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72 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
What is philosophy?
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The love of wisdom (pg 3)
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What are the four main areas of philosophy?
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Epistemology, logic, metaphysics, & ethics (pg 12)
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Logic
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Studies the nature of arguments (12)
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What does it mean for a set of statements to be logically consistent?
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If and only if it is possible that all claims in the set are true at the same time. (16)
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Logically inconsistent?
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If and only if it is impossible that all claims in the set are true at the same time. (16)
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Metaphysics
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The study of the nature of ultimate reality (16)
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Epistemology
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The study of the scope and nature of knowledge (16)
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Ethics
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Studies questions of how we should act (16)
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Aesthetics
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The study of questions about art and beauty (16)
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Causally possible
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If it does not violate the laws of the universe (19)
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Logically possible
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Anything that does not entail a contradiction. (19)
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Lexical Definition vs. philosophical definition
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Lexical definitions are dictionary definitions, which lack the precision and exactitude necessary for philosophical definitions.
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Necessary condition
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A condition A is necessary for B if it is impossible for something to be A and not B.
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Sufficient Condition
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A condition A is sufficient for B if it is impossible for something to be B and not A.
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Counterexample
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An example that satisfies all the premises but comes to an opposing conclusion.
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Thought experiment
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The scenario in which silly but logically possible counterexamples take place
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Possible worlds
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The setting where anything causally possible can happen
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Argument
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A statement in the form of premises and a conclusion
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Premise indicator
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Indicates premise: Because, since, for
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Conclusion indicator
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Indicates conclusion: therefore, thus, hence, it follows that
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Deductive argument
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An argument structured such that if the premises are true, then the conclusion logically follows.
Ex: modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, hypothetical syllogism |
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How do we evaluate deductive arguments?
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Validity and soundness
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Valid Argument
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If an argument is in the proper form; that is, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must logically follow
**NECESSARY FOR A GOOD/SOUND ARGUMENT** |
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Sound argument
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Valid arguments with all true premises
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Modus ponens
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If p then q. P, therefore q.
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Modus Tollens
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If P then Q
Not Q Therefore: Not P |
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Disjunctive Syllogism
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P or Q
Not P Therefore Q |
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Hypothetical Syllogism
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If P then Q
If Q then R Therefore: If P, then R |
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Inductive argument
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Arguments that establish their conclusion only to some degree of probability
Evaluated in terms of strength and weakness |
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Enumerative arguments
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All observed P are F
Therefore: All P are F |
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Argument by Analogy
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F is like P
P has property A Therefore: F has property A |
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Argument by inference to best explanation
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A
A is best explained by B Therefore: B |
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Occam's Razor
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Explanation A is better than explanation B if (all other things being equal) explanation A is simpler than B
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Principle of Conservatism
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Explanation A is better than explanation B if (all other things being equal) explanation A fits together better with the rest of my beliefs about the world
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What are the three types of knowledge?
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Knowledge-how, knowledge-that, knowledge-of.
Philosophers are concerned with knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge |
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What is the philosophical definition of knowledge?
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Justified true belief
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Gettier counterexamples
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Situations in which justified, true beliefs are not indeed knowledge
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Skepticism
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Someone who denies that we have genuine knowledge
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Global skepticism
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No knowledge of any kind about any subject matter is possible
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Local skepticism
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We cannot have particular knowledge about certain subjects
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Cartesian method of doubt
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Looking at all our beliefs to check whether we can find any reason to doubt they are true
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Dream argument
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If it is possible that I am dreaming right now then I have reason to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true.
If it is possible that I am dreaming right now. Therefore: I have reason to doubt whether my current perceptual beliefs are true |
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Evil Genius argument
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Everything that he's experiencing could be a deception
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What does Descartes know?
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He is a thinking thing
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Russell's criticism
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Descartes is only a thinking thing for an instant--he doesn't even have time on his side.
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Solipsism
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We can only know the contents of our own minds
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Prima facie
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At first glance--"At first blush"
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Empiricism
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We can know something if we can justify it with respect to what we see, hear, smell, touch or taste.
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Indirect Realism
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Empiricist theory. Holds that not all the properties we perceive an object to have are indeed in the object. For example, color doesn't truly exist. The world is ultimately different than we preceieve it to be, but it is pretty closely related to our perceptions.
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Naive Realism
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The world is exactly as we perceive it to be
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Idealism
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Empiricist theory. Everything is just a collection of perceptions. Nothing is mind-independnt.
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Primary property
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A property that is genuinely had by an object. A property that is IN the object itself. Ex: size, shape, and motion
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Secondary property
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A property of an object that is in us. We perceive it even though it doesn't really exist. Ex: Color
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Principle of uniformity of nature
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Nature is not freaky/is uniform
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Rationalism
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Knowledge can only be had through pure reason
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A priori
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Before experience--"from the former"
Ex: A bachelor is an unmarried man |
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A posteriori
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After experience--"from the latter"
Ex: John is a bachelor |
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Necessary truth
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If it is known a priori. A truth that does not depend on how the world actually is.
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Contingent truth
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It it is known a posteriori. Its truth value depends on how the world actually is.
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Problem of Induction
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Our experience can only confirm particular facts, not general and universal claims. (65)
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Analytic Truth
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Necessary truth. Based on a priori knowledge. True by definition.
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Synthetic truth
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Contingent truth. Based on a posteriori knowledge. True by experience. The only "interesting" knowledge.
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Logical positivism
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Committed empiricist who believed that a priori knowledge only had limited value. Thought necessary truths were "uninteresting"
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The Problem of Free Will
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Can we be free even if the future is determined by the past?
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Hard Determinism
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The future is causally determined by the past. Since determinism is not compatible with having free will, hard determinists conclude that free will is an illusion. (Weak because we don't like it.)
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Indeterminism
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Not all events are causally determined by events in the past. The past only has limited influence on the future. The future is therefore not fixed by the past and the future is therefore not determined. (Weak due to the lack of randomness in our world.)
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Traditional Compatibilism
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We are free as long as we can do what we want to do without being constrained by an outside force.
(Weak because some of our desires aren't in accordance with our will.) 1. The action is caused by the will of the agent 2. The action is performed without constraint |
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Compatibilism/Soft Determinism
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We can have free will even if there is only one future. Determinism is compatible with free will and responsibility.
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Deep Self-Compatibilism
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We are free as long as we act on desires we truly wish to act on.
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Libertarianism
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The future is not determined by the past. Agents have special causal powers that give them control over undetermined actions. Having these powers allows agents to have free will.
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Under which theories are you responsible for your actions?
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All but indeterminism and hard determinism
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Incompatibilism
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Free will can only exist if determinism is false. We have to choose between accepting determinism or free will. We cannot consistently believe in both.
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