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45 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Impossibility
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Essence of definition involves a contradiction. No cause to bring into existence.
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Necessity
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Something is necessary by reason of essence or cause
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Contingency
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Only limited knowledge for Spinoza. An effect of limited knowledge of the causal chain.
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Naturalist
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Everything in nature is fundamentally similar. that everything has a mind, we are not unique beings (i.e. panpyschism)
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Rationalist
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everything in the world is fundamentally intelligible. He expresses this when he states things like, the effect is conceived and known through the cause.
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Monist
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the view that everything is connected/unified under one substance
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Define substance, attribute and mode
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Substance → self-conceived, essence involves existence.
Attribute → property of substance, cannot be shared between substances. Mode → the way in which a substance is expressed/exists. Not self-conceived, its explanation cannot be separated from larger definitions i.e. its own definition does not explain it’s existence. |
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Determinism
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belief that the sequence of events that make up the present world are predetermined like set of dominos from some initial state
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Necessitarianism
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belief with the added caveat that there is only one possible initial state, one possible sequence and no other
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Mind and Body for Spinoza
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A mind has an idea (or some degree of understanding) of every state of its corresponding extended form that is part of the infinite ideas in God’s attribute of thinking. So for example, when someone is stabbed with a knife, the body experiences several states and the mind experiences the states that correspond with the ideas of the stabbing, producing pain. There is no direct causal interaction, only parallel states.
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Spinoza's Ontological Argument
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Ontological argument: by definition he exists, for existence is part of his essence
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Spinoza's ontological argument sustained by the PSR (a priori)
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a. Everything that is or isn’t necessarily is or isn’t.
b. so if there is no reason why God Does NOT exist (prop 11), than he must necessarily exist. c. This reason would have to be in God’s nature (which it is not) d. or outside God contained in another substance. But this substance could offer no explanatory relevance to God for it could not have enough in common to limit or inform His essence without implying a contradiction and being the same substance. e. Therefore there is no reason within or without the substance of God to explain why his non-existence. He must therefore exist. |
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A posteriori ontological argument
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a. We exist, so this would mean we are more powerful than an absolute being.
b. Therefore either nothing would exist or an infinite being and finite beings would exist. c. So God must exist because we exist and he cannot be less powerful than we are because that would be absurd. |
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Argument for Necessitarianism
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o Whatever exists, exists within god since he is infinite and is the only substance.
o But God is certainly not contingent (his will and intellect are not prior to his nature, Spinoza’s version of the PSR) o And the modes of his substance are therefore certainly not contingent o Considered “absolutely” these things are therefore determined to act a specific way. God causes not only the existence, but they way the act, or rather, the way the exist (the essence) o So nothing could be contingent because God himself is not contingent and acts by his nature which is necessary (See pg. 143) |
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Summary of causality according to Spinoza-
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Claims that men are aware of their emotions, but not of the causes. The causes of which are completely predetermined. Moral responsibility seems to go out the window.
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What is Leibniz's cosmological argument for the existence of God?
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To come to the conclusion that God exists, Leibniz first questions why there are dependent things. I depend on something else to exist. I am not self-caused; I am not an independent thing. Leibniz believes that there must be “sufficient reason in truths of facts” – he believes in the principle of sufficient reason. I am dependent upon something else for existence. If I am dependent upon something that is also dependent, this chain continues infinitely; this is an infinite regress. Given the PSR, we need a reason beyond just a chain of dependent beings because that is not a satisfactory response to PSR. Leibniz is not satisfied with this infinite regress and addresses the question of why this whole chain of dependent beings exist. He concludes that there must be the “sufficient or ultimate reason” outside this series, analogous to a bag around the chain. To explain the “bag,” you must go outside of the bag because if one dependent being explained why the whole bag existed, then that dependent being X would explain itself, and then X would have to be an independent being. Therefore, the sufficient or ultimate reason for the bag is OUTSIDE the series; you need to go outside the series to explain why the series exists and appeal to an independent being, which Leibniz calls God – a being whose perfection entails no limits or bounds.
