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74 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Government Accountability Model
(Majoritarian Model) |
The way you hold government official accountable by giving citizens the power to remove official if they are not responsive to their preference.
Two methods: Clarity of Responsibility: Who is responsible for Policies/Choices Elections that are "decisive": If someone loses the election they must be be able to be removed form office |
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Representative Delegates Model: (Proportional influence Model)
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Way to create a political process that is inclusive and distributes power to different groups that can lead to outcomes where people compromise for an answer that helps everyone.
- Meaningful choice among candidates/parties - Effective representation between elections You want to disburse power. You may want to have a bi-cameral political system or federalism, You want to water-down the clarity of responsibility so others groups can have a say in the political process. |
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Building Blocks of Modern Democracy
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Executive Power: Administration and execution of policy and law
Legislative Power: Creation of laws the define the scope and purpose of executive actions Judicial Powers: Adjudication of disputes over legislative and executive actions Head of State: Representation of state |
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Separation of Power (GM)
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Directly-elected executive
Directly-elected legislature Power more spread around Forces broader consequence/ compromise Committees affects how legislature ends up Executive and legislature are independent of each other for political survival. Potential for dividend government: Separation requires compromise and accommodation. |
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Fusion of Power (RM)
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Found in Parlimentary systems
Only the legislature (parliament) is directly elected. Parliament in turn elects the executive (cabinet/ government) Power is more consolidated Votes generally made on party lines Easier to push through legislative agenda |
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Mutual Dependence
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Government must have the "confidence" of the legislature
If not: Parliamentary Majority can dismiss government and replace it with another one if it choose to do so. (Vote of Confidence) However, government can dissolve the legislature Ensure that there is no divided government in a parliamentary system No fixed election on calender, but does have some constitutional provisions to say how long you can wait |
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Single-Party Majority Government
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One party has majority in Parliament and therefor has a huge say in legislature.
Example: Parliamentary election in UK, May 2005 646 seats in House of Commons 324 required for majority Labour Party (under Tony Blair) continues in gov't because they win the majority [in the executive] UK, Ireland, France, Greece (weak legislature) |
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Majority Coalition Government
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No single party wins the majority. Therefore, parties form a coalitions to gain a majority vote in Parliament and compromise about positions in government as well as different legislature.
Parliamentary election Germany (Sept 2009) 622 seats, 312 required for majority Nobody has a majority, can't appoint a PM CDU/CSU formed a coalition under Angela Merkel and replace the previous gov't (the executive) |
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Consequences for elections: The "Democratic Connection"
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Focus of legislative election is on government. If people are not happy with the way the government has operated it changes the way they vote concerning the legislature.
Elections determine party weights in the legislature. Elections are decisive if a party wins a majority If elections are not decisive then government formation depends on party negotiations. |
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Who makes up the cabinet?
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The Prime Minister
Cabinet Minsters with and without Portfolios |
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What is the role of the Prime Minister?
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Presides over cabinet and has some power over cabinet ministers.
