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87 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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bargaining model |
takes 2 sides to fight in a conflict, war can ALWAYS be avoided (strike a deal, give enemy what she wants, surrender), have to make conscious decision to fight instead of seeking peaceful alternative |
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war as a tool |
of governments, leaders to achieve certain political object |
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social characteristics of hunter-gatherer socities |
nomadic/semi-settled, small bands or larger tribes
wooden/stone weapons, exclusively adult male warriors |
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prizes of fighting for hunter-gatherers |
food women natural resources territory insults/threats spiritual/ritual elements |
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2 types of hunter-gatherer warfare |
1. face to face battles- highly ritualized, few casualties, disorganized, decisive victory impossible 2. raids- surprise attacks, many casualties, merciless massacre |
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social characteristics of pastoral/agricultural socities |
settled or semi-nomadic animal herders |
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warfare in pastoral/agricultural socities |
*greater accumulation of wealth necessitates protection of valuable possessions -more face to face battles bc of larger settlements -better fortifications (eg Jericho) -greater prizes of victory |
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state |
concentration of military force w/i group of ppl elevated to a commanding position over society, institutionalized thru tax collection, enforcement of military service, administration of law & justice, construction of infrastructure |
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warfare in first chiefdoms/states |
surplus of wealth supports chief & personal army, accumulation of wealth thru raids
*first warfare specialists- professional fighters |
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Vikings |
chiefs raise small armies to conduct raids against southern/eastern/western european tribes, accumulate wealth & territory --> expand into state |
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change in warfare after establishment of first states |
-technological change (bronze weapons, spears, clubs) -larger armies -larger scale construction of fortifications/defense systems -funded by central states |
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Assyrian Empire |
first real territorial empire w/ first standing army -raised large peasant armies w/ professionalized elite -organized fighting formations, discipline |
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Greek phalnax |
type of infantry formation that grouped masses of people close together, risking bloody defeat but necessary bc of mountainous geography
*state leaders more willing to lose huge #s of ppl in more decisive battles |
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Second Punic War (Roman Empire) |
btwn Carthage & Rome, Italy loses 100K men in battle (larger populations= larger pool from which to draft soldier), result: Italy controls Spain
*larger stakes, scale ramped up enormously |
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European military revolution [1400s] |
huge growth in wealth of societies thru development of commerce, industry- govts become able to invest in military technology +gunpowder, cannons, muskets |
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How did the Industrial Revolution affect warfare? |
country's military might becomes inextricably linked to technological development |
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total war |
entire societies pivot towards warfare (huge % of population mobilized, % of nat'l budget allocated for military spending increases)
ex- WWII 50% of US natl wealth directed towards military efforts |
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democratization of warfare |
diffusion of access to weapons (machine guns, explosives, etc.) and to transportation/communication technology (trucks, internet, etc.), wealth enables smaller groups to have huge destructive capability (eg. terrorists, guerrilla warfare) |
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brute force |
using strength to physically take or hold on to what you want, disarmament/killing of enemy, overcoming enemy's strength |
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coercion |
ability to influence enemy's behavior under threat of using brute force, threaten to take what you want or else impose suffering/kill enemy
*deterrence by promising to impose certain costs unless enemy complies w/ demand |
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militaries |
groups of ppl organized for purpose of fighting wars, keeping internal order |
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idealism |
[initially proposed by Woodrow Wilson after WWI] prevention of war by reliance on intl agreements, compliance w/ intl law |
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3 components of idealism |
1. open covenants of peace- no secret diplomacy 2. collective security- countries agree not to attack each other or else face intl punishment 3. disarmament- settlement of arms race |
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disarmament |
reducing armaments to lowest point consistent w/ domestic safety |
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Examples of failed interwar treaties |
Treaty of Versailles (disarmed Germany) Kellogg Briand Pact (all major world powers agree not to go tow ar) |
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interests |
those objectives that ppl or govts want for themselves (eg. power, security, prosperity, freedom) |
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power |
ability to impose one's will on another |
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balance of power |
state in which all nations can check all others' attempts to increase their power, stable dist. of power as means of preventing one country from attaining total dominance |
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internal balancing |
taking steps intra-nat'lly to make the nation stronger in order to be able to check another country's power |
