Reading...
Play button
Play button
Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
86 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
|
• What are the two questions presented in “The Metaphysical Problem”?
|
o What are mental entities?
o What are mental operations? |
|
|
• Mental entities are described using two types of criteria, what are those two criteria types?
|
o Mental States
o Mental Properties |
|
|
• What aspects are attributed to mental states?
|
o Propositional Attitudes
o Sensations o Emotions o Volitions |
|
|
• What aspects are attributed to mental operations?
|
o Believing
o Sensing/Perceiving o Acting o Reasoning o Imagining |
|
|
• What are the three answers to the Metaphysical Problem that were presented in class?
|
o Dualism
o Materialism o Behaviorism |
|
|
• People who reason with Dualism believe the ____ and ____ are Distinct, fill in the blanks.
|
o Mental
o Physical |
|
|
• Dualism can be broken down into two categories, what are those two categories?
|
o Substance Dualism
o Property Dualism |
|
|
• What is the definition of Substance Dualism?
|
o There are two fundamentally different kinds of things in the world, mind and bodies. No mind is a body; no body is a mind
|
|
|
• What is the definition of Property Dualism?
|
o There are two different kinds of features in the world: mental properties and physical properties
o All things are structures of properties o Some things (rocks, clouds, cosmic rays, etc.) are purely physical and some things, such as human brains, incorporate both |
|
|
• What is the definition of Behaviorism?
|
o Minds are nothing but matter. Mental properties reducible to physical ones
|
|
|
• What are the two types of Behaviorism described in class?
|
o Philosophic Behaviorism
o Psychological/Methodological Behaviorism |
|
|
• Philosophic Behaviorism contains two theses, what are the two theses?
|
o Ontological Thesis
o Analytical Thesis |
|
|
• What is the Ontological Thesis as it relates to Philosophic Behaviorism?
|
o Mental states are behavioral states, dispositions behave
|
|
|
• What is the Analytical Thesis as it relates to Philosophic Behaviorism?
|
o Every statement contacting mental state terms can be translated without loss of meaning into statements about behavior
|
|
|
• What is the definition of psychological/methodological Behaviorism?
|
o Psychological facts are best understood by laws that don’t use mentalistic terms. Such terms should be replaced with operational definitions.
|
|
|
• Psychological/Methodological Behaviorism can be broken down into two areas, what are those two areas?
|
o Identity Theory
o Functionalism |
|
|
• What is Type-Type Identity Theory?
|
o Mental states are identical to brain state types
|
|
|
• What is Token-Token Identity Theory?
|
o Mental state tokens are identical to brain state tokens
|
|
|
• What is Functionalism as it relates to Psychological/Methodological Behaviorism?
|
o Mental properties are functional properties
|
|
|
• Functionalism can be broken down into 3 sections, what are those 3 sections?
|
o Functional Roles
o Functional Properties o Functional States |
|
|
• What are functional roles?
|
o Higher-order relational properties
o Causal properties |
|
|
• What are functional properties?
|
o A property of first-level things possessed in virtue of possessing causal properties that have the functional role in question that corresponds to each functional role
|
|
|
• What are functional states?
|
o A state type whose essential property is a functional property
|
|
|
• In class we were given an argument for Pain as a functional state, what does this argument look like?
|
o X is a property such that, if a person S has his finger nails pealed off this tends to bring about a token occurrences of X in S, which tends to evoke a loud scream. Call this role PAIN
o Corresponding to this role is the property of having some causal properties that are in instance of this role o So, some state token is a pain in virtue of being a token of some state type that has functional role PAIN |
|
|
• What is the question presented by Normative Epistemology?
|
o How do we have knowledge of and justified beliefs about other minds and our own minds?
|
|
|
• What are the two questions posed by Descriptive Epistemology?
|
o By what processes do we form beliefs about the minds of others and about our own minds?
o What is the content of our mental concepts and how do we acquire them? |
|
|
• What is the Theory Theory of Theories of mindreading?
|
o Ordinary people construct a naïve psychological theory that guides their attribution of mental states
|
|
|
• How did the Theory Theory view of mindreading come about?
|
o It is a development of the philosophical thesis that peoples mental concepts are theoretical terms of a naïve or folk psychology theory of human behavior
|
|
|
• Which developmental study best provides evidence for the possession of our folk psychological theory?
|
o The False Belief Test
|
|
|
• What type of model is the “keystone” of a Theory of Mind Module?
|
o Cognitive Modules
|
|
|
• What are the names of the two systems that comprise a cognitive system?
|
o Special Purpose System
o General Purpose System |
|
|
• What are Special Purpose Systems?
|
o Systems that perform only a single cognitive task or some narrow range of tasks
|
|
|
• What are General Purpose Systems?
|
o Systems that are unrestricted in their domain of application
|
|
|
• What are the eight characteristics of Cognitive modules described in class?
