Mock Trial Case Law

Front 1

Wiley v. Young (1965)

Back 1

A product can be defective for purposes of a strict liability claim in three ways: (1) defects in manufacturing; (2) design defects; or (3) defects in instructions or warnings. A plaintiff may properly plead and prove more than one theory of defect in a single lawsuit, even with respect to the same injury caused by the same product.

Front 2

Kate v. Drago Manufacturing (1993)

Back 2

A product has a manufacturing defect when it is created or sold in a way that deviates from its intended design. For example, a product missing a particular part called for by the manufacturing specifications has a manufacturing defect, as does a product where an unintended part has been used in place of an intended one.

Front 3

Zemler v. Wiik (1980)

Back 3

A product is defectively designed when: (a) the product as designed is not reasonably safe; or (b) the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.

Front 4

Bower v. Romano (1989)

Back 4

A product has an “instructions or warnings defect” when: (a the omission of certain instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe; and (b) the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by providing reasonable instructions or warnings.

Front 5

Lehnhoff v. Hunter Agricultural Supply (2007)

Back 5

The presence of some instructions or warnings does not necessarily defeat a strict liability claim and the absence of any instructions or warnings does not necessarily render a product defective based on a failure-to-instruct-or-warn theory. The threshold question in every case is whether the product as manufactured or sold—which includes the instructions or warnings that were or were not provided—was reasonably safe

Front 6

Taylor v. Teske Boating International (2006)

Back 6

Although the three types of product defect claims described in Wiley v. Young are distinct, a defendant’s satisfaction of one duty may be relevant in assessing whether it has satisfied another duty. The safer a product is designed, the fewer instructions or warnings may be necessary. In contrast, clear, conspicuous, and thorough instructions or warnings may, to some extent, reduce the risks posed by design hazards, and may in appropriate circumstances preclude liability on a defective design theory.

Front 7

Leighton v. Westwick (1972)

Back 7

The determination of whether a product is reasonably safe requires weighing the foreseeable risk of harms posed by the product as manufactured or sold against the product’s utility.

Front 8

Wade v. John Dean Co. (2005)

Back 8

In strict liability cases where risk/utility is at issue, the jury should consider the following factors: (1) the usefulness and desirability of the product to the user and to the public as a whole; (2) the likelihood that the product will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury; (3) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and render the product safe; (4) the defendant’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without unreasonably impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive; (5) the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care; (6) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and the avoidability of those dangers.

Front 9

Murray v. Goranin Toy Co. (2000)

Back 9

The knowledge and expectations of a reasonable consumer must be considered in deciding whether a product is reasonably safe. For example, a reasonable consumer understands that knives are used to cut things, that alcohol produces intoxication, and that heavy objects may cause injury if bashed against a person’s skull. A product is not unsafe when it poses dangers that would be obvious to a reasonable consumer and can be avoided through the exercise of reasonable prudence.

Front 10

Vitan v. Goddard (1971)

Back 10

In deciding if a product is reasonably safe, a defendant should be held liable only for foreseeable risks, which entails consideration of both the product’s intended users and its intended use. A defendant cannot be held responsible if a small child attempts to use a kitchen knife to pry the lid off a jar because the child is not the intended user of the knife and knives are not intended to be used in that manner.

Front 11

Ramsden v. Heikkila (2002)

Back 11

In a strict products liability action, whether a particular user or use is intended does not depend simply on the defendant’s subjective desires or unexplained directives. Instead, at least absent clear and reasonably specific warnings, a defendant also may be held responsible for the consequences of use by reasonably foreseeable users and reasonably obvious misuse. For example, a defendant whose dining room chair collapses when a 90-pound child stands on it cannot escape liability simply by declaring that the chairs are for use only by those over the age of 12 or that they are not designed to be stood upon.

Front 12

Renden v. Munson (1996)

Back 12

The question in a strict liability action involves an objective assessment of the safety of the product as actually produced and sold, rather than the defendant’s carefulness or subjective intent. Thus, one sued on a strict liability theory may not escape liability simply by showing that she was not negligent or lacked intent to cause harm. Nonetheless, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes. For example, evidence that a defendant was or was not aware of a particular type of risk is relevant to assessing the extent to which that risk was foreseeable and the defendant’s consideration or failure to consider alternative designs (and the safety of those designs) may bear on the extent to which such an alternative would have been reasonable.

Front 13

Hunter v. Ma-Ma (2001)

Back 13

In a strict product liability case, a plaintiff may not rely on the defendant's failure to comply with a statute as a basis for proving that the product was defective under Midlands Civil Code § 662.

