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40 Cards in this Set
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Part Two – Reimbursing The Providers
summary (Also includes material from SN 601 Ch. 1 and 4 and SN 105) CAPITATION (PREPAYMENT) Considerations in Developing a Capitation Contract With Providers |
Form of the Capitation Reimbursement
Other Factors Scope of Covered Services; Carve-Outs Size of Patient Base |
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Form of the Capitation Reimbursement
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Standard: PMPM
Varying by Age and Sex of Enrollees The blended capitation rate means the average capitation rate that the physician is essentially receiving per member. Varying By Other Factors health of the patients geog location practice type per subscriber per month Capitation as a % of Premium Problems: cashflows are hard to predict premium shortfall gets passed onto the physicians. e.g. due to poor underwriting. Full Risk Capitation (Referral Risk): favored by large physician groups |
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Other Factors
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Exclusive Business rewards
Copay levels (Benefit Design) should only shift costs, not change doctor’s income The Scope of Covered Services (see next section) The doctor’s patient base (see next section) |
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Scope of Covered Services; Carve-Outs
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A PCP’s capitation should include all services the PCP will deliver himself.
Be careful about including the following services in a PCP’s capitation contract: services the PCP might not perform himself: surgeries, ancillary diagnostics services the PCP usually refers out prescriptions immunizations; obstetrics (cost is out of the control of the PCP) Carve-outs are used for services that the physician doesn’t have discretionary control over. They are paid Ffs. Carved out services will have higher utilization |
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Size of Patient Base
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easy to know for PCP’s in HMO plans
difficult to estimate for PCP’s in POS plans difficult to estimate for Hospitals and Specialists Advice for Making the Scope of Services and the Patient Base Easy to Identify: Contract with Single-Specialty groups Specialty-specific IPA’s or DM organizations use self-contained ancillary providers Apply the capitation to a specific region Restrict PCPs’ choices of Specialists to refer to Hire a Specialty Network Manager |
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Converting from Fee-for-Service to Capitation
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Utilization will drop after the switch
must enforce UM before switching |
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CAPITATION AS A METHOD OF REIMBURSEMENT — PROS AND CONS
Advantages Of Capitation To The MCO |
encourages Utilz Control
providers’ incentives match HMO’s Costs predictable easy & cheap to administer Physicians can't cheat by upcoding. |
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Disadvantages Of Capitation To The MCO
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Disliked by physicians
hard for MCO to recruit new doctors encourages doctors to deny care (underutilize) poor societal perception exposure to lawsuits “Significant Financial Risk” laws UM can’t be used (b/c costs are fixed) The MCO must direct patients to the capitated providers Difficult to compute an appropriate capitation rate Difficult to compute age/sex/location variations Providers may fail to manage their risk and go bankrupt. Nondiscretionary costs must be carved out Capitation is difficult to use in POS and PPO plans (double payment) |
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Advantages Of Capitation To The Providers
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stable cash flow
Providers who are good case managers are favored. |
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Disadvantages / Risks Of Capitation To The Providers
Disadvantages / Risks Of Capitation To The Providers Disadvantages |
punishes the doctor for good service.
Doctors with very few patients have volatile experience (Law of Small Numbers). Solutions to the Problem of Small Numbers: Capitate Pools of Doctors instead of individually. Provide stop-loss insurance to the capitated doctors Pay Ffs until the physician has more than 50 patients Pay the greater of capitation and Ffs |
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Risks
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high utilization risk
catastrophic case risk referral risk (under Full Risk Capitation) Misestimation Of: (in evaluating a capitation rate) # of services, cost per service administrative costs family size (in a Per-Subscriber-per-Month contract) demographics Solution: Use capitations that vary by the age and sex. Misuse of funds Misunderstanding the risk Failure by MCO to meet enrollment objectives to penetrate employer groups Leads to antiselection. Ways providers can manage (reduce) their Capitation Risk See SN 601 Ch. 2, last list, entitled “Practice Management”. |
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FEE-FOR-SERVICE
Forms of the Fee-For-Service Reimbursement |
Straight Ffs (“Straight Charges”, “Billed Charges”) $$$$
Discounted Ffs (“Discount from Billed Charges”) $$$ UCR (aka Fee Maximums) $$ Discount from UCR (“Fee Allowance”) $ Usual = what the doctor would normally charge Customary = prevailing charges Determination of the UCR Amount: Collect UCR data from the region Set “UCR Maximum” equal the 60th percentile Claims < UCR Maximum are paid in full. Problem with UCR: Physicians raise their normal fees to the UCR. Performance-Based Fee-for-Service: Fees vary by: the individual PCP's performance, or plan performance. |
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Two types of Performance-Based Ffs:
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Budgeted Ffs
maximum budget in each service category Ffs pmts reduced after budget is reached. Complicated to administer. Sliding Scale Individual Fee Allowances Doctor’s reimbursement ranges from 70%UCR to 110%UCR More unnecessary services he performs, the lower the fees. |
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Special Legal Requirements for Billing in a Fee-for-service system
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coinsurance % must be applied to the actual reimbursement.
