Murakami Japan Politics

Front 1

Hanbatsu Seiji

Back 1

Meiji Oligarchy. Significance: oligarchy of japan preceding the taisho era

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Tenno

Back 2

Emperor

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Sumitsuin

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Privy Council

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Genro

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Elders

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Taisho Democracy

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1912-1926 period. Shift from oligarchic genro power to the diet. Followed by militaristic control

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Kensei no Jodo

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Normal Constitutional practise

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Gunbu daijin gen'eki bukan sei

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The legal requirement that limited the appointments to the position of military minister to only ACTIVE DUTY GENERALS and ADMIRALS

-- Did it cause the short parliamentary democracy?

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Edo bakufu

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The Tokugawa Shogunate from 1600-1828. They were pressured to open up Japan by the west and suffered as a result

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Meiji Restoration

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Shift towards western idealism.

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(Edo): Shogun

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Meiji: Tenno

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Feudal state ---

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Modern state

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Bakufu ---

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Cabinet

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Samurai ---

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Military

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Nengu ---

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rice based tax system (changed to a traditional tax system in the meiji restoration

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Hirobumi ITO

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Father of meiji constitution, First PM, a Genro, First President of the Rikken Seiyukai, assassinated in Harbin by a Korean. From the Chosu area

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Rikken Seiyukai

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Old japanese party founded in 1900 by ITO. The most powerful party in Japan for 21 years.

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Aritomo YAMAGATA

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Father of modern Japanese military. From the Chosu area. Introduced the Gunbu Daijin...bukan sei...in 1900.

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Nejire-Kokkai

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Twisted Diet; Split of both houses (89, 98, and 07 are when LDP lost the HoC)

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1955 System

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Two (one) party system with LDP dominance until 1993 (

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M+1

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in a SMD district there's likely only two parties eligible to win. M+1 entails that whatever the magnitude of parties there are...

Sign: been around a long time, but mostly since 1993, and it allows for stronger competition against the LDP.

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Zoku-Giin (Policy Tribe)

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Pre-1990s: LDP Politicians who specialized in policy areas --> factions would focus on specific areas, and leaders

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Administrative Guidance

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MITI/Bureaucrats "proposing" guiding lines for industry and setting export quotas. If their "requests" are not met then there is often punishment.

Significance: Result of Developmental state

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Developmental state (Chalmers Johnson)

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Japan grew its miraculous economic output as a result of this. CJ:

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Japanese Bad loans

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Banks gave very generous loans. Didn't take.

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Yanagisawa and Takenaka

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Policy wonks hired as finance ministers

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Carrot and Stick approach

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Takenaka's approach by being strict on megabanks, and soft on local banks. He actually went ahead with such policies

Front 27

Zainichi Koreans

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Koreans staying in Japan, have lived there all their life, but don't have citizenship

- Why not?
Murakami:
- Ideational cultural reasons (based on cultural or symbolic theories?
- Regime theory
-

Front 28

Kisha Club

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Tight knit press correspodnents clubs in Japan. Pro-government coverage gets them access. Turns out they are very much objective

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Quasi-government change

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Gist: DPJ unable to consolidate power with new practises (no pork barrel)

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Habatsu ( Factions )

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Under SNTV: factions were deterministic of what factions would join

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Convoy System

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Result of the administrative guidance under the developmental state theory: Government bureaucrats are the engines and guiders of industrial policy. Their restructuring, support, and merging of weaker firms would keep inefficiency in the market, and helped to cause the bubble.

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Hyper-accountability

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Nyblade: Japan's pmo takes on responsibility of many facets of the party, becoming basically its head in all factions. This ends up causing policy

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Nakasone

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PM in early 80s. Reaganomic, deregulating, and privatizing (incl. of tobacco, salt, rail)

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Takeshita

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87-89 PM. Taxed consumption to fund social welfare and redistribution, and was involved in money scandals

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Hosokawa

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First JSP PM since pre-1955. Changed electoral system in 1993-4 and opened rice markets

Front 36

Obuchi :)

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98-00 PM. Left with higher popularity. Compromised in his coalition and restructured finances

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Ozawa

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A hugely skilled politician within the LDP who rose ahead in many ranks. Gained power and influence from various factions but most of them hated him. He defected in 93 and it seriously destabilized the LDP as a result of his movement to the "Japan Renewal Party". Formed then the Life Party after a stint as president of the DPJ.

Front 38

JRP

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Japan Renewal party. Formed as a result of young reformist splits from the LDP around 93

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New Frontier Party

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Ozawa's effort for an alternative party to the LDP. Part of Steven reed's "party receptacle" boom

Front 40

1994 Electoral changes

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Change by Hosokawa to the House of Reps. ONLY
- Prior: SNTV in MMC's
- Now: SMD's as well as PR, where people could run for BOTH

Sign: In SMD's it CAUSED a two party system (Duverger's law + M+1, and reduced internal party competition). Voters become strategic and vote for the top two parties.

