Persons Minds Bodies

Front 1

Multiple Realizability
Against type identity theory
Pain is not necessarily just c-fibre firing
Turing machine
Rejects functionalism

Back 1

Putnam

Front 2

Physicalist
Mind-Brain Identity--particular states of mind identical with particular states of brain

Comparisons to lightning = electrical discharge,
morning star = evening star

Back 2

Smart

Front 3

Against physicalism
How can one claim that the mind is physical yet cannot grasp what "physical" is

Back 3

Montero

Front 4

Intentionality vs. Intensionality
paradoxes of intentionality
reducing intentionality

Back 4

Byrne

Front 5

Refuting reductionism
"What it is like to be a bat"
There are ineffable aspects of subjective experience
We can imagine what it is like but we do not know for sure

Back 5

Nagel

Front 6

Property Dualist
"What Mary didn't know"
Physicalist and functionalist stories cannot capture "what it is like"

Back 6

Jackson

Front 7

Philosophical Zombies
hard problem of consciousness
naturalistic dualism--mental states caused by physical systems, mental states ontologically distinct from and irreducible to physical systems

Back 7

Chalmers

Front 8

Essential vs. Accidental

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic

Back 8

- an object must have this property
- an object happens to have this property

- property in virtue of the way object is, perfect duplicate would necessarily instantiate

- property in virtue of interaction with world (like weight), perfect duplicate need not instantiate same property

Front 9

Problem of Mental Causation for Interactionist dualism

Back 9

- seems as if mental events cause physical ones
- how?
- weird to think that an immaterial thing causally influences a psychochemical (physical) process

Front 10

Difference between role-state and realizer-state functionalism

Back 10

- role state: mental states identical with 2nd order properties of having 1st-order properties that realize functional roles i.e pain = property of having a property that realizes the pain functional role

- realizer state: mental states identical with 1st order properties that realize certain functional roles i.e. pain = property that realizes pain functional role

Front 11

Block on different concepts of consciousness

Back 11

Access - mental state that is free for use in reasoning and for direct control of action
Phenomenal - mental state is phenomenally conscious if there is something it is like for something to be in that state

Front 12

According to Campbell, what is it for something to be material? Spiritual?

Back 12

- Material: must be comprised only of substances currently recognized by physics, and subject to physical laws like gravity

- spiritual: any substance that opposes the concept of materiality, composed of nothing recognized by physics and obeys no recognized physical laws, distinct from immateriality in that it displays properties of consciousness and intentionality

Front 13

What do logical behaviorists believe?

Back 13

- statements involving mental vocabulary are wholly translatable to statements involving only physical behaviour vocabulary
- entails truth of claims like "S is in pain iif S is disposed to x" where ex stands for a purely physical description of some type of behaviour

Front 14

What do "commonsense" functionalists believe?
Psycho-functionalists?

Back 14

- Commonsense says being a cognitive entity with mental states is sufficient for having knowledge about the nature of mental states

- Psychofunctionalist says that mere experience is insufficient... in-depth study necsessary to gain knowledge about mental states and their functional roles

Front 15

What is "minimal physicality duplicate" of the actual world? State the thesis minimal materialism.

Back 15

- Minimal physical duplicate: possible world that contains all substances deemed physical in our world, and subject to same physical laws but nothing further

- Since mental properties are just physical properties, the minimal physical duplicate would also be a mental duplicate of our world

Front 16

What is Strong AI? Weak AI?

Back 16

- Strong AI is the view that computational systems are sufficient for original intentional states, thus they have the potential to be minds

- Weak AI says that computational systems can, at most, be SIMILAR to minds

Front 17

State two of the three paradoxes arising for Brentano's way of understanding intentionality

Back 17

1. Ontological reality of intentional objects is seemingly irrelevant. One can have beliefs about non-existent things. For example, I can believe that unicorns fly quickly, but unicorns do not exist.

2. Intentional objects of certain mental states are seemingly non-specific. I can desire to own a dog, but specific dog is irrelevant. Any number of things could be the referent of my mental state

3. I can have beliefs about A, but no beliefs about B, even when A=B. For example, Lois Lane believes Clark Kent works at Daily Prophet, but not Superman, even though Clark Kent = Superman

Front 18

State the "ability hypothesis"

Back 18

Mary's propositional knowledge of the colour red enables her to know all there is to know/experience about it. Upon leaving the room, she merely gains the procedural skill of being able to recognize the colour red in good lighting. She learns nothing new of the colour red itself.

Front 19

What is a philosophical zombie? State zombie version of conceivability argument,

Back 19

Philosophical zombie is an entity that is only a perfect physical copy of a human being, in the way of minimal materialism. No mental states.

I can conceive of an entity, the philosophical zombie, that perfectly copies the physicality of humans, yet lacks mental states.
What is conceivable is possible.
Thus, these zombies are possible, and physicalism is false, since a zombie has all the same physical properties yet lacks mentality.

Front 20

How should materialists reply to Jackson's "knowledge argument"? When it comes to explaining what happens to Mary when she is released from her black-and-white room, who has the best account, Jackson or the materialist?

Back 20

- The knowledge argument says:
1. Every physical truth is such that Mary (before her release) knows that truth
2. It is not the case that every truth is such that Mary (before her release) knows that truth. Mary learns something after leaving the room--"what it is like to see red"
3. There is at least one truth that is nonphysical
4. Physicalism is false

- David Lewis says:
Yes Mary learns something, but she gains a TYPE of knowledge. There is propositional knowledge, which is knowing that some proposition is true. Then there is ability knowledge, which is knowing how to do something. When Mary leaves the room, she does not learn anything new about the colour red. She merely gains the ability knowledge of how to recognize red under particular lighting. Thus materialism still holds true.

However, Lewis capitalizes on the "what it is like" statement, explaining it away as a new ability that Mary gains. Jackson's argument can be run without this statement.