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external balancing |
seeking allies, placing military in certain region outside one's country, engaging in territorial expansion to increase relative nat'l power |
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relative gains |
countries must worry both about their own accumulation of power and that of others relative to their own |
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security dilemma |
accumulation of power by one states (even if only for purpose of self-defense) necessarily weakens other countries bc of relative gains |
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polarity |
how many powerful countries exist in world at any given time, suggesting level of instability in int'l system |
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balancing coalitions theory [Morgenthau] |
unipolar world= unstable, fraught w/ contention, war prone bc hegemon unrestrained, can exercise power as it chooses result= balancing coalitions try to counteract, dethrone hegemonic power |
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hegemonic stability theory |
1 great power can keep peace thru-out int'l system by using overwhelming force to prevent use of violence by others (like having superseding int'l gov't/authority) |
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band-wagoning |
contradicts balance of power idea- countries may align themselves w/ other countries not to balance itself against strongest power, but rather to side w/ it in order to get something it wants |
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zero sum conflict |
any gain for State A is a loss for State B and vice versa, no way for both to win (no range of mutually preferred settlements) |
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inefficiency puzzle of war |
wars are inefficient because more to go around before war (for both parties) than after |
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disagreement over relative power |
if one side overoptimistic about its chances for victory, not going to accept settlement that other side finds acceptable and war likely to occur
*side that overestimates its own strength/underestimates its enemy's will lose |
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all or nothing war |
1 side will be completely destroyed |
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indivisibility |
either A gets everything or B gets everything (only 2 possible outcomes)
-no mutually preferred negotiated settlement possible [either choose to fight or give thing of interest up to opponent]
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effective indivisibility |
one or both sides prefers the thing of interest not to be divided bc doing so would decrease its value significantly (even if not necessarily physically indivisible) |
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the commitment problem |
occurs when 2 sides anticipate change in relative power, can't commit themselves to abiding by previously established agreements
eg. US & MX put border @ San Diego, but MX anticipates surge in US power that will drive them to seek more land south of border |
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first strike advantage |
when the outcome of war influenced by which side attacks first |
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preventative war (because of shift in relative power) |
if you know next yr enemy will be strong enough to take everything from you/win war w/ certainty, but right now you have a chance at victory, more likely to take that opportunity to destroy enemy before she becomes threat to you/your allies |
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diversionary war |
gov't starts war just to divert attention of public away from other domestic political issues |
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What info do you need to estimate your/enemy's relative power? |
1. info about capabilities 2. info about resolves |
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capabilities |
resources at a country's disposal (# of troops, quantity/quality of equipment, weaponry, quality of leadership/training, economic resources, military strategy) |
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resolve |
how much country/gov't values object or dispute and willingness to tolerate costs to obtain it |
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Why do disagreements over relative power occur? |
private information [about capabilities & resolve] |
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How do countries reveal info about their capabilities/resolve? |
-show of weaponry, military demonstrations (eg. detonating nuclear weapons) -communicate w/ one another during negotiations |
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Why don't countries reveal information about war to avoid disagreements over relative power? |
INCENTIVES TO MISREPRESENT ONE'S STRENGTH, INTENTIONS - lying about resolve to gain concessions - classified military secrets - feigning weakness for surprise during war |
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Tactics for overcoming misunderstandings |
I. verbal communication II. intelligence III. costly signaling |
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verbal communication |
- building reputation for honesty bc sometimes you do want your opponent to know your capabilities - hard to hide/lie when you have multiple audiences |
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costly signaling |
country that's willing to fight a war can take actions that a country unwilling to fight wouldn't take
eg. military investment, mobilization, public pronouncements |
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audience cost |
leader may pay political price with her own ppl if she reneges on a promise made publicly- attaches certain credibility to public pronouncements |
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convergence |
war begins from disagreement over relative power and ends when sides reach agreement over relative power
war as a learning process about enemy's power and the relative power btwn you 2, learn less and less as fighting goes on, become more willing to negotiate |
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When does convergence occur rapidly? |
*when battles reveal strength *toleration of costs reveals resolve |
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When does convergence occur slowly? |
