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36 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Describe Paley's watchmaker in relevant terms |
Purpose --> watchmaker Contrivance (esp. in nature) --> contriver |
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What were Paley's views about attributing the watch to the law or laws of nature |
Law or laws always presuppose an agent. Without the agent, therefore without the power, law and laws are meaningless and ineffective. |
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What were Paley's views on if the watch had been descended from other watches? |
The fundamental question is still unaswerd. Design begets a designer no matter how far back the chain goes. |
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Paley on cosmological arguments v. arguments from design |
Doesn't matter if we found a first watch and the chain could go back infinitely far anyway. |
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Paley's argument summarized in premise and conclusion form. |
(1) If something is organized toward a purpose, then it is made by a purposeful being (2)The natural world is organized toward a purpose. (3) So the natural world is made by a purposeful being. |
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What is Cleanthes' argument from design? rough form |
(1) Effects resemble each other (2) By rules of analogy, causes resemble effects (3) Therefore, the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man |
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How does Philo reply to Cleanthes' Argument from Design? |
Cleanthes' analogy gets weaker as you progress in orders of complexity Who are you (i.e. Cleanthes) to talk about this stuff b/c have you ever seen this stuff? {In the text} "Have worlds ever formed under your eye" (p. 22) |
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Explain Philo's regress in the Argument from Design |
Well look at the mind; things are logically arranged there, so couldn't there be an author there and so forth? Moreover, why stop anywhere? Couldn't there be an infinite regress? |
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How does Cleanthes' respond to Philo's assertion of an infinite regress? |
Philo you're wrong because: (1) There is evident purpose and intention in the world and (2) Your objections so far have been abstruse and vague |
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How does Philo respond to Cleanthes' criticisms of Philo's rebuttal? |
An ideal system arranged of itself, without a clear precedent design, is not that explicable |
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Generally, what is a problem with assuming there's probably a designer? |
Our thought, our partiality, favors a designer, but these reasons are good ones in favor of a designer. |
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What does (presumably) Philo specifically call into question about what sort of designer can be inferred? |
(1) There's not a good reason for assuming this deity is perfect (2) Kinda from (1), many botched worlds may have been made (3) We may be able to point to design, but not a designer - that doesn't make any sense |
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What does Cleanthes' say when he gets the 'last word' in the argument from design? |
Well, (1) I don't like your rambling incoherent criticisms and (2) Philo, you dismiss design, but at every point in your life turn to it as though it has meaning. |
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What three principles does Mackie claim, when taken together, are inconsistent |
(1) God is omnipotent (2) God is wholly good (3) Evil exists |
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Why are the three principles Mackie claims are inconsistent? |
(1) God is opposed to evil insofar as that he should try to eliminate evil as much as possible (2) There are no limits to what omnipotence can do |
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Break Mackie's argument down |
(1) An omnibenevolent being eliminates evil as much as it can (2) An omnipotent being can eliminate all evil (3) From (1) & (2) and omnibenevolent and omniscient being would eliminate all evil. (4) If there were such a being, there would be no evil (5) There is evil (6) Therefore, there is no omnibenevolent and omniscient being (by reductio ad absurdum) |
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What are some replies to Mackie's argument? |
Against (1) & (2), a world with good but no evil is impossible Against (3) A world with evil & good > a world with only good Against (4) A world with free will but no evil is impossible |
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How does Mackie respond to these replies? |
Disregards replies against (1) - (3), but says against reply to (4) that God could have made it so that people always freely choose good. |
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What is Plantinga's goal with the free will defense? |
To show that (1) God is omni... and (2) There is evil Are consistent with some other proposition (3), where (3) is free will
Basically (1) and (3), taken together, entail (2) |
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What does it mean to say P and Q are consistent? |
There is some possible world where P & Q are both true
In the sense of metaphysical possibility |
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What does it mean to say P entails Q (i.e., P-->Q)? |
P-->Q means that in every possible world where P is true, Q is also true |
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What does significantly free mean? |
If on an occasion, someone is free to do something morally right and simultaneously free to do something morally wrong. |
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What does the free will defense argue broadly? |
A world with significant freedom, and consequently evil, is more valuable than a world without free creatures |
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How does Mackie object to Plantinga? |
(1) There is a PW in which significantly free creatures never choose to do moral evil. (2) God could've actualized any PW (3) God could've actualized the world described in (1) |
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How does Plantinga respond to Mackie's objection? |
Plantinga concedes (1), but says God couldn't actualize any PW |
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What does the non-interference principle say? |
If you do something, P, freely then no one else made it the case that P. Basically, they didn't entail P. |
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Give an example of a counterfactual conditional. |
If I dropped the chalk, it would break |
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What are some properties of counterfactual conditionals |
(1) Not truth functional (2) Don't obey antecedent strengthening |
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What is a conditional excluded middle? |
A-->C or A-->~C |
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What is the difference between strongly actualizing something and weakly actualizing something and how does this relate to free will? |
They might cause P,
or
{weakly actualizing} where if P were the case then Q would've been the case The non-interference principle is only true if we understand make it the case/actualize in the strong sense |
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What is Plantinga's final answer? |
Transworld Depravity:
(1) W is a world where Curly is significantly free and never goes wrong (2) T is everything God strongly brings about in world W (3) If T were actual, then Curly would do something morally evil |
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Explain what Rowe believes about apparently pointless and pointless evils |
There are evils that are point; that a triple O being would have no reason to allow
What is the evidence for pointless evils? Apparently pointless evils So the support for the claim that pointless evil is probable relies on two premises
(2) Apparently pointless evil confirms pointless evils |
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What are the two responses to Rowe's evidential argument |
(1) Theodicy (2) Skepticism |
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Generally, what are noseeum arguments and what assumption do they rest on? |
(1) So far as we can detect, there is no X (2) Therefore, it is more likely than not there is no X.
Noseeum assumption: it's conclusion is more likely than not if more likely than not we'd see the item in question |
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Explain confirming, disconfirming, and independence with Ps and Qs |
E confirms P if including E as evidence makes the new probability of P higher than the original probability
Disconfirms is vice versa
And independence... |
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For any E and P where E is evidence and P is a proposition what must be true? |
Only one of these--confirms, disconfirms, or is independent--can be true
E disconfirms P iff confirms the proposition that it's not the case that P |