Most visible politician in the country-- media exposure can be important Usually also the party leader, party usually the biggest in coalition Immensely powerful in terms of directing policy Power is contingent, based on: - Removal by election: no longer able to create a coalition/ retain confidence in Parliament - Removal by Vote of confidence: PM must resign, can be implicit/ explicit, can replace old one or dissolve Parliament and have new elections - Removal by Party: loses internal party support and is forced to resign Can call a vote of Confidence |
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Parliaments/ Legislatures
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Plays a marginal role in policy-making process (done by govt)
Two Primary Tasks: 1) Control the government through vote of no confidence 2) Participate in law-making process, depends upon institutional structure |
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The Vote of No Confidence
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Major constraints on the government
The need to maintain legislative confidence ensure democratic accountability Huber: Stakes can be changed, and thereby attach incentive to certain policies, creating other considerations than whether policy is good/bad Sufficiently opposed to legislation to risk job? Asymmetric Can be used as a tool to permit legislators to engage in position. - taking for their constituencies while the PM still gets his/her policy outcome Shapes legislature base on: Committees, Investigatory Power, Amendments, etc. Forces PM to resign...works a number of ways...either replace old PM or dissolve the government and parliament and hold new elections. |
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The Vote of No Confidence Huber
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Major constraint on the government
- The need to maintain legislative confidence ensure democratic accountability - Forces PM to resign - works a number of ways - either replace old PM or dissolve the govt and parliament and hold new elections. Huber: VOC can have negative effects in situations where Parliament is dissolved, confidence votes can be attached to specific polices - forces legislators to decide if sufficiently opposed to legislation to risk job - thereby changing the stakes, censure costs allow votes to be made on criteria other than the merits of the policy. PM gets preferred outcome. |
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Features of Strong/ Influential Legislature
ex. Germany |
Permanent Specialized committees - likely to propose meaningful changes to bills and understand its implications
Correspondence to Cab. ministers jurisdictions - knowledge/ expertise of Ministers matches up with relevant criteria in the bill Broad investigatory powers- Allowed reports/ data that is believed to be relevant; oversight Ability to offer amendments Ministers unable to restrict debate - ministers cannot curtail committee investigation/ discussion More common in proportional systems- powers more dispersed; committees one-sided Netherlands, Germany, Denmark |
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Weak Legislatures
ex. Ireland |
No strong permanent committees with broad investgatory powers
Bills do not correspond to ministerial jurisdictions Ministers can curtail debate: 1) Package Vote: allow some but not other amendments to be voted on 2) Guillotine: Attaches vote on bill to vote of no confidence: all debate ends becomes law unless PM voted out of office and Parliament dissolved More common in majoritarian systems UK, Ireland, France, Greece |
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Legislature and Law making
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Parliaments must usually consent to legislation (Veto Power)
- Has to pass bills for them to become laws -extent on how parliament shape legislation depends on institutional structure Govt. generally sets legislative agenda Govt bills written by Cabinet Minister and given to Parliament to vote on- generally easier to pass/ higher likelihood |
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Constitutionalism
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Set up machinery of govt- explains 1) what puposes for which political power might be used and 2) how the constitution can be changed
-Higher law: established to prevent abuse of power - Written vs. Unwritten: Ambiguity far more contentious in unwritten Two disputes: Violation of procedures and substantive restrictions (more common) Usually resolved in courts European constitutions generally far easier to change |
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Courts
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" Guardians of the Constitution"
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Constitutional Review
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Looks at whether law could have been passed in the first place
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Judicial Review
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Looks at legislation itself and test whether power fits with constitution
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Abstract Judicial Review
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Used in absence of concrete case- powerful tool of opposition parties
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Concrete Judicial Review
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Actual case
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Appointment Process
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Politicized: Partisan appt. no supermajority required, no necessary legal qualifications
Depoliticized: Consensus appt. supermajority needed, legal qualifications required |
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EU Supranational vs. Intergovernmental?
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Supranational Organization: Above level of nation state and influences actions of them regardless of how they view them. ex UN
Intergovernmental Organization: Above level of nation state but brings leaders together to solve collective dilemmas-- cannot do things against will EU has elements of both, but shifting more to supra national: - "Pooling of Soverignty" Soverignty moved from national to international level - Continued importance on state governments Why pooling sovereignity? Comes from "German Question" and integrete benefits of free trade area and problems that require transnational solutions |
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Widening vs. Deepening
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Widening: Greater geographic scope, more member
Deepening: Integrate further, EU more authority - radically affect policy outcome |
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EU History
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1950: Schuman Plan - integrate Germany? Create organization to coordinate steel and coal production?
1951: Euro Coal and Steel Community: common oversight of war materials - Created commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament & European Court of Justice 1958: Treaty of Rome : Establishment of the European economic community, removed internal tarriff barriers, creation of common external tariff, Principle of "free movement of people, goods, services, and labor, form the Common Agricultural Policy 1986: European Single Act: Removed non-tariff barriers for trade 1993: Treaty of EU-Maastricht: Occurred after the reunification of Germany 2009 : Treaty of Lisbon: Removed unanimity to double majority. Gave president more powers. |
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EU- How does it spend its money
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Cohesion and Competitiveness:
Attempts to provide developmental aid Agriculture and direct subsides for farmers to produce certain things Single market and currency Labor regulation, discrimination, environment, etc. |
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Five Central Institutions of the EU
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The European Commission
The European Parliament Council of Ministers Council of Justice European Council |
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Regionalism
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No constitutionally- guarantee division of power between levels of government.
