-Tyube. Air base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan – Russian signed lease until 2032 with 5 year renewal option. Secures Russia's physical and cultural presence in Central Asia. Balances NATO influence. |
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2004 Andijan Massacre |
Uzbeki gov troops opens fire into protest killing hundreds of people. West says Uzbek citizens protesting against human rights abuses. US subsequently kicked out of air base in Uzbekistan. Prompted strategic Uzbek-Russian relationship largely based on shared authoritarian ideologies. |
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2012 Russian-Tajiki agreement |
October 2012 Russia leases military base until 2042. Russia in return trains tajiks and upgrades their eq. Tajiks negotiated better terms for their gastarbeiters. Tajik workers send back 3.3$ billion in remittances from Russia which accounts for 43.4% of Tajiks GDP (jesus christ) |
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2012 Uzbek actions: CSTO, Russia, China, US, Int status |
2012 Uzbekistan suspended partnership with CSTO, recommitted to Russia-Uzbek strategic partnership and signed strat partnership with China. Passed a bill, after not letting US use its bases to demilitarize from Afghanistan, to ban all participation military centers and declared neutrality. |
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Manas military Bases |
2001 US set up base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan. IN 2009 Kyrgystan voted to shut down the base, which was the only remaining US base in Central Asia. In June of the same year the shut down was reversed and base was up under a different name until 2014. Rent increased from 17$ mil to 60$ mil. Base was key because it processed 98% of demilitarization from afghanistan |
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Baikonur Cosmodrome |
Major space launching facility in Kazakhstan leased to Russia until 2050. Was a site of a possible joint missile command between US and Russia. |
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Operation Steppe Eagle |
Joint US/Kazakh training exercises held in Kaz using Kaz base. Intended for co-op regarding IRA. |
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1999 NATO action in former Yugoslavia/impact on Russian foreign policy |
Deepened Russian hostility to NATO because militant west disregards international law (IO of Russia). Viewed links with Chechnya. Russia suspended participation in NATO Permanent Joint Council and withdrew its reps from NATO. |
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1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit/Russian reaction |
OSCE summit offering political settlement in Chechnya and calling for the Charter for European Security. Russia starts seeing OSCE as a Western tool and Charter as forced democratization by the West. |
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1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act |
Signed in 1997 giving Russia 16+1 NATO Permanent Joint Council for consultation on shared interests. Declares that Russia and NATO are not adversaries and institutionalizes Russian presence in NATO headquarters. |
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2002 NATO-Russia Council |
Replaced the Permanent Joint Council with NATO+1 body. Russia has no veto power on NATO decision, but can participate in all phases of negotiations and work as a partner in areas of mutual interest. |
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Hybrid warfare |
Military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare. Tailored to maximize a non-violent, persuasive use of economic and political influence to reform hostile governments, movements, or trends in politically, socially and economically unstable conditions |
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1994 Budapest Memorandum |
Political agreement signed among Russia, UK, US and Ukraine so that Ukraine surrenders its nukes to Russia. All parties must thus: 1) respect Ukr independence, 2) refrain from threat of force to ukr, 3) refrain from economically coercing ukr, 4) seek immediate UNSC action, 5) no nukes against ukr, 6) consult one-another on issues |
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How Russia annexed Crimea |
Black sea fleet agreement in place -> Russians bring troops in -> they take over ukrainian bases and parliament -> peoples referendum held -> tadaa! |
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Minsk Accords |
Agreement to halt violence in donbass. Drawn up by Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. Failed to stop fighting. Texts consists of 12 points. Minsk II: Ukraine, Russia, France, Germany agreed on package of measures to alleviate war |
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European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System (EPAA); difference from Bush plan |
Bush plan was to place land-based interceptors in Poland and Czech Rep to allegedly contain Iran. Russia said that system will lead to a new arms race, threatening to aim their nukes at Poland, placing Iskanders in Kaliningrad and suspending ties with NATO and its participation in the CFE treaty. |
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Russia's argument against EPAA |
EPAA will undermine Russia's first strike capability. West says: nope, cuz we wont be able to stop a strike. [counterargument: Russia only wants to use tactical nukes, and the missile defense can stop that] |
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Russia's military reforms after 2008. Weaknesses discovered in Ukrainian conflict |
Large war deemed unlikely so tactics changed to fighting small conflicts on Russian borders. Army transformed into 'permanent readiness forces' made up of brigades. Halved the number of regiments and brigades in the Army. Also cut down Army in western parts which suggests that Russia thought large scale conflict there unlikely. Russia shifted more to special ops. Airborne Troops amplified strength. Makarov ordered the creation of a Special Op Forces command and a Cyber Command. A 'Super special purpose force'. After Crimea and the war in donbass, Duma withdrew its formal permission to use army in Ukraine so it was impossible to put Russian Army's new look to a more rigorous test. |
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What Assumptions underlie Russian military doctrine. How does Soviet/Russian strategic culture differ from the West |
Russia believes that conflict with US is inevitable. Russia is great power solely because of nukes and its internal regime cannot survive without a clearcut enemy for Russia. Russia must maintain eternal tensions with US. If conventionally attacked by the West Russia reserves the right to a first strike |
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Russian negotiation tactics |
1) generally worded agreements 2) promote broad range of interests at the same time 3) careful preparation while manipulating environment 4) instruct negotiators very tightly 5) combative negotiation style 6) divide and rule 7) back-channelling |
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Energy Union |
Would allow EU Commission to have a bigger say in negotiations with Russia on gas and nuclear fuel. Attempt to create a unified policy towards energy. Member states would have to inform commission if negotiations are conducted in advance, allowing officials to check wether agreements comply with EU regulation
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ECT |
Russian signed but didn't ratify. Provided balanced framework for energy competition. 5 key provisions: protection from FI, nondiscriminatory trade, reliable cross-border transit, est dispute resolution procedures,promotes energy efficiency. Russia left in 2009 |
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Third Energy Package |
2009: 2 EU directives + 3 EU regulations to unify the EU energy market. Unbundling: producer cannot control transit too. Create a single energy market |