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On what grounds did God choose this world over all the other possible worlds? Could God have made a different choice?
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God chose our world instead of another possible world because ours is the best world, i.e. the best of all possible worlds. Each possible world is differentiated from the others by its properties. Our world, the one and only one world chosen by God to be created, is the best of all possible worlds because when you consider all of its properties together, this world maximizes goodness to the greatest degree. Due to the PSR, God must have had a REASON for his choice (If there were a tie for bestness, God would create nothing). The goodness of the world is prior to God’s will and then due to his perfection, he chooses the best one which is at the same time simplest in hypotheses and richest in phenomenon. The best world is one which has a wide variety of phenomenon governed by simple laws. Leibniz rejects necessiarianism and says God chooses world A (assuming world A is the best) God who has wisdom, benevolence, power, etc sees the worlds in complete detail and chooses which is the best of all. His benevolence makes Him capable of choice. God, in all of his perfection, could not bring about something that is less than perfect; his wisdom makes him choose, his benevolence makes him choose the best world, ad his power makes him create it. The possibilities of different worlds depend on his intellect and his choice depends on his will.
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Predicate in Subject Principle
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The predicate in subject principle is that in every true proposition, the concept of the predicate is somehow contained in the concept of the subject. For example, triangles have three sides. The subject is triangles and the predicate is having three sides. Implicit in the subject is the predicate. The concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject.
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Why might the PISP seem to threaten freedom?
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It might seem to threaten freedom (? Don’t know if this would be on it) because the PISP asserts that everything is already included in something’s concept – God can see everything in advance. It seems to assume a certain aspect of predestination but human beings would not feel this because we, as finite imperfect beings, cannot see everything. Your action is free in the case that you could have done otherwise, but I could not have done otherwise because I could not have existed without doing all of the things I did. Leibniz believes that freedom requires the possibility of other possible worlds where Caesar did not cross the Rubicon. Within the best possibly world, my action is determined by God’s choice but freedom is not compatible with that action necessarily occurring because there are other worlds in which Caesar might not have crossed the rubicon; Freedom requires other possible worlds.
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Pre-established harmony
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philosophical theory about causation under which every "substance" only affects itself, but all the substances (both bodies and minds) in the world nevertheless seem to causally interact with each other because they have been programmed by God in advance to "harmonize" with each other
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Why does Leibniz think that finite substances do not causally interact? (See, especially, Discourse on Metaphysics, sections 14-15.) Does it follow, for Leibniz, that finite substances have no causal power at all?
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No. Finite substances do have causal power because one monad stage causes the next monad stage. This happens internally within monads. Monads themselves do not act uponother monads.
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Monad
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A monad is a simple substance that enters into composites; it is without parts. Monads are the elements of things; since they have no parts, they do not have shape, extension, or divisibility. Monads can only begin or end all at once – begin with creation and end by annihilation, whereas composites begin or end through their parts. Monads cannot be broken down into anything smaller. Wheres bodies, aka composites, are made of matter than can be continually divided, Leibniz came up with the building blocks which he called monads.
Leibniz also upholds the belief of panpsychism because each monad has a mind. |
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Identity of Indiscernibles
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ontological principle which states that two or more objects or entities are identical (are one and the same entity), if they have all their properties in common. That is, entities x and y are identical if any predicate possessed by x is also possessed by y and vice versa. A related principle is the indiscernibility of identicals, discussed below.
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Principle of Sufficient Reason
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states that anything that happens does so for a definite reason. It is usually attributed to Gottfried Leibniz.[1]
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Cause for Leibniz
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a true cause is a cause such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect
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Identity for Locke
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as far back as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person”
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Why does Locke think that shape and size are real features of objects, but color and taste are not?