Are created and maintained by the grace of the central government |
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Federalism
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Division of government between federal and regional governments.
Constitutionally guaranteed division of powers between levels of government. Federal government makes framework laws, and the administration of each state determines how to implement the laws. |
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EU- Level of Governance
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Subsidiarity Principle:
Political decision ought to be made at the lowet level the problem can be solved on Efficiency: need issues to be solved by people who have understanding of the issue. "Closeness to citizens": Want a government that has a closeness to the citizens. "TIiebout Competition" - Having different levels of government provide competition It allows people to move to different jurisdictions that cater to their taste. - Limit on Power: If you start abusing your power people are more apt to move away. Politicial leaders must not over use power of else others will leave. |
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Democratic Deficit in the EU?
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Refer to Notes!!
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The EU Commission
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- 27 commissioners, the Commission President
- Appointed by the member-state - 5yr terms - Represents the EU, not the member-states - 2 main powers: 1. Propose legislation 2. Monitor the implementation of EU policy |
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The EU Parliament
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(Lower house)
- Directly elected by popular vote - Proportional Representation - 5yr terms - Low voter turnout - 736 members of European Parliament - Transnational Parties; Vote with national policy |
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Council of Minister
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- Upper house
- Rotating membership based on policy area - COREPER: permanent committee staff - QMV ( decicions are based on Qualified majority voting) - Represent the member-country's interest |
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The Co decision Procedure
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Most EU policy under this procedure
Commission proposes legislation Consent of two institutions required: - The council of Ministers - The European Parliament In case of disagreement, a conciliation committee is called on to work out a compromise. Amendments against Commission's will require unanimity in the Council of Ministers. |
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The EU Council and Court of Justice
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- 27 judges
- 6 year renewable terms - Appointed by member-state - 2 main powers: 1. Settles disputes about implementation of EU law 2. Power to ensure the consistent application of EU law across member states - Concrete review |
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The European Council
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- All of the heads of government, President of the EU, President of the Commission
- Ministers without portfolios 1. Guidelines for Commission 2. Sign big treaties 3. Deal with expansion issues - Intergovernmental institution |
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Kelsen Court
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The Kelsenian court model sets up a separate constitutional court, which may have sole responsibility over constitutional disputes within the judicial system.
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"Cohabitation"
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French system combines Presidential and Parliamentary systems...Directly elected President appoints a Prime Minster from the majority party that is different than the President.
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Two Roles Cabinet Minsters play in Coalition Governments
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Representing their Party
Head of Cabinet area: instrumental in drafting policy/ carrying out the government agenda Helps hold the coalition together by negotiating compromises and being sensitive to other parties interests/demands |
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Regionalism
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No constitutionally-guaranteed division of powers.
Regional governments are created and maintained by central governments. - Ex. UK (Scotland, Wales, N. Ireland) |
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Cleavages
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Until 1970s, much of European political behavior through appealing to a certain number of cleavages
3 Characteristics: - Social division that coincides with social characteristics (occupation, religion, ethnicity). - Groups have a "collective identity" think of selves as members of groups associated with specific characteristics - Division has given rise to certain organizations (union, churches, political parties) Cleavages tend to be much longer lasting and important than attitudes. Divisions between people that have long term impacts and are politically significant; influences how people vote and what policies one supports. Importance has declined in recent years; can't use today to predict. |
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Class Cleavage
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Working class identity emerges out of the Industrial Revolution
Primary cleavage in Britain and Germany; significant everywhere else |
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Religious Cleavages
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most salient in Catholic societies in virtue of church-state conflicts (Netherlands, France, Italy); unimportant in Protestant societies
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Urban Rural Cleavages
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Division between urban and rural interests; particularly important in Scandinavia where it has given rise to agrarian parties
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European Political Attitudes
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Church Attendance: Very low compared to US (except Italy). Must say God is not that important in lives.
