Phil100D Midterm

Front 1

Descartes' Epistemological Argument

Back 1

1. I have a clear and distinct idea of myself (i.e. my mind) as essentially a thinking thing.
I have a clear and distinct idea of my body as essentially an extended thing.
2. In light of (1), I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my body existing without my mind, and vice versa.
(3) If I can conceive of my mind existing without my body and vice versa then God could bring about this state of affairs, therefore its possible.
(4) If A can exist without B and vice versa then A and B are really distinct.
(5) My mind and body are really distinct.

Front 2

Mind as Thinking Thing

Back 2

Descartes uses the Evil Demon scenario to see what, if anything, is indubitable. He reaches the conclusion that if he is thinking, then he must exist, and he can't be wrong about this.

Descartes comes to the conclusion that the property of bodies is being extended, if they exist at all. Since no matter what you do to a piece of body it will still be extended.

Front 3

Body as an Extended Thing

Back 3

Descartes imagines a piece of wax and all the alterations one could make to it and comes to the conclusion that if there is one property that it is essential to it, it would be extension, because without this the body would not exist at all.

Front 4

Clear and Distinct

Back 4

Descartes notes that often his senses have deceived him but when he has been clearly and distinctly perceiving something, he was not wrong. Also God insures that whatever Descartes clearly and distinctly perceives is accurate.

Front 5

Substantial Union of Mind and Body

Back 5

Descartes' believes that although M and B are distinct they do comprise a substantial union in the form of a person. In some sense the mind "permeates" the body in that sensations are localized in certain parts of the body.

The M and B also interact in a very subtle way much like the way gravity interacts with bodies without them actually touching. It is a mistake to think the interaction works in the same way body-body causation works, no it is mind-body.

Front 6

Category Mistake

Back 6

University Example

Cartesian M-B dualism is based on the category mistake that the mind is some separate entity from the brain when really it is just something like a function of the brain, it is nothing separate from the brain.

Front 7

Cartesian Dualism & Problem of Other Minds

Back 7

If the mind and body are distinct and do not have to exist together, how can we know that other people have minds at all? There is no necessary connection between brains and minds so it is easily possible that no other minds exist at all.

And, since we can only know our own mind we can only think about it from our own case so we cannot even conceive of other people's minds since according to dualism we can't know anything about them.

Front 8

Ryle & Problem of Other Minds

Back 8

Ryle argues that dualism undermines the idea that we know what someone means when he says, "She is in pain," we all have a thorough grasp on the meaning of this sentence however according to dualism we don't. Dualism suggests that we can't even make sense of such sentences when clearly we do.

Any thesis that contradicts our understanding of something we clearly do understand must be wrong.

Front 9

Mental States according to Analytic Behaviorism

Back 9

Analytic behaviorists believes that mental states just are the behaviors or dispositions to behave associated with them. Being in pain is saying "ouch", whincing, groaning and the like, or A is in pain iff if you stab A then A is disposed to groan.

believing that the ice is thin is identical to being careful and cautious or if one is not near ice, were one to go ice skating, one would be disposed to be cautious.

Front 10

Problem of Correspondence Laws & Direct Checks in Dualism

Back 10

Feigl notes that indeed we could solve the problem of other minds by setting up correspondence laws between mental and physical states however it seems a direct check into any mental state besides ones own seems logically impossible.