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9 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Jay has political preferences that are transitive. He likes candidate A better than candidate B and C better than A. Therefore, we know he likes C better than B. |
True. |
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In a two party primary, candidates should moderate their views, anticipating the median view they will likely face in the general election. |
True. |
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The preference revelation problem associated with lindahl printing becomes more sever as the number of people in society increases. Why? |
More people=easier to free ride. With so many people, it is less likely that anyone would detect a single free rider. By free riding, reduces aggregate contribution to public good thus reducing level of public good provision. In large community, each individual's share is so small relative to the whole that feee riding by a single individual does not significantly change level of public good provision. |
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If X is a single dimensional issue, the median position cannot lose under majority rule. |
Uncertain. The median voter theorem requires that preferences be single peaked in order for the result to hold. |
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Iona has political preferences that are intransitive. She likes A better than B and B better than C. Therefore we know she likes A better than C. |
False. |
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An increase in the transactions cost involved in voting reduces voter turnout. |
True. |
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What problem does lindahl pricing demonstrate? |
Preference Knowledge Problem. People overstate or understate their MB; don't truly know willingness to pay. |
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Using a majority voting method, a public good will only be provided in the quantity desired by the majority of voters. |
Uncertain. The median voter theorem does not necessarily provide the optimal quantity. |
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No more in this set. |
No more in this set. |
