Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
56 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Argument from Analogy |
Mill's argument that we can use the behaviour of others to infer they have minds because they behave as i do and i have a mind |
|
Analytical Behaviourism |
Mental concepts can be reduced to statements about behaviour |
|
Logical Behaviourism |
Talk about the mind can be analysed in terms of talk about behaviour- mental states are behavioural states/dispositions |
|
Category mistake |
Treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it does not belong to |
|
Problem of causal interaction |
The problem with explaining how mental states or substance can interact causally with physical states or substance (ontological) |
|
China Brain |
Block's objection to functionalism. If the population of China, using radios, duplicated the functioning of the brain would this create conscious experience. If not functionalism is false |
|
Clear and distinct ideas |
A clear idea is present and accessible to the attentive mind, a distinct idea is clear and also separate from other ideas so that every part of it is clear (Descartes) |
|
Conceivability argument (Descartes) |
It is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body, conceivability entails possibility, so it is possible that the mind can exist without the body. Therefore the mind and body are distinct |
|
Consciouness |
The subjective phenomena of awareness of the world and ones mental states |
|
Easy problem of consciousness |
The problem of analysing and explaining the functions of consciousness |
|
Hard problem of consciousness |
The problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo conscious experiences |
|
Divisibility argument |
Bodies are divisible into spatial parts, but the mind has no such parts. Therefore the mind and body are distinct |
|
Property dualism |
The theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically basic kinds of property- mental properties and physical properties |
|
Substance dualism |
The theory that two kinds of substances exist, mental and physical substances |
|
Eliminative materialism |
No mental properties, so our mental concepts are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they do not refer to anything that exists |
|
Epiphenomenalism |
Mental states are by-products, the effects of some physical process but with no causal influence of their own |
|
Folk Psychology |
A theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people's behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse |
|
Functionalism |
Mental states are reducible to functional states- state of input and output in relation to stimuli Function of mental states in terms of role they play in a network of causes and effects. A mental state can be realised by any state that plays that causal role |
|
Ghost in the machine |
Substance dualism according to Ryle |
|
Idealism |
Minds are the only kind of substance, all that exists are minds and ideas |
|
Indefinitely heterogeneous disposition |
Dispositions that can be manifested in many ways. Ryle argues that mental states are indefinitely heterogeneous behavioural disposition, so that while mental concepts can be analysed in terms of behaviour, they cannot be reduced to talk about behaviour |
|
Indiscernibility of Identicals |
Leibniz's principle that if two things are identical, then they share all their properties and so are indiscernible |
|
Intentionality |
The property of mental states whereby they are directed towards an object, that is they are 'about' something |
|
Introspection |
Direct, first-personal awareness of one's mental states |
|
Argument from introspection |
The argument that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with knowledge gained from introspection, if mental states do not cause anything then how can i know what mental states i have? |
|
Inverted qualia |
Two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways |
|
Knowledge argument |
Mary the scientist thought experiment (proving she learns something new when seeing the colour red) |
|
Materalism |
The only substance is matter, everything that exist, including the mind, depends on matter to exist |
|
Monism |
Only one kind of substances exists. Both materialism and physicalism are monist theories |
|
Multiple Realisability (behaviourism) |
The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions |
|
Multiple Realisability (type-identity theory) |
The claim that one and the same mental state can have its function performed by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states |
|
Ockham's Razor |
The principle that we should not put forward a hypothesis that says many different things exist when a simpler explanation will do as well. A simpler explanation is a better one, as long as it is successful |
|
Ontologically basic |
Not dependent on or derivable from some other entity or property e.g property dualism claims that mental properties are ontologically basic as they cannot be derived from physical properties |
|
Ontologically distinct |
Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other |
|
Ontology |
The study of what exists |
|
Phenomenal consciousness |
Form of consciousness with subjective experiential quality as involved in perception- qualia! |
|
Physicalism |
Modern form of materialism which claims that everything that exists is physical or depends on something physical. Everything that is ontologically basic is physical and every physical event has a sufficient physical cause |
|
Non-reductive Physicalism |
A form of physicalism that claims that while mental properties depend upon physical properties, they are not reducible to them. e.g Functionalism and Behaviourism |
|
Reductive Physicalism |
Mental properties are physical properties e.g type identity theory |
|
Private |
Mutually exclusive access/ Capable of being experienced by no one other than the subject themselves |
|
Problem of other minds (Epistemological) |
The question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of other minds is through behaviour |
|
Representational property (intentionality) |
A property of a mental state that enables it to represent what it does, to be 'about' something. |
|
Qualia |
Phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic and non-representational, what-it-feels-like or raw sensation of experience |
|
Reducible |
Can be completely explained in terms of or identified with another property which is considered to be more ontologically basic |
|
Solipsism |
Only one's mind exists, there are no other minds and no mind-independent physical objects |
|
Type-Identity theory |
The theory that mental properties are identical and ontologically reducible to physical properties. Every mental state identical to specific physical state |
|
Verification principle |
All meaningful claims are either analytically or empirically verifiable |
|
Zombie argument (Chalmers) |
The argument for property dualism that if consciousness were identical to some physical property, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness |
|
Philosophical Zombies |
An exact physical duplicate of a person but without any phenomenal consciousness |
|
Essence |
What defines a substance |
|
Modes |
Form an essence can take |
|
Nomological dangler |
Sensation that cannot be explained by science |
|
Token identity theory |
Particular mental states are identical with the accompanying physical process but cannot be identified with a type of physical process just with the general class of mental states |
|
Chinese Room (Searle) |
A.I can manipulate symbols in such a way that mimics understanding but lacks genuine understanding or intentionality (against functionalism) |
|
Access Consciousness |
Aspects of consciousness that relates to cognitive capacities such as thinking |
|
Inverted spectra or qualia |
Proving qualia as non-physical, someone's blue may be my purple |