Front 41

M+1

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The M = Magnitude of the constituency. M=3, means that there will be four parties in contention (including duplicate parties, like TWO LDP's)

Front 42

Duverger's law

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SMD practise creates two parties. Steven Reed says its WORKING as there is more direct government vs. opposition party by district (98pct from 38, 15 years ago)

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Did Pork barrel politics end in the 90s?

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Kobayashi: Still a strong relationship between local subsidies and LDP vote share even in SMD areas. + their vote share increases when we see contributions present

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Policy-oriented voting

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Massive increase since 1992. 93% of voters say they considered at least one issue in voting

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Why didn't pork spending decline?

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Ethan D. Scheiner: Depends on social stuff moreso, and also the economic stagnation reduced a lot of it.

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There weren't many other institutional changes besides electoral, and there weren't many quick effects: why?

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Pekkanen and Krauss (2011): The LDP only focused on electoral and financial changes. Other institutions like the Koenkai, PARC, and factionalism didn't change much.

OR...

Front 47

Aren't there long term effects of institutional changes from those that occured in the 1990s?

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Reed, Scheiner, Thies: LDP dominance ended in 2009 (DPJ even got rural voters).

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What are the effects of 1990s reform?

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LDP did it internally from intra-party competition. There is now a two-party system, more competition and PM centralization, less money in politics, and more policy-orientation than pork-barrel politics

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Junichiro Koizumi

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01-06. Privatized post office. Agenda: Ending faction politics. "I will break up the LDP" "All those against me are resistance groups".
Centralized his PMO power, made liberal reforms of the economy by having more deregulation and privatization

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Mother Tanaka

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Helped Koizumi get elected. She "did too much" and was ousted, so she crossed to the DPJ. She rep'd the Niigata district (her fathers district), where ldp had 20-30pct vote share

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Koizumi fever

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Started with 80-90pct approval in april 2001. Ended by Aug 02 with 50pct approval

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Koizumi reforms

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Pledged to end the bad loans, faction power, and the post offices. Actions: Appointed two policy folk as finance ministers, Yanagisawa and Takenaka, to punish the banks. He fought an election to privatize the post offices (who were important because they acted as local banks by giving out loans). He also awarded ministerial posts for merit.

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Postal Reforms

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HoC blocked the vote, so Koizumi said he'd ask voters. He ran a totally one-policy election (DPJ devoted 6pct of time to post, and then won

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Was Koizumi strong?

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Kamikawa: Stronger than others but he compromised a lot. Great PR battles won by him though, as the people loved the mane.

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Takenaka Stick and Carrot Approach to structural reforms

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1. Abandoning fiscal austerity
2. Double standard towards mega-banks and local/regional banks.
- Harsher to megabanks with accounting standards. Injecting public money gave him the legitimacy to force them to listen as they were on a public mandate now.
- Encouraged generous loans from local to small businesses, sustaining them

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How did Koizumi win?

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Competent staff in Takenaka, and he kept a high public support.
- everyone after him lost (abe, fukuda, aso)

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DPJ rose...how?

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Became logical alternative to LDP. Offered social welfare policies against construction-based policy. Child care, minimum wage, securing labor rights, etc. They also promoted CHANGE.

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How did the DPJ win?

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-Frustration with LDP
- DPJ spoke to the vulnerable non-urban LDP base
- $-crisis
- Natural alternative
- Led by Ozawa group

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Sequence of DPJ PM's

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- 09.9-10.6 = Hatoyama (eyes). Couldn't Keep promise of removing US base
- 10.6-11.9 = Kan. Criticized for being slow against the EQ
- 11.9-12.12 = NODA. Lost LXN.

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Why did the DPJ lose LXN?

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-Weak leaders
- EQ and other bad events
- Didn't achieve LXN promises
- LDP became attractive
- Political institutions didn't favor them

Front 61

DPJ LXN policies in 2009 that were hardly met

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- Remove base -> gave up
- Child benefits -> abolished and went back to ldp sys.
- Abolish labor dispatch service -> kinda worked
- 25% cut of CO2 -> nearly gave up
- Cutting wasteful spending -> became difficult

Front 62

Post DPJ-voter feelings

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Most voters felt like the DPJ were ****** but even LDP supporters wanted the LDP to have a viable alternative

Front 63

Nyblade on why Japan has a high PM turnover?

