Pol 001 (For Real This Time)

Front 1

Factions in government (Madison)

Back 1

on a national level, there are so many factions that not one can hold a majority, while on a state level factions can easily hold majorities and spread

Front 2

Madison's Republic and conflict

Back 2

Encourages conflict, as it leads to compromise; there are different term lengths for each branch; is bicameral, with one not allowing majority by population; only congress can make laws but the president can veto; etc.

Front 3

Federalist 10

Back 3

can't get rid of factions, because that would mean getting rid of liberties (bad) or forcing people to conform (impossible); see factions in government and madison's republic and conflict

Front 4

collective action problems

Back 4

if groups get too large, it increases the risk of free-riders (people who don't participate due to cost and only take in the benefit); can lead to the tragedy of the commons as the actions of one individual doesn't significantly affect the whole group

Front 5

The Democratic Dilemma

Back 5

citizens are uninformed, but have to vote; with heuristics, they can make decisions without knowing the full context (shortcuts)

Front 6

Voting models

Back 6

spatial voting model, retrospective voting model, valence voting model, Michigan voting model

Front 7

spatial voting model

Back 7

place ideology of candidates and self on a scale (line graph), and vote for whoever's closest to you; flawed as it assumes citizens know the ideology of the candidates or themselves; can be called proximity

Front 8

valence voting model

Back 8

voting not based on policy; things such as honesty or character, etc

Front 9

retrospective voting

Back 9

choosing one topic all sides can agree on (e.g. good economy is good, war is bad), and using that to make decisions; if people think economy is good, they'll re-elect the candidate, while if they think it's bad, they'll elect the other side

Front 10

Michigan voting model

Back 10

Party identification has psychological ties; if you're in one party, you're likely to vote for the person in your party even if you have opposite views, but it does consider ideology and stuff

Front 11

median-voter theorem

Back 11

whichever candidate holds views most similar to the median voter (the average of all the voters) will win

Front 12

resource bias

Back 12

those with more resources will be able to afford the cost of doing things (e.g. voting) more than those who don't have the resources, so the result will prefer the opinions of those who have more resources; TL;DR rich people have more influence in government

Front 13

Zaller's/Receive-Accept-Sample model

Back 13

Also called top-of-the-head; when people make decisions, they take the average of the opinions that sink to the top of their head (e.g. + - + - + = +); public opinion varies as the opinions at the top-of-the-head change, but are more steady if people think about the issue before answering or have political experience

Front 14

Interest Groups

Back 14

Madison's "factions"; usually non-political groups that follow a political motive (e.g. schools, or AAA, or AARP, or churches); provide some benefit (social, economical, political) to those who participate to prevent collective action problems

Front 15

"The Logic of Collective Action"

Back 15

see collective action problems; exclusive and inclusive resources

Front 16

exclusive resources

Back 16

resources with a limited amount; groups pursuing these tend to be smaller to get the most gain for each individual

Front 17

inclusive resources

Back 17

resources that are unlimited; groups pursuing these can be infinitely large as each individual will gain something (though collective action problems)

Front 18

Pluralists

Back 18

agree on Madison's conclusion but not how he got it; believe interest groups are the "factions" Madison was looking for (see interest groups) and disagree on the value of elections (self-interests are not in elections, but in interest groups)

Front 19

Paradox of voting

Back 19

citizens need to vote, but voting takes cost and provides minimal benefit (collective action problems)

Front 20

principal-agent problem

Back 20

people (principals) hire specialists (agents) to do work they don't need to do, but the people are unable to tell if the specialists are actually doing their jobs or are scamming them; politicians are the agents while citizens are the principals

Front 21

tragedy of the commons

Back 21

one person can use a shared resource for personal benefit, but enough people doing so will result in the destruction of the shared resource, leading to benefit at all

Front 22

byproduct theory of group representation

Back 22

in pluralist theory, how political representation occurs as a byproduct of involvement in interest groups

Front 23

party identification

Back 23

if you identify with a party, you vote for that party, disregarding all ideological views

Front 24

Bicameralism

Back 24

Splitting the legislative branch into the House and Senate; causes conflict and prevents majority from dominating (population minority can get an upper hand in the Senate, and a faction would need a 2/3 majority in both parts to have a firm grasp on government (next to impossible))

Front 25

rational ignorance

Back 25

reasons as to why it's okay to not know about politics (takes too much effort, don't have access to resources, etc.); helps to fuel the paradox of voting

Front 26

plurality voting

Back 26

voters can only vote for one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins

Front 27

Duverger's law

Back 27

any plurality rule, single-member district will gravitate toward the two-party system; proportional representation systems allow party development of smaller parties

