Phil

Front 1

four characteristics of persons

Back 1

1.Intrinsic value-non-derivative value, valuable purely for its own sake, unconditional value. (idea that whatever happens to you, doesn’t diminish your intrinsic value).
2.Should never be treated merely as means to an end-no exploitation. EX.Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment targeted poor communities to find people to be involved (people with no medical care, not smart). Not treat them-but not tell them. Said they’d get access to health care (exploiting).
3.Persons are non-interchangeable/ non-replaceable.
4.all persons are bearers of rights and entitlements (eg. right to life)- - -positve, negative analysis

Front 2

positive analysis

Back 2

right to life saving assistance and non-interference

Front 3

negative analysis

Back 3

right to non-interference (right not to be killed)

Front 4

personal identity

Back 4

what accounts for the numerical sameness of a person existing at some time in past and now or in the future.

Front 5

numerical identity

Back 5

“x and y are numerically identical” =df “x=y” (x and y are numerically identical if x=y)

Front 6

qualitative identity

Back 6

"x and y are qualitatively identical” =df “x and y are indistinguishable in appearance.”
 Ex.-Bill and Sue have the same car. (numerically=1 car, qualitatively=2 cars)

Front 7

Locke's analysis of human identity

Back 7

-“x at t2 is the same human as x at t1” =df “x at t2 has the same living body with the same organized structure as x at t1 (but with different particles of matter)”

Front 8

Locke's analysis of person

Back 8

-“person”= df “rationale, self conscious being” (if you can reason/reflect, and know who you are in relation to others)
 According to Locke- newborn, fetus, and Alzheimer’s patient wouldn’t be persons.

Front 9

Locke's analysis of personal identity

Back 9

(memory theory) “x at t2 is the same person as x at t1” =df “x at t2 remembers that x at t1 actually had.” (you go back as far as your memory goes back, etc).

Front 10

Reid: Continuity requirement for personal identity

Back 10

personal identity requires continued uninterrupted existence over time (a person can’t come into existence and go out of existence).
o Says you can’t go in and out of existence like in the case of Andrea Yates and monster mom but that it is all the one, same person. Locke, however, would say that you can, and that it is not the same person.

Front 11

Reid's view of PErsonal identity as perfect identity

Back 11

perfect identity has no degrees, requires a strict “yes” or “no” answer. Either x=y or x doesn’t =y.

Front 12

Reid's view of personal identity as imperfect identity

Back 12

admits of degrees, no strict “yes” or “no” answer. Both x=y and x doesn’t = y.
 Eg.-ship of Theseus story. Both same (old) ship and different (new parts) or the idea of USD is imperfect (changes).

Front 13

Reid: objection to Locke’s theory based on the alleged implausibility of transmigration of consciousness. (“Transmigration Objection”)

Back 13

according to Locke, one person can equal many persons (transmigration of consciousness).

Front 14

Reid: objection to Locke’s theory based on assumption that irreversible amnesia does not result in loss of identity. (“Amnesia Objection”)

Back 14

according to Locke, one human can equal many persons (Multiple instances of Irreversible Amnesia)

Front 15

Reid: objection based on the Brave Officer Case

Back 15

Locke’s theory says that his life is in terms of A=child, B=military hero, and C=senile old general (based on what he can remember). C=B, B=A, but C doesn’t =A. however, this is a problem because it doesn’t follow basic principle of logic. When brought into court, you cannot get a clear answer from Locke’s reasoning, there is no straightforward answer.

Front 16

Reid: Argument that Memory Doesn’t Guarantee Personal Identity

Back 16

1. Locke holds that memory guarantees personal identity.
2. Therefore, on Locke’s view, if my memory impression of a past act is similar to my experience at the time of the act, then I’m the person who did it.
3. But then, anyone else with a similar memory impression is also the person who did it.
4. But 2 people can’t be the same person.
5. Therefore, memory does not guarantee personal identity.
 (A LOT OF US HAVE SIMILAR MEMORIES, DOESN’T MEAN WE’RE THE SAME PERSONS).

Front 17

Reid: Argument from Continuity

Back 17

1. Numerical identity is grounded in what is continuous and stable.
2. Therefore personal identity is grounded in what is continuous and stable.
3. Memory/consciousness is constantly changing.
4. Therefore, personal identity can’t be grounded in memory.

Front 18

logical possibility (Perry)

Back 18

conceivable/thought without contradiction (not logically possible: square circle, married bachelor, life after death?)

Front 19

material possibility (Perry)

Back 19

compatible with known scientific laws.
 You can have things that are LP and aren’t MP but everything MP is LP.

Front 20

Weirob: Bodily Continuity Account of Personal Identity; Kleenex box example

Back 20

A person=his/her body, death=annihilation, therefore there is no post-mortem survival. Personal identity is determined by bodily continuity.
o Kleenex box-if you destroy KB, then no numerically identical KB can exist. Only, qualitatively identical KB can exist.

Front 21

substance dualist account of personal identity

Back 21

PI is determined by continuity of a person’s individual soul, a person survives death as a non material soul. Pre mortem GW=non material soul inside body, post mortem GW=non material soul.

Front 22

substance dualist accound of soul/body correlation thesis

Back 22

a person is a non-material soul contained in a material body. The fact that he same body continues to exist implies that the same soul exists inside that body.

Front 23

GW’s critique of Soul/Body Correlation Thesis

Back 23

1. SBCT can’t be established by observation, since the soul is unobservable.
2. Therefore, SBCT can’t be known as a posteriori.
3. Nothing in the definition of soul entails that the same soul always remains in the same body.
4. Therefore, SBCT can’t be known a priori.
5. Therefore, SBCT is groundless-i.e. entirely lacking in evidentiary support.
6. Therefore, SBCT can’t be used to justify our ordinary judgments about personal identity.