Back 63

Hyper-Accountability: Presidentialization of the PM, as a full on party rep. They got more media attention, and the political reforms of the last 20 years pushed power into them.
- Also, there are many more independent voters who cause VOLATILITY

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Consequences of high PM turnover

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PM's respond sensitively to voters, but the policies end up favoring short-term, and the PMO can't push leadership onto the civil servants and other bureaucrats as much

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Summary of why the DPJ rose and fell:

Back 65

Two-party development, their priority of nationaliation and development + social welfare, but then they FAILED.

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Abe as an outlier - why?

Back 66

Lost some support buth e hasn't dropped as much as the last set of PM's.

Front 67

Urban pop

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In 07 there are now 150 cities with more than 1m people. This means LDP support base declines

Front 68

Buffer voters

Back 68

Kabashima: People who prefer LDP, but will try to hold them accountable by voting for an opposition if the LDP has too much power/neglects popular demands. They'll reward them though if the opposition gets too close to government. They compose at least 40 percent of voters. OR ARE THEY ECONOMIC VOTERS?

Front 69

Economic voters

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Voting based off of economic conditions assuming government is responsible for them. They reward and punish! They're one of two: sociotropic, or pocketbook voters. When the CPI was doing well, the LDP support grew (Miyake).

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LDP and the Nikkei

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Support flux'd with avg stock price

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Macro polity

Back 71

Ohmura: Dynamic process of public demands met with policy responses. the LDP has been (overall) quite responsive to public demands in most policy areas since the 60s. Socially, they responded. In education and agriculture, they ignored it. DPJ responded to social welfare though (index of laws rose.

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Paradox of voting

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Your vote is miniscule and costs time (which is money!). So why do you vote?
- Duty/values?
- Expressing satisfaction and opinion?
- Mobilization by elites?

Front 73

Senkyo - Shouting out RENKO

Back 73

A truck repeating the candidates name

Front 74

Public elections act

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Koenkai-based groups will have Renko going on. There are strict rules (cant visit houses, publish freely their posters, and start the campaign until they're allowed to)

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Short election dates

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It's now down to 17 days for C, 12 days for R, and 9 days for prefectures. DUE TO INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE

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Incumbent advantage

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Parties can manipulate rules when they're in power for a long time. Ex. electorally: shorter elections means the incumbent hodls on longer

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Koenkai

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Voter-based social networks in supprot of a candidate

Front 78

Idoshi Gensho

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Oriental zodiac year sees HoC turnout slump (every 12 years). Why? Ishikawa: HoC voting is in the summer every 3 years. Local LXN's are in the spring every 4 years. --> When it happens at the same time, voter turnout is down because there's less mobilization

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ARAI and Enforced learning of voting

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Voters turn out b/c of enforced learning. Voters are active if they felt good/it was effective. Others stop if they didn't get a thrill/win. Some voters don't get mobilized!

Front 80

Calderon/Noriko Immigration scandal

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Filipino family overstays visa somehow, Noriko is born, what happens? Assimilated already...

Front 81

Immigration gate control policy

Back 81

Japan is strict here: the act of deciding whether all illegal immigrants should be strictly and entirely deported, or if they should be freely acommodated to overstay visas. Is it strict? 1. Economy: there's a labor shortage and its being already accommodated for + history of economic organizations not letting in immigrant work. 2. Domestic opportunity structure: no pro-immigrant parties, there are anti-immigration hardliners, and the MoJ has been tough on it. 3. Culture and society: considered racist and closed, weak sense of heterogenity, and there is anti-immigrant sentiment

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Is Japan racist?

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Lots of rallies against zainichi koreans and chinese ofc. Why? NO RACIAL SPEECH LAWS. Freedom of speech is always cited in response.

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Immigrant integration policies

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How well do immigrants naturalize or integrate? Canada is high on this, while .6pct of japanese foreigners gain it.

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Zainichi Koreans

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Naturalized koreans who didn't get citizenship-level rights for a very long time. They were treated as foreigners, and didn't get rights of pensions, health, and childcare until the 80s. Why?

1. Ideational-cultural theories: could they really be a part of the NATION? It was inevitable since Japan signed on to so many international rights treaties
2. Regime theory: could they be integrated?
3. PERCEIVED AS A SECURITY THREAT: Ties with JCP from the start (yoshida warned about them as communists)

They still don't have suffrage outside of local government LXN's

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Zainichi koreans and the JCP

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Koreans were funding 1/3 of the JCP convention costs in the 1940s, and formed a large base of their membership. Yoshida viewed them as a full on communist threat

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Administrative Guidance in the Media

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In 93, Asahi's chief wanted to be anti-LDP, and when they lost, he was suspended. ministry of post and telecomms used guidance to make sure asahi was being neutral.

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Media/Cabinet correlation

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When media is negative, cabinet support decreases. Vice versa.

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Asahi Shinbun

Back 88

Japanese news network. not very biased

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NHL

Back 89

Dominant japanese news network. not very biased