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30 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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The primary sources of Knowledge (according to The Standard View)
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a. Perception
b. Memory c. Testimony d. Introspection - seeing how you feel e. Reasoning - inference about facts f. Rational Insight - logic, arithmetic |
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The Skeptical View
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• That we know far less than The Standard View says
• Advocates wholly reject the The Standard View and believe we really don’t have any knowledge at all and that there is no response to the arguments of skeptics. • Global vs. limited skepticism |
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Deductivism
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The belief that the only good arguments are deductively valid arguments.
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Inductively strong
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(1) is not deductively valid (2) it is improbable that the conclusion is false given that the premises are true
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The Principle of the Uniformity of Nature
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The future will be like the past,
or The unobserved will be like the observed |
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Induction by Enumeration
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• Induction by means of enumerating all past instances of a certain phenomena and concluding the next instance will be like the others.
• All A’s have been B’s. The next A will be B. |
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Levels of Argument
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• Levels of argument can be used to justify arguments.
• Arguments on Level 1 talk about individual things or events. • Arguments on Level 2 talk about arguments on level 1 • Arguments above Level 2 talk about the arguments below them. |
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Counter-inductivist
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• One who follows a system of logic which presupposes on all levels that the future will not be like the past.
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Different Kinds of Knowledge
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• Propositional knowledge
• Acquaintance knowledge (familiarity) • Ability knowledge (procedural knowledge) |
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Traditional Analysis of Knowledge
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S knows P
=df S believes that P, its true that P, and S is justified in believing that P |
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The Categories of Knowledge in the Standard View of Knowledge and 4 Questions Concerning
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b. Our immediate environment
c. Our own thoughts and feelings d. Commonsense facts about the world e. Scientific facts f. Mental states of others g. The past h. Mathematics i. Conceptual truths j. Morality k. The future l. Religion Q1. Under what conditions does someone know something to be true? Q2. Under what conditions is a belief justified? Q4. Do we really have knowledge at all? Are there any good responses to the arguments of skeptics? Q5. In what ways do results in natural science (cognitive psychology) bear on epistemological questions? Do recent empirical results undermine The Standard View? |
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Possibility of Error Argument
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1. For almost any belief about the external world, that belief might be mistaken.
2. If a belief might be mistaken, then it is not knowledge. 3. Therefore, almost any belief that any person has about the external world is not knowledge. • Knowledge is compatible with the possibility of error (but not actual error). Knowledge simply requires strong justification and truth. |
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Introspective Indistinguishability Argument
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1. If a person can have knowledge on the basis of fallible evidence then there can be cases of knowledge that are “introspectively indistinguishable” from cases of non-knowledge.
2. But there cannot be cases of knowledge that are introspectively indistinguishable from cases of non-knowledge (they wouldn’t count as knowledge). 3. A person cannot have knowledge on the basis of fallible evidence. (5-1, 5-2) 4. But all evidence we have for any propositions about the external world is fallible. 5. Therefore, we cannot have any knowledge about the external world. • We can reject (2) because there can be cases of knowledge that are introspectively indistinguishable from cases of non-knowledge. Knowledge requires only that we have very good or excellent reasons for believing something, and that the something is true. If a person has excellent reasons for believing p, and p is true, then that person has knowledge even if the belief that p is introspectively indistinguishable from a false belief. |
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Critically Discuss Introspective Indistinguishability Argument
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1. If a person can have knowledge on the basis of fallible evidence then there can be cases of knowledge that are “introspectively indistinguishable” from cases of non-knowledge.
2. But there cannot be cases of knowledge that are introspectively indistinguishable from cases of non-knowledge (they wouldn’t count as knowledge). 3. A person cannot have knowledge on the basis of fallible evidence. (5-1, 5-2) 4. But all evidence we have for any propositions about the external world is fallible. 5. Therefore, we cannot have any knowledge about the external world. We can reject (2) because there can be cases of knowledge that are introspectively indistinguishable from cases of non-knowledge. Knowledge requires only that we have very good or excellent reasons for believing something, and that the something is true. If a person has excellent reasons for believing p, and p is true, then that person has knowledge even if the belief that p is introspectively indistinguishable from a false belief.have very good or excellent reasons for believing something, and that the something is true. If a person has excellent reasons for believing p, and p is true, then that person has knowledge even if the belief that p is introspectively indistinguishable from a false belief. |
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GE Moore’s Response
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1. Here is one hand.
