Moral Psychology (Phil134-Ucsb) Final Exam

Front 1

Wallace & Smith

Back 1

Rationalist understanding and rebuttal against Humean view, Smith's view.

Front 2

Roskies & Smith

Back 2

Smith argues for Motivational Internalism, Roskies creates a dilemma and forces Smith onto the empirically false "horn."

Front 3

Frankfurt & Watson

Back 3

Frankfurt & Higher-Order Willpower

Watson's criticism & valuational system

Front 4

Holton

Back 4

Holton & Strength of Will

BDA & objections/responses
AHA vs. WP account

Front 5

Nagel

Back 5

Moral Luck

Should we revise our morality?
Are we morally responsible for any of our actions?

Front 6

Wallace's understanding of HTM

Back 6

a) An account of PR must be able to explain goal-directed (teleological) character of Motivational States (MS).
b) Beliefs = ~ goal-directed (~teleological); .:. don’t explain MS (at least not alone)
c) Desires = goal-directed (teleological); .:. desires must explain MS (in part)
d) RAPR = True .:. Desires are not involved in explaining MS (motivation)

Front 7

Motivated & Unmotivated Desire

Back 7

Unmotivated desires – desires w/o rationalizing explanation (UD)

Motivated desires – desires w/ rationalizing explanation (MD)

Front 8

Humean Account of Practical Reason
(HAPR)

Back 8

• HAPR in Wallace’s Terms:
 All MD are instrumental desires
 All DULT = UD

• RAPR in Wallace’s Terms
 Some MD = DULT

Front 9

Rationalist Account of Practical Reason
(RAPR)

Back 9

• HAPR in Wallace’s Terms:
 All MD are instrumental desires
 All DULT = UD

• RAPR in Wallace’s Terms
 Some MD = DULT

Front 10

Desire-out, Desire-in Principle
DODI

Back 10

Reasoning that give rise to a desire can always be traced back to a further desire. All D.ULT = UD


Smith needs to establish DODI to argue for HTM

Front 11

Roskies & her vicious dilemma

Back 11

EITHER

MI is philosophically uninteresting
MI is empirically false

Front 12

Rosies & philosophically uninteresting

Back 12

In TPR you can always use the [Practically Irrational] clause to reject any contradiction to MI.

Front 13

Strong Motivational Internalism is empirically false.

Back 13

VM patients are not practically irrational and they have true moral judgments

Front 14

1st order desire

Back 14

desire that P

Front 15

2nd order desires

Back 15

desire to desire that P

Front 16

Effective desire

Back 16

desire --> move agent to

Front 17

2nd order volitions

Back 17

2nd order desire for some 1st order desire to be effective

Front 18

Agent’s Will


(Frankfurt)

Back 18

agent's effective desires

Front 19

The Will

Back 19

mental faculty that produces effective desires


(Frankfurt)

Front 20

Wanton

Back 20

agent with no second order volitions but with desires

Front 21

Free will


(frankfurt)

Back 21

having a second order volition that a certain desire be effective

and that desire is actually effective

Front 22

Unwilling Addict

(frankfurt)

Back 22

The unwilling desires to smoke and not to smoke; has a second order volition that 'to not smoke be effective'

but 'to smoke' is effective

.:. not free

Front 23

Wanton Addict

Back 23

has a desire to smoke and a desire not to smoke

has no second order volitions

Front 24

Willing Addict

Back 24

has a desire to smoke and a desire not to smoke

has a second order volition to smoke

desire to smoke is effective

agent is free

Front 25

Watson's Criticisms (of Frankfurt's account)

Back 25

Authority Problem - how is it that identification stops the vicious regress?

Realistic-ness Problem - is this hierarchy of desires psychologically real?

Is it always the case that we exercise freewill in virtue of second order volitions?

Front 26

Evaluate [Watson's Criticisms (of Frankfurt's account)]

Back 26

Unconscious background desire?

Does this refute Frankfurt?

[evaluate]

Front 27

Watson's account of the will and when its free

Back 27

the will is free when

(a) S has motivation to ϕ

(b) ϕing is a value of S (c) S’s valuing ϕ determined S’s effective motivation to ϕ

Front 28

How does Watson’s account differ from a non-rationalist account?

Back 28

---Humean
i. Reason – rational; alethic; truth inference mechanism: beliefs
ii. Passion –nonrational; motivation: desires


---Rationalist
i. Reason – rational evaluative: beliefs + motives (desires)
ii. Passion – nonrational : beliefs + motives (desire)

Front 29

Humean Faculty of Reason


(Watson)

Back 29

Reason - rational; truth inference mechanism:
[produces]

beliefs

Front 30

Humean Faculty of Passion


(Watson)

Back 30

Passion - nonrational; motivating:
[produces]

desires

Front 31

Rationalist Faculty of Reason


(Watson)

Back 31

Reason - rational, evaluative:
[produces]

beliefs + motives

Front 32

Rationalist Faculty of Passion


(Watson)

Back 32

Passion - nonrational
[produces]

beliefs + motives

Front 33

Evaluate Watson's Account

Back 33

Over-Rationalistic Problem

Not everyone is as rationalistic as Watson's Conception of Freedom dictates. I can have an effective motivation to X even if I don't value it and still be free.