|
o Domain Specific
o Automatic o Informational Encapsulated o Fast o Relatively inaccessible to central systems o Have conceptually shallow outputs o Are realized in some fixed neural architecture o Exhibit characteristic and specific breakdown patterns |
|
|
• An autistic child’s theory of mind can best be described as…?
|
o They lack a cognitive module that encodes a theory of mind
|
|
|
• What can we conclude from the False Belief Task results of autistic children and Down Syndrome children?
|
o Theory of mind is not a central processing challenge
o There is a dedicated piece of “hardware”, mind module, that the autristic child can’t make up |
|
|
• What are Intentionality Detectors?
|
o Some special purpose cognitive module is operating on low-level information to represent subjects of intentionality
|
|
|
• What is the most salient example of intentionality detectors described in class?
|
o Collections of moving geometric shapes will, if the shapes move in certain patterns, look as though some of the shapes are “trying” to do something: escape, capture, hide, etc.
|
|
|
• What is the Rationality Theory?
|
o The ordinary person is a rationalizer.
o They assume that their friends are rational and seeks to map theory choices by means of this rationality postulate |
|
|
• What is Simulation Theory?
|
o Ordinary people fix their target’s mental states by trying to replicate or emulate them
|
|
|
• What are the two products of offline utilization of a person’s own inferential /planning mechanisms that were discussed in class?
|
o A person’s attribution of mental states to others
o Predictions of behavior associated with those attributions |
|
|
• What are the two things meant by “offline” simulation accounts?
|
o Their operation doesn’t result in outputs (representations) being sent to the Belief Box
o Their operation doesn’t result in output plans being sent to behavioral control systems |
|
|
• What are the three usual sources of evidence for the mental states of others, as described in class?
|
o Observations of their behavior
o Listening to what they say about themselves o Observations of their environment that results in inputs to the person’s belief box |
|
|
• What kinds of beliefs should be sent into the Belief-Box during a simulation run?
|
o Genuine beliefs that are share by the subject and the person performing the simulation
|
|
|
• What are the three desired outcomes from a simulation’s offline outputs?
|
o New genuine beliefs
o Genuine beliefs about the genuine beliefs o Likely behavior of the person whose mentality is being simulated |
|
|
• According to Goldman, what are the four central questions any “adequate theory” should answer?
|
o How do people mindread others?
o How do people mindread themselves? o How is the mindreading capacity acquired? o What are the contents of our mental concepts |
|
|
• According to Goldman, what are the three, less central, questions any “adequate theory” should answer?
|
o How does the story of mentalizing fit into the larger story of human cognition?
o What is the relationship between mentalizing and other forms of social cognition? o What is the evolutionary story behind human mentalizing? |
|
|
• Goldman claims “What is the evolutionary story behind human mentalizing?” is a less central question a adequate theory should answer, what is meant by this question?
|
o Is the mentalizing mechanism an evolutionary product, is it inheritable?
|
|
|
• What do Simulation Theory and Theory Theory of mentalizing both have to “mark”?
|
o The distinction between thinking about one’s own decisions vs. thinking about the decisions of others
|
|
|
• How does Theory Theory mark the distinction between one’s own thinking and the thinking of others?
|
o By making the target the subject of the propositions that enter the subject’s theoretical inference box
|
|
|
• How does Simulation Theory mark the distinction between one’s own thinking and the thinking of others?
|
o By marking faux-beliefs that go into the subject’s practical inference box with a label
o The label refers to the subject of the attribution task |
|
|
• What part of the Simulation Theory distinction process is most pivotal?
|
o The tags on the pretend desires & beliefs
|
|
|
• Simulation Theory needs some way of ensuring faux-beliefs aren’t treated as real beliefs, what two methods for this were described in class?
|
o A Label
o A Quarantine |
|
|
• What role does a label provide in Simulation Theory?
|
o It prevents a person from undertaking the actions of the target ze is simulating, until a decision has been reached
|
|
|
• What role does a quarantine provide in Simulation Theory?
|
o It prevents contradictions that many result from interactions between the faux-beliefs of the target and the real beliefs of the simulator
|
|
|
• On what assumption do we need quarantines in relation to the Simulation Theory?
|
o Mechanisms of inference (theoretical & practical) apply inputs in virtue of content and logical form
|
|
|
• What content and form must faux-beliefs posses in order to simulate a target’s inferences?
|
o Faux-beliefs must have the same content and form as the target
|
|
|
• According to Theory Theory, which inference box or boxes are involved in mentalizng the target’s “m-ing”?
|
o The theoretical reasoning box
|
|
|
• Why doesn’t Theory Theory require a quarantine like in Simulation Theory?
|
o The entirety of a belief store can be considered relevant, unlike in Simulation Theory
|
|
|
• According to Simulation Theory, which inference box or boxes are involved in mentalizng the target’s “m-ing”?
|
o The practical reasoning box
|
|
|
• According to Dr. Tolliver, what is the “soft underbelly” of Simulation Theory and why?