Front 28

single-member district

Back 28

every district is represented with only one official, and the official with the majority in the district will get elected (e.g. seats in the house/senate; gerrymandering)

Front 29

Mobilization

Back 29

the act of getting voters to pay the cost of voting; asking people to vote through peer pressure or otherwise

Front 30

agenda control

Back 30

setting the choices available to others; setting the agenda means influencing what people think about, but not what people actually think

Front 31

selective incentive

Back 31

incentives only available to members of a group; for example, towing for AAA members

Front 32

primaries

Back 32

election to determine the candidates for a future election; michigan model doesn't apply due to lack of party-choice heuristic, which also brings a more educated voter

Front 33

open primary

Back 33

primaries where people can vote regardless of their political party

Front 34

closed primary

Back 34

primaries where only people of the political party can vote in that party's primary (Republicans can only determine republican candidates)

Front 35

status quo bias

Back 35

it's harder to change things than do nothing; it's significantly easier to stop something from happening than changing something

Front 36

politicians and self-interest

Back 36

politicians want preeminence in power, but also want to be re-elected; therefore, if they don't act in the shared interest of those who elected them, they won't get re-elected, but term limits allow politicians to do whatever on their final term

Front 37

agency loss

Back 37

relates to the principal-agent problem; occurs when the agent does not work for the principal; e.g. car mechanic doesn't actually fix your car but pretends it does

Front 38

prisoner's dilemma

Back 38

the individual benefit is stronger than the shared benefit but will harm the other party; if both people act on the individual benefit, both parties will get a worse outcome than the shared benefit

Front 39

transaction cost

Back 39

the cost it takes to do something; e.g. a pure democracy is more accurate than a republic, but has a much higher transaction cost

Front 40

descriptive statement

Back 40

an empirical statement; not necessarily a true fact, but can be backed by evidence (cutting calories causes weight loss)

Front 41

normative statement

Back 41

a statement of value; an opinion; subjective (pandas are cute)

Front 42

getting past the paradox of voting

Back 42

would make it seem as nobody would vote, but duty to vote, mobilization, and private good must be considered

Front 43

Voting formula

Back 43

R=P(B)-C+[D+M+b]; R=reward, P=chance that vote becomes pivotal, B=public good, C=cost, D=duty to vote, M=mobilization, b=private good; without brackets, would be negative

Front 44

free riding

Back 44

getting the shared benefits of a group without contributing to the costs of sustaining the group

Front 45

anti-federalists

Back 45

wanted more state power in the constitution, and wanted the bill of rights

Front 46

federalists

Back 46

wanted more government power in the constitution

Front 47

cues

Back 47

another name for heuristics, i guess?

Front 48

partisan voting

Back 48

voting based on the heuristic of party identification

Front 49

gerrymandering

Back 49

strategically organizing districts to give one party a population advantage over another even if the general population in the state is leaned toward the other party

Front 50

Australian ballot

Back 50

a ballot listing all the candidates in a single list and is filled out by voters in private

Front 51

privileged groups

Back 51

interests groups small enough that the members would gain more from the public good than the cost needed to provide it; good will always be provided

Front 52

latent groups

Back 52

interest groups large enough that people can free-ride without a noticeable difference in supply; good will not be provided unless selective incentives are given

Front 53

intermediate groups

Back 53

interest groups that are large but small enough that if someone free-rides there would be a noticeable decrease in supply or increase in cost; good might be provided

Front 54

Political Action Committee (PAC)

Back 54

an interest group that gives politicians money to advance the group's interests

Front 55

public interest group

Back 55

an interest group that covers issues of general public concern (environment, etc.)

Front 56

outside lobby group

Back 56

a lobbying group that uses public pressure to influence officials

Front 57

inside lobby group

Back 57

a lobbying group that directly communicates to influence officials

Front 58

"ambition must be made to counteract ambition"

Back 58

madison's idea of separation of powers; if every branch had equal ambition and there were checks and balances (vetoes, only congress making laws, and later unconstitutional ruling of laws), no faction can get majority control

Front 59

Zaller's RAS model axioms

Back 59

reception axiom, resistance axiom, accessibility axiom, response axiom

Front 60

reception axiom

Back 60

the more engaged someone is with an issue, the more the person will be exposed to and comprehend political messages concerning said issue

Front 61

resistance axiom

Back 61

people resist arguments inconsistent with their political opinions, but only to the point where they know the context necessary to get a relationship between their opinion and the argument's

Front 62

accessibility axiom

Back 62

the more recently a person thinks about an issue, the less time it takes to bring up considerations and related considerations to the "top of the head"

Front 63

response axiom

Back 63

people answer survey questions by averaging the considerations immediately available to them

Front 64

types of interest groups (related to group size)

Back 64

latent groups; privileged groups; intermediate groups