No Balance-Billing |
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FEE-FOR-SERVICE AS A FORM OF REIMBURSEMENT — PROS AND CONS
For MCOs |
Advantages Of Ffs To The MCO
Doctors are happy Easy to negotiate, as opposed to a capitation rate. Disadvantages Of Ffs To The MCO Doctors negate discounts by raising fees. Manipulation by churning upcoding unbundling Solutions by MCO: Tight UM watch for anomalies in physicians’ charges automated "rebundling" software peer review penalize providers who bill incorrectly more structured Ffs (UCR or performance-based) |
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For Providers
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Advantages Of Ffs To The Providers
Easy to understand Much less financial risk than capitation Rewarded for good service Disadvantages / Risks Of Ffs Or Indemnity Plans To The Providers Bad debt (patient fees, insurance claim hassle) Cashflows not steady MCO could fail to bring in enough patients. If patient can switch doctors, then treatment is not continuous. |
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OTHER FORMS OF REIMBURSEMENT
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Reasons Why Combinations of Forms of Reimbursement Are Used Together, Rather Than Just One Method:
Broad geog. area Merging MCO’s Different products Different services |
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RELATIVE VALUE SCALES (RVS)
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Each type of service has a relative value (based on ratios of UCR prices)
payment = (monetary multiplier) * RVS Advantage: only multiplier is negotiated (easy billing & payment) prevents unscheduled fee hikes Disadvantages: Underlying UCR prices must be accurate procedural/cognitive imbalance Solution: RBRVS. reflects Time, Training, etc. needed to provide care |
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PER DIEM (PER DAY)
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Services the Hospital has no control over should be carved out of Per Diem (e.g. intensive care; maternity)
Problem with Per Diem Gives hospitals an incentive to keep patients there longer. Solutions Reimburse 2nd and subsequent days at a lower rate than 1st day use Sliding Scale per diem payments based on volume Use Global Fees or Capitation instead Use risk/bonus or risk-sharing arrangements |
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PER CASE (aka GLOBAL FEES) (aka CASE RATES) (aka DRG’s)
Scope of the Global Fee could be: |
one provider; one procedure
a whole episode over a time period (episode-based) multiple providers (bundled; package pricing) |
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A hybrid of Capitation and Fee-for-service.
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Similarities to Capitation
hospital takes on risk rewarded if resource use is low. Fixed fee per episode stabilizes costs to MCO Similarities to Ffs The more services performed, the more the reimbursement |
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Determination of the Global Fee for an episode
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Gov't publications specify different DRG groups
consider what services are needed, and with what probabilities. If too much variability, then split the DRG into more specific DRG’s. |
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Advantages of Global Fees to the MCO:
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Administration and billing is simpler than per diem
protects against unbundling (but not churning; also, hospital can falsify its DRG’s) A compromise between Capitation and Ffs gives hospital incentive to manage its utilization. Useful for MCO's with poor UM Including new MCO's. Good for POS plans, where pure capitation fails. |
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Disadvantages of Global Fees to the MCO:
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Providers can use “churning” or falsify their DRG coding on their bills
Case Mix risk: If higher-cost DRG’s occur too often, total cost will exceed MCO’s expectations. |
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Advantages of Global Fees to the Hospital or Provider:
Disadvantages of Global Fees to the Hospital or Provider: |
Advantages of Global Fees to the Hospital or Provider:
Similar to Capitation or to Ffs, whichever the provider likes best Disadvantages of Global Fees to the Hospital or Provider: Length-of-Stay risk Severity Mix risk (complicated episodes of a particular DRG) Trend risk (fixed global fee doesn’t adjust for inflation) Unforeseen administrative costs negotiation risk – maybe the DRG’s global fee was improperly evaluated Solutions Hospitals can Use Control length of stay Use prospective, concurrent, and retrospective utilization management Use rounding Instead of inpatient procedures, use alternative settings: Outpatient, nursing homes, in-home care, etc. |
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CONTACT CAPITATION
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Contact Capitation, and other modern forms of provider reimbursement, are combined with my notes to SN 105..
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BED LEASING
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MCO pays the hospital a monthly fixed amount per bed
payment processing is easy. |
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SALARY
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Similar to capitation.