Front 14

Mamma Plassaras v. Howard’s Supply of Batah (1995)

Back 14

Traditional negligence actions are brought under Section 318 of the Civil Code. To prove the defendant was negligent, the plaintiff must show a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff and a breach of that duty by the defendant (plaintiff must also show causation and damages). Negligence per se claims (i.e., statutory negligence), brought under Section 319, substitute the defendant’s statutory violation for proof of duty and breach. Where a defendant violates a statute that is designed to protect a person such as the plaintiff from harm such as the plaintiff suffered, the defendant is presumed negligent as a matter of law.

Front 15

Sheridan v. IPX, Inc. (1998)

Back 15

“Excuse” is an affirmative defense to a negligence per se claim. A defendant’s violation of a statute is excused and thus does not constitute negligence per se under Midlands Civil Code § 319 if the defendant demonstrates that (a) it neither knew nor should have known of the factual circumstances that rendered the statute applicable, or (b) the defendant’s violation of the statute was due to the confusing way in which the requirements of the statute were presented to the public. Ignorance of the law, however, is not itself a defense to a negligence per se claim.

Front 16

Hamilton v. Dr. Fu’s Home Gym Co. (1999)

Back 16

The focus in a negligence per se action is narrowly confined to whether the defendant violated a duty imposed by statute or regulation and whether that violation resulted in the sort of harm that the statute or regulation was designed to protect against. As a result, a great deal of evidence that would be entirely admissible in a traditional action based on negligence, recklessness, or strict liability is simply inadmissible in an action based on negligence per se, including evidence about a defendant’s subjective awareness of the risks posed by a particular product or course of action, its reasons (or lack thereof) for proceeding in the way it did, and its consideration (or failure to consider) alternatives. Trial judges must be particularly vigilant in enforcing these requirements, for the wrongful admission of such evidence in a negligence per se action will generally constitute reversible error.

Front 17

James v. Sarah’s Patients, Inc. (2007)

Back 17

Under Criminal Code Rules 80.01 and 80.02, “requisite intent” applies only to a person’s intent to “manufacture, distribute, or otherwise dispense.” It does not apply to the “significant quantity” or “Schedule I Substance” components of the statute, for which there is no intent or knowledge requirement. In other words, a defendant who knowingly manufactures, distributes, or otherwise dispenses a product, but does not know that it is a Schedule I Substance and does not know that it contains a “significant quantity” of such substance, can nonetheless be in violation of Criminal Code Rule 80.01.

Front 18

Yanka v. Edwards Industries (1961)

Back 18

Causation has two components: cause in fact (or direct cause) and proximate cause. To show cause in fact, the plaintiff must establish either that she would not have been harmed “but-for” the defendant’s conduct or that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing the harm about. Proximate cause requires showing that that particular harm suffered by the plaintiff was both a foreseeable result of the defendant’s unlawful conduct and is of a type that could reasonably have been anticipated.

Front 19

Kramer v. Puro (1984)

Back 19

As in negligence and negligence per se cases, plaintiffs in strict liability actions (as well as caregivers, parents, guardians, and others who owe duties of care to the plaintiff) have a duty to exercise due care with respect to their own safety (or the safety of the person to whom they owe a duty). Midlands has abandoned a “pure” contributory negligence regime (in which any negligence by the plaintiff precluded liability on either a negligence or a strict liability theory) in favor of a “modified” comparative fault regime in which the responsibility of all relevant parties is considered. If the defendant establishes that another party bears some responsibility for the plaintiff’s injury, the question then becomes the degree of relative culpability. If the defendant establishes that the plaintiff’s responsibility equals or exceeds that of the defendant, the defendant is not liable. In contrast, if the plaintiff’s responsibility is less than that of the defendant, the defendant is liable but any damages recovered by the plaintiff shall be reduced by the extent of the plaintiff’s relative fault.

Front 20

Laskey v. Hecht (1995)
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Back 20

Because the negligence standard is based on the conduct that can be expected of a reasonable adult, a child under the age of five years is incapable as a matter of law of being negligent. The ability of older children to be negligent involves a fact-intensive assessment of the nature of the conduct in question and the reasonableness of expecting a child of a particular age to conform his or her conduct to that of a reasonable adult

Front 21

Rusk v. Stock (1987)

Back 21

Parents and other caregivers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising minor children. It is critical, however, that courts and juries not hold parents to an impossible or unrealistic standard. Parents cannot be standing at their child’s elbow 24 hours a day, and even the smallest children can have a remarkable knack for finding ingenious ways for getting themselves into trouble at a moment’s notice.

Front 22

Stacey v. Waffles, Inc. (2009)

Back 22

A parent or guardian of a minor child may bring an action on behalf of and in the name of that child. The plaintiff in such an action is the child himself or herself, with the parent or guardian acting as the child’s agent for the limited purposes of bringing and prosecuting the action. For evidentiary purposes, however, both the parent/guardian agent and the child are still treated as a plaintiff and party to the lawsuit.

