Reading...
Play button
Play button
Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
24 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
|
Prudential Standing
|
"When standing requirements are met, the court may choose not to hear: 1) injury not w/in zone of interests protected by statute at issue 2) injury is not to generalized – can’t be shared by all/almost all citizens (taxpayer example) 3) no 3rd party litigants 4) Grievances more appropriately addressed in representative branches (political question)"
|
|
|
Theory and types of Generalized Grievances:
|
"Theory - proper avenue is through political system and not the court - unless Congress has provided otherwise. Includes: Taxpayer Standing, Voter Standing, Citizen Standing"
|
|
|
Political Question Cases
|
"Baker v. Carr, Nixon, Powell, Chadha (kinda), Luther, Goldwater"
|
|
|
Baker v. Carr
|
Claim that apportionment was unconstitutional. Six categories from Baker v. Carr: 1) **Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department 2) **Lack of judicially discernable and manageable standards for resolving it 3) Impossibility of deciding without a policy decision. 4) Impossibility of undertaking resolution without ta lack of respect due to branches of government 5) Unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made 6) Potential embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
|
|
|
Justiciable Standards
|
"Are there criteria for judging? Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon – suit that challenged initiative process as a violation of the republican form of government. While the Constitution says the federal government guarantees a republican form of government, it does not give standards as to what a republican form of government is."
|
|
|
Ripeness defined and line of cases
|
"No premature issues. Question is ripe when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the P. Laird, Goldwater, Lyons"
|
|
|
Mootness – defined and line of cases.
|
"When a case has disappeared or no longer presents an actual ongoing dispute between the named parties. Voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct does not make the case moot, requires case by case determination. Roe v. Wade, Earth v. Laidlaw"
|
|
|
What are the early commerce clause cases that allow for a broad reading of Congress' commerce power?
|
"Gibbons v. Ogden, The Shreveport Rate Cases, Champion v. Ames, Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers"
|
|
|
How did Gibbons v. Ogden define commerce?
|
"Commerce is undoubtedly traffic, but is also something more: it is intercourse between states. "
|
|
|
"How did Gibbons v. Ogden define ""among the states?"""
|
Among the states: commerce which concerns more states than one. Completely inernal commerce of a state is reserved for the state itself. Congress can regulate intrastate commerce if it has an impact on interstate activities.
|
|
|
What are the early commcerce Clause cases that narrowly interpret the Commerce Clause?
|
"EC Knight, Carter v. Carter Coal, Hammer v. Dagenhart"
|
|
|
10th Amendment
|
Reserves powers not granted to the national government to the states and the people. (Garcia, US Term Limits, Gregory v. Ashcroft)
|
|
|
Anti-Commandeering Principle
|
Unconstitutional for a federal government to compel or commandeer states to adopt laws or to commandeer state agencies to adopt or enforce federal regulations. (New York v. U.S., Printz, Reno v. Condon)
|
|
|
Self Executing Treaties
|
Medellin – treaties that do not have some self-executing language require further legislation to become law
|
|
|
The Eleventh Amendment
|
Prevents suits for monetary relief against state govs by either citizens of that state or foreignser and Congress cannot alter this. (Alden: immunity for individuals seeking damages is prohibited). Also can't sue your own state in federal court for damages.
|
|
|
Cases regarding the President’s Foreign Powers
|
"Youngstown, U.S. v. Curtiss Wright, Dames & Moore, Medellin, Prize Cases, Hamdi, Hamdan, Garamendi, Boumediene"
|
|
|
Legislative Power in Foreign Affairs
|
Declare war, spend money, War powers resolution and Treaty Power
|
|
|
War powers resolution
|
"War powers resolution requires the president to notify congress within 48 hours when he has introduced troops into hostilities. Congress has 60 days to authorize war or the use of force or the troops need to be removed. President can get a 30 day extension if he shows unavoidable military necessity. Arguments against this act: infringes on President’s ability to command troops. Congressional support for act: we fund and declare war, so we need you to report. Never been challenged."
|
|
|
Judicial Decisions on Executive Authority in Domestic Affairs
|
1) Absent a need to protect military or national security, the court is unlikely to allow the president to invoke executive priviledge (US v. Nixon) 2) Courts Cannot issue an injunction against a standing president 3) The president is immune from actions for damages. 4) Presidential immunity does not extend to the President's aides. 5) In order for a presidential immunity to attach, the president must be acting in the scope of his office (Clinton v. Jones) 6) The need for information in civil cases is not as urgent as the criminal subpoena in the Nixon case. Criminal cases can weed out frivoulous claims.
|
|
|
Nondelegation Doctrine
|
Congress often wants to delegate b/c of sheer size of modern government. The court must provide the agency with an intelligible principle (Mistretta) Rare cases where court finds congress delegated too much power (Schecther and Panama Refining) 3) Line item veto was a delegation of too much power (Clinton v. City of NY) –
|
|
|
Legislative Veto
|
"INS v. Chadha - Congress is attempting to assert control over the legislative process, claims they cannot do their job unless they have leg veto power due to expansive administrative bureaucracy. Congress cannot retain power constitutionally assigned to the Court or the President. The idea of a legislative veto violated the principles of bicameralism and the Presentment Clause."
|
|
|
Congressional Controls over Executive Agencies
|
WARSROB: 1) Can enact a measure repealing the authority of the agency or reshape the delegation of authority 2) Can instigate oversight hearings that push for changes in executive policy. 3) Can institute budget cuts or increases 4) Can provide for sunset language 5) Can place a rider in the Appropriations bill 6) Have control over confirmation of appointments 7) Can enact a wait and see provision. This means an agency can make policy and allow the policies to become effective if Congress has not passed a statute to the contrary.
|
|
|
Removals
|
"No constitutional provision addresses removal power. In General, Pres may remove an exec officer for any reason whatsoever unless removal is limited by statute. Congress can limit removal by statute both if it is an office where independence from Pres is desirable and if the law does not prohibit removal but instead limits removal to instances where good cause is shown" (Myers and Humphrey's executor)
|
|
|
Morrison and the Test for Principle vs. Inferior Officer
|
"A President’s power to removal can be limited by a for cause provision for individuals that are inferior officers. Court states independent counsel is inferior for 4 reasons: 1) Subject to removal by higher exec branch official, AG 2) Limited Scope of power, only performed limited duties 3) Limited Scope of JX 4) Tenure, duration of employment, boundaries"
|
