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8 Cards in this Set

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Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s8
1.D must Aid, Abet, Counsel, Procure or be part of a Joint Enterprise
2. D must realise the act could assist the principle and intend to assist the principle.
3. D must have foreseen a real possibility that the principle would commit the crime that the principle did
'Aid'
a. Aid means to perform an act of some help: Bryce
i. Providing equipment is sufficient: Bainbridge
ii. Providing information is sufficient: Able
'Abetting'
b. Abetting is encouragement at the time of the offence: Gamble
i. Presence is insufficient, unless the presence amounts to the encouragement: Searle
'Counselling'
c.Counselling is encouragement before the offence: Gamble
i.A very low amount of encouragement is required. Simply saying ‘oh goody’ can be sufficient: Gianetto
ii.There must be a causal link between the counselling and the offence: Bryce
'Procuring'
d. Procuring means causing the principle to commit the offence: AG’s Ref No. 1 of 1975
'Joint Principles'
e. A joint enterprise is two or more offenders embarking to commit the offence.
i. There must be a common purpose: Gnango
ii. It is assumed that any ‘extra’ crimes are part of a plan for when things go wrong, unless you don’t know about the element (e.g. not knowing that partner has a gun): Davies v DPP
D must have foreseen a real possibility that the principle would commit the crime that the principle did
English; Powell
4. Commentary on Accessorial Liability:
a. Mueller argues that the mens rea should be the same as required for the principle, as a matter of social policy – we should not have to fear that ordinary acts = liability