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39 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Traditional Analysis of Knowledge
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(i) true
(ii) believed (iii) justified (knowledge is justified, true belief) |
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Supervenience
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a dependency relationship where some state y arises out of some state x, such that y depends on x.
A dependency relationship where the existence of one state occasions another state, where the second state depends on the first. A baseball event supervenes on the physical event of a baseball being thrown around amongst players, etc. There can be no change in A-properties without a change in B-properties |
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(JD)
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If S is justified in believing p,
• P --> Q • S deduces q from p • accepts q b/c of that deduction --> S is justified in believing q |
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(JF)
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It is possible for a person to be justified in believing a false proposition.
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(JD) in Gettier
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Smith, from
1. Jones has 10 coins in pocket. 2. Jones is the man who will get the job. deduces 3. The man who will get the job has 10 coins in pocket. ------------------- We do not want to reject (JD) b/c it would imply that if a person is justified in believing p, and deduces q from p, is not justified in believing q where p is false; this would mean someone who is justified in believing p, deduces q from p, is justified in believing q where p is true. But how is one any more justified than the other? Neither knows if p is true. |
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(JF) in Gettier
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Rejecting (JF) implies that very rarely are we justified in believing anything.
If in 2 situations, there's no difference in evidence for each guy, then either they're both justified or they're both unjustified. And almost any justified true belief we have could have turned out to be a justified false belief. So if the JTB in some equivalent situation is an JFB, is the first situation not justified? |
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No-False-Grounds (NFG) theory of knowledge
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(i) S believes p
(ii) p is true (iii) S is justified in believing p (iv) All of S's grounds for believing p are true |
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NFG vs. Gettier
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In Gettier, Smith's belief that
'The man who will get the job has 10 coins in pocket.' is.. (i) true (ii) believed (iii) justified (iv) but based on false grounds, viz.: 'Jones is the man who will get the job' So, as our intuitions tells us, Smith does not have knowledge |
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NFG vs. Extra Reasons
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NFG is a good solution only if
(i) in all Gettier-style cases the believer has a false ground (ii) there are no cases of knowledge in which the believer does have a false ground. A counter-example for (ii) is the Extra Reasons Case, where Smith has two independent justifications that someone in his office owns a Ford. Nogot supplies good evidence, but is pretending. Havit supplies good evidence, and is not pretending. Smith knows p, but there is a false ground related to the belief. But it is not a false ground for that specific belief; they are independent. |
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NFG vs. Critical Discussion
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Condition (i) for NFG is not true. In some Gettier-style cases the person does not have a false ground.
Steve is having trouble finding his chess trophy. He then sees it in his bedroom. He concludes "My chess trophy is in this room." Turns out what he saw was a an exact replica, but the trophy really is in that room, under his bed. His belief was true, justified, and not based on false grounds. |
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Truth t defeats S's justification for believing p
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There is no true proposition q such that, if S were justified in believing q, then S would not be justified in believing p.
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No Defeater's Theory
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(i) S believes p
(ii) p is true (iii) S is justified in believing p (iv) There is no true proposition q such that, if S were justified in believing q, then S would not be justified in believing p. |
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ND vs. Gettier
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In Gettier, Smith's belief that
'The man who will get the job has 10 coins in pocket.' is.. (i) true (ii) believed (iii) justified (iv) but there is a proposition such that if S knew it then S would not be justified in believing p, viz.: 'Jones will not get the job.' ------------------ So, as our intuitions tell us, Smith does not have knowledge |
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ND vs. The Radio Case
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"Smith is sitting in his study, radio off, & knows that it's off. K101 is playing song x. If Smith turned the radio on, Smith would hear the song and know radio is on."