Front 23

Filteau v. Wanek (1992)

Back 23

The application of various rules of evidence in a particular situation will sometimes turn on the identity of the person making a statement. Because Midlands law contains a strong preference for jury determinations of important questions, courts must be careful not to usurp the jury’s role in this context. As long as the proponent of the statement produces evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given person made a particular statement, the court must assume the statement was made by that person for purposes of assessing its admissibility.

Front 24

Riley v. Jones (2005)

Back 24

Consistent with the holding of Filteau v. Wanek, the fact that an email or printout of an email is listed as coming from an address that is either known or purports to belong to a particular person is sufficient to lay foundation that the email was sent by the person in order to determine its admissibility, at least absent particularized reason to believe that the email may have been sent by someone else. This ruling does not foreclose challenges to the admissibility of an email on other grounds.

Front 25

Jeff v. Wario’s Toolkit (1974)

Back 25

Absent some special rule to the contrary, a plaintiff in a civil case must establish all the elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., establish that all elements are more likely than not true ).

Front 26

Wikstrom v. Lindell (1976)

Back 26

Any affirmative defense must be proven by the defendant by a preponderance of evidence.

Front 27

Crigler v. Dudley (1981)

Back 27

The only objections that need or may be made during a deposition are those to the form of the question or to assert a privilege. All other objections are preserved for trial and may be raised when an opposing party seeks to admit the entire deposition or portions thereof. A trial judge has discretion to admit a deposition in whole, admit it in part, or exclude it altogether.

Front 28

Davis v. Adams (1993)

Back 28

Under the Midlands Rules of Evidence, trial judges must ensure that any scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable. In determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable, judges should consider only the methods employed and the data relied upon, not the conclusions themselves.

Front 29

Richards v. Mississippi BBQ (1997)

Back 29

Midlands Rule of Evidence 703 does not afford an expert unlimited license to testify or present a chart in a manner that simply summarizes the testimony of others without first relating that testimony to some specialized knowledge on the expert’s part, as required under Midlands Rule of Evidence 702. The court must distinguish experts relying on hearsay to form scientific conclusions from conduits who merely repeat what they are told. The testimony of the former is admissible; that of the latter is not.

Front 30

Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994)

Back 30

In assessing reliability under Davis v. Adams, judges should consider, among other factors, whether the theory or technique has been or can be tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether it has a known error rate, and whether it has gained widespread acceptance within the field. These factors, while relevant,are not necessarily dispositive. For example, lack of publication does not automatically foreclose admission; sometimes well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published. Indeed, there is no definitive checklist in making a preliminary assessment of whether reasoning or methodology underlying expert testimony is scientifically reliable. Judges must make such assessments based on the totality of the circumstances, and the proponent of such expert testimony must meet the threshold proof requirement of a preponderance of the evidence.

Front 31

Thomas v. Davis (2001)

Back 31

The purpose of the pleadings is to frame the issues for trial and to permit the parties to frame their presentations accordingly. This latter function is especially important because Midlands, unlike most jurisdictions, does not permit the plaintiff to call rebuttal witnesses or the defendant to alter its decision about which witnesses to call after hearing the plaintiff’s evidence. Accordingly, it is highly inappropriate for a party that has alleged or denied something in its complaint or answer to seek to prevent its adversary from presenting otherwise admissible evidence that relates to that thing by asserting that it is no longer interested in alleging or contesting that particular thing. Parties may, of course, choose which evidence they wish to present and which arguments they wish to emphasize at trial, but the time for amending one’s pleadings is well before the court convenes for purposes of trial.

Front 32

Karan v. Baboons, Inc. (1994)

Back 32

Even in cases in which the liability and damages phases have been bifurcated, a plaintiff still must establish “harm” in order to establish the defendant’s liability on either a strict liability or negligence per se theory. At the same time, however, because the purpose of a threshold liability-only phase is to establish only the existence, rather than the extent, of the defendant’s potential liability, trial judges should be especially vigilant in applying MRE 401 and 403 with respect to evidence that either does not or only marginally relates to questions at issue during such a phase.

Front 33

Ordes v. Ethel A. Candy Co. (2005)

Back 33

Although they are closely related, in Midlands a cause of action for negligence is legally distinct from a cause of action for negligence per se. Accordingly, a plaintiff who pleads only a claim for negligence may not pursue a negligence per se claim at trial and a plaintiff who pleads only a claim of negligence per se may not attempt to establish liability based on a theory of simple negligence at trial. Although this result may seem harsh, it is necessary because the two types of claims have different elements and require different proof, and defendants have the right to know which (if either) theory they must be prepared to face at trial.