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Because Color and Taste can be explained by appealing to Shape and Size. However, you can’t explain Shape and Size by appealing to anything else. Shape/Size/Motion are the most fundamental qualities of an object, but Color and Taste are not. Thus, Shape and Size are “real” features of an object, and Color and Taste are not “real” features of an object.
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Substratum
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A substratum is a basis for qualities; a support for qualities
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Berkeley's idealism•
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bodies are mind-dependent—bodies must be perceived in order to exist
• Bodies are not “substances”→they are ideas and mental qualities |
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Locke's idealism
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• Locke: substance brings about qualities and properties (1st + secondary qualities)→for Locke, substance is mind-independent
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ESSE ET PERCIPERE
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• To be is to perceive
• A mind must perceive in order to exist |
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Berkeley's Master Argument
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The argument seems intended to establish that we cannot actually conceive of mind-independent objects, that is, objects existing unperceived and unthought of. Why not? Simply because in order to conceive of any such things, we must ourselves be conceiving, i.e., thinking, of them. more charitable reading of the argument (see Winkler 1989, 184-7; Lennon 1988) makes Berkeley's point that we cannot represent unconceivedness, because we have never and could never experience it.
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Berkeley's Idealism Argument
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1. only ideas are immediately perceived
2. physical objects are immediately perceived 3. physical objects are ideas |
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Relation of Ideas
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o Everything that is demonstratively certain (can never be proved false)
o Discoverable by the mere operation of thought (not through experience or experiment) o Geometry, algebra and arithmetic. |
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- Matters of fact
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o Always learned from experience, never reasoning a priori.
o The contrary doesn’t imply a contradiction because we only know it from experience and not from reasoning. o Always founded on the relation of cause and effect. An effect can never be inferred by reason from a cause because they look so different from each other – we need observation and experience. o Laws of physics. These are discovered by experience although geometry assists in the application of the law. |
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Skepticism, according to Hume
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doubt and suspense of judgment; avoid hasty determinations; confines inquiry into human understanding exclusively to everyday life and practice; opposes the indolence and pretensions of much of philosophy.
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Common inference made by all people (according to Hume)
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- All A’s have been followed by B’s
- An A occurs now - A B will follow A |
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Uniformity Principle
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* The future will resemble the past
* unobserved matter of fact, because it concerns the future * Logic: o In the past the future has resembled the past (the UP has held up in the past.) o The future will resemble the past. o Therefore: in the future, the future will resemble the past. The justification for induction is itself inductive. The UP presupposes the UP. A circular argument. |
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Demonstrative reasoning (concerns relation of ideas
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- Results purely from reasoning faculties
- Considers priori the nature of things |
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Moral reasoning (concerns matters of fact or existence)
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- All arguments concerning existence are founded on cause and effect and therefore derive from experience.
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Skeptical Gap (Hume)
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: Hume puts into doubt all empirical claims made in everyday life and through scientific methods. Induction leads not only to uncertain conclusions, but uncertain principle itself is doubtful.
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Skeptical Solution (Hume)
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We can’t help but believe in the UP and unobserved matters of fact. Philosophical argumentation is powerless to persuade us in our daily lives. Hume claims nature will prevail.
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Custom or Habit
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Custom conceals our natural ignorance. We make inferences about effects from causes because of custom.
- Custom is why we can make an inference about an object from a thousand instances but not from one. Reason is not capable of that variation. - All inference from experience are the effect of custom and not reasoning. - Custom is a universally acknowledged principle of human nature. It is the great guide of human life without custom we would be ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to our memory or sense. Without custom, action would completely stop. |
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Belief
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The result of custom is belief.
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Why does Hume think that we can have no reason to believe in any unobserved matter of fact?
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- Unobserved matters of fact are inferred from observed phenomenon and presuppose the uniformity principle – the future will conform to the past. However, the UP itself presupposes the UP; the UP itself is an unobserved matter of fact. This is a circular argument and thus all our predictions about the future are unjustified
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