Smith knows the radio is off. There is a proposition 'K101 is playing x' where if Smith were justified in believing it, he would not be justified in believing the radio is off. But we're fairly certain he knows the radio is off. This seems to refute ND however it feels not quite right. The method by which Smith ascertains p involves changing the facts corresponding to his belief. This is unacceptable. In the Gettier cases, finding out that Smith will get the job does not change the facts corresponding to his belief. The only fact that is changed is that someone supplied him with the defeater, but that doesn't alter the truth of the proposition. |
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Causal Theory of Knowledge (CT)
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s knows p iff the fact that p is causally connected in an appriorpiate way with S's believing p
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CT vs. Gettier
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In Gettier, Smith's belief that
* 'The man who will get the job has 10 coins in pocket.' is.. not causally connected in an appropriate way with the fact that p ---------- S knows p iff S's belief that p is causally connected in the appropriate way with the fact that p. Which comes from: (1) perception (2) memory (3) reconstruction of causal chains * is caused by S's deduction from 'J will get the job' and 'J has 10 coins'. These are in no way connected with what makes * true. What makes * true is that 'Smith will get the job.' Thus Smith thus not have knowledge. |
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CT vs. Critical Discussion
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- Knowing Generalizations
but these aren't anything above and beyond the facts themselves, just infer - Over Determination poison/heart attack Bob takes poison and dies. You know he is dead. but it was from a heart attack. Problem here is that it is causally connected to the police telling you he is dead -Perception/Evidence judy/trudy CC but it could have been trudy. you need justification. but its not CC: it would be connected with Judy and the fact that shes not Trudy. Mathematical / A Priori Knowledge where is the fact that '2+2=4' ? the inference is in your head |
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Modest Proposal
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(i) p is true
(ii) S believes p (iii) S is justified in believing p (iv) S's justification for p does not essentially depend on any falsehood 'Essential Dependence' is vague. Nogot is always bragging about his Ford, so you JTB 'someone in the office owns a Ford.' If it weren't for Nogot, Havit would brag, and S wouldn't be gettiered. So his justification for p depends on a falsehood, but not essentially. |
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Get the Evidence Principle
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If S's actual evidence supports p, but S should have had additional evidence, and this additional evidence would not support p, then S's belief in p is not justified.
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Two Fundamental Claims of Foundationalism
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(i) There are justified basic beliefs.
(ii) non-basic beliefs are justified in virtue of their relation to basic beliefs. |
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Cartesian Foundationalism (CF)
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CF asserts that all justified basic beliefs are beliefs about introspective knowledge, and elementary truths of logic. (basic)
Justified basic beliefs are justified b/c we cannot be mistaken about them. (why basic) The rest of our justified beliefs are justified b/c they can be deduced from our basic beliefs. (deduction) |
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Two Central Ideas of Coherentism
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Only beliefs can justify other beliefs.
Every justified belief depends in part upon other beliefs for justification. |
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Modest Foundationalism
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Basic beliefs are spontaneously formed. Typically beliefs about the external world are justified and basic. Beliefs about mental states can also be justified and basic.
(spontaneous) A spontaneously formed belief is justified provided it is a proper response to experiences and it is not defeated by other evidence the believer has. (proper response) Nonbasic beliefs are justified when they are supported by strong inductive inferences - including enumerative induction and inference to the best explanation - from justified beliefs. (strong induction) |
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Counterfactual conditional
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If so-and-so were the case, then such-and-such would be the case.
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Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge
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(i) P is true
(ii) S believes p (iii) S’s belief tracks the truth of p (across possible worlds) (a) If p were false, (using M) S wouldn’t believe p. (b) If p were true, (using M) S would believe p. Modal Translation (a*) In the nearest possible world in which p is false and S uses M, S does not believe p. (b*) In the nearest possible worlds in which p is true and S uses M, S does believe p. |
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Recursive Definition
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They amount to defining the A-things in terms of initial basis collection (the B-things, or basis things) and a relation which “generates” A-things from A-things, and then specifying that the A-things are all and only the things one obtains in his way.
(ii) If n is an even number, then n+2 is an even number. (iii) No number is even unless its being so is determined by (i) & (ii). |
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Reliabilist definition of Justification
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i. If S's belief in p at t results from a belief-independent process that is reliable, then S's belief in p at t is justified.
ii. If S's belief at t results from a belief-dependent process that is conditionally reliable, and the beliefs the process operates on are justified, then S's belief in p at t is justified. iii. the only way beliefs can be justified is by satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) Belief Dependent - Conditionally Reliable Belief Independent |
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Red Barn Example & Truth-Tracking
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S is driving along a highway; in the field there are many barns. S believes a red barn is in the field, is justified in believing its a red barn, and it is the case that a red barn is in the field.