I bash my head against the wall out of frustration, but do not value bashing my head against the wall, that action was still free?

"If S is bashing her head and all that, then it is a value of hers"

but you said values must come from reason in a cool non-deceptive fashion, this obviously is not.

"S is not free because her will is being controlled by irrationality"

Hint 33

(of the will and when its free?)

Front 34

Objection's to Watson's Account

Back 34

Manipulation Problem - an individual could have value X, but was brainwashed into it. still free?

no because although Watson states "those principles and ends the agent articulates"

not the brainwasher

Willing Addict Problem

S value's theft
S has an eff. motiv. to steal
S's valuing theft determined S's eff. motiv. to steal

But S could not stop if he tried. Is he free?

addiction is self-deceptive
If its not self-deceptive, then the agent is free

Over-Rationalistic Problem

Hint 34

(from Watson)

Front 35

The Humean (Belief-Desire) Account


(BDA)

Back 35

Ontology: Beliefs & Desires

Mechanism: the strongest conative input determines the will

(the will is determined by the strongest conative input)

Front 36

The Augmented Humean (Belief-Desire-Intention) Account


(AHA)

Back 36

Ontology: Beliefs, Desires, & Intentions

Mechanism: the strongest conative input determines the will

Front 37

Willpower Account


(WPA)

Back 37

Ontology: Beliefs, Desires, & Intentions

Mechanism: some faculty that allows for willpower, since strength of conative state is insufficient

Front 38

Holton's Argument against BDA

Back 38

1. BDA must account for all cases of SoW
2. there are cases, unexplainable by BDA, of SoW
3. .:. ~BDA

Smoking:
An agent who smokes has a desire to quit smoking for good soon (A). But the agent also has a desire to not quit smoking for good soon (B).

Agent has a desire to not resist this cigarette (C).
Agent has a desire to resist this cigarette. (D)

Front 39

Responses to Holton's Argument against BDA

Back 39

Adding a further Desire
a. Reductive version: a resolution is a desire and/or belief
b. Illocutionary acts version: the resolution is the act of making a promise to oneself

Adding a Further Belief

Effective: If I resist this cigarrete, I will quit smoking soon. (D->A)

Necessary: If I don't resist this cigarette, I will not quit smoking soon. (C->B)

Front 40

Replies to Responses to Holton's Argument against BDA

Back 40

Problems of Detail

Phenomenology
----------------------
Holton:____Both BDA responses do not account for feeling of effort associated with a resolution

Response:____BDA can account for the feeling of effort consider the effort of choosing among things when you have conflicting desires

Holton:____The feeling of maintain a resolution is not the same as managing conflicts desires.

Front 41

Holton's Argument against AHA

Back 41

1. AHA must account for all cases of SoW
2. AHA cannot account for the phenomenology of the will in certain cases.
3. ~AHA

The phenomenology of effort cannot be accounted for by AHA.

Consider this case:

Ego-Depletion

Subjects who exercised SoW in suppressing emotional responses gave up much sooner on a subsequent handgrip exercise.

Thus willpower is like a muscle, that can be fatigued. Willpower comes in limited amounts that can be depleted. How can AHA account for this?

Front 42

Respond to Holton's Argument against AHA

Back 42

Ego-depletion weakens resolutions or strengthens inclinations. Mentally exhausting activities (such as exercising WP) do this for some reason.

Holton: AHA has no good explanation for why WP is depleted systematically in such different conative states.

The systematic effect explained by saying that creating resolutions that are stronger than contrary inclinations depends on depletable energy.

Me/Holton: Well that sounds like WPA

Me: Perhaps mentally exhausting activities (ego-depletion) cause us to revert to our more basic instincts, a sort of animalism. We are more focused on inclinations and our resolutions weaken. Just as muscles get tired, so does our reasoning.

Front 43

The Problem of Moral Luck

Back 43

S is a drunk driver, and only got lucky that someone didn't intersect paths with his car. In case 2, S got unlucky and someone did get hit.

Is the second any worse than the first?

Front 44

Control Principle (CP)

Back 44

individuals cannot be morally assessed for factors no within their control.

Front 45

Existential Moral Luck Claim (EMLC)

Back 45

there are cases of moral luck, which is the phenomenon of luck making a moral difference.

Front 46

Moral Luck (ML)

Back 46

the phenomenon of luck making a moral difference

Front 47

CP vs. EMLC

Back 47

individuals cannot be morally assessed for what is not in their control, but the phenomenon of luck making a moral difference exists, so in these cases is the individual not to be morally assessed?

Resultant Luck vs. Causal Luck

Front 48

Causal Luck

Back 48

luck in how antecedent circumstances determine the present

Front 49

Resultant Luck

Back 49

luck in how one's actions and projects turn out

Front 50

Circumstantial Luck

Back 50

luck in one's circumstances

Front 51

Constitutive Luck

Back 51

luck in having a certain mental constitution