2. Here is another. 3. Therefore, at least two external objects exist. 4. Therefore, the external world exists. • Moore gives this argument with a few warnings. He points out that his conclusion is distinct from his premises, hence he is not begging the question. He also notes that the argument is deductively valid and since the premises are known with certainty to be true, the argument is a sound proof of the external world. • Moore also points out that his argument is more certain, or that his premises are more certain then the arguments for skepticism, thus it is more rational or reasonable to accept his argument. However Moore fails to show what exactly is wrong with the skeptical arguments. |
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Critically Discuss Moore's Argument
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1. Here is one hand.
2. Here is another. 3. Therefore, at least two external objects exist. 4. Therefore, the external world exists. • Moore gives this argument with a few warnings. He points out that his conclusion is distinct from his premises, hence he is not begging the question. He also notes that the argument is deductively valid and since the premises are known with certainty to be true, the argument is a sound proof of the external world. • Moore also points out that his argument is more certain, or that his premises are more certain then the arguments for skepticism, thus it is more rational or reasonable to accept his argument. However Moore fails to show what exactly is wrong with the skeptical arguments. |
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Address the Claim that Skepticism is Self-Refuting
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• The antiskeptic claims the skeptical view is self-refuting. The antiskeptic claims that since skeptical arguments prove that we cannot have knowledge about the external world, the arguments for skepticism cannot be justified. But this only proves that we can never know the conclusions of skeptical arguments, not that they aren’t true.
• Skeptical arguments are valid, and the premises seem to be true. Thus even if the skeptic can’t know them to be true, doesn’t mean they aren’t. The skeptic can give the argument and not have to know the conclusion. |
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Hume's Argument for Problem of Induction
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1. All of our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact are justified by considerations of the relation of cause and effect, if at all.
2. All beliefs about the relation of cause and effect are based on experience, if at all. 3. All conclusions from experience are justified by the Principle of Uniformity, if justified at all. 4. The Principle of Uniformity cannot be justified a priori, so must be justified by experience, if at all. 5. The Principle of Uniformity cannot be justified through experience, this would be circular. 6. Therefore, The Principle of Uniformity cannot be justified. 7. Therefore, All of our beliefs about the relation of cause and effect are not justified. |
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Two Defects of Hume's Argument
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1. All of our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact can be justified by considerations other than the relation of cause and effect.
All F’s have been G’s. The next F will be a G. All people I have met have had feet. The next person I meet will have feet. 2. Hume presupposes that the only good arguments are deductively valid arguments. This is not true. Hume thus incorporates the Principle of Uniformity into his argument to make it deductively valid. The Principle of Uniformity should be more like a rule for inductive reasoning, rather than an explicit premise. |
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Inductive “Justification” of Induction
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'Induction has worked in the past, so it will work in the future' amounts to circularity.
Unless it doesn't, because we use levels of argument to prove it. level 1 - induction has been reliable in the past, so it will be reliable in the future level 2 - arguments of level 1 have been reliable in the past so they will be reliable in the future etc. counterinduction |
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Pragmatic Justification of Induction
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1. nature is uniform \/ nature is not uniform.
2. nature is uniform --> induction will succeed. 3. nature is not uniform --> no method will succeed. 4. therefore, If any method will work, Induction will. |
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Problems with Pragmatic Justification
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• (3) is subject to question. Perhaps in an entirely chaotic universe some method, Method X, will work. If this is the case then eventually induction will discover Method X, so if any method will work for everything, induction will. Method X is a subset of induction.