Left-Right Scale: Liberal = socialist, Conservative = social democrats. Spain and Italy somewhat skewed to the left; Netherlands closer to the center; Sweden significantly distributes across scale; France and Germany have leftward lean but much bigger spike in the middle. Redistribution: Most Europeans believe it is likely to be essential to the democracy --> higher expectation of government, want more govt programs and expanding the welfare state. (Contrast with the U.S who place heavier emphasis on responsibility and private ownership |
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The Logic of Office-Seeking
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To the extent that politicians are motivated by "office" considerations:
1. Coalition governments/parties require at least a majority seats 2. Prefer to have no more than a bare majority of seats--don't want to have to cater to more interests than necessary; minimal winning coalitions: every part is necessary for a majority To the extent that politicians are motivated by "policy" considerations: 1. Coalition parties don't care about the size of the coalition per se 2. Prefer coalitions that result in policy outcomes that are closer to their preferences; ideologically connected coalitions (ideologically adjacent to one another on a spectrum) ; ideologically compact coalitions (parties are close to each other on the spectrum). |
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Coalition Governments and Elections
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Most European governments use PR electoral systems--under PR rules, a single party rarely wins a majority of seats
-Implications: a group (coalition) of parties is required to govern--requires majority support to remain in office; entails sharing of cabinet ministries; control over cabinet ministries gives lots of influence over that policy areas -Minority government: holds cab. mins. but not majority of seats; dependent upon other parties to support them Elections produce possible combinations; which government takes office depends upon negotiations among party leaders --> being smaller can lead to bigger parties catering to your interests; weights of parties, but this is not decisive for government formation |
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Various Party Systems
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US: politics one dimensional; only choice between 2 parties--line drawn between left and right fairly easily
UK: 5 parties, 3 major parties--Labor, Conservatives & Liberal Democrats; basically one dimension bc if fiscally liberal one must vote for socially liberal parts Germany: No single dimension; more choice from voters' perspective; Dutch system essentially the same Spain: PR but uses low DM to have only two parties --> 1 dimension |
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Competition among Multiple Parties
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Voters within a multiparty system are more likely to vote in a much more narrow fashion--multiple parties exist to reflect wide variation in beliefs/interests; parties more likely to stress ideological differences rather than play them down
-Govt ideology far less cohesive -Parties will spread out along ideological spectrum -Parties don't require 51% to win; leaning towards extremes if it will get sufficient votes |
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Convergence to the Median
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Hotelling-Downs Model: If politics is one-dimensional parties are motivated to win, and voters sincerely vote for the party that is closest to them ideologically, then two party competition under plurality rule will result in the convergence of both parties to the position of the median voter.
- Mitigated by requirement of appealing to base--cannot move to close without losing votes from 'extremists" -Done to obtain max # of votes by looking attractive to the other side -Median voter need not be in middle of the spectrum--just means half of votes exist on either side Doesn't work for multiparty/ PR systems |
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Party Competition and Positioning
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Assumptions:
1. Politics is "one-dimensional"--left-right political spectrum 2. Politicians care about winning 3. Voters have an "ideal point" and want the winning candidate to be as close as possible to their ideal point |
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Durverger's Law/ "M+1 Rule"
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Durverger's Law: SMD elections will tend to produce a two-party system
-Mechnical effect: rewards big parties within the district (over-rep) -Psychological effect: pressure put on supporters to vote for competitive candidates over weaker, unelectable ones-> strategic desertion -->ex. Miller, Jones & Smith in district of M=1 run for office--Miller & Jones are the leading candidates-strategic derertion is likely to undermine Smith's support even more since not likely to win -Difficult to sustain more than two viable candidates The M+1 Rule: District Magnitude+1= Number of viable candidates -District magnitude serves as an upper limit on the number of viable candidates/parties; SMP=2, PR>2 |
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Anderson/Gvillory: Political Institutions & Satisfaction with Democracy
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Is support for a political system mediated by political institutions?
