Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
23 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
- 3rd side (hint)
|
Zomerfeld v. Noto |
Pursuant to midlands rules of evidence 104 a relating to character evidence and admissibility, the court is merely permitted to consider the underlying inadmissible evidence in order to assess the admissibility of the offered evidence. |
Evidentiary ruling |
|
|
State v Lowe |
A criminal defendant’s decision to exercise the constitutionally protected right not to testify in his or her own defense may not be commented upon by the State either explicitly or implicitly. However, if the defendant does choose to testify, his or her credibility is to be judged like that of any other witness. |
Burden of proof |
|
|
Graham v. State |
While the prosecution in a criminal case must prove each of the elements of its burden beyond a reasonable doubt, this burden does not typically apply to evidentiary matters. In Midlands, the proponent of the evidence need only prove these evidentiary matters by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., it must establish that all elements are more likely than not true). |
Burden of proof |
|
|
State v. Parsos |
In the guilt phase of a criminal trial, admission of evidence offered solely for the purpose of discussing the available penalties for the crime charged is strictly prohibited. This has no impact on evidence of prior crimes of witnesses that is admissible subject to the Midlands Rules of Evidence. |
Misconduct in criminal trial |
|
|
State v. Campbell |
In Midlands, all criminal trials are bifurcated with a guilt phase followed by a penalty phase. It is improper for an attorney to comment on sentencing or discuss potential penalties during the guilt phase of the trial. Such conduct is grounds for a mistrial and may constitute conduct for which sanctions are appropriate. |
Misconduct in criminal trial |
|
|
State v. Shiek |
When a defendant pursues an affirmative defense of entrapment, he or she necessarily admits to the elements of the crime. Thus, when a defendant pursues an entrapment defense, the prosecution need not prove the elements of the charged crime, and any evidence offered for the purpose of contesting the elements of the charged crime is inadmissible at trial. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
State v. Walton |
A defendant’s decision to offer an affirmative defense, including entrapment, must be disclosed to the State at least 15 days before trial. The proper remedy for a defendant’s failure to disclose the defense 15 or more days before trial is typically a continuance of the trial date; however, when a continuance is not practicable, the secondary remedy is rejection of the affirmative defense by the trial court. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
State v. Heflin |
Government agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government may prosecute. A valid entrapment defense has two related elements: (1) government inducement of the crime, and (2) the defendant’s lack of predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct. The government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the government induced the defendant into committing the crime. The defendant should be found not guilty only if the prosecution fails to meet its burden and the defense meets its burden. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
State v. Jeffcott |
In determining a defendant was predisposed to commit a crime for the purposes of an entrapment defense, the trier of fact should consider the following factors:A. Whether government agents initially suggested the criminal activity;B. Whether the defendant demonstrated reluctance to commit the offense;C. Whether government agents repeatedly pressured or persuaded the defendant toperform the criminal activity;D. The defendant’s level of participation in the offense;E. The defendant’s character and reputation, including criminal history or lack thereof. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
State v. Veli and pickerill |
In determining whether a defendant was induced to commit a crime for the purposes of an entrapment defense, the trier of fact should consider whether government agents employed methods of persuasion or encouragement that create a substantial risk that a crime will be committed by a person who was otherwise unlikely to commit it. It does not sufficient for a government agent to merely provide a defendant with the opportunity, means, and facilities to commit the offense – though evidence of such may be relevant. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
State v Dressel |
An informant participating in a government investigation is a government agent for the purposes of an entrapment defense. As such, the actions of an informant are attributable to the state and may be the basis for showing that a defendant was induced to commit a crime. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
State v Dousa |
The means by which a law enforcement officer recruited an informant or obtained an informant’s participation do not in and of themselves support an argument that a defendant was induced into committing a crime. The pressure applied to an informant is not the pressure that was applied to the defendant. However, the interactions of a law enforcement officer with an informant may still be relevant to an entrapment defense if they impact or explain either the law enforcement officer’s or the informant’s interactions with the defendant. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
Lee v. State |
Even if inducement has been shown, a finding of predisposition is fatal to an entrapment defense. The predisposition inquiry leads the fact finder to consider whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or, instead, a criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime. Thus, predisposition should not be confused with intent or mens rea: a person may have the requisite intent to commit the crime, yet be entrapped. Also, predisposition may exist even in the absence of prior criminal involvement. |
Entrapment defense |
|
|
Filteau v. Wanek |
A statement’s admissibility will sometimes turn on the identity of the person making a statement. Because Midlands law contains a strong preference for jury determinations of important questions, courts must be careful not to usurp the jury’s role in this context. As long as the proponent of the statement produces evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given person made a particular statement, the court must assume for the purposes of assessing the statement’s admissibility that the statement was made by that person. |
Authentication |
|
|
Grover’s of New Mexico v. R.G.D. Boots Co. |
That an email is listed as coming from an address that either is known or purports to belong to a particular person is sufficient to lay foundation that the email was sent by the person in order to determine its admissibility, at least absent a particularized reason to believe that the email may have been sent by someone else. This ruling does not foreclose challenges to the admissibility of an email on other grounds. |
Authentication |
|
|
Ginger v. Heisman |
Discussing the admissibility of misleading text messages allegedly sent to voters by a candidate or his agents in an election fraud case, we reiterate that text messages received on a cell phone are properly authenticated when the proponent of the evidence shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, the author of the message. The evidence offered to meet this standard may include direct or circumstantial evidence of authorship. |
Authentication |
|
|
Illiadais v. State |
Rule 801(d)(2) may be invoked in only one direction in a criminal case. Specifically, Rule 801(d)(2) permits the State to offer statements by a criminal defendant.. The rule does not permit a defendant to offer statements from himself. This rule remains the same even if the State has already elicited out-of-court statements by a defendant during a preceding examination. Consider a case where the defendant made a variety of statements to a police officer, who was called by the State at trial. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) permits the State to elicit the defendant’s statements during the direct examination of the police officer, because those statements are being offered “against an opposing party” (i.e., the defendant). The State thus elected to admit only a few of the statements provided by the defendant. But when defense counsel attempted to elicit other, less inculpatory statements by the defendant on cross-examination of the police officer, the State properly objected because those additional statements would not be offered “against an opposing party.” |
Hearsay |
|
|
Illiadais v. State |
Rule 801(d)(2) may be invoked in only one direction in a criminal case. Specifically, Rule 801(d)(2) permits the State to offer statements by a criminal defendant.. The rule does not permit a defendant to offer statements from himself. This rule remains the same even if the State has already elicited out-of-court statements by a defendant during a preceding examination. Consider a case where the defendant made a variety of statements to a police officer, who was called by the State at trial. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) permits the State to elicit the defendant’s statements during the direct examination of the police officer, because those statements are being offered “against an opposing party” (i.e., the defendant). The State thus elected to admit only a few of the statements provided by the defendant. But when defense counsel attempted to elicit other, less inculpatory statements by the defendant on cross-examination of the police officer, the State properly objected because those additional statements would not be offered “against an opposing party.” |
Hearsay |
|
|
Americas best cookie v international house of pancakes |
Although practices may be different in other jurisdictions, in Midlands it is entirely possible for an out-of-court statement by a person who is or will be testifying in a particular trial to be excluded by the general rule against hearsay. Subject to Rule 801(d), hearsay is any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. And although the Midlands Rules of Evidence contain a variety of exceptions to the rule that hearsay is generally inadmissible, there is no categorical principle permitting receipt of any out-of-court statement simply because the person who made that out-of-court statement is or will be a witness in the trial |
Hearsay |
|
|
State v capaldi |
In a criminal case, a law enforcement officer is not considered a “party opponent” for the purpose of admissibility of a statement made by that officer under Midlands Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). This remains true even when a law enforcement officer is designated as a “party representative” for purposes of Rule 615. Midlands allows prosecutors to designate a police officer to remain in the courtroom throughout trial. However, the same logic that allows the State to admit admissions by a criminal defendant as admissions by a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2) does not permit defense attorneys to offer statements of a police officer as statements of the State of Midlands. This ruling should not be misconstrued to preclude the admissibility of a law enforcement officer’s outside-of- court statements under other applicable provisions of the Midlands Rules of Evidence. |
Hearsay |
|
|
State v goodman |
The provisions of State v. Capaldi apply to informants working on law enforcement operations. Informants are not “party opponents” under Midlands Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). |
Hearsay |
|
|
State v chambliss |
Criminal conspiracy to commit a given crime occurs when a person agrees with another or others to commit an offense, attempt to commit an offense, solicit the commission of an offense, or aid another in the planning or commission of an offense. |
Hearsay |
|
|
State v owens |
For a statement to qualify under the hearsay exclusion of Midlands Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the proponent must establish the existence of said conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the statements may be admitted conditionally subject to Rule 104, meaning that the proponent of such statements may lay proper foundation before offering the statements or the trial court may allow the proponent to admit the statements first and lay the foundation for the predicate conspiracy during the remainder of the trial. As Rule 801(d)(2)(E) makes clear, proof of conspiracy may be based in part on the statements themselves, but the proof must also include some independent corroborative evidence. |
|
