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72 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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3 conclusions about war
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no generalizable war causation theory
multiplicity requires intl + doemstic worldwide just peace impossible |
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war causation distinctions - ILEPIUCUNS
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ILEPIUCUNS
instinctive vs. learned efficient vs. permissive immediate vs. underlying conscious vs. unconcsious necssary vs. sufficient |
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Stag Hunt
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Rosseau - man act selfishly to survive, inability to know acts of others
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nuclear deterrence
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not based on addressing causes, but prevent war based on horrible consequences
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Dif. in studying war: problem of causation
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just because x precedes y, doesn't mean x causes y
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Origins of war
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belief that best way to discover war's cause it how it came about
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historian origins of war
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each war is unique, universal explanation includes addressing each individual war
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IU
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immediate - events that trigger war
underlying - conditions that provide setting for war |
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Structural interpretation
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the structure of international system leads to war, not preventable by statesmen
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EP
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efficient - causes leading directly to war
permissive - conditions allowing war to happen - like international anarchy |
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Non-intervention
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principle that states don't intervene in domestic concerns of others
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international anarchy - criticism
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system not really completely anarchic, there are actually lots of rules that are followed
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NS
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Necesary - elements necessary for war to occur (armaments, groups, lack of efficient mechanism to prevent war)
Sufficient - element that, if existent, always leads to war |
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human nature explanations of war
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men different from animals due ot the ability to learn behaviors; human instinct towards agression leads to war
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nature vs. nurture
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nature (conservatives) can't be changed, only dealt with; nurture (liberals) can be affected
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Human nature causes - criticism
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1. animal studies don't necessariliy apply to humans
2. nature then causes both war and peace |
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Frustration explanation of war
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inability to reach goals causes frustration that leads to war - optimism in that system can be modified to channel or reduce frustration
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Misperception explanations of war
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war caused by misperceptions of situation or others
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Misperception explanations - criticism
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some misperceptions basd on inability to fully interpret behaviors of others
many wars involve real disagreements |
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CU
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Conscious - leaders see decision to wage war as conscious choice
Unconscious - scholars often look to unrealized influences on leaders as cause of war |
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Group explanation of war
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gropu mentality diffuses responsibility, pomotes group-wide opinions, can help lead to war
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Interstate - internal
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idea that trend in warfare away from interstate combat to internal conflicts, may be premature due to lack in resources making developed countries more interested in fighting
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Napoleonic legacy
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massive size, ideological warfare, conscription, offensive nature of warfare, rise of nationalism
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7 aspects of clausewitz
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war is politics by other means
act of violence to achieve otherwise unattainable goals each age creates own form of war whole nation should take part in war war involves people and is therefore unpredictable only value of victory is political gain else being equal, numbers win |
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2 key developments of industrialization of war
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more sophisticated weaponry - rifling, better artillery, armored ships, mines, submarines
civilian technologies - railroad, telegraph, mass production |
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Importance of naval power
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1. tranport men
2. disrupt trade lines, wage economic warfare |
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things leading to total war
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1. tradition of mass armies
2. power of defensive armies leads to stalemates 3. breaking stalemate causes use of gas, tanks, increase in casualties 4. offensive aircraft 5. larger armies leads to exspansion of theater 6. more legitimate targets |
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developments of World War II
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1. mass conscription (incl. females)
2. rationing 3. propaganda/censorship 4. social totality - nationalism/racism 5. new tactics (blitzkrieg, radar, aircraft carriers, nuclear weapons) 6. conflict between ideologies 7. civilians as primary bombing targets 8. expansion of air, naval, parachute campaigns |
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Effects of nuclear weapons
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1. caused preference for limited warfare
2. more prevention than tactical 3. caused developed nations losses in limited wars like Korea and Vietnam 4. shift towards conventional, counter-insurgency fighting |
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Shift towards postmodern warfare
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1. geopolitical motivations - identity politics
2. wras between states - wars between states and groups 3. state financing to groups self-financing 4. war still as much of a political tool as before |
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Cl. - On War
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1. Use of force, distinguishes it from other forms of political/economic strategy
2. Idea is to compel obedience, not just senseless slaughter |
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Cl. - political context matters
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not just individuals fighting, but political context matters
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Cl strategy defintion
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use military means to achieve political objectives
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Cl strategy - rational
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strategy based on clear objectives and strategies designed to achieve them
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CL strategy - art/science
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more art than science, too many variables to allow for one complete theory
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CL process of successful strategy
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1. identity political goals
2. assess one's comparative advantage over enemy 3. calculate costs and benefits carefully 4. examine risks and rewards of alternative strategies |
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CL purpose of strategy -
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convince enemy they cannot achieve their aims
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CL - on war - 4 different contexts
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1. War cannot be waged without bloodshed