-As a system becomes more consensus-based (PR), support of losers goes up and support of winners goes down -As a system becomes more majoritarian (SMD), support of losers goes down and support of winners goes up Majoritarian systems create bigger differences in satisfaction/support between winners and losers PR systems offer greater minority protection (political) |
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Pinto-Duchinsky: Critique of PR systems
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Makes it more difficult to dismiss governments
Breaks the connection between voters and govts--> govts are determined by deals and negotiations of coalitions rather than ideas of parties or voters May over-represent smaller parties-> great deal of power in farming coalitioins can extract large concessions Advantage of Majoritarian systems--> generates clear choices and high accountability to citizens |
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Electoral Law and Party Systems
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Affects how votes are translated into seats, what kind of votes citizens can cast, type of political system, i.e the quality of democracy.
European Parliamentary Elections generally don't have fixed election dates, only a limit or max time between elections. govt more or less free to call elections at anytime. "Snap Election" an election called earlier than expected, usually to capitalize on a unique electoral opportunity or decide a pressing issue. |
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The Problem of Bundles
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Parties represent "bundles" of political issues and positions - in choosing a party, you will get a mix of things you like and things you don't
electoral laws have a significant effect on the "bundles" not only the things included in bundles, but what position are taken |
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Single Member District, Plurality Elections (SMD)
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"Winner take all", "First past the post" elections
Country is divided into a large number of small districts in which only one representative is elected (DM =1); the candidate with the largest number of votes wins (U.S, U.K) France: Modified System --> Two Round Runoff -- To win first round, candidate requires a majority of votes cast - if no one wins the first round, the two candidates with the highest percentage of votes, as well as any other candidate with the first two with the higher votes goes into a runoff, whoever wins the runoff wins the election. |
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Proportional Representation
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Parties receive a number of seats that is (roughly) proportional to their share of the vote
Larger district magnitudes (DM >10)- generally done as "List PR" Voters cast vote for a party, not a candidate- number of seats (x) for each party is determined, and the first (x) candidates on the list are elected. Difference among PR systems: - District Magnitude - Closed List vs. Open List: Party vs. Voter control over priority of candidates - Legal Thresholds: requires percentage of vote to obtain a seat - Electoral Formula: how votes are translated into seats Ex. Dutch 2010 - 1 nationwide district, M=150, no LT, very proportional outcome. |
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The Logic of Policy- Motivations (One Division)
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To the extent that politicians are motivated by "policy" considerations in one dimension
The median party is in a strong position to form a coalition- parties on either side don't control a majority of seats, and the two sides cannot agree on an alternative they refer to the median party's position. Some governments cannot be explained by office motivations alone: 1. Surplus Majority Governments: More parties than required for majority 2. Minority Governments: Single Party or Coalition, wouldn't exist if only cared about getting into office - both require support outside of cabinet by support parties. Two Kinds of Support parties: 1) Formal: Explicit pledge and commitment to support on specific issues 2) Ad Hoc: Different parties called on to support on difference issues |
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How Parliaments differ from other Democracies?
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Only the legislature is directly elected; Parliament elects executive
Executive and Parliament depend upon another for survival Government and Executive requires the "confidence of the legislature".- parliamentary majority can replace government with another via vote of confidence - likewise the govt can dissolve Parliament and hold new elections No divided government possible- avoid stalemates and gridlock No fixed electoral calendar Government, not legislature, passes most legislation- generates quickest response to citizen wants |
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Retrospective vs. Prospective Voting
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Do elections matter for those in power? How are elections used to control the government?
-Retrospective: looks at past performance Prospective: future expectations, requires knowing implications --accountability requires clarity of responsibility (retrospective) -Majoritarian systems exhibit a higher degree of clarity/identifiability -PR systrems make it difficult to identify responsible people and this it's harder to punish accordingly |
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Powell: Citizen-Government Congruence
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Does high accountability/ identifiablity lead parties to converge to the median voter?