|
o Only the practical reasoning box is involved in mentalizing the target’s “m-ing”
o For this to be true the mechanism would have to be very clever and know: S’s beliefs about T; all worldly relevant info regarding T; and which info will optimize happiness and therefore be allowed into consciousness |
|
|
• What objection do Theory Theorist give when asked if Simulation Theory is a distinct hypothesis from Theory Theory?
|
o In Simulation Theory, the subject attributing mental states to the target must assume that the target is relevantly similar to hirself
o An adequate theory needs to explain the success rate of the mental state attribution method, Simulation Theory doesn’t o People frequently attribute mental states to things dissimilar to themselves (trees, animals, geometric shapes) o Similarity between the subject and the target isn’t generally necessary for successful simulation |
|
|
• Successful simulation between dissimilar systems requires a true theory of relationship, what does Goldman call this?
|
o Theory driven simulation
|
|
|
• Which type of simulation doesn’t require a theory of the phenomenon simulated to be successful?
|
o Process driven simulation
|
|
|
• In Tacit Theory, a simulation of a process is ____?
|
o Like a model of the process
|
|
|
• If the model of a process is an algorithm, what can we conclude?
|
o The process is modeled by means of a system of symbols/rules for the generation/transformation of the model
|
|
|
• ___ is a kind of implicit theory of the simulation process, what is the blank?
|
o A algorithm
|
|
|
• How is the success of the Tacit Theory model explained?
|
o By the truth that is explicit in the explanatory gloss
o By the truth that is implicit in the algorithmic model |
|
|
• What does the argument a Theory Theorist might allege regarding successful processes of simulation in Simulation Theory?
|
o Is the simulation were at chance, the prediction would be of little value
o Is the simulation does better than chance, the simulation contains some information about the target process o The successful simulation implements at least a partially true theory of the simulation process o Therefore, any successful Simulation Theory mental state attribution is a form of implementation of a (at least partially) true theory of mind |
|
|
• Why must mindreading skills/cognitive systems be grown as the systems of the brain grow?
|
o They’re neutrally, computationally dedicated
|
|
|
• What problems may arise from mindreading skills/cognitive systems that are neutrally, computationally dedicated?
|
o There will be variations in performance due to incomplete or defective systems
|
|
|
• What four characteristics do language and mindreading share?
|
o Speed
o Everyone does it o Appears in early development o Neural defects produce breakdown patterns |
|
|
• What are the two kinds of simulation?
|
o Generic Simulation
o Mental Simulation |
|
|
• What is the Argument for Generic simulation?
|
o Process (P) simulates P’=df
o P duplicates P’ in some significant respect o In duplicating P’, P fulfills one of its functions |
|
|
• What is the Argument for Mental simulation?
|
o Process (P) is a mental simulation of a target process P’=df
o P and P’ are mental processes o P and P’ exemplify the relation of generic simulation |
|
|
• What is the best explanation for the possession of an implicit theory of mind, not derived from routiniizng prior explicit theory?
|
o Implicit theory is innately specified
|
|
|
• What four characteristics define FaBER as low-level mindreading?
|
o Comparatively simple
o Primitive o Automatic o Occurs sub-conscious |
|
|
• Whay is FaBER considered “simple”?
|
o It consists in recognizing (not always w/ success) tokens of basic emotion with identifying propositional to those tokens
|
|
|
• In what two ways is FaBER “Primitive”?
|
o Reading basic emotions may be an evolved skill
o Reading basic emotions may involved mirror neuron systems |
|
|
• What argument does Simulation Theory provide in regards to brain damage and emotion recognition?
|
o In normal people, mental mechanisms are responsible for emotional experiences
o These mechanisms are used to simulates other’s emotional states (E) o If the mechanism is damaged then a person’s recognitional ability for E will be impaired o If the mechanisms for other emotions are not impaired, the ability to recognize other emotions won’t be impaired |
|
|
• What two arguments does Theory-Theory provide in regards to brain damage and emotional recognition?
|
o Modular Theory-Theory
o Nonmodular Theory-Theory |
|
|
• What is the Modular Theory-Theory argument?
|
o If a cognitive module were involved in emotion recognition, it would be an implicit model of reasoning of emotion producing/reacting mental states
o Normal operation would produce outputs of mental state representations which can be inferred from input representations o Impairment of the module will eliminate or produce unreliable outputs o This will either prevent or render unreliable all reasoning about emotional states |
|
|
• What four emotions were studied in people with damaged emotion recognitions discussed in class?
|
o Fear
o Disgust o Anger o Guilt |
|
|
• What was true about the two subjects who had damaged amygdale and fear?
|
o They failed to produce the same fear responses and normal people
o Their performance with other emotions was comparable to the normal population |
|
|
• What neurotransmitter is associated with anger, as described in class, and how was this effect determined?
|
o Dopamine
o Administering dopamine blocker results in a diminished ability to recognize anger in normal subjects |
|
|
• What is true about Psychopaths and emotions
|
o They have a diminished ability to experience guilt
o Other emotions don’t typically differ from controls |
