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6 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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distribution problems
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different preferences over alternative possible agreements
no distribution problem when both actos prefer the same coordination points |
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enforcement problems
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incentives actors have to break an agreement
not whether it's enforced or not, but whether they solved the incentive to defect or not |
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number of actors
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number of relevant actors (not membership)
whether there are asymmetries among them |
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uncertainty about behavior
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can you tell who is cooperating?
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uncertainty about state of the world?
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can you tell what the consequences of cooperation will be?
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uncertainty about preferences
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what do partners really want?
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