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34 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Three classification of dictatorships |
-Monarchic dictatorship -Military dictatorship -Civilian dictatorship |
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Monarchic Dictatorship |
-An autocracy in which the executive comes to and maintains power on the basis of family and kin networks
-Most stable for of dictatorship -Suffer from less violence and political instability - Have more stable property rights and experience faster economic growth -Their stability is due to having credible commitment |
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Military dictatorship |
-An autocracy in which the executive relies on the armed forces to come and stay in power -Short durations -Likely to end with negotiations rather than violence more than any other regime type -Most likely to become dictatorships - The value of giving up power is higher, but their interests will still be accounted for cause they have the guns |
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Civilian dictatorships |
-All other autocracies - Do not have an institutional base of support instead they create one -They create either personality cults or regime parties |
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Identifying A dictorship |
-Identify the head of state -identify whether the head of government has the title king -identify if the head is member of the armed forces |
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Support coalitions |
-Need to be kept happy in order for dictators to stay in power
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Dominant-Party dictatorships |
-A single party dominates access to political office and control over policy, though other parties may exsist and com0ete in elections -Are the longest lived dictatorships after monarchies -Majority factions try to co-op minority factions rather than exclude them from power -Often engage in electoral fraud |
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Personalist Dictatorships |
- The leader, although often supported by a party or military, retains personal control of policy decisions and the selection of regime personnel
-Weak, nonexistent press, strong secret police, arbitrary use of state violence
-Creation of narcissistic leaders who wish to be flattered -They create loyal citizenry by producing false beliefs in the population -Most likely to end in violence |
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Dictators dilemma |
They relive on repression to stay in power but this repression creates incentives for everyone to falsify their preferences so the dictator never know his true level of support |
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Signaling story |
Personality cults can provide a credible signal of support -They can gauge who are true believe by publicly making incredible claims - This makes it hard for option groups to organize cause no one wants to admit their true preferences |
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Problems with authoritarian rule |
- The problem of powersharing - The problem of authoritarian control |
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Authoritarian powersharing |
-Intra-elite conflict -No one is there to enforce the power sharing agreement so the dictator has an incentive to work at his benefit -Only thing stopping dictator from grabbing more power is his support coalition overthrowing him |
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Contested dictatorship |
When the threat to remove the dictator is credible and the power shared between the dictator and his allies |
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Personalist dictatorship |
When the threat to remove the dictator is not credible and the power lies in only the hands of the dictator |
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Personalist Dictatorships arise |
When support coalition fails to stop repeated power grabs |
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Political institutions |
-Help solve the monitoring problem -Also used to reward allies in the support coalition and co-opt the opposition |
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Stable power sharing agreement |
The coalition needs to be able to credibly remove the dictator if he backs out and they also need info |
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Strong and Weak dictators |
Strong ones don't need to institutionalize only weak ones need too |
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Authoritarian control |
-Conflict between the elite and the masses -Can be solved through repression or cooperation -Repression will strengthen the military and help the dictator control the masses but also might give the military leverage |
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Societal opposition levels |
-If high only the military can put down the violence and but the military will want concessions - If low military can be kept weak and only a police force will be established, this is called civilian control -Moderate military can pretend to be strong, but real sting militaries have no need to openly intervene in politics |
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Cooperation with institutions |
-Dictators providing direct transfer is not crebible - They give the masses a stake in in maintaing the regime |
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Selectorate Theory |
-The variation in the performance of political leaders can be explained with regard to the institutional environment in which they operate -Some are encourage to behave well, others not |
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Selectorate |
The set of people who can play a role in selecting the leader |
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Winning coalition |
Those people whose support is necessary for the leader to stay in power |
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Disenfranchised |
Those residents who do not have a legal right to partipant in choosing the government |
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Incentives |
-Leader have to keep coalition happy to stay in power -Theybcan distribute public or private goods |
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Public goods |
Which are consumed by everyone |
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Private good |
Which can be consumed by the winning coalition |
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Tax |
Used to generate revenue |
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Challenger |
Also makes offer regarding public goods, private goods, and the tax rate |
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Loyalty norms |
- The probability of being the leader's winning coalition -W/S When W/S is small the winning coalition is extreme loyal |
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Small W/S |
More likely to engage in corruption and kleptocracy (when corruption is organized by political leaders with the goal of personal enrichment) - Have an incentive to produce poor public policy |
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Size of Winning Coalition |
-Leaders in small Coaltion provide private goods -Leaders in large one provide public goods (amount increases with size) |
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Civic minded and selfish leader |
Both will produce either good or bad economic performance depending on W/S and W size |