However there are many facade barns which cannot be painted red. S believes p & q. p - I see a barn. q - I see a red barn. If p were not true, (using M) S would still believe p. So p is not knowledge. If q were not true, (using M) S would not believe q. So S knows that 'I see a red barn,' but does not know 'I see a barn,' on Nozick's view |
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Red Barn Example vs. Criticism
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p - I see a barn.
q - I see a red barn. S's method for tracking the truth of Red Barns is a "red-barnish" experience identification method. If p were not true, (using M), S would not believe that p, because the red-barnish experience identification method only picks out red barns. If q were not true, (using M) S would not believe q because the red-barnish experience identification method only picks out red barns. |
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Modest Proposal
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S knows p =df.
(i) p is true (ii) S believes p (iii) S is justified in believing p (iv) S's justification for p does not essentially depend on any falsehood Counter-Example • Havit knows that Smith wants to enter the contest, but is reluctant to reveal his Ford ownership to Smith. He hears Nogot make his case to Smith about his, Nogot’s, (feigned) ownership of a Ford. Havit decides not to tell Smith about his Ford ownership. If Nogot had not made his false claim to Smith, Havit would have revealed his legitimate evidence. • Does Smith’s justified belief essentially depend on a false proposition? It seems not, since if he had not come to believe that false proposition, he would have come to believe a true proposition that would have justified his belief that his office was Ford-owner-occupied. |
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Significant Version of Relativism
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It is possible for a person to be justified in believing p, and justified in believing that other people are justified in believing ~p, and not have any reason to believe that his or her own reasons are superior to those of other people.
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Infinite Regress Argument & Coherentism
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1. Either there are justified basic beliefs or reach justified belief has an evidential chain that either:
(a) terminates in an unjustified belief (b) is an infinite regress of beliefs (c) is circular 2. beliefs based on unjustified beliefs are not justified, so ~a 3. No one can have an infinite chain of beliefs, so ~b 4. No belief could be justified by itself, so ~C 5. .:. There are justified basic beliefs. ----------------- The coherentist denies 4. The justification for one proposition can be another, which is justified by still others. A belief is justified by a whole system, of which it is a part. |
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Cartesian Foundationalism
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CF1. Beliefs about one's mental states and beliefs about elementary truths of logic are justified basic beliefs.
CF2. Justified basic beliefs are justified because we cannot be mistaken about them. CF3. The rest of our justified beliefs are justified because they can be deduced from our basic beliefs. |
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Three Objections to Cartesian Foundationalism
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(Fake Pains)
S puts his hand down on the supposed hot stove and yells "OW I AM IN PAIN!". then he realizes he's not, stove was off. ------------------- (Rarity of Introspective Beliefs) CF says we can only deduce things about the external world from introspective beliefs. But then the Ext. W. beliefs would be extremely rare. ------------------ (Deduction) To say that Ext. W. propositions can be deduced from the appearance propositions is to say that it is not even possible for the appearance propositions to be true while the Ext. W. propositions are false. |
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Coherentism
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CT1. S is justified in believing p iff p logically follows from the conjunction of everything S believes.
CT2. S is justified in believing p iff S's system of beliefs is coherent and includes a belief in p. |
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Objections to Coherentism
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Alternative Systems
in order to justify some belief, someone could just rearrange their beliefs to fit the belief they want to believe. Flat-earthers Isolation Objection an individual can be so isolated from reality that they have this entirely coherent set of beliefs that do not accord with reality. Magic feldman. |
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Give a few uncontroversial examples of epistemic relativism, then give at least one controversial example of epistemic relativism; critically discuss
Two Teachers "Everyone has a right to their opinions" |
Uncontroversial
R1-R4 What one person/society knows (/at one time) might differ from what one person/society knows (/at a different time) Controversial R5 |
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Appropriate Causal Connections
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Perception
Memory Reconstruction of Causal Chains |
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ND vs. Grabit Case
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Black sees Tom steal wallet. Tom's (crazy) mom says that it was his evil twin. There is a true proposition 'Tom's mom said it was his evil twin.' that defeats Black's justification.
But there's a defeater for this defeater 'Tom's mom is crazy.' |
