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33 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Perceptual Variation by Russell |
There is variation in our veridical perception which means that what we are immediately aware of in perception is not the same as what is independent of our minds, which means that we do not perceive physical objects directly. |
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Illusion Argument by Russell |
We can perceive variations which misrepresent a physical object, which appear indistinguishable from veridical perception, and so we perceive sense data in ____ and veridical, and so we see sense data directly and not physical objects. |
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Hallucination Argument |
We perceive something that is not physical, and instead must be entirely mental/imaginative, but are also subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception. So, we must see sense data for both, and not physical objects directly in both cases. |
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Time-Lag Argument by Russell |
What we see takes time to travel to our eyes, and so what we perceive cannot be direct as it has to travel indirectly to our vision. This shows that it is sense data, and not physical objects. |
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Indirect Realism |
Due to the numerous objections to direct perception of physical objects, and the lack of differentiation between, say, illusion and veridical, we can infer that sense data is the cause for our perceptions, and that we perceive physical objects indirectly through this. |
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Russell's Argument for the External World
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Since there are two hypothesis' that either physical objects do or don't cause my sense data, we can infer through Ockham's razor that the best hypothesis is that physical objects exist and cause my sense data. |
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Locke on Qualities |
It is argued that, when we percieve physical objects, we gain our observations through primary qualities (imperceptible parts, base parts of it, mind independent) and secondary qualities (relational properties of objects, mind-dependent.) |
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Perceptual Variation by Berkeley (V2?) |
Through inference of colors not appearing as they are, we can infer that colors are appearances, not properties of physical objects, which reflects on actuality and falsality. |
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Berkeley's Attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction |
He proves that primary qualities are dependent on the mind as much as secondary qualities, due to subjective views in effect of perspective, and other factors, showing perceptual variation to apply to primary/secondary qualities. He concludes that Indirect realism leaves us with skepticism regarding the external world. |
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Berkeley's Idealism |
Following his notation that primary and secondary qualities, he notes that since they both are mind dependent, this means that all our perceptions are mind dependent, and so all we perceive are ideas in our minds. |
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Philonous' other approach |
We have to consider size or scale when we think of objects, but if we perceive mind-independent objects, then we must not be able to consider scale, but we do, showing some physical presence external to our mind. Therefore, we cannot coherently convieve of an object that has primary qualities alone. He bases this on the material substratum, which is required of objects to exist materialized in reality, or else there is no object. |
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Berkeley Claim Defense |
Our experience support the idea of idealism as opposed to realism, since our experience cannot verify the hypothesis of a mind-independent world. The experience supports more on the side of that all we perceive is all we know, and that is all. |
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Berkeley's 'Master' Argument |
He concludes that an object can be mind dependent, and does not follow that what he is thinking of is also mind-dependent. He says that thoughts cannot exist outside the mind, and so the thought of something is mind dependent, and so there is no thought of something if it is not thought of. It is therefore impossible for something to exist when it is not thought of. |
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Berkeley regarding why we percieve (Idealism) |
He considers 3 causes of our thoughts, or perceptions; perceptions, his mind or another mind. He deems the first 2 wrong, being that perceptions cannot be controlled from physical objects, as we have no control of our perceptions unlike imagination. The ideas that comprise physical objects must exist in another mind, which wills these perceptions, and this must be god, given the systematicity and complexity of our perceptions. |
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Limerick regarding Idealism |
First, there is an objection to idealism; There was a young man who said, God I find it exceedingly odd, when He finds that the tree continues to be, when no one's about in the quad. Then, Berkeley replies; Dear sir, your astonishment's odd. I'm always about in the Quad. And that's why the tree Continue's to be Since observed by yours faithfully, God. |
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Hylas to Berkeley regarding Illusion |
He asked how Illusions could be explained with idealism; he responded that our ideas, and our reality, do not have to be the same. We have an idea of crookedness, but the reality is that it is not. |
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Idealism in Time and Space |
He argues that objective time and space are regularities in relations between what we experience and these regularities are part of the mind of God. So idealism can secure objective space and time - in the mind of god. |
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Idealism and Solipsism |
Idealism shows, through an argument, there it is possible that other minds exist since you yourself are a mind, since we have the notion of what a mind is. If mt perceptions dont originate in my mind, then they must exist in the mind of a powerful being, alike to god. |
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Idealism and God |
People object to god being part of idealism, and his existence, stating that our ideas must not be a part of god's mind, as they exist in OUR minds. Idealism replies that perceptions exist as part of God's understanding. God created existence eternally in his mind. What i perceive is what god wills me to perceive. |
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JTB (initial) |
If a proposition is true of which you believe in, then the very fact that you believe in the proposition justifies this belief. |
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Necessary and Sufficient Conditions |
These serve as guidelines for being able to identify true knowledge, using 3 conditions taken together to result in this. The proposition must be necessary for knowledge, but also sufficient, as in the proposition must suffice a logically conclusive premise. |
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Truth is not necessary for Knowledge |
With the fact that there have been paradigms, where 'knowledge' was universally believed to be true, but turned out later to not be. It is speculated whether or not truth is required. It seems odd to state that this means that alot of what we regard as knowledge is in fact not knowledge at all. |
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Thomas Kuhn's Knowledge and truth |
He talks of paradigms, as he says that different paradigms cannot be named more 'correct' than another, and so they could both be true in their own terms, and so not incorrect and both knowledge. Different paradigms refer to different thing, and there is no neutral way of describing the world, since paradigms interpret a concept or reality differently; it plays a new role.