1. limited wars 2. wars of attrition |
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limited war |
war in which neither side applying full force to fight war bc think they can win war more cheaply or would rather not escalate into full scale conflict
eg. Korean War (US only fights on Korean Peninsula, doesn't invade Chinese mainland) |
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war of attrition |
war in which each side tries to outlast opponent by being willing to tolerate suffering for a longer period
eg. Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan |
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Misperception of enemies & rationality |
if gov'ts are rational estimates should be correct on average even tho countries keep military secrets, all countries do & know this- should factor into their calculator of relative power
-errors on case by case basis |
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Misperception of enemies & irrationality |
a. nationalist/racist myths (good for mobilizing population, but can lead to overestimation) b. illusions of cheap war |
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Causes of Russian underestimation of the Japanese |
- unobservable factors (intentions, resolve) - national/racial bias - Japanese military secrecy (knew war was imminent) |
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Russo-Japanese Imperial War [1904-1905] |
2 empires fighting for control of Korea/Manchuria, commercial access to the territories [want to set up trade, control natural resources] |
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Results of Russo-Japanese War |
I. Japan gets exactly what it wanted before war started (understood they were a match for Russia) II. Russia forced to retreat (could've been much better off w/ negotiated settlement) |
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4 major factors in Russian evaluation of Japanese power |
1. Russian military attaches in Japan 2. Accurate evaluation of army 3. Inaccurate evaluation of navy 4. Failure to predict attack
*not completely uninformed, but major gaps in knowledge |
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Russian military attaches in Japan |
face military secrecy- see some military equipment, etc. but didn't speak Japanese, as war becomes more likely Japanese restrict access even more |
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Russia's poor evaluation of Japanese army |
Training & discipline- army in middle of reforms, difficult to decipher preparedness/strategy
Full wartime strength unobservable- how many ppl they could mobilize/deploy |
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Why didn't Russia predict the Japanese attack? |
misread their strength --> misread their intentions |
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Operation Rolling Thunder [1965-68] |
US bombing of economic/military targets in N. Vietnam, imposing cost on Vietnamese in hope they would give up, stop supplying men/equipment to communists in S. Vietnam (war of attrition) |
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costly signaling by North Vietnamese |
signal resolve by tolerating the bombing for long period |
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convergence during Operation Rolling Thunder |
US learns N. Vietnamese resolve, lowers demands and eventually gives in (learns a lot at first, less as time goes on) |
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Why did the US get involved in the Vietnam War? |
maintaining non-Communist gov't in S. Vietnam of strategic military value |
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crisis instability |
when 2 states find themselves in dispute or negotiation in which there is a possibility of peaceful settlement or of war
-large first strike advantages mean both sides anxious to get first strike should negotiations fail, fearful opponent will do same |
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preemptive war |
war that's started to preempt being attacked by another country |
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generic preemptive war |
you attack first because you think they're going to attack you |
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accidental war |
crisis instability, crisis can become volatile even if in negotiations for which war is not inevitable but countries so worried about opponent striking first that they misinterpret any slight aggression as the first, war-inciting attack |
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first strike advantage leading to lack of transparency |
states hide intentions, capabilities, feign weakness - harder to conduct effective diplomacy |
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first strike advantage and being labeled "agressor" |
first side to attack almost almost blamed for war- costly and can undermine war efforts in that own ppl, potential allies, int'l community can turn against you |
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second strike capability |
making sure that you have the capability to retaliate should opponent make the first strike (important way to mitigate first strike advantage)
eg. hiding nuclear weapons under ground |
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internal factors affecting relative power |
economic growth- increase in nat'l wealth |
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external factors affecting relative power |
acquisition of territory, resources, ppl that can increase your nat'l power |
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short term factors affecting relative power |
eg. calling up reserves, giving temporary increase in power |
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potential power |
growing economic power/wealth can lead to huge increase in potential power |
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window of opportunity/vulnerability |
period during which preventive war likely to happen in that declining states has opportunity to truncate growth of rising state before it gains too much power (danger zone) |
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touchstones |
when an adversary growing in power other countries will try to test that adversary's intentions to see whether they can live w/ them when they become more powerful
-comes about from aggressive diplomacy (demanding concessions from enemy, test willingness to concede) |
