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142 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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St. Thomas Aquinas
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- doctors of the church "need not be free from error"...they are fallible
- asserts 5 ways to prove there is a God |
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we can evaluate proofs according to...
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- strength
- force - power to produce conviction in the conclusion |
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a posteriori; a priori
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propositions that are justified in a _______ are often thought to have a justification that is less secure than the proposition justified in a purely ________ fashion
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a posteriori justification
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highly fallible - see evil demon example
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purely a priori proof
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an argument in which every single premise is justified a priori
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cosmological arguments
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partly a posteriori; an inference from certain existence facts about the world to the existence of a certain kind of being (motion --> first mover)
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teleological arguments
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partly a posteriori; inference from certain goal-based, end-based or purpose-based facts about the world to the existence of a certain kind of being
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ontological arguments
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purely a priori; no experience or observation of anything in the world is required in order to be justified in believing the premises
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"first cause"
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argument for the conclusion that a _____ exists isn't an argument for the conclusion that a being is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing exists
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First Way
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from the existence of motion to the existence of a first mover; since there is a motion, there must be a mover
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Second Way
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nothing can be a cause of its own existence, nor can there be an infinite chain of causes and effects; so there must be a first mover
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Third Way
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if everything that existed only contingently existed, then there would be a time at which nothing existed; but something exists, and something can't come from nothing; so there can be no time at which nothing existed; so there must be something that necessarily exists
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Fourth Way
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there is something that is maximally good, noble, and true; there is one thing that is the cause of all goodness, truth, existence, and nobility
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Fifth Way
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some things act for an end, either by chance or by design; obviously it isn't by chance, so there must be some intelligent being that designed them to act for this end
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problem with Aquinas' argument
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confusing possible non-existence with a thing not existing at a time
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premises that are false in Aquinas' argument
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2, 3, and 4
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Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
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the existence of every contingent being has a causal explanation
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Kalam Cosmological Argument
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Aquinas' argument that begins: everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence...the universe began to exist
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St. Anselm of Canterbury
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Monologion, Proslogion, Cur Deus homo
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Anselm
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God is that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-thought
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reductio ad absurdum
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an argument that begins by assuming the opposite of what one wishes to prove
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Paley
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author of the Design Argument
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The Design Argument
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the teleological argument that tries to prove the existence of God through a watch and watchmaker appeal
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a posteriori
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the premises of Paley's design argument are _______ justified
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true
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Paley says that we can perceive, upon inspecting a watch, that its parts are put together for a purpose
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observations; infer; deduce
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_______ of the watch's mechanical structure allow us to _______ or ________ that the watch serves a purpose
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false
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True or false: if we cannot fully understand all the parts of the watch, or have never seen one before, then we can't claim the watch has a maker
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True
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True or false: the discovery of a reproducing watch makes the inference to the existence of a maker more obvious
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atheist
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Paley compares failure to conclude that a reproducing watch has a maker to the position of a(n) _______
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inference to the best explanation (IBE)
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the process of arriving at an explanatory process
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background knowledge
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the evaluation of a best explanation premise of an IBE argument depends on ________
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the probability of an observed fact upon a given hypothesis
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Pr(F|H)
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Pr(F|H)
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how likely is it that F would have occurred given that H is true?
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Pr(F|H1)
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the probability that I flip heads ten times in a row (F) given that h1 (I am flipping a fair coin) is low
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better
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If we have two hypotheses and there is some fact such that the probability of that fact given the first hypothesis is greater than the probability of that fact given the second hypothesis, then, all other things being equal, the first hypothesis is a _____ explanation of that fact than the second hypothesis
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HIGH
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Pr(there is a watch on the heath | there is a watchmaker) =
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"works of nature"
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there is a disanalogy between the watch case and the _____ case
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designer; evolutionary process; our existence
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Paley's argument could be repaired by appealing to some kind of ______ of the _______ that gave rise to _______
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challenging principle
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if there are 10 balls in one urn and ten trillion in the other, there is good evidence that you drew ball 5 from the first urn
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doomsday argument
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Pr(Your Birth Number is Low | Doom Far) = LOW
Pr(Your Birth Number is Low | Doom Soon) = HIGH |
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Ethical Intuitionism
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some moral propositions are known or justifiedly believed on the basis of intuitions
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intuitions
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a particular type of mental state that involves forcefully representing a proposition as being true
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seeming-states
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example of intuition; ordinary cognitive faculty which we know exists
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non-inferential knowledge
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some formulate ethical intuitionism as the claim that we have ________ of some moral statements
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The Autonomy of Ethics
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it is not possible to infer any ethical/moral/evaluative conclusion in a way that would produce (justification for or) knowledge of that conclusion from premises none of which are themselves ethical/moral/evaluative
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Foundationalism
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all inferential knowledge is ultimately based upon (by way of reasonable inferences) non-inferential knowledge
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No Moral Skepticism
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we have some moral knowledge or some justified moral beliefs
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deny
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Sam Harris needs to _____ the Authonomy of Ethics if he wants to defend his claim
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Hume's Law from "Treatise of Human Nature"
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It is impossible to come to know a moral conclusion (like an ought-conclusion) on the basis of a logical derivation from purely non-moral premises (is-premises)
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partly moral fact
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It is the case that the proposition that "torturing babies just for fun is always wrong is true" - this is a _____
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Huemer (Ethical Intuitionism)
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uses the "communism is bad" example that does not bridge the is-ought gap
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argument contains implicit premises which are evaluative
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why the "communism is bad" argument doesn't bridge the is-ought gap
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Karmo
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establishes (to my satisfaction) that no deductive argument spans the
is-ought gap unless the conclusion is trivial, like “Bad things are bad” |
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non-deductive
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a ______ argument could provide knowledge of a non-trivial moral conclusion
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The First Step Towards Intuitionism
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uses The Autonomy of Ethics, Foundationalism, and No Moral Skepticism as premises
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(C) Some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential
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conclusion of the First Step towards Intuitionism
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Classical Definition of Knowledge
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knowledge is justified true belief
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No Sensory Moral Knowledge
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Purely sensory experiences cannot provide us with the knowledge that anything has a moral property
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cognitive faculty; moral claims
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perhaps the _____ that lets me know "2 + 2 = 4" is what gives me justification for believing _____
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Piety I
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Euthypro: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about anything at all, whether the wrongdoer is anyone at all.
