Introduction To Competition Law Cases

Front 1

EU Competition law Aims at "effective competition" rather than perfect competition.

Back 1

Metro (1997)

Front 2

EU competition law is designed to protect the interest of not only competitors and consumers, but also the structure of market as whole and thus competition as such.

Back 2

T-Mobile (2009)

Front 3

National and EU competition law can apply in parallel, since both consider restrictive practices, but from different points of view.

Back 3

Manfredi (2006)

Front 4

The inter-state or internal market element determines whether EU law applies. Purely internal cases do not fall under EU competition law.

Back 4

Consten and Grunding (1996)

Front 5

Term undertaking means every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of legal status or the way it is financed.

Back 5

Höfner (1991)

Front 6

Undertaking can mean a unitary organization of personnel, tangible and intangible elements which pursues a specific ecnomic aim on a long term basis.

Back 6

Shell (1992)

Front 7

Production and trading companies which produce and distribute products (such as bananas) are undertakings.

Back 7

United Brands (1978)

Front 8

Non-profit making bodies engaging in economic activities such as an old age insurance scheme based on the principle of capitalisation and on investments are undertakings.

Back 8

Sociétés d'Assurance (1995)

Front 9

Public placement offices or employment agencies entrusted under the legislation of a MS with the operation of a service general economic interest is a undertaking.

Back 9

Job Center (1997)

Front 10

The field of application of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU is not limited to undertakings established within EU. Provisions apply to any conduct that (potentially) distorts competition within EU and (potentially) affects trade between the MS.

Back 10

Tepea (1978)

Front 11

Proper definition of relevant market is a precondition for any judgement under 102 TFEU.

Back 11

Volkswagen (2000)

Front 12

101 and 102 TFEU seek to achieve the same aim (namely the maintenance of effective competition within the internal market) on different levels. Thus, can apply at the same time.

Back 12

Continental Can (1973)

Front 13

Participation in collusive practice may involve the abuse of a dominant position.

Back 13

Piau (2005)

Front 14

Article 101(1) is directly effective.

Back 14

BRT v SABAM (1974)

Front 15

Joint action between parent and subsidiary, if the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of action int the market is not considered collusive conduct.

Back 15

Centrafarm (1974)

Front 16

Join action between principle and agent relationship where the agent is not an independent economic agent is not considered collusive conduct.

Back 16

CEPSA (2008)

Front 17

Collective agreements between employers and workers that pursue social policy objectives is not a collusive conduct.

Back 17

Albany (1999)

Front 18

The finding of infringement must be limited to only those part of a contract which constitute the infringement as long as they are severable from the rest of the agreement.

Back 18

Consten and Grundig (1966)

Front 19

Three forms of collusion having he same nature which are distinguishable from each other only by their intensity and the forms in which they manifest themselves; agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices.

Back 19

T-Mobile (2009)

Front 20

Agreements between undertakings: a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, form in which it is manifested being unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties intention. I.e. any type of agreement whether concluded formally, orally, or even by tacit acquiescence.

Back 20

Bayer (2004)

Front 21

Agreements within framework of collective or representative bodies, such as trade associations.
E.g. National Bar Association or The International Olympic Committee.

Back 21

Wouters (2002) and Meca Medina (2006)

Front 22

Concerted practices: A form of co-ordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical co-operation between them for the risks of competition.

Back 22

Dyestuffs (1972)

Front 23

Concerted practices do not include intelligent adaptation to existing and anticipated conduct of competitors, without any direct or indirect contact.

Back 23

Suiker Unie (1975)

Front 24

Exchange of information, the mere reciprocal exchange of individualised commercially sensitive information (e.g. pricing) amongst undertakings leads to rebuttable presumption concerted practice.

Back 24

Anic (1999)

Front 25

Concerted practices are di the only difficult to prove, in particular in situation where a concerted practice is not the only plausible explanation for parallel conduct.

Back 25

Woodpulp (1993)

Front 26

As one element of "may affect trade between MS" Trade between MS includes agreements extending to the whole of one Member State, since they reinforce compartmentalisation of the market.

Back 26

Vereeniging van Cementhadelaren (1972)

Front 27

As one element of "may affect trade between MS" Trade between MS includes agreements of undertakings in one MS where the market is susceptible to imports.

Back 27

Belasco (1989)

Front 28

As one element of "may affect trade between MS" Trade between MS includes agreements that relate to a raw material which in itself does not affect inter-state trade but which is incorporated into another product which is the subject of inter-state trade.

Back 28

BNIC (1985)

Front 29

The trade between MS element of "may affect trade between MS" agreements must be assessed on the basis of the agreement as a whole, rather than on its individual elements.

Back 29

Windsurfing International (1986)

Front 30

The broad test of actual or potential effect on MS trade, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of objective factors that the agreement in question may an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between MS.

Back 30

Manfred (2006)

Front 31

To be prohibited by 101(1) TFEU the undertakings conduct affecting the trade between MS must be appreciable.

Back 31

Tepea (1978)

Front 32

In Commission guideline on the effect on trade concept (2004) 101(1) does not apply when aggregate market share of parties in any relevant market within the EU affected by agreement is less than _% and the turn over is less than _ million.

Back 32

5, 40

Front 33

Under 101(1) undertaking conduct has the actual effect preventing, restricting or distorting market must be appreciable.

Back 33

Völk (1969)

Front 34

Directly o indirectly fixing the puchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions is conduct preventing, restricting or distorting competition under 101(1).

Back 34

Vitamins (2003)

Front 35

Limiting or controlling production, markets, technical development or investment is conduct preventing, restricting or distorting competition under 101(1).

Back 35

Citric Acid (2006)

Front 36

Sharing markets or supply is conduct preventing, restricting or distorting competition under 101(1).

Back 36

Zinc Phosphate (2003)

Front 37

Applying dissisimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage is conduct preventing, restricting or distorting competition under 101(1).

Back 37

Dutch Banks (1989)

Front 38

Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance of obligations not connected to the commercial nature of contracts is conduct preventing, restricting or distorting competition under 101(1).

Back 38

Velcro/Aplix (1985)