Latin America: Presidential Systems

Front 1

Instability

Back 1

- General lack of governability, possible crisis of government as a result of impeachment of the president
- here: will be used in context of pol deadlock and ineffective coalitions

Front 2

Instability and crisis of regime

Back 2

- Presidential PR seen by critics as meaning that crisis of gov easily becomes crisis of regime
- but actual instances of regime crisis were pre-74
- focus on Southern cone ( ≠ Haiti 04, post-Aristide violence and non-dem status)

Front 3

Presidential PR systems

Back 3

- Dual democratic legitimacy
- Proportional Representation: percentage of seats received matches share of vote

Front 4

DDL

Back 4

- separate mandates for executive/legislative + President can be elected without maj in Assembly
- symbolic strength of presidency (plebiscitary nature + symbolic attributes: head of nation)

Front 5

DDL v Parliamentarism

Back 5

- executive appointed by and accountable to legislature, resulting in nested hierarchies and vertical accountability
- in Pr: separate mandate legislature/executive: no democratic principle to resolve dispute between the two (so 'poder moderador' of the army)

Front 6

PR and instability

Back 6

- higher fragmentation (number of parties): parties range over a wide ideological spectrum, all holding less seats
- combined with open party lists, this can lead to weak party system

Front 7

Presidentialism and instability

Back 7

- relationship between President and legislature
- institutional and accidental/individual factors (Llanos+Margheritis)

Front 8

Presidents: Perceived v actual authority 1

Back 8

- tradition of Pres systems goes with authoritarian legacy remaining from bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of 60s:
- executive vested with symbolic strength not mirrored in actual capacity to govern: concentration of symbolic accountability

Front 9

Presidents: Perceived v actual authority 2

Back 9

- stuck between high expectations and relatively low power due to fragmented party system
- Opposition parties have no reason to rally to Pres: stand to gain no credit for successful policies, and blame for unsuccessful ones

Front 10

Presidents: Perceived v actual authority: examples

Back 10

- Presidents ousted in 00s following opposition for austerity measures (IMF-driven): Perez (Venezuela), de la Rua (Argentina), Sanchez de Lozada (Bolivia)
- Ousted for insufficient action taken against econ crisis: Alfonsin (Argentia), Collor de Mello

Front 11

Pres system and rigidity (electoral timetables)

Back 11

- non coinciding timetables: if Pres loses majority in congressional elections, expected to finish term ≠ change of leadership in Parl
- President cannot be 'evacuated' w/o special measures (impeachment), which leads to instability

Front 12

Presidential system and instability so far 1: systemic

Back 12

- Institutional and symbolic constraints/rigidities
- in an essay, good place to cite examples
- Valenzuela: instability as systemic ≠ episodic

Front 13

Presidential system and instability so far 2: Presidents and majorities

Back 13

- despite symbolic accountability, LA presidents 'reign' rather than 'rule'
- weak due to congressional majorities (less than 1/2 win by absolute majority, only 1/4 have legislative majority)
- parties unwilling to be associated with weak pres/consolidate a strong one

Front 14

Mainwaring: Presidentialism and Fragmentation

Back 14

- specific link between PR, ensuing party instability, and Presidentialism
- pb is 'polarised pluralism': ideologically fragmented/distant parties
- Chile 33-73: only ex of Pr system surviving without working majority for over a decade)

Front 15

Working majority: definition

Back 15

- 'legislative contingent' which President requires in order to operate effectively (propose/lobby for legislation..)

Front 16

The effects of PR and Presidentialism

Back 16

- failure/consequent impeachment of leader (Collor de Mello)
- quasi-dictatorship (Fuji autogolope Apr 92)
- so either leader takes control, or is removed. Peter Hakim: need for a) strong parties b) better leadership

Front 17

Pres: Inherent instability and governable countries

Back 17

- governable countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay)
- least governable: Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
- if all LA systems are pres, and pres is inherently unstable, why have some reached degree of stability?

Front 18

Brasil: special case

Back 18

- federalism and resulting indiscipline of ideological catch-all parties: should be typical example of chaotic exec/legis relations
- Limongi+Figuereiredo: even less disciplined parties can expect 85% members to vote in support of party

Front 19

Brasil: why

Back 19

- why: powers of decree+veto: president has authority to direct policy-making
- all he requires is fluid/cooperative legislature to vote in laws, not a 'creative' legis to initiate policies
-+ see party disciple in Lula's PT

Back 20

Front 21

Llanos and Margheritis: Importance of leadership (individual factors)

Back 21

Coalitions are at the heart of stable presidential systems
- president leads cooperation between branches of government and legislature, essential in multiparty coalitions

Front 22

2 points 1: structural constraints v quality of leadership

Back 22

- de la Rua: insurmountable rigidities (and econ crisis)
- Collor de Mollo: insurmountable econ crisis
- instead: lack of sufficient leadership skills: CdM u-turn, unwillingness to carry reform through led to alienation from gov

Front 23

2 points 2: good leadership v populism

Back 23

- so far: populism seemed only way for effective (if undemocratic) gov
- 'the role of leadership is not to impose personal vies, but to help soc define and attain collective goals'
- populist leader, with all his strength of char/coercive techniques, is not ex of good leadership
- good leadership requires coordination of different actors

Front 24

Instability: conclusion

Back 24

both structural and accidental: both a healthy legislature-executive relationship and good Head of State are necessary to avoid instability

Front 25

Foweraker: reform v overhaul

Back 25

tradition of Pr is entrenched in LA history: reform is better than calling for complete overhaul

Front 26

Note on continuismo and Linz

Back 26

- fallacious analogy with Pa of UK, Italy, Scandinavia
- recurring mandates for parties have not led to such fierce continuismo
- concludes that presidential systems cause dif political culture
- not true: pol culture may be different, but esp nascent: naive to compare European/LA democracies (dif: length of dem history ≠ system of gov)