Defects ------------ 1. Induction Sucks - It is no clear that this defense of induction implies that induction is any better than the best of a set of bad options. Even though it’s true that, if anything will work induction will, this is not enough to refute Hume. This is not a justification of induction. 2. Principles of Induction Unjustified - This argument does not justify the principles of induction. If the world is not uniform, then nothing will work and we can never know this. There is no guarantee that induction will yield good principles for forming beliefs about unobserved things and is therefore unjustified. 3. Principle of Uniformity Unjustified - If the purpose of the Pragmatic Justification was to justify the epistemic rationality of the Principle of Uniformity, it fails at this goal because it does not demonstrate any justification for the Principle of Uniformity, or that we have good reason to believe PU. |
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A Priori Justification of Induction
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• Knowing that things have been a certain way in the past gives us good reason to believe they will be the same way in the future.
• This is all that it means to be reasonable. • However Hume would challenge this on grounds that we need to deductively prove the principle. However we don’t need to, it is sufficient to just show that the principle is reasonable. • However for this to work we need to show what the rules of rational inductive reasoning are, or else we have no definition to argue from. |
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Russell & Appearance and Reality
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• Russell argues that we do not perceive reality directly; rather we perceive sense data which provide information about the world. However these can be unreliable when attempting to determine what is real. Thus Russell makes a distinction between appearance and reality. We only have direct access to appearance and through it indirect access to reality. Russell uses the example of a table. One may think it to be blue, but from different angles and in different lights it may have a sheen or glare and if the lights are our then it has no color at all. It’s shape depends on where the individual stands in the room so it only appears to be rectangular or whatever shape it seems to be, but this will change depending on perspective. We believe it has a certain texture however on closer inspection we believe it to have a different one.
• Russell concludes that the real table is not directly known to us. Our perception of the real table relies upon certain sense-data which rely on the relations between the observer and the object. |
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Transmissibility Argument (Matrix)
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1. S cannot know that S is not in the matrix.
2. There being a test in front of S implies that S is not in the matrix, and S knows this. 3. If S knows that there is a test in front of her, and there being a test in front of S logically implies S is not in the matrix, then S can know that S is not in the matrix. 4. S does not know there is a test in front of S. |
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Critically Discuss Transmissibility Argument
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• There is no reason to believe premise (1) is true. Knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Knowledge merely requires that we have excellent reasons for our beliefs and for the fact that we are not in the matrix, we do have excellent reasons. There is no reason to think we are in the matrix. If it is the case that we are not in the matrix, and we have very good reason to believe this (we have hands, people exist, etc.), then we do indeed have knowledge. Just because the knowledge could be wrong does not mean that it is. Thus it is possible for S to know that S is not in the matrix.
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Descartes & Role of Evil Genius
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Descartes uses the Evil Genius as a tool to rid himself of all dubitable beliefs, and arrive at a set of certain, indubitable beliefs which he calls foundational beliefs. He imagines the most skeptical scenario he can, one in which an Evil Genius, or demon, is deceiving him wholly and completely about everything he experiences. Thus all of his knowledge is cast into doubt. However Descartes finds one belief that the genius could not deceive him into having: that he exists. For existence is a precondition for being deceived, or interacted with in any way for that matter. Thus Descartes arrives at his first foundational belief.
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“Obama knows whether or not there are spies in Georgia.”
Explain in terms of propositional knowledge |
The sentence ‘Obama knows whether or not there are spies in Georgia,’ is actually a piece of propositional knowledge expressed in simplified terms. The expanded statement, in terms of propositional content, states that ‘Obama either knows that there are spies in Georgia or that there are not spies in George, but not both.’ The word ‘whether’ in this case implies an exclusive disjunction.
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Example of non-propositional knowledge
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'S knows T just in case S is acquainted with T.’ We could attempt to explain this statement in terms of propositional knowledge but will ultimately fail. ‘S knows that T has such and such properties.’ But we can know that a certain person has certain properties without being acquainted with them. Just because I know Obama is the president of the United States, is over 35, is married, etc. does not mean that I know Obama.
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"I know that my friend George is dead, but I just can’t believe it.”
Explain why this isn't a problem for Traditional Analysis of Knowledge |
This is not a problem for the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge because although the first part of the sentence is literal and expresses the proposition ‘that I know my friend George is dead,’ the second part is figurative and expresses the proposition ‘that I am having trouble coping with the fact that my friend George is dead.’ Since the second half is figurative, the sentence does not hold that someone can know something yet disbelieve it at the same time. It yields no contradiction.
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