Front 24

a posteriori

Back 24

knowledge based on observation (senses or introspection).

Front 25

a priori

Back 25

knowledge based on conceptual definitions

Front 26

SM’s reply to GW’s critique of Soul/Body Correlation Thesis-

Back 26

1. The soul is the ground or basis of psychological continuity, since the soul contains the same memories, beliefs, etc. over time.
2. Psychological continuity is (a) directly observable via introspection, and (b) indirectly observable via observation of behavaioral regularities.
3. Therefore, the soul can be directly observed by introspection and indirectly observed by observing behavioral regularities.
4. Therefore, SBCT can be known as a posteriori.
• Soul is the container of psych states-mental states or states of consciousness. Psych states cause behavioral patterns (same behavior(directly observable by self/others)same psych states (directly observable by self/indirectly observable by others)same soul)

Front 27

GW’s argument that Continuity of Soul Can’t be Known Through Introspection

Back 27

1. What I observe directly through introspection are my psychological states.
2. I do not observe the non-material substratum (container) of these states.
3. Therefore, when I observe my psychological states, I do not observe a non-material soul.
4. Therefore, for all I know, my psychological continuity could be grounded in more than one soul over time and through change.
5. Therefore, introspection does not provide evidence that my psychological continuity is grounded in the continued existence of one individual non-material soul.
6. Therefore, introspection does not provide evidence that an individual’s personal identity can be defined in terms of continuity of his/her individual soul.

Front 28

GW’s argument that Continuity of Soul Can’t be Known Indirectly via Observation-

Back 28

1. If non-material souls existed, then two or more souls could contain exactly similar psychological states.
2. Psychological states are indirectly observable via observation of behavioral regularities.
3. Therefore, for all we know, behavior regularities as manifestations of similar psychological states could be the product of multiple souls existing consecutively within the same body.
4. Therefore, observed behavioral regularities do not guarantee that exactly one individual soul is the source of those regularities.
5. Therefore, observing such regularities does not provide evidence that my personal identity is grounded in the continued existence of an individual non-material soul.
• Given the two foregoing arguments, GW concludes that there is no evidence to support the SD account of personal identity.

Front 29

Caramel Candy example: illustration of direct vs. indirect observation problem

Back 29

swirl correlates with caramel inside. Swirldirectly observable-can be observe by unaided senses or introspection. Caramelindirectly observable-can be inferred to exist on basis of what’s directly observable.
o What can’t be observed directly under any possible conditions can’t be observed indirectly (can’t open body and observe soul)

Front 30

Circularity Objection to Locke’s Memory Theory of Personal Identity-

Back 30

1. Following Locke’s theory, personal identity is defined in terms of real memory.
2. To establish that memory is real (not apparent), it is necessary to show that memory impressions were caused by actual past experiences (since th phenomenological content of real memory might be the same as that of apparent memory).
3. Therefore, to show that memory impressions were casued by actual past experiences, it is necessary to show that the person with the memory impression is the same person as the one who actually had those experiences.
4. Therefore, it is necessary to prove personal identity in order to prove real memory.
5. Therefore, but locke claims that it is necessary to prove real memory in order to prove personal identity.
6. Therefore, Locke’s theory is circular.
• Problem-real/apparent memory can be phenomenolgoically similar.

Front 31

apparent memory-

Back 31

memory impression not caused by actual experience

Front 32

real memory

Back 32

memory impression caused by actual experience

Front 33

Reductive Materialist Analysis of Personal Identity; North/Beaudine Case-

Back 33

says person=brain. Personal identity=brain continuity. (as long as same brain exists, you survive).
o Julia North (brain intact, body destroyed) and Mary Francis Beaudine (brain destroyed, body intact). Reductive Materialism says that the person who wakes up is Julia. GW say it’s Mary. Locke says the person will wake up, you test memory, and then know who it is.

Front 34

Existential Gap Theory of Post-Mortem Survival; critique of EG Theory

Back 34

at death a person ceases to exist. (there is no non-material soul that survives death). At some later time, a person is brough into existence that is psychologically and physically indistinguishable from the pre-mortem person. This post-mortem person is numerically (as well as qualitatively) identical with the pre-mortem person.

Front 35

Dennett: Rationale for rejecting Bodily Continuity Theory of Personal Identity

Back 35

-(Bodily Continuity Theory says you are your body, when your body dies, you die) argument says:
1. D can survive loss of D’s body.
2. Therefore, D = D’s body.

Front 36

Dennett: Rationale for rejecting Reductive Materialist Analysis of Personal Identity

Back 36

(Reductive Materialism says D = brain) argument says:
1. D experiences bodily states- hunger, walking, etc.
2. A disembodied brain can’t have these experiences.
3. Therefore, D doesn’t = D’s brain.

Front 37

Dennett: Problems with Locke’s theory of Personal Identity

Back 37

(Locke says D=D’s consciousness/memories=D’s point of view) argument says:
1. A person’s consciousness, memories, and perspective can change.
2. Personal identity doesn’t change.
3. Therefore, D doesn’t = D’s consciousness, memories, and perspective.

Front 38

Dennett: Implausibility of Personal Fission and plausibility of Functionalists View of Persons

Back 38

(personal fission is one person split into 2 or 2+N persons)
1. Based on practical human concerns (marriage, property rights, legal and moral obligations( personal identity is a one-one relation (only one person can have my phD, married to wife)
2. If personal fission is possible then one person can become 2 or more which would undermine human legal and social institutions.
3. Therefore, personal fission is implausible.