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Williamson's knowledge/mental state explaination |
He argues that knowledge is not a form of belief, but rather an entirely different mental state. Either you believe something or you know it; but you don't know something by believing it. Knowledge is the most general factive mental state. This entails that any factive mental state is a way of knowing. He also states that just because belief and knowledge are subjectively indistinguishable, this doesn't tell us anything about what knowledge is. |
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Gettier; Is justified true belief knowledge? |
The famous cases are presented, known as the ____ cases, where justified true belief does not lead to a satisfactory conclusion in a case of true knowledge. For example, one case is that smith and bob go for a job, and smith believes that bob will get the job because he has a coin, and this will result in him getting the job. Bob gets the job, and so smith's belief was correct. Was he? This doesnt seem right, and so JTB seems unsatisfactory due to the connection between his belief and the truth of his belief. |
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No False Lemmas condition |
A condition added to JTB which makes the Gettier Cases false and allows for JTB to make sense. This provides, at the end of the condition sequence, that you do not infer from anything false. However, there were still a few Gettier cases which are not inferred from anything false yet still do not provide knowledge. The 'Barn County' example still provides that knowledge cannot be easily identified in some cases even with no ____ ____. |
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Infallibilism Argument |
It argues that knowledge is completely certain, and certainty is the only factor that determines and justifies whether true belief is knowledge or not. If a belief is not certain, then it is not justified. The implication is that our beliefs are rarely sufficiently justified to count as knowledge. Descartes uses this method in order to establish knowledge as opposed a plethora of beliefs, and that all beliefs that are doubtable are not knowledge at all regardless. Following this, we find that we can doubt alot of the things we appear to know already. |
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Infallibilism Objection |
Between the premises 2 & 4, there is a logical error in how the word 'can't' is understood in logical terms. It either states that you 'can't possibly be mistaken if you are certain' or 'you are not mistaken', which are different in conditional terms. There are cases of memory which can be mistaken, but i am not, and this true belief rests on evidence. The two claims are different, since one says about whether I am mistaken, and the other that i could mistaken. To accept infallibilism, we need some other, independent reason to believe. |
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Reliabilism Argument |
It argues that if your belief is created and caused by a reliable cognitive process (your senses, abstraction of thought, reflection, etc). It is a process that produces a high percentage of true beliefs. True beliefs caused by such processes count as knowledge. An advantage of such argument is that it allows animals and young children to obtain knowledge. This doesn't solve Gettier's cases, however, since in the Barn County example, Henry does not know whether this knowledge is true or not. |
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Sophisticated Reliabilism Argument
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An extra premise is added to the reliabilism argument in order to secure a most definite conclusion. It adds that '4. You are able to descriminate between 'relevent possibilities' and the actual situation'. This stops the Gettier cases from falsifying Reliabilism. |
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Reliability as Tracking the Truth, by Robert Nozick |
He provides a different definition of 'tracking the truth', saying that you know that p if; p is true, you believe that p, in the situation you are in, or a similar situation, if p were true, then you would not believe that p, and that in the situation you are in, or a similar situation, if p were true then you would believe that p. This allows us to distinctly identify knowledge from our inferred beliefs. |
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Virtue Epistemology Argument by Sosa |
It is the argument of exercising your means to perceive, identify and believe. It adds a new premise and replaces 3, stating that '3. your true belief is a result of you exercising your intellectual virtues.' This then provides 3 factors which determine whether or not your belief is knowledge. It is accuracy; truth, adroitness; use of intellectual virtues, and aptness; is the belief true in result of use of their intellectual virtues? |
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Virtue Epistemology Objection |
The Bat County objection comes back. When a barn facade is seen, his belief is apt, but we said that belief doesn't count as knowledge. We can reply that Henry doesn't have the ability to recognize real barns from fake barns. His true belief can't be the result of an ability he doesn't have - so it isn't apt. We could reply that the belief is the result of luck, but then it is not the result of his abilities. |