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Refuting Piety I
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Socrates: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you to tell me one or two of the many pious actions, but that form itself makes all pious actions pious.
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Piety II
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Euthypro: Well, then what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious.
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Refuting Piety II
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Socrates: The same things then are loved by some of the gods and hated by some of the gods, and those thing would be both god-loved and god-hated.
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Piety III
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Euthrypro: I think, Socrates, that on this subject no gods would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty.
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is; isn't
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there (is/in'st) frequently widespread disagreement amongst humans about whether someone has done something wrong (Socrates); there (is/isn't) disagreement over whether someone who has done something wrong should pay a penalty
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Modification I
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what is dear to all the gods is pious; what is hated by all gods is impious
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Modification II
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What is loved by all the gods is definitely just, what is hated by all the gods is
definitely unjust, and what is loved/hated by the gods is neither definitely just nor definitely unjust. |
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Modification III
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What is loved by all the gods is just. What is hated by all the gods is unjust.
And everything else is morally neutral. |
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Divine Command Theory
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claims that ethical sentences express propositions, some of which are true, about the attitudes of God; "charity is good" = "God commands charity"
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problem with Euthyro's definition of piety
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- Assumes that gods never disagree about what is just
- Is an action pious because it is loved by the gods, or do the gods love it because it is pious? - Non-reflexive causation: is what is loved by all the gods pious because it is loved by all the gods? |
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Nihilism/Error Theory
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there are no objective facts
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Non-Cognitivism
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Moral predicates do not refer to moral propositions in ethical evaluative statements
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Three types of Antirealism
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- Subjectivism
- Nihilism - Non-Cognitivism |
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Two forms of Moral Realism
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- Ethical naturalism
- Ethical intuitionism |
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realism
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there are objective moral facts
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natural properties
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moral properties = _______
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Ethical Naturalism
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There are objective moral properties, but these properties are identical to natural properties (probably very complex properties)
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Ethical Intuitionism
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There are objective moral properties, but these properties are not identical with any natural properties; we use intuitive knowledge to know some moral facts
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evaluative statement
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expresses positive or negative evaluation of something
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descriptivism
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moral evaluative statements describe the world rather than merely expressing feelings
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Argument from Queerness
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objective moral properties would be strange propositions, so there are no objective moral properties
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Epicurus (341 - 270 BCE)
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- If God is willing to prevent evil, but not able, He is impotent
- If God is able to prevent evil but not willing, He is malevolent - If God is both able and willing, then why does evil exist? |
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Demean defense
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The world is but a point with the universe...the present evil phenomena are rectified in some future period of existence
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Leibnizian defense
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this is the best of all possible words - the evil that exists is a splotch of ugly color that contributes to the beauty of an overall painting
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Great Goods Defense
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God must permit the evils he permits in order to realize a great good or to avoid a greater evil
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Skeptical Theist's Defense
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- There is some reason for which God permits the evil she permits, and we can't know it
- We have no good reason to believe there isn't a good reason for which God permits evil |
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Plantinga's Argument
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to bring about certain greater goods, God has to let some evil exist
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natural evil
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Plantinga's argument about the necessity of evil does not address the problem of ______
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Dostoevsky
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brought up the question of whether torturing babies for some Greater Good is morally acceptable
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Doestoevsky
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wrote "The Brothers Karamozov"
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i) These apparent evil states of affairs aren't evil
ii) Greater Goods Defense iii) Skeptical Theist Defense |
the theist must claim _____, _____, or _____ to justify the existence of evil
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Ivan Karamazov's First Challenge (Dostoevsky)
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asks whether you would consent to be the architect of a world the creation of which would entail the incredible suffering of innocent human persons
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Le Guin's challenge
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aims to elicit the intuition that rebellion is morally required even if the Greater Goods Defense is true
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true
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True or false: it does follow from the fact that all arguments for the existence of God are bad that...
- nobody has a good reason for being a theist - theistic belief must be based on mere faith |
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Knowledge Regress Argument
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what Foundationalism is based on
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basic; foundational
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beliefs about the external world are often thought to be _____ and _____ beliefs
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Mackie
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attempts to philosophically demonstrate that theistic belief is "positively irrational"
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The Logical Problem of Evil
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These three cannot be true at once:
1) God is wholly good 2) God is omnipotent 3) Evil exists |
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premises Mackie adds to deduce that God does not exist
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4) If something is wholly good, it always eliminates as much evil as it can
5) If something is omnipotent, it can do anything |
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adequate solution
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to reject one of the premises of Mackie's Problem of Evil
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fallacious solution
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a solution which tries to solve the Problem of Evil while still maintaining the truth of (1) - (5) and implicitly rejecting one of (1) - (5)
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First Fallacious Solution
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Good cannot exist without evil; evil is a necessary counterpart to good
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how Mackie responds to the relative good claim
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- The theist holds that God is good in an absolute, not a relative, sense
- The absolute sense of being large doesn't require the existence of anything small - There could be one thing that is large and no small things |
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Good Requires Evil II
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every quality requires for its existence there being something which lacks that quality
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fallacious solution II
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the universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there was no evil
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first order evil
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an evil necessary for bringing about a higher good (pain)
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first order good
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happiness
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second order evil
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cruelty
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fallacious solution III
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Evil is due to human free will
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Mackie's response to fallacious solution III
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God should have made men such that they always freely choose the good in order to maintain free will and lack of evil
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Ethics
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concerns itself with the truth and falsity of evaluative statements
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evaluative statement
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expresses a positive or negative evaluation of something; says that something is good, something is bad, something is right, something is wrong, and so on...
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Metaethics
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concerned with non-evaluative questions about the nature of ethical evaluative statements
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Semantic Questions
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in the statement "the cat-burning is wrong", does "is wrong" refer to a property the act of cat-burning has?
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Epistemological Questions
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how can we know, if we even can, that cat-burning is wrong? Is is possible to justify our moral beliefs to others?
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Metaphysics
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Do objective moral values exist? If so, what kinds of things are they?
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Moral Psychology
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What motivates us to act in the ways we take to be morally required? What motivates us to seek the good? Does sincerely believing an evaluative statement entail in us the presence of a motivation to act in a certain way?
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subjective properties
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F-ness is ______ IFF whether x is F depends upon the attitude or response of an observer
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objective properties
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F-ness is _______ IFF F-ness is not subjective
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examples of subjective properties
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funniness and sexiness
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examples of objective properties
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squareness and weighing 120 lbs
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Moral Realism
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claim that there are objective moral properties
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Moral Subjectivism and Error Theory
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in ethical evaluative statements, moral predicates refer to moral properties
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Non-Cognitivism
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in ethical evaluative statements, moral predicates do not refer to moral properties
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Moral Subjectivism
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If moral predicates refer to properties, then there are things that have those properties
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Emotivist Non-Cognitivism
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Evaluative statements are not statements that one feels a certain way, they are MERE expressions of feeling - they don't involve the making of any statements
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example of an emotivist non-cognitive statement
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crying; "x is good" means "Yay x!"
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Prescriptivist Non-Cognitivism
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Evaluative statements are commands we use to influence other's behavior - can't be true or false
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example of a prescriptivist non-cognitivist statement
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"x is good" means "Do x!"; "stealing is wrong" means "Don't steal!"
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Nihilism
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While evaluative statements purport to refer to moral properties and attribute them to things, there are no such moral properties to be had
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Subjectivism
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Evaluative statements purport to attribute properties to things and some things have those properties
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true
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true or false: in subjectivism, some evaluative statements are true
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Moral Realism
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evaluative statements purport to attribute moral properties to things; there are objective moral properties that do not depend on the attitudes or reactions of people towards them
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Ethical Naturalism
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There are objective moral properties, but these properties are identical to natural physical properties
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Ethical Intuitionism
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there are objective moral properties but these properties are not identical with natural properties; have intuitive or basic knowledge of some moral facts
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descriptivism; non-cognitivism
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Mackie thinks that _____ is true and _____ is false
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Motivational Internalism
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Necessarily, if S sincerely believes that A is the right course of action, then S will be at least somewhat motivated to do A
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Objective Prescriptivity
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a moral judgement "tells the person" what to do; something's being good both tells the person who knows it to pursue it and makes him pursue it
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The Argument From Queerness (Main Argument)
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Objective moral properties would be properties "of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe", so there are no objective moral properties
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The Realist and Mackie
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Claims that there's a connection between natural and descriptive facts and the moral facts
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desires
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(3) There is no objective moral property such that being acquainted with it requires the presence of ______
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The Final Argument
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- The Form of the Good is such that something's being good tells the person who knows it to pursue it and makes him pursue it
- An objective good would be sought by anyone acquainted with it - Reason can never be an "influencing motive of the will" |