Does post election bargaining among many parties lead to governments that produce good outcomes despite low accountability? Powell's conclusion: Correspondence between voters & government is highly variable in majoritarian systems -"failure to converge" -might converge more if they didn't have to compete as much -vote-seat disproportionality- often over reward large parties who didn't receive a majority of votes with a majority of seats ex. UK 1983 General Election- split Labour vote, Conservative landslide victory - "longest suicide note in history," SDP- Liberal Alliance; Falklands War -PR systems produce better correspondence, and do so more reliably |
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Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)
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Requires more than a base majority (51%) and unanimity
- usually requires a percentage like 62% or 74%; forces a broader consensus to be reached to pass legislation. - Protects individual member states from having to consistently implement policies contrary to their interests- prevents tyranny of the majority at the supranational level - Also prevents single member states from being able to override/ frustrate EU policy |
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Autolimitation and what makes court powerful
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Autolimitation: Anticipation of constitutional review, an attempt to craft a bill so that its insulated judicial censure
- Laws written to surmount an obstacle- not to respond to preference, creating different policies than if they want. What makes them powerful? - Separation of Powers --> independent referee (Madisonian) - Public Support --> potential of judicial backlash by populous- fear how public may react to rulings Independent Budget: no worries about funding taken away |
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The Dilemma of Coalition Government
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Principal-Agent Problem: How are coalitions bargains enforced?
-Parties delegate cabinet ministries on particular issues to others-- how do they make sure other parties don't double cross them? Generated by 3 features of coalition government: 1) necessity for compromise 2) need to delegate minister, and 3) separate electoral accountability of parties How do they solve this dilemma? - No enforceable contract and incentive limit alignment solutions -- there will always be a drive - Use the Junior Ministers as "watchdogs" - can use them as an inside source in ministers where division and conflict exist to sound the alarm - difficult to get minister to change bill |
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Accountability/ Identifiability
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How do we know? Do parties live up to election pledges?
-Coalition govt makes it difficult to keep promises and easier to get out of them-depends upon controlling the relevant ministry, whether written into coalition agreements, and whether controversial among coalition members; same pledge=high likelihood of passing -Single party govt does the opposite--losing votes generally results in more dramatic shifts in power; easier to hold reps accountable. But elections are crude instruments, esp. if # of parties are small -defense must be that competition between small # of parties leads them to do what most citizens want (convergence to median voter) What does good governance mean? Maj: "a majority;" -Con: "as many as poss" |
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Two Models of Democracy & Elections
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Government Accountability Model: govt works because people in office don't need to bargain with others; coupled with SMD elections to provide clear incentives for policy-makers to offer what citizens want because that will get them elected
Representative Delegates Model: elections allow citizens to elect reps that match their preferences who must compromise and produce legislation that everyone likes--doesn't use elections for accountability Which is better? -Powell: depends on what is meant by "better" External criteria: citizens get what they want? satisfy preferences? Internal criteria: citizens wants v. what the govt actually does --> problem of counterfactuals- comparing hypothetical worlds -how do we know? |
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What explains stability?
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Attributes of the political system:
- Investiture Vote: vote of no-confidence attached to re-formation of government; ensures Prime Minister has enough support - Number of parties: higher number = more instability and shorter tenure More options and possibilities for coalitions and renegotiation Attributes of the cabinet: - Ideological con and divergence coalitions with closer preferences last longer - Majority and Minority status |
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Constitutionalism
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Set up machinery of government- explains 1) What purpose for which political power might be used, and 2) how the Constitution can be changed.
"Higher Law" established to prevent abuse of power Written vs. Unwritten - Ambiguity far more contentious in unwritten Two disputes: violations of procedures and substantive restrictions (more common) - usually resolved in courts European constitutions generally far easier to change |
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Portfolios and Policy Agreements
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What do politicians get out of forming a coalition government?
1) Portfolios: responsibilities and policy area of cabinet ministers. - Control generally given through proportionality - 40% of seats = 40% of the portfolio; large parties tend to get the better portfolio, small parties try to get certain parts that are important to them. 2) Policy Agreement - Coalition governments require compromise - between parties vs. with in parties - coalitions within parties will vote certain ways; coalitions usually negotiate a coalition contract - details policy agreements on central issues --> most are formed for policy Coalitions require significant delegations to cabinet ministers - more conservative, more cuts to budget, more liberal, given more money |
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Principal Agent Problem
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The Principle has a task they want completed and hires the agent to complete it. The problem is that the principle has less information about the task and how it should be done than the agent does - the agent can ignore their obligation to the principle to benefit themselves
3 ways to solves 1. Align Preference 2. Align Incentives 3. Mechanism for Monitoring and Correction |