2. War a contest between armies, generals, and states 3. War an instrument of policy 4. War is a social activity |
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CL. the trinity
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Passion - held by people
Probability - the military Reason - the government |
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CL - nature of war defined by interaction between
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1. objectives of two sides
2. people, government, militaries of belligerents 3. Attitudes of allies and neutrals |
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CL - comparative advantage based on enemy "center of gravity"
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1. Army
2. Capital city 3. Principal ally 4. Leader 5. Public Opinion |
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CL - Limited vs. Unlimited War
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Limited - fight only to occupy enough land to gain political advantage (gulf war)
Unlimited - complete overthrow of enemy to force capitulation (iraq war) |
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CL - Rational Calculus of War
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War strategy should be based on calculation of objective and risk - primary objective allows for more risk and sacrifice than peripheral goals
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CL - friction
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What makes more difficult in real life than on paper:
1. danger posed by enemy 2. effort requirements of own forces 3. difficulties of physical environment 4. hard to know what's occurring all the time |
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Sun Tzu vs. Clausewitz
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Different in setting, similar to conclusions; differ in strategic preferences and views of intelligence and deception
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ST - strategic preferences
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1. victory w/o bloodshed ideal
2. victory not result of destruction, but convincing enemy to give up 3. knowing enemy key to success 4. attack enemy strategy, than alliances, than army |
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ST - intellgence
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Good intelligence can let you predict outcome of conflict
1. Relative, not absolute, strengths important 2. Focus on qualitative, not quantitative, awareness |
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ST - Deception
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Generals should be able to deceive enemy
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Criticisms of strategy in the modern age
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1. Omniscient intelligence overcomes friction - need for new strategy
2. State-based strategy doesn't deal with conflict b/t transnational groups 3. Strategy an illusion |
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Responses to criticisms of strategy in modern age
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1. Lack of friction - no evidence of this, actually new complexities may add friction
2. Transnational groups - just being non-state doesn't mean non-strategic 3. Illusion of strategy - confuses difficulty of executing strategy with validity of strategy |
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3 Views of Strategic Culture
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1. Value-added: culture supplementary to theories of systemic pressure
2. Theoretical model - can explain state behavior 3. Non-falsifiable: culture only understood through immersion, powerful but unmeasurable |
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3 roles of political culture
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1. Cognitive - empirical and causal beliefs
2. Evaluative - values, norms, moral judgments 3. Expressive/affective - emotional attachments, patters of identity, loyalty, etc. |
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Strategic culture and nuclear deterrence
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Jack Snyder - preference of offensive preemptive weapons result of history of insecurity and authoritarian control
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Sources of strategic culture
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1. Geography
2. History and Experience 3. Government and military structure 4. Myths and Symbols 5. Important Texts 6. Transnational Norms 7. Generational change/technological advancement |
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Keepers of Strategic Culture
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1. Elites - provide common historical narrative, culture a 'negotiated reality' between them
2. Institutions - both military and civilian |
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2 things causing change in political culture
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1. external shocks (balkans for germany)
2. conflicts between primary tenets of strategic doctrine (japan and east timor) |
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Why the "perception-reality" gap in international law?
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1. Unfair comparison between domestic and international law
2. Untrue idea that norm in IL is breach whereas with DL is compliance 3. Wrong idea that legal system needs threat to function - domestic law often carried out without punishment 4. IR focus on conflict over cooperation, carries over to IL |
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Why states obey international law?
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1. Attach value to observance itself
2. Attach value to the law and legal principles it enshrines 3. See international law as being functionally important 4. Inertia - states get in habit of law being the way it is |
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Powerful nation challenge of international law
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codify international law based on will of majority of states, not just on status quo desires of powerful nations
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Forms of compliance, efficacy
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1. Coercion
2. Self-interested compliance 3. Obedience out of respect for laws and sense of their legitimacy |
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When states break rules
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1. Problem general not with overall idea of law but interpretation of the law
2. Reaction shows strength of law's legitimacy 3. Be cautious - some claims of disagreement are disingenuous |
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Types of law governing force
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jus ad bellum - law governing going to war
jus en bello - law governing the fighting of war |
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Jus Ad Bellum
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- War not seen as viable daily action, but viable means of last resort
- Force not done in disregard but conscious breach of the law - Crucial matter in war is necessity of objective vs. direct, political, and normative costs |
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Jus en bello
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- not designed to force self-limitation, but act in interest of states as needless barbarity can make matters worse
- impossible to "humanize" war |
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International Humanitarian Law
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unilateral and non-reciprocal
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3 levels of obligation under IHL
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Customary international law/just cogens
Principles under Martens clause not subject to reciprocity Innovatory or non-customary rules based on reciprocity |
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Main advantage of army
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defensive capability - can occupy land and hold it
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3 ways to accomplish success in ground war
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1. Outmaneuver - go against rear and flanks, disrupt supply chain
2. Have bigger army 3. Attack swiftly, destroy enemy before they can attack |
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Naval power
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not as important due to inability to wage economic warfare, mostly projecting force from shore to sea
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Airpower
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1. bombers generally get through
2. greater degree of accuracy than before |
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Space war
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1. Lots of military satellites
2. Limitations - no national sovereignty, no weapons 3. no sense of attack in space |
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Cyberwar
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vulnerability of developed nations, more likely used by non-state actors, possibility of it coming back to bite you
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