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RETAINER
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MCO hires a specialist at a fixed rate (adjusted periodically)
Useful if network is short in that type of specialist. |
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RISK/BONUS REIMBURSEMENT and RISK-SHARING
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Withholds
Bonus Pools (aka Profit Shares) Risk-Sharing Capitation Pools for Specialist and Hospital Services Advantages: PCP’s have a monetary incentive to limit referrals SCP’s have a monetary inventive to prevent hospitalizations The Risk-Sharing Arrangement 5 expense pools, each with its own target PMPM cost The risk-sharing agreement specifies how each pool’s surplus or deficit is shared among different classes of providers. For example: Hospital pool: Surplus/deficit split 50% hospital / 25% SCP’s / 25% PCP’s Variations Each PCP’s individual utilization could be considered The Hospital pool surplus might not be paid out completely May or may not include Pharmacy (since controversial) |
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Warnings About Risk/Reward Systems
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The following types of services should not be part of a risk/incentive program. That is, doctors should not be at risk for the following services:
Capitated laboratory contracts services the PCP has no control over the cost of: obstetrics, immunizations, possibly drugs patients known to have chronic diseases scope of services must be clearly defined Problems with Risk/Incentive programs based on drug costs drug costs volatile only large groups can manage drug use no evidence that this lowers drug costs. |
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Regulation of Physician Incentive Programs (PIP’s)
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Significant Financial Risk laws
Stop-loss protection req’d. Pooling must be used PIP’s disclosed to patients Any conflicts of interests disclosed. Similar laws govern capitation arrangements. |
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TYPES OF RISKS BORNE BY PROVIDERS
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Prepaid Risk (aka Service Risk)
by capitated providers. “Opportunity cost” if the doctor’s capitated patients fill up his whole schedule. Financial Risk (Business risk; Administrative risk) voluntary risk-sharing default risk financial instability of the MCO (“affiliate risk”) Analytical Risk Underpricing/Overpricing Misestimation of expenses Includes random risks like catastrophes, epidemics, etc. |
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Individual Risk Vs. Pooled Risk
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Physicians with good experience prefer Individual risk/reward
Physicians with poor (high-cost) experience prefer to be pooled. |
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Individual Risk Programs
Adv and disadv |
Advantages
easy to track individuals (Accountability) Disadvantages "Law of Small Numbers" (luck has huge impact) PCP’s blame bad experience on bad luck not appropriate for Hospitals (costs too volatile) PCP’s have incentive to deny care or make their patients go out of network. |
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Pooled Risk Programs
Adv and disadv |
Advantages
reduces volatility Disadvantages The impact of any individual PCP is hard to detect doesn’t elicit behavior change hard for MCO to give feedback. physicians with good experience resent having to subsidize poor physicians Moral: The Pool must be large enough to have statistical integrity, but small enough to see individual doctors’ results. |
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SUMMARY OF ALL THE REIMBURSEMENT METHODS
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Fee-For-Service
Straight Ffs Discounted Ffs Sliding Scale Discount based on volume UCR Discount from UCR Relative Value Scales RVS RBRVS Performance-Based Ffs (the most structured type of Ffs) Ffs-Capitation Hybrids Per Diem Sliding Scale Per Diem Higher First-day payment Global Fees (DRG’s) Contact Capitation (SCP’s only) Capitation Straight capitation with carve-outs adjusted for age/sex PMPM or PSPM or As A Percent Of HMO’s Revenue Salary (staff model HMO’s only) Risk/Incentive Programs Withholds Bonus Pools Risk-Sharing Capitated Pools for Nonprimary Services (PCP’s only) POS / PPO PLAN DIFFICULTIES Handling Capitation in POS Plans Method 1. Don't reduce capitation rates at all. Problems: Double-paying PCP has incentive to push sick patients o-o-n. Method 2. Reduce capitation rates given to physicians Problems: Puts physician at greater Service Risk Inequitable Law of Small Numbers Method 3. Retrospectively adjust the payment at the end of each month Advantages: viable and equitable Problems: Default risk: Hard for MCO to collect refund at end of month Method 4. Only use capitation for patients in the pure HMO plans; pay providers Ffs for services rendered to patients who are in the POS plan. Advantage: viable Problems: confusing to physicians. Ffs is more expensive than capitation. Method 5. Use Global Fees instead. Best. |
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Handling Risk/Incentive Programs in POS plans
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Trade-Off:
PCP’s have no control over o-o-n costs But if PCP’s not held responsible for them, they will push sick patients o-o-n Solutions: spread out risk/reward among Pools of Doctors base incentives on nonutilization factors such as quality patient satisfaction efficiency and e-commerce use compliance. |
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Handling Performance-based Fee-for-Service in POS plans
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The problems are similar to those of Risk/Incentive programs.
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Summary: Recommendations for Reimbursement in a POS plan:
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Use Standard Fee-for-Service (non-performance-based)
Use Global Fees Use Capitation Method #3 or #4. Base risk-sharing bonuses on factors